H. W. SCHOMERUS

Śaiva Siddhānta

An Indian School of Mystical Thought

Translated by

Mary Law

Edited by

Humphrey Palmer



H.W. SCHOMERUS

Śaiva Siddhānta

AN INDIAN SCHOOL OF MYSTICAL THOUGHT

Presented as a system and documented
from the original Tamil Sources

Translated from German by
MARY LAW

Edited by
HUMPHREY PALMER

MOTILAL BANARSIDASS PUBLISHERS
PRIVATE LIMITED • DELHI

First English Edition: Delhi, 2000

First Published in 1912 under the title "Der Śaiv Siddhānta"

ISBN: 81-208-1569-6

MOTILAL BANARSIDASS

236 Sri Ranga, 9th Main III Block, Jayanagar, Bangalore 560 01
41 U.A. Bungalow Road, Jawahar Nagar, Delhi 110 007
8 Mahalaxmi Chamber, Warden Road, Mumbai 400 026
120 Royapettah High Road, Mylapore, Chennai 600 004
Sanas Plaza, 1302 Baji Rao Road, Pune 411 002
8 Camac Street, Calcutta 700 017
Ashok Rajpath, Patna 800 004
Chowk, Varanasi 221 001

PRINTED IN INDIA
BY JAINENDRA PRAKASH JAIN AT SHRI JAINENDRA PRESS,
A-45 NARAINA, PHASE I, NEW DELHI 110 028
AND PUBLISHED BY NARENDRA PRAKASH JAIN FOR
MOTILAL BANARSIDASS PUBLISHERS PRIVATE LIMITED,
BUNGALOW ROAD, DELHI 110 007

Dedicated
in true gratitude
to
PROFESSOR HOFSTAETTER
Lic Theol., Synod Officer
by
H. W. Schomerus

Preface

When I was learning Tamil, my interest in philosophy led me to choose philosophical texts for my study. As I soon discovered, these differed considerably from the philosophy of Vedānta, as presented by Professor Deussen and other Indologists. And as I got to know Tamilians personally I found the Vedāntic world-view strange to most of them. This led me to enquire whether the ideas in those books of Tamil philosophy were familiar to them. Finding this suggestion quite widely confirmed, I undertook deeper study, and soon came across the Śivajñānabodha, the main doctrinal text for Śaiva Siddhānta. Later on I was able, by the friendly co-operation of the authorities of my mission, to work through this and several other texts with the help of a qualified Tamil scholar; and I was finally led on to attempt a systematic presentation of the philosophy they contain. There were many setbacks. The varying calls of my professional work made progress difficult; an interruption could come right in the middle of a sentence, and might last weeks or even months. The climate also was exhausting. But the task is now complete—as if by miracle!

There are several groups, to whom I trust this work will be of use. For some, acquaintance with Śaiva Siddhānta would seem essential, if the achievements of Indian thought are to be correctly judged. I hope Indologists will welcome this contribution to a fuller knowledge of Indian spirituality. Secondly, missionaries in India, and especially in southern India, need to know something of Śaiva Siddhānta. Thirdly, I would like theological scholars to read this book. The Mission will need help from theological scholarship, if it is to accomplish its task in India. Christianity had to come to grips with the Graeco-Roman philosophy of life, in order to make its way in the ancient world. And if Christianity seeks to conquer India, it must come to grips with the Indian world-view. This it has not so far done, to any great extent; which explains why it has not won more victories there.

The Mission has no scholarly institutes devoted to studying the Indian world-view, and can hardly expect its missionaries to undertake this weighty task without such support. I think anyone with practical experience of the present missionary enterprise will grant this point. It is for the learned community of ancient Christendom, surely, to undertake this task, which the Mission itself cannot yet discharge. Is that an unreasonable request? Consider the efforts which go into studying the systems which Christianity met, in remote ages. Consider also how, by the efforts of the Theosophical Society, the thought-world of India is finding its way into Europe too. Surely our scholars should now give their attention to the system that confronts Christianity and arrests its victorious progress. This book ventures to supplement the material already to hand for our study of India; and I trust the world of theological scholarship will find this new material also deserving of further study.

Many Indian words occur in the text, unavoidably. For some, we have no suitable equivalent. In other cases equivalents do exist, but by using them we should lose the connexions and shades of meaning, which owing to their background in Indian ideas are often so different. Readers not familiar with Indian philosophical terms should find help in the Indexes, if their use occasions any difficulty.

Śaiva Siddhānta in its Tamil writings uses Sanskrit philosophical terms, in Tamilised form. In translating terms already familiar to scholars, I have used the Sanskrit form. Other terms, including proper names, book titles and place names, are given in their Tamil form.

In transcribing Sanskrit words I have naturally followed the method customarily used by Indologists.[1] Unfortunately there is no agreed method for transcribing Tamil. Dr. Graul's (in his *Outlines of Tamil Grammar*) is quite impractical. Here the following marks have been used for Tamil letters (to conform with the transcription from Sanskrit):

N-sounds: ṅ for guttural, ñ for palatal, ṇ for lingual, plain n for dental and lingual dental.

---

1. The diacritical marks in this version are as shown in the German except that ś is used in place of ç, e.g. Śiva and Śakti. (Ed.)

L-sounds: ḷ for hard, lingual sound, plain l for weak.
T-sounds: ḍ for hard, lingual, plain t for dental.
R-sounds: ṛ for palatal, plain r for tongued sound.
(Doubled ṛ sounds almost like ttṛ, nṛ like ndṛ.)

Flensburg 1912 H. W. SCHOMERUS

References

1. Cross-references within this book are by chapter and section (as in page-headings) with 'below' or 'above'.
2. Schomerus abbreviates titles when quoting Siddhāntin scriptures: (see Intro. 3 for details of these)

Śiva-jñāna-bodha by Meykaṇḍadeva .... *Bodha*
Śiva-jñāna-siddhiār by Aruḷnanti .... *Siddhiār*
Irupāvirupathu by Aruḷnanti .... *Irupā*
Śiva-Prakāsa by Umāpati Śivan .... *Prak:*
Tiruarudpayan by Umāpati .... *Payan*
Porripakroḍai by Umāpati .... *Kroḍai*
Tirukkaliṟṟu-paḍiār by Uyyavantadeva .... *Paḍiār*

3. The following table will help in tracing references to pages of the German original:

	Ger	*Eng*		*Ger*	*Eng*
I	33	29	IV	180	163
II	44	39	V	209	191
	66	58		251	228
	84	75	VI	272	247
	93	85		335	300
III	101	93	VII	380	341
	137	124		414	371
	176	159			

4. Notes added by translator or editor are marked Ed.

Contents

Introduction

1. The Home of Śaiva Siddhānta

As the name indicates, Śaiva Siddhānta is a philosophical system of Śaivism. 'Siddhānta' means an issue, a conclusion, and 'Śaiva' adds that this conclusion is one at which Śaivism has arrived. The name thus indicates its special features, which distinguish it from all other Indian systems of thought; special features not concealed, but boldly set out and defended against other schools of thought. This makes it fairly easy for us to locate Śaiva Siddhānta within what is called Hinduism.

It does indeed belong to Hinduism, being of Indian origin and spirit; for it accepts the authority of the Vedas. While emphasising its own special doctrines and criticising other schools for teaching differently, it yet treats them as sister-schools. Non-Indian religions receive different treatment, along with such schools as Buddhism and Jainism, which diverged from Hinduism.

It should not be assumed that those who built the system of Śaiva Siddhānta had no knowledge at all of non-Indian systems of thought. The centuries in which Śaiva Siddhānta was being worked out, as described in these pages, were not a time of petty isolation for its main geographical homeland, southern India, but one of progress and expansion. Inscriptions on stones and other evidences from these centuries show that there were in southern India at that time powerful kingdoms, not confined to southern India, but with political interests in Ceylon, the home of the Singalese, and in the further Indies down to Sumatra and even to Java, and economic connections with a much wider area. Moreover, it was in these centuries that Islam established itself in India. Would the theologians of Śaiva Siddhānta have neglected completely the religions of peoples touched by the trade and politics of their country? Or Islam, which posed a threat to India at that time? Or Christianity, already firmly established on the south-western coast,

the gateway to India? No, these thinkers clearly had a wider interest in things of the spirit. They were familiar with all the spiritual currents of India and were critically engaged with them. How can we suppose that people with such a background had no knowledge of religions just next door?

The reason why no mention of them is found in the Siddhāntin writings is not, that Siddhānta was completely unfamiliar with non-Indian religions, but rather a conviction, which nothing could shake, of the persuasiveness and uniqueness of Indian wisdom. Moreover, in doctrinal works addressed to Indians we should not expect a defence of Śaiva Siddhānta against non-Indian religions, any more than we would look to a Christian theologian to debate his doctrines with all the non-Christian religions known to him.

The theorists of Śaiva Siddhānta thought that, as there was no wisdom outside India, they need only engage with systems of thought which originated within India and belonged to Hinduism: which they put into four groups.

First, those systems that had their origin in India, but broke away from Hinduism, or were expelled as heretics:

1. Lokāyata (the Materialists),
2. Buddhists (four groups),
3. Jains.

Second, those systems which accept the authority of the Vedas (so are part of Hinduism) but interpret them wrongly; or which accept only certain parts, and reject the Śaivāgamas (which with the Vedas are the chief authority for Śaiva Siddhānta):

1. Vaishesika and Nyāya,
2. Mīmāmsa,
3. Ekatmavāda or One-Soul-Theory, including:
   (a) Māyāvāda, which like Samkarācārya preserves the unity of all being by saying the apparent plurality of the worlds of matter and of spirit is just Māyā (illusion),
   (b) Bāshkalavāda, based on the Bāshkala Upanishad, which regards both worlds as emanations from Brahma,
   (c) Krīdābrahmavāda, which regards worldly events as part of a game Brahma is playing,
   (d) Śabdabrahmavāda, (Vedāntist) which sees Brahma and Veda as One, in which all things meet their end.

4. Sāmkhya,
5. Yoga,
6. Pāñcarātra, on which Rāmānuja and later Vaishṇavite schools were based.

Third, Śaivite systems based on the Śaktāgamas:

1. Pāśupata, for which the soul is bound by two fetters only, Māyā and Karma (Siddhānta also has Āṇavamala),
2. Māvratavāda, which regards Caryā-practice as sufficient for salvation (Siddhānta has two further stages),
3. The Kāpāliga school, which says the soul must work itself into an ecstatic state, to earn a revelation of Śiva,
4. The Vāma school, which says the world emanates from Śakti (female), and return to her constitutes Release,
5. The Bhairava school has Bhairava in place of Śakti, and certain extra rites,
6. The Aikyavāda Śaiva school.

Fourth, the schools called Śaiva Siddhānta. These are all orthodox, and differ from one another only on small points. In the texts on which this study is based six of these are criticised as open to objection: Pādānavāda; Bhedavāda; Śivasamavāda; Śivasaṃkrāntavāda; Īśvara Vikāravāda; Śivādvaitavāda. The other Siddhāntin schools, which we shall be discussing, are called Suddhādvaita Siddhānta.

Another listing mentions sixteen Śaivite schools:

Ūrdha, Anādi, Ādi, Mahā Bheda, Abheda, Antara, Guṇa, Nirguṇa, Adhvan, Yoga, Jñāna, Aṇu, Kriyā, Nālu pāda, Śuddha (each name followed by 'Śaiva').

Śaiva Siddhānta, then, is a doctrinal scheme within Śaivism; and Śaivism is, after Vaishṇavism, the largest religious body within Hinduism (if we can use such terms). It covers the whole of India, from northern Ceylon right up to the Himalayas.

What is Śaivism? What is Hinduism? Neither question admits of a precise answer. Hinduism is not one uniform entity, but includes very various 'isms'. Śaivism also is not a uniform whole. Everyone who shares the general basis of Hinduism: the authority of the Vedas, caste, the transmigration of souls; and who also recognises Śiva as the highest God, and spreads white ashes upon his forehead, may be called a Śaivite. Whether he also worships other gods, whether he accepts any philosophy or theology, or lives without them, is not decisive on this point. Śaiva Siddhānta,

then, is that branch of Śaivism (and so of Hinduism) which regards Śiva as the highest God, and shares in the Indian philosophy of life; and these are the only reliable indicators of Śaiva Siddhānta's position within Śaivism and within Hinduism.

The list of schools just given comes from the detailed Commentary on Śivajñānabodha, the chief authoritative writing of Śaiva Siddhānta; and shows that Śaiva Siddhānta is not the only or the sole orthodox exponent of Śaivism, though it claims to be the only one completely orthodox.

The schools of the third and fourth groups are Śaivite, as are several of the second group, e.g. the systems of Śaṃkaracārya and other non-Vaishṇavite representatives of the monistic tendency we describe collectively as Vedānta. No matter how far these Vedāntic schools differ from Śaiva Siddhānta, they are all Śaivite, for they regard Śiva as the highest God. Thus Śaiva Siddhānta is one doctrinal scheme within Śaivism, but not the only one.

For this reason, Śaiva Siddhānta needed to define its position within Śaivism, as against the Vedāntic tendencies in particular. Can we then define its home ground more precisely? It belongs to one part of Śaivism, although that part cannot be defined numerically. Rather we must ask whether Śaiva Siddhānta had a more important place, within Śaivism, than its Vedāntic rival.

Vedānta (especially as expounded by Śaṃkara) is better known in Europe. That hardly settles the point. Indians with an English education have for some time been publishing works favouring Vedānta, and are happy to be called Vedāntists. That also is not decisive. Nor can we measure importance by the number of professed supporters. What is decisive is the relative effect of these schools of thought on the national spirit.

Do most Śaivites base their thinking and feeling and willing on Vedānta, or on Śaiva Siddhānta? There is at present no evidence by which to answer this question. Research into the modern folk-history of India in all its popular, religious and social diversity has barely begun. Scientifically, this is still an unknown quantity, despite all the books we now have on Indian philosophy.

The author of this book can claim to know only a very small part of the immense store of Indian riches. He has some knowledge of Tamil literature, but not of other non-Sanskrit writings, as a well-founded judgment would require. So he is in no position to decide whether Vedānta is in fact more influential than Śaiva

Siddhānta. But he would venture to say that for southern India the influence of Śaivite Vedānta has been underrated. He is inclined to the view that Śaiva Siddhānta is (at least in Tamil-speaking districts) a better key than Vedānta to an understanding of the Śaivite mind. That is why he took up the study of Śaiva Siddhānta; and finding more progress could be made in this way he set himself to master it in a systematic manner and to publish his results for those who are interested.

Our list of Indian schools also shows that Śaiva Siddhānta is not a single and definite system of thought, but rather a tendency, within Śaivism, which includes several distinct systems of thought; just as we might speak of a Vedāntic tendency which includes several systems differing on this point or on that.[1] These differences are minor (except as regards Pāśupata, Vīraśaiva, and the Pratyabhijña school).

The present book deals mainly with Śuddhādvaita Siddhānta, as this school is representative of the Siddhāntin tendency, and also enjoys the highest reputation in the Tamil land. Points on which other schools deviate from it are not dealt with in detail, as that would occupy too much time for too little benefit. It is, however, important for us to remember that the school we are to describe is only representative, and that there are differences between the different schools of Śaiva Siddhānta. Otherwise we might get into a muddle, as happens when Śaṃkara's Vedānta is taken for Vedānta pure and simple, or as the most orthodox expression of it, which it hardly is. Further detail on the location of Śaiva Siddhānta within Hinduism is given in the next section; and again in III. 3 below, which discusses Śaiva Siddhānta as a metaphysic, within Hinduism.

The geographical homeland of Śuddhādvaita is in Tamil Nād, but it was influential over a much wider area, almost the whole of India. In the north of Bombay province and especially in Gujurat we find the Pāśupata school. That really belongs to our third group above, but has much in common with Śaiva Siddhānta. In the north of the Tamil country, where Kanarese is spoken and up as far as the Hindi-speaking area, the Vīraśaiva is very strong. And

1. More than thirty Bhāshyas on Bādarāyana's Vedānta Sūtra have already been found, and commentaries on these run into hundreds. Almost every Bhāshya represents a distinct tendency within Vedānta.

Kashmir, in the extreme north of India, is the home of the Pratyabhijñā school.

This brisk geographical survey of the distribution of Śaiva Siddhānta is a very incomplete. So far as I know, no proper enquiry has yet been made into the geographical spread of Śaiva Siddhānta in India. That the basic ideas underlying Śaiva Siddhānta are much more widely spread will be clear from what we have to say about the Śaivāgamas.

2. The Śaivāgamas, their Main Authority

Like all orthodox Indian schools, the school of Śaiva Siddhānta recognises the authority of the Vedas; but not as the only authority, or even the most important one. The Śaivāgamas stand next to the Vedas, or even above them, as their scriptural authority. There is no need for us to survey the Vedic writings, as there is a very substantial literature on this in German. The Śaivāgamas require a more detailed treatment, so as to explain the origin and significance of the Siddhāntin schools. Moreover, the Āgama literature is practically unknown in Europe, so information on it must be provided here, to enable readers to evaluate the statement that the Śaivāgamas are a scriptural authority for Śaiva Siddhānta.

A full treatment of the Āgama literature is unfortunately not possible yet, as so little research has been done on it. There seem to be two reasons for this. From a sixth-century manuscript of the Sutāsaṃhitā (part of the Skanda Purāṇa) found by Professor Bendall in Nepal, which discusses the relation of the Vedas to the Āgamas, we discover that even at that early time many did not recognise the authority of the Āgamas, and indeed were hostile to them. Unlike most works, the Āgamas do not emphasise the supremacy of the Brahmins, so the Brahmins may well have opposed them, and certainly did see to it that they were not widely known. Many Āgamas disappeared, either being destroyed or not copied and circulated; and anyone familiar with the influence of Brahmins on Indian literature will readily suppose that their opposition was responsible. It is notable that in southern India the guardian of the wisdom of the Āgamas was and is a Śaivite monastery led by non-Brahmins. The unsympathetic attitude of the Brahmins must, then, have been partly responsible for the Āgamic literature being largely unknown even today. But there is

another and more important reason. The theological representatives of Śaiva Siddhānta believe that the Āgamas, and the Śaiva Siddhāntin schools based upon them, lead souls to a still higher stage than do the Upanishads and Vedānta; on beyond knowledge to mystical experience. Like most mystics, they think the masses cannot climb that high, or even understand books about it. Only a few elect ones, they think, are capable and worthy of learning what the Āgamas teach. According to Indian scholars with an English education, many manuscripts of Āgamic works have fallen victim to the fears of monks that these teachings might fall into the hands of the uninitiated. Instead of being read and studied, they have been or will be destroyed by insects, as the monasteries have long ceased to be centres of learning.

A few of the Tamil manuscripts based on the Āgamas have now been printed (against opposition) and so made accessible to the public at large. The detailed commentary on the Śivajñānabodha, the most important work of Śaiva Siddhānta, was only after long and almost futile efforts allowed to be printed a few years ago, and then only in part (due to ants). A number of manuscripts that can give valuable information about the Āgamas and about the systems built on them must still lie hidden in the libraries of monasteries, and there is no immediate hope of their being brought into the light of day. Even quite enlightened people, who evangelize for Śaiva Siddhānta in English, regard part of the available literature as too holy for strange eyes. In this situation it is no surprise to find that our information about the Āgama literature is full of gaps.

(a) *Origin and Date of the Āgamas*

We have no direct evidence about this. The word 'Āgama' means 'What was handed down', suggesting that we are dealing with an ancient type of literature.

Legend tells that, after the creation of the world, Śiva taught the twenty-eight Āgamas by Srīkaṇṭharudra to Nandiperumān. This revelation is supposed to have taken place in Mount Mahendra, i.e. in the Western Ghats, on the border between Travancore and Tinnevelly districts. D. Savariroyan, Secretary of the Tamil Archaeological Society, is of the opinion that the Āgamas represent the oldest productions of Dravidian literature; that they were written in prehistoric times in the Dravidian (Tamil) tongue, and

that most of them were lost in the great flood which swept away a large area south of what is now Cape Comorin, the chief settlement of the old Dravidians; and that some part only of the old Āgama literature was later translated into Sanskrit, and preserved in that form.

This theory is open to question. Perhaps it is true in this, that the home of the Āgamas is to be looked for in the Dravidian lands i.e. in southern India. From the south, they seem to have made their way to the north, and later returned to the south again, where they helped to expel Buddhism and Jainism, which had taken a hold in those parts. However, even if we grant that the Āgama literature sprang from Dravidian sources, we must still admit that it fell very early under the influence of Sanskrit literature. The surviving Āgamas, and their derivative writings, are clearly Sanskritic in character; for the Āgamas themselves are all in Sanskrit, and those derivative systems which are not written in Sanskrit employ Sanskrit terminology. As things stand at the moment, then, it is not possible to do anything else but to treat the Āgama literature as an integral part of Sanskrit literature, and to evaluate it as such.

Dating Indian documents is risky, 'like setting up skittles to be knocked down again' (W.D. Whitney). The date of Indian works of well-known content is obscure, and even more so that of the Āgamas, which are mostly lost or, as luck may have it, undiscovered.

However, we need not quite avoid the question about the age of the Āgamas. As noted earlier, the Śaivāgamas are mentioned in the Sūta-saṃhitā of the Skanda Purāṇa, so a date for the Sūta-saṃhitā would provide a lower limit for the dating of the Āgamas. In an article 'What the Sūta-saṃhitā says about the Śaivāgama', M. Narāyanaswāmi Aiyar wrote in the magazine Siddhānta Dīpikā IV. 6 that Professor Bendall had found in Nepal a manuscript of the Skanda Purāṇa, produced in the sixth century A.D. Now if this MS does come from the sixth century, and does contain the Sūta-saṃhitā or at least if the Sūta-saṃhitā did at that time already form a definite part of the Skanda Purāṇa anthology, then the Skanda Puraṇa must come at latest from the sixth century.

Now some time would be required, say a century, before this would be recognized as a Puraṇa, an old legend, so the Skanda Puraṇa must have been put together before the sixth century.

And as Buddhists and Jains are mentioned in the Sūta-saṃhitā, that document must have emerged after the second or third century B.C. By this reckoning the Skanda Purāṇa must have been composed at latest by the fifth century B.C., in which case the Āgamas must definitely have been in existence by the fifth century-if we can say 'definitely' in a matter so hypothetical.

More detailed statements about Āgamas in the Sūta-saṃhitā encourage us to date them even further back. As it says in the first chapter, the Āgamas have to thank Īśvara for their existence, while the Puraṇa is traced back to Vyasa, son of Satyvatī. IV. 8. 22-24 mentions 'Bhārata', 'Tarka and other Śāstras', together with the Śaiva, Vaishṇava and other Āgamas. IV. 20 gives a list of practices used in religious worship, in ascending order of merit; first, worshipping God on one's own authority, next, worship as prescribed in the Buddhist Āgama, then as in the Arha Āgama, then the Prajāpatya Āgama, the Vishṇu Āgama, and last and best the Śaivāgama.

The Śaivāgamas were divided into those of higher and lower origin. The higher Śaivāgamas are the first ten, called 'Kāmika etc.', (Kāmika always stands first, in lists of the twenty-eight). The other eighteen are lower Āgamas. The author of the Sūta-saṃhitā adds that the Vedas represent a higher authority than the Āgamas, which are meant for beginners. These statements show that in the time of the author of the Sūta-saṃhitā, a complete Āgama literature already existed, and was considered an authority on a par with the Vedas. Because, as we shall see later, the range of Āgama literature is very great, they may well have taken centuries to compose. The author of the Sūta-saṃhitā certainly looked on them as coming from an earlier, darker period; for although he did not entirely agree with the Āgamas, he did attribute them to Īśvara, and would not have held them to be of divine origin, and given them an authority second only to the Vedas, has they not been already ancient.

We find the Āgamas mentioned, and rejected, in the Padma Purāṇa, the Laiṅga or Liṅga Purāṇa and the Kūrma Purāṇa (from the eighteen Purāṇas, which includes the Skanda Purāṇa).

The Śaivāgamas are often mentioned in Tamil writings. The oldest must be Tirumūlār's Tirumantra, which does not merely mention the Āgamas, but is more or less a re-working of its doctrines. Tamil scholars consider this work was produced, at latest,

in the first or second century, on linguistic grounds. V.V. Ramanan mentions the archaic prosody, words and metre forms (Siddhānta Dīpikā X.4, from lectures given in the Theosophical Hall, Madura on September 25th and 26th 1909). These persuade him that the Śaivāgama cannot be later than the First Buddhist Council (soon after the Buddha's death in 480 B.C.). So we can confidently claim that the beginning of the Āgama literature goes back to a time before the birth of Christ.

(b) *Grouping and Range of the Āgamas*

We often find in the Vedas an effort to break away from polytheism. This effort is so characteristic of them that one shrinks from calling them polytheistic; so the term henotheism or katheno-theism has been introduced, to mean a belief in individual gods, or in one individual god. This resulted in a grouping of the gods; one group being centred round Agni, chief of the earth gods, another round Vāyu or Indra, chief god of the atmosphere, and a third around Surya the sun, chief god of the world above. Surya then fell back, leaving Agni Indra and Vāyu as the chief gods. Later this trinity was replaced by the trinity Brahma, Vishṇu and Śiva. Śiva, probably Rudra of the Vedas, took over the functions of Agni, and of some other popular Dravidian gods; Vishṇu assumed the functions of Indra and Surya; and to this day these two dispute the supremacy, each with a great following.

Brahma has no such following, remarkably, even though he is creator. To explain: Indian speculation does not concern itself with phenomena, but looks for a fundamental basis behind the phenomena. Now the god who is the active power behind the universe is naturally taken as the true Reality behind phenomena, and this is the mythological god, Brahma, God of creation. He then merges with the underlying power behind the mantra, Brahmanaspati the Lord of Hymns, and was less and less regarded as an individual entity, but rather as the non-personal Reality behind the universe, the one unchangeable eternal substance, the *Ding an Sich* (Reality as it really is). This change, or more correctly this identification of the first person of the trinity with the abstract impersonal Noumenon was a product of speculation, and would not naturally lead to a particular cult devoted to Brahma.

There is a further reason why Brahma ranks behind Vishṇu

and Śiva as an object of worship. To the devout Indian, Brahma, the god of creation, is a god of the past; his work is done. Vishṇu and Śiva are still at work, so worshipping them seems a better investment. You might perhaps expect ascetics to worship a god no longer directly involved in active life, as they seek to avoid activity in the world and even contact with it; but not ordinary worldly people, who rely on the world for their existence and well being and must bring it, with God's help, into their service. But even ascetics, though they might be expected to have a platonic love for Brahma, will find elsewhere a more suitable object for practical religious activity. With detachment from phenomena as their ideal, they were bound to look towards Śiva the destroyer rather than Brahma the creator. Śiva not Brahma must appear to them as Saviour.

Devotion to Śiva the Destroyer might have satisfied their otherworldly religious feeling but not their intellectual interest. Intellectually they had to reckon with the world, and while as ascetics they might prefer to regard the world with contempt, they had to face several problems, e.g. how did the world originate, and what was it there for? So, led by their religious interest towards Śiva the Destroyer, they began to trace back the reason for the creation and preservation of the universe — at least in one sense — to Śiva. It was his function to destroy the world. Why did he not do it? You could say, so that it could exist independently of him; but that reason would run contrary to the religious anticipation and hope that he, through the destruction of the universe, would cause the liberation of souls. This hope would be an illusion, if the reason for the creation and destruction of the universe was quite separate from him. So people sought in Śiva a cause for the universe, seeing alongside the Destroyer also his Śakti as creating and sustaining power. Śakti took over the role of Brahma the Creator. Brahma still remained nominally an integral part of the trinity, there for pure speculation as a merely abstract divinity; but for religious practice he is superseded by the Śakti. It was no longer Brahma, Vishṇu and Śiva that courted the worship of believers, but Vishṇu, Śiva and Śakti.

The Āgama literature is very closely connected with the worship of these three, so this literature is divided into three groups, called Śaktāgama, Śaivāgama and Bhagavata (Vishṇu) Āgama, after those deities. Seventy-seven Śaktāgamas are reckoned

orthodox, twenty-eight Śaivāgamas and one hundred and eight Pāñcaratrāgamas. Countless other Āgamas are referred to in commentaries on the few Āgamas which are known to native scholars.

The twenty-eight Śaivāgamas are of more interest to us, being the chief authority for the Śaiva Siddhānta system here set out. Ten are 'from higher sources':

Kāmika, Yogaja, Chintya, Karaṇa, Ajita, Dīpta, Sūkshma, Sāhasraka (Sahasra), Amsumān (Amsumat), Suprabha (Suprabheda-Suprabodha).

Then 'from lower sources' come another eighteen:

Vijaya, Nisvāsa, Svāyambhuva,
Āgneyaka (Agneya, Anala, Anila), Bhadra (Vīra),
Bourava, Mākuṭa (Makuṭa, Mukuṭa), Vimala,
Chandrahāsa (Śhandranjāna),
Mukhayugbimba (Mukhabimba, Bimba),
Udgīta (Prodgīta), Laḷita (Lalita),
Siddha, Santāna (Sānta),
Nārasimha (Sarvokta, Sarvottara),
Paramesvara (Pāramesvara)
Kiraṇa, Para (Pārahitā, Vatuḷa, Vatūla).

This list of Śaivāgamas is given in the notes to V.V. Ramanan's English translation of the commentary (Śaiva-Bhāshya) by Srikaṇṭha (or Nīlakaṇṭha) on Bādarāyana's Vedānta Sūtra. Most of the following details are also from that source.

The extent of the twenty-eight known Āgamas is uncertain. Nijaguṇa-Śivayogin (Vivekachintāmani Book II, section Āgama-Sāṃkhya), estimates the number of verses as 20,100,010,193, 844,000, but Sambhudeva (Śaiva Siddhānta Dīpikā) reckons there are only 280,000,000. Higher and varying counts are given in Vātulāgama (101,100,000,305,500,000), and in Kāmikāgama, Kāraṇāgama and Suprabhedhāgama. While this information on the number of verses is intrinsically incredible, and so variable as to be worthless, it does show that the Śaivāgama literature was thought to be of considerable extent. Perhaps the great difference between Sambhudeva and the others is due to his counting only the twenty-eight Āgamas while they reckoned Upāgama, supplements, explanations and appendices in with the Āgamas. Each of the twenty-eight Śaivāgamas has a number of Upāgama: Kamikāgama and Kāraṇāgama speak of 207, Nijaguṇa of 198.

V.V.Ramanan lists (in his translation of Nīlakaṇṭha's

commentary on the Vedānta Sūtra) the Upāgamas mentioned by Nija-guṇa. In addition to these 198 there were certainly others, e.g. the Mṛigendra Upāgama, quoted by Mādhava in his exposition of the Śaivadarshana in the Sarvadarshanasamgraha; this is one of the few parts of the Āgama literature which has been preserved for us, but is not in that list. The same holds for Śivadharmottara.

Each Āgama is meant to be divided into four parts called kāṇda: vidyā- or jñānakāṇda, yogakāṇda, kriyākāṇda and caryākaṇda. Jñānakāṇda should lead to the knowledge of God, yogakāṇda to the concentration on one object of contemplation. Kriyākāṇda gives information about all the ways necessary for consecrating an idol, from the trench for the laying of the foundation stone of a temple onwards. Caryākāṇda teaches the methods of worship.

These last two are less than fascinating. What people say of the tantras also holds for the kāṇdas (indeed the two are partly identical).

Caryā kriyā and yoga kāṇdas can be learnt from human teachers, Jñānakāṇda only from Śiva himself (as Guru). Only the Jñāna kāṇda is of philosophical interest, though the Yoga kāṇda also helps in understanding Indian psychology. The Upāgama is the most philosophical in character.

The Śakta or Deviāgamas, whose number is reported to be seventy-seven, divide into three groups:

five Subhāgamas, also called Samaya, teach the way to attain knowledge and release,

sixty-four Kaulāgama mention very low tricks for gaining magical powers,

eight Misrāgama are of mixed content.

Philosophically these are of little significance. A more philosophical development of the Śaktagamas can be found in the Śakti Sūtras.

(c) *Significance of the Āgamas*

As is already clear, the Āgama literature is closely connected with the Śakta-, Śiva-, and Vaishṇava-sects, that is, with the sects most important in India. This suggests that the Āgamas may open up a perspective on present-day Hinduism, which study of Vedas and Upanishads has failed to provide. And so many modern Indian scholars would claim. Thus, P.T. Srinivasa Iyengar writes in the

Introduction to his *Outlines of Indian Philosophy* (Theosophical Publishing Society, Benares and London, 1909), regarding the importance of the Āgamas: *Although the Hindu honours the Vedas as eternal, and, with much pride, calls himself a Vedāntist, and has recently resolved to carry the light of Vedānta to the West, the living religion of the Indian today is based on the Āgamas, that is, on the Śaiva-, Śakta- and Vaisṇavāgamas ... Although discussion is for preference based on snippets of the Upanishads, the actual opinions and religious beliefs of the Hindu are taken entirely from the Āgamas.*

In another part of the book he writes: *The influence of the Āgamas or (as they are more usually known) the tantra has become very deep in Indian life. The living religion of the Hindu of today is essentially tantric, from Cape Comorin as far as the furthest corner of Tibet. Even the few genuine Vedic usages that have survived, and which are thought to stem directly from the Vedas, the Sandhyā, have been modified by adding tantric usages. The Āgamas also influenced considerably the development of Vedānta philosophy. Śaṃkara was a supporter of the Śākta sects, and his advaita interpretation of Vedānta, though clearly independent of the Śakta Āgama, is influenced by tantric theories. And Rāmānuja, who on Doctor Thibauts' view presents a less extreme form of Vedānta, though one closer to the ideas of Bādarāyana, was a Vaishṇavite, and regarded the Vaishṇāva Āgama as an authority, although he seldom cites it in support of his exposition. Mādhva stands so much under the influence of the Āgamas that his Commentary (on the Vedānta Sūtra) is just a catena of Āgamic texts, with a few words put in here and there to connect them.*

Swami Vivekananda, the representative of Hinduism at the Congress of Religions in Chicago, gave a similar judgment at a Congress held in Madras:

As to tantra and its influence, the fact is that apart from the srouta and smarta rites, all other rituals being observed from the Himalayas to Cape Comorin are drawn from the tantra, and they dominate the worship of the Śaktas, the Śaivites and the Vaishṇavites and all the others.

To attempt to establish in detail the influence of the Āgama upon the Indian cultus would be too bold an undertaking for a European. For one thing those Āgamas that have survived are kept secret. For another, Europeans may not enter the inner sanctuaries of temples so cannot possibly become acquainted with the cultus.

We can, however, show in more detail the influence of the

Āgamas on philosophy; as Āgama philosophy is available to us from the Jñāna-kāṇda schools which were built on it, although not much is stated in the Āgama itself. Even here caution is needed. We can't always be sure that a doctrine found in the Āgama schools really came from the Āgamas themselves. And where we do find similar teaching in the Upanishads, or in Nyāya, Sāṃkhya, Yoga, etc., we still can't work out which came earlier.

We would very much like to know just how the Āgamas are related to Sāṃkhya. Garbe thought Buddhism derived from Sāṃkhya, and therefore dated Kapila before the middle of the sixth century before Christ, making him even older than the Āgama. However, the oldest available scriptures of Sāṃkhya are much later, and probably later than the Āgamas; so caution seems advisable in judging which is earlier or later.

The tattva theory found in Śaiva Siddhānta, which is based on the Āgamas, is certainly more recent than that set out in the Sāṃkhya system (see III.3g below). But that does not mean the Āgama itself is more recent. So, as our knowledge of the Āgama itself is incomplete, and their chronology is uncertain, we cannot say exactly what influence this or that Āgamic doctrine had on Indian thought in general. But we can attempt a general account of the significance of the Āgama.

Vedic religion is mainly magic. The Vedic minstrels sought to placate the gods (who were personifications of natural forces) by offerings of ghee or soma. The sacrifices were cast into the fire, which they regarded as the mouth of the gods, spiced with mantras or magic incantations. Many of the mantras were hymns of praise to the gods, but others were mere sound-combinations with no meaning, or inarticulate sounds 'like the roar of a bull'. Magic forms the starting-point for Indian philosophy and speculation, a point to which more attention should be given.

The thought that gods, the personifications of natural forces, could be made subservient through sacrifice and magic spells, was to dominate post-Vedic literature completely, and provided a fertile soil for the notion that man was Supreme, as priest in rituals and as soul for philosophy, thus setting up a macrocosm alongside the microcosm, and later above it. The Purusha-sūkta provides proof of this. (Rig Veda X.90, 13 & 14).

Seeing gods behind the forces of nature, they saw them also

behind the spoken mantra and the powers of the soul, and identified these with the forces of nature, and finally gathered them together into Brahma, which the priest understood as the mantra (prayer) and the philosopher read as the soul of man. Thus, they thought of an inner sacrifice, antar yāga, alongside the outer one, bahir yāga: and an inner worship, mānasa pūjā, alongside the outer, bāhya pūjā. This tendency in the literature of ancient India to seek God in the soul (the microcosm), and to worship him there produced the literature of the Upanishads, and reached its classic conclusion in the school of Vedānta, which sought God in the soul, one could say, and not finding Him there ended by identifying the soul with God. But not every Indian thinker went looking for God within himself. Many continued to seek him in the macrocosm, his creation; in the forces of nature, which had led to the notion of gods, and to the idea of God. The attempt to understand all Being as a unity (above Intro. 2b) meant they could not rest content with the forces of nature, as the Vedic singers did, but drove on to seek an ultimate cause behind the many forces of nature, i.e. a natural force from which all the others derived, as from a mother. This one natural force, called Śakti, they then took for God. But as they did not find him there, any more than in the soul, they either took the Śakti as the immanent aspect of a hidden transcendent God (in myth, as the female aspect of divinity), or else just identified it with God. This tendency to seek God in the macrocosm found expression and champion in the Āgama literature, and it lived on in the philosophical schools based on them. And it is here that the real significance of the Āgama literature is to be found.

Some Indologists are familiar only with the development from Vedas to Upanishads, and look to understand all of Hindu speculation on that basis. For them Idealism (God in the soul) is the essence of Hinduism, Śaṃkara's Vedānta is inevitably taken as its classic expression: more they cannot see. But Indian speculation has not all fallen prey to man-deifying Idealism, though it is often so represented. Over the last thousand years a great number of sects have developed, sharing one point despite all their differences: they reject out-and-out idealism, and take the macrocosm as their starting-point. Scholars accustomed to tracing all Hindu speculation back to the ideas and initiatives of the Upanishads cannot cope

with the growth of all these sects. Unable to accommodate them as off-shoots of the Upanishads, they treat them as revolts against genuine Hinduism, and brand them as apostate; or else trace them back to non-Indian and even to Christian influences. But this whole puzzle about the development of these anti-Vedāntic, (no, anti-idealistic) sects and schools disappears once we bring the Āgama literature to bear on our study of Indian thought. It is from the Āgamas that those tendencies and thoughts come which set the founders of those sects in revolt against one-sided idealistic tendencies; as some of them admit by treating the Āgamas (whether Śakt-, Śaiv-, or Vaishṇava-) as of equal authority with the Vedas and Upanishads.

The opponents of Śaṃkara's extreme idealism found most of their weapons in the Āgamas. Through the labours of such European scholars as Max Müller and Paul Deussen Śaṃkaran idealism has taken on fresh life, but it still faces opposition, as in earlier centuries, opposition based in the thought-world of the Āgamas. Extreme Vedānta of a Śaṃkaran variety is busy trying to draw the English-educated circles into their sphere of influence. To combat this, people are now studying other Vedāntic schools, which teach a less radical idealism, as well as non-Vedāntic schools; and are publishing those writings, so as to reach a wider audience, and engaging in verbal and written propaganda both in English and the vernaculars. All this is undertaken in reaction against the idealism of Śaṃkara, as is shown by a remark of an active leader in the revival of Śaiva Siddhānta, who wrote to the author that 'I would rather see India become Christian than fall prey to the Vedānta of Śaṃkara'. It is here that I see the real significance for Indian thought of the Āgama literature. It has prevented, and still prevents India from lapsing into an idealism which idolizes human beings.

(d) *The Authority of the Āgamas*

The statements already cited (above, 2a) from the Sūtasaṃhitā show that the authority of the Āgamas was not generally recognised. The detailed commentary of Śivajñāni-Swāmi on the Śiva-jñānabodha cites many assertions from the Padma-Purāṇa, the Liṇga-Purāṇa and the Kūrma-Purāṇa criticizing the Āgamas, sometimes quite sharply. This opposition forced the supporters of the Āgamas to pay special attention to the question of their authority.

Sri Nīlakaṇṭhācārya, who will be readily acknowledged as one of the supporters of Śaiva Siddhānta, defends his dependency upon the Śaivāgamas by saying 'I see no difference between Vedas and Śaivāgamas. The Veda is the Śaivāgama.' In genuine Śaiva Siddhāntin writings we find a certain difference admitted between Vedas and Śaivāgamas; so for them the question of how the Śaivāgamas can be an authority is rather more difficult than for Nīlakaṇṭha, who simply disregards the difference. To criticise the authority of the Vedas would be dangerous, as that would put them outside Hinduism, and on a par with Buddhism and Jainism. Having realised that they were different they could not rank them side by side, as authorities of equal value. Nor could they accept the solution of the Sūtasaṃhitā, by which the Vedas were more authoritative while the Āgamas were helpful for beginners; for that would make them into mere beginners. The formula which was thought to do justice both to the Vedas and to the Āgamas is found in the Tirumantra of Tirumūlār:

The Vedas and the Āgamas are. true — revealed from the Supreme. One is general, the other is special. Both are revelations of God. Treat both as assured results. If people say they are different, I tell you that for those who are great, there is no difference. (*Tirumantra* VII.276).

The writings on which our account of Śaiva Siddhānta is based take up this same position, as we can see from Śivajñānasiddhiār VIII.13-15: *Religions and religious books contradict each other and are diverse. If you ask which religion and which book is true, I tell you, the one which without any debate says, This is true, that is not true; which says, This and this are as they should be; that is the true religion and the true book. That is what you find in the Vedas and the Āgamas. Both are contained in the foot of Śiva.* (13) *The esteemed Vedas and Āgamas are books of the first magnitude. Because they give information about everything it is difficult to measure their contents. And by Śiva's grace* (*aruḷ*) *and through question and answer souls, as their understanding allows, set up sects for themselves. Smriti* (*memory, tradition and writings considered holy, but not inspired*), *Purāṇa, books of science, and all other books are explanatory of these Wisdom books. Vedānga and Āgamānga are appendices. There is nothing that can be said which is not already found in the Vedas and the Āgamas. To those who say that there is something further, we need not give an answer.* (14) *The Vedas and the Śaivāgamas are the only authentic books. All other books derive from them. They are the first books, revealed by the forever Mala-free* (*Śiva*). *The Vedas are general in*

character, the Śaivāgamas particular. The Vedas were given for the worldly ones, the Śaivāgamas for those who have reached Śaktinipāta (enlightened ones). The Śaivāgamas contain things not revealed in the Vedas, plus the inerrant content of the Upanishads. All other books are in a different category. The Śaivāgamas are books of Siddhānta. (15)

These quotations, and especially the last, show clearly that Śaiva Siddhānta rates the Śaivāgamas higher than the Vedas as a source of truth. The Vedas, as well as the Śaivāgamas, are manifestations of the Supreme, and so are true. Both contain nothing false: yet they are not equal in value, being revealed for different purposes. Śaiva Siddhānta employs the notion of evolution in the field of religious knowledge also. The individual soul has to work its way gradually upward from the lowest stages of understanding to the highest stages of perfection. To this end, God permits the creation of many religions; each of them is true for its stage; it contains truth, if not the Truth. As a common foundation for all religions, Śiva revealed the Vedas. He who studies the Vedas always comes into his own, always attains to possession of the truth to which he is entitled, and which he needs at the stage at which he finds himself. The truth for the highest stage is contained in the Vedas, but it is very difficult to extract from them, being stated in a very general form, as those writings were meant for all stages of development. Truth is not contained in them in a clearly recognisable form, but only in a general and concealed manner. But of the Śaivāgamas it is said that they contain the truth, indeed the full and complete truth, clearly stated and easily recognised by those souls who are ready to receive it. Siddhāntins can see from the word Āgama that the Śaivāgamas contain the full and complete truth; for reading Ā as Pāśa (fetter), ga as Paśu (cattle), and ma as Pati (lord), Āgama must concern the three eternal substances, Matter Souls and God. Another favourite definition takes Āgama as Ā for Śivajñāna, ga for Moksha, ma for Mala-removal and equipping with Śivajñāna, which confers complete bliss.

3. The Sources for Our Account

Apart from the Āgama, Śaiva Siddhānta has a considerable literature, mostly in Tamil (see 4 below). This writer could not possibly refer to all of these, not being a university teacher undisturbed by

other duties, but a practical man with all sorts of calls to meet. He could snaffle only a little time for scholarly work, and if he was to achieve anything he had to accept certain limitations. It was a simple matter to pick out the best sources for Śaiva Siddhānta. Any work on this topic requires precise knowledge of their system of thought. So he decided to tackle their world-view, concentrating on their doctrines as given in theoretical works, starting with fourteen writings which have the status of scripture, called Meykaṇḍa Śāstra (philosophy of realised truth):

1. Śiva-jñāna-bodha, by Meykaṇḍadeva of Veṇṇeynallūr.
2. Śiva-jñāna-siddhiyār by Aruḷnanti of Tiruturaiyūr.
3. Irupāvirupathu, by the same.
4. Tiruvuntiyār by Uyyavantadeva of Tiruviyalūr.
5. Tirukkaliṟṟuppaḍiār by Uyyavantadeva of Tirukkaḍavūr.
6. Uṇmaiviḷakka by Manavācakam kaḍanta deva.

7-14. Eight works by Umāpati Śivan of Koṟṟavaṅkuḍi:

Śiva-prakāśa, Tiruaruḍpayan, Viñāveṇba, Poṟṟipakroḍai, Koḍikkavi, Neñcuviḍutūtu, Uṇmaineṟiviḷakka, Sankalpanirākaraṅa.

The most important of these is the Śivajñānabodha. This Tamil work presents twelve short Sūtras from the Sanskrit, with a commentary. These Sūtras form part of the Bourava Āgama. Legend tells that at the time of the creation of this present world Śiva created the Vedas and the twenty-eight Śaivāgamas. Srikaṇṭharudra taught the twenty-eight Śaivāgamas to Nandiperumān. As he could not reconcile the statements in the Āgamas about the four stages of Caryā, Kriyā, Yoga and Jñāna, he was taught the Śivajñānabodha (the twelve Sūtras of the Bouravāgama), as a digest of all the teachings of the Āgamas, and all his doubts naturally disappeared. He then taught the Sūtras to his favourite pupil Sanat Kumāra Muni, a rishi of Vedāntic times, who taught it to Satyajñānadarśani, who taught it to Parañjotimuni.

This man came down from heaven to teach the Sūtra to Meykaṇḍadeva, and he translated it into Tamil, and provided it with a commentary. His personal name was Śvetavana, and he lived about the thirteenth century in Tiruvaṇṇeynallūr, on the banks of the lower Peṇṇār, about twenty miles from Panrutti railway station in Arcot District. Legends offer these details:

A certain Alchuta, in the village of Pennagadam near Tiruveṅkāḍu or Śvetavaṅa in Tanjore district had long been childless, and was always praying to Śvetavana Īśvara for the blessing of a child. One morning he

went early to the temple pool and bathed. As he ended his prayer, he noticed a new-born child lying on the steps of the pool. He picked it up, hugged it, and took it home to his wife, praising God for his grace. They brought it up as their own child, and because he was a gift from Śvetavana Īśvara, called him Śvetavana. But his caste-members were soon criticizing Alchuta for bringing up a lower-caste foundling. The foster-parents began to be in a state of great embarrassment about it; so when Alchuta's brother-in-law, on a visit from Tiruveṇṇeynallūr, offered to take the child away with him, and to bring him up himself, Alchuta gladly agreed.

So, from his third year onwards, Tiruveṇṇeynallūr was the home of the child. It was later reported that he was dumb from birth, and that his only play was to make a Śiva liṅga out of sand, and to meditate on it. Now one day a siddha, a jīvanmukta, the Parañjotimuni mentioned earlier, passed by the village. He saw the lad at his game, and felt drawn to him. Realising how far the child had gone in spiritual matters, he touched the lad with his grace, changed his name to Meykaṇḍadeva, instructed him in the divine philosophy of Śivajñānabodha, and told him to translate it into Tamil, so the world could get to know the truth it contained. The boy remained dumb until the end of his fifth year, receiving further instruction from the god Gaṇeśa in Tiruveṇṇeynallūr, who bore the name of Poḷḷār Piḷḷayār. After the end of his fifth year Meykaṇḍadeva began to teach the Śivajñānabodha and to preach, gathering many disciples.

In those days there lived in Tiruturaiyūr a famous pandit and philosopher, Aruḷnanti Śivācārya, well versed in all the Vedas and the Āgamas, and, because of that called Sakala (all) Āgama pandit. One day, he came with his pupils on a visit to Tiruveṇṇeynallūr. His pupils became sympathetic to the teaching of Meykaṇḍadeva, and gradually began to forsake their former teacher. Aruḷnanti Śivācārya wanted to know why his pupils forsook him, and made preparations to meet Meykaṇḍadeva face to face, and to confound him; but as soon as he approached Meykaṇḍadeva, and the eye of grace fell upon him, he felt his pride and ignorance dwindle away, and feeling himself vanquished, he fell at his feet, and from that hour became his devoted pupil, paying no heed to the fact that he was a brahmin and Meykaṇḍa only a sudra. Under the inspiration of his new teacher, Aruḷnanti wrote the Śivācārya-Irupāvirupathu; and, as an authorised commentary on Śivajñānabodha, the Śivajñānasiddhiār.

While we must discount these legendary stories of extraordinary precocity, we can confidently accept Meykaṇḍadeva as an historical

personality, and as the author of the existing Tamil Śivajñānabodha: The time at which he lived, when the work attributed to him may have been written, is of more interest to us than the legendary account of his early inspiration etc. Two dates may help us determine, at least approximately, the time of composition of the Śivajñānabodha. Namaśivaya Deśika, the founder of the Tiruvavaduturai monastery, established about 600 years ago, claimed to be the fifth successor of Meykaṇḍadeva. Further evidence is provided by the preface to the Sankalpanirākaraṇa of Umāpati. Umāpati dates the writing of this work to the 1235th year of the Salivahana era (1313 in our calendar). According to tradition, which appears correct, Umāpati was the fourth of the so-called Santana gurus, that is the third direct successor of Meykaṇḍadeva.

Reckoning about twenty-five years for each Guru or ācārya, that would place the composition of the Tamil Śivajñānabodha, ascribed to Meykaṇḍadeva, in the first third of the thirteen hundreds, a date that coincides with the statement just quoted from Namaśivaya Deśika.

This work contains, first, a free translation of the Sanskrit Sūtra in condensed poetic language; than an analysis into separate points, called churnika. For each point a Reason is given, called varthika, in concise prose and with unnecessary words avoided, and followed by analogies or examples, called udāharana. Point reason and analogy together make up a section (adhikaraṇa), between two and seven of these for each Sūtra. The twelve Sūtras are further divided into two parts of six Sūtras each, one of general and one of special interest. Broadly speaking, the part of general interest concerns itself with the metaphysics and psychology of Śaiva Siddhānta, and the special part is of a more practically religious character. Each part is further divided into two parts of three Sūtras each.

The first part of the first section, called pramāṇaviyal (proof), deals with:

Sūtra 1. The Existence of God.

Sūtra 2. Transmigration, which relates God to world and to souls.

Sūtra 3. The Existence of Souls.

The second part of the first section bears the name Lakshaṇaviyal (how things are) and treats of souls:

Sūtra 4. Souls and their organs.

Sūtra 5. Their dependence on God.

Sūtra 6. Matter and God are totally different.

The first part of the special section is called Sādhanaviyal (means, i.e. a way towards Release):

Sūtra 7. Nature of soul being released.

Sūtra 8. Aids to help in Release.

Sūtra 9. How souls are cleansed.

The last part is called Payaniyal (result):

Sūtra 10. Removing the soul's fetters.

Sūtra 11. Union with God.

Sūtra 12. How released souls worship God.

Like almost all Indian books of any significance, the Śivajñānabodha has attracted many commentators. The most important of these is Śivajñāna yogi or muni, who must have died in 1785. He wrote a short commentary and a longer one. The shorter commentary is partially translated in the following pages, the larger one has been used now and then.

Śivajñānasiddhiār, the next most important canonical work of Śaiva Siddhānta, is by Aruḷnanti. The second part of this is also a commentary on the Śivajñānabodha. The first part, the Parapaksha (opposing side), offers a critique of many other doctrines; the second, Svapaksha, gives a positive account of Śaiva Siddhānta, along the general lines of the Śivajñānabodha.

The special importance of Śivajñānasiddhiār is that it deals expressly with some matters which were taken for granted or hinted at briefly in the Śivajñānabodha. The commentary of Tattva Prakāśar has been used in translating quotations from the critical section; and that of Śivajñāna Yogi or Swami, in the systematic part.

From Aruḷnanti we also have the Irupāvirupathu, a short work mainly about the nature of pāśa, the shackle of the soul. Mariajñānasambandha was a disciple of Aruḷnanti and teacher of Umāpati Śivācārya, who wrote no fewer than eight of the fourteen

canonical theological works, and was one of the temple brahmins of Chidabaram, renowned for his scholarship.

Tradition tells how once, as he journeyed, he passed by the dwelling-place of Mariajñānasaṃbandha, who saw him and cried out 'There goes a man who is blind in broad daylight.' Umāpati hearing this left his palanquin, fell at the feet of the Guru, and out of pure admiration for him even ate of the remains of his rice, although Mariajñānasaṃbandha was a sudra. When Umāpati had been instructed in the mysteries of Śaiva Siddhānta, he returned to Chidabaram, but was not received back into the fellowship of his caste, and had to live outside the village.

Yet, although he had broken caste law, the brahmins had to recall him on account of his scholarship, to assist at a great celebratory feast of the gods. About this time he composed the short poem 'Koḍikkavi'. He wrote other works also, including a legendary account of the temple at Chidambaram, a short summary of the Periya Purāṇa, the sacred book of Śaivism, and a Purāṇa in praise of Sekkilar, the author of the Periya Purāṇa.

All these he wrote in Tamil. He also wrote a commentary on the Paushkara Āgama in Sanskrit, and a manuscript of this should be in the library of the Tiruvavaduturai monastery.

Of Umāpati's eight works in the Meykaṇḍaśāstra, the most important are Sankalpanirākaraṇa, a polemic against other schools, Śivaprakāśa, a sort of compendium of the Śivajñanasiddhiār, and Tiruaruḍpayan. Siddhāntins regard this last as a supplement to Kuraḷ, Tiruvaḷḷuvar's famous catena of maxims on the three goods — virtues possessions and desires; Umāpati's work in the Tiruaruḍpayan on Moksha as the fourth good is quite properly linked to the Kuraḷ, especially as it is written in the same metre. There is nothing to report about the authors of the other three canonical scriptures, Uyyavantadeva from Tiruviyalūr, Uyyavantadeva from Tirukkadavūr and Manavācakam kaḍanta deva.

4. A Survey of the History of Śaiva Siddhānta

The fourteen canonical writings chosen as basis for our account of Śaiva Siddhānta stem from the 1300's, but it goes back much further than that. It is based on the Śaivāgamas, and is a development of the thought-world there presented; not just as a part of Śaivism but as an independent entity within Śaivism, alongside the Śaivāgamas.

We do not know enough about the Āgamas to sketch the development from the Śaivāgamas to the fourteen canonical works. Something has already been said earlier about the gradual emergence of Śaiva Siddhānta as an independent school of Śaivism; though it might have been better not to, for a thick mist of ignorance still shrouds the whole story of Indian religion, and especially that of Southern India. That mist has not lifted much, and in this area we can only suggest hypotheses. It is reasonable to suppose that Śaiva Siddhānta is a comparatively recent trend within Śaivism, especially when we consider the teaching about the Śakti. In other sections of Śaivism the idea of the śakti is presented as something material or perceptible, but in Śaiva Siddhānta the Śakti is characteristically spiritual.

Elements of Śaiva Siddhānta are to be found in the oldest productions of Tamil literature, in the Kuṛaḷ of Tiruvaḷḷuvar and in the maxims of his sister Auvai: but it would be stupid to call them Siddhāntins: indeed the fact that the author of the Kuṛaḷ is regarded as a follower of Jainism should make us cautious here. Whether Tiruvaḷḷuvar was a follower of Jainism or of Śaivism, is a question that may never be solved. His book of maxims, relating mainly to practical matters, includes too few on religio-philosophic topics to prove anything. The oldest author known to us who is definitely Siddhāntin is Tirumūlār. His extensive work, the Tirumantra, which may even go back to the first century, provides several basic thoughts of Śaiva Siddhānta and a sophisticated theology. Until even older Siddhāntin writings in Tamil are discovered we must assume that it was Tirumūlār who made the philosophy and world-view of the Āgamas accessible to the people of Tamil-speaking southern India.

Parts of this copious work have been published in an English translation by J.M. Nallasāwmi Pillai in the periodical 'Siddhānta Dīpikā'. Unfortunately the translation is not quite faithful. An accurate translation in some European language would be very helpful, as this book has much to tell us about the philosophical character of the Śaivāgamas and about the culture of southern India in former times, a topic which has so far been treated in stepmotherly fashion by European scholars, who prefer Northern India.

A wider circle supporting the Śaiva Siddhāntin philosophy of life would have grown first from the work of the four Śaiva-ācāryas. Their work was of immense significance for the development of

religion in southern India, where Buddhism and Jainism had for centuries enjoyed strong support and had dominated Tamil literature. These Ācaryas freed the Tamils from that dominance: a victory not won easily, as is fantastically reported in their Lives (a dubious historical source), but one which required a fight. But the victory was complete. These four heroes of Śaiva Siddhānta are Maṇikkavācaka, author of the Tiruvāśaga, Appar (also called Tirunāvukkarasar), Jñānasaṃbandha, and Sundara, whose hymns we find in the compilation Devāra. Unfortunately we do not know exactly when they lived, but we shall probably not be mistaken if we fix it to a time before the year 1000. Many Indian scholars give the eighth century as the date, which may be correct.

Somewhat later Siddhāntin Śaivite writers worthy of note are Nambi Āṇdar Nambi and Sekkilār. Nambi gave the Tamil people an anthology still called the Tamil Veda. It is revered as a Veda and used in temples. It consists of eleven books; the first seven contain hymns of the three Acāryas, Appar, Jñānasaṃbandha and Sundara, and bear the common name of Devāra. The eighth book is the Tiruvācaka. The ninth is a collection of verses by nine different poets, and in the tenth book we find the Tirumantra of Tirumūlār. The eleventh book contains a number of smaller poetical works, mostly by Nambi although some are attributed to other authors. A part of the eleventh book — the Tirutoṇḍar Tiruvantāti, forms the basis for the Periya Purāṇa of Sekkilār, the famous book of legends of Tamil Śaivites. The life of each of the sixty-three Śaivite saints is extolled in this comprehensive volume, sometimes in a highly fantastic manner.

Next to the Ramāyāna, which was put into Tamil by Kambar, the Periya Purāṇa must be the book most beloved by a wide circle. It is the twelfth book that is frequently described as the Tamil Veda, and would have come out about the end of the eleventh century.

It was apparently in the thirteenth century that Śaiva Siddhānta first became recognised as a philosophical school and an independent sect within Śaivism, when Meykaṇḍadeva formed into a system the ideas introduced into Tamil literature by those early writers, from the Āgamas onwards. He is not the founder of Śaiva Siddhānta but its theologian, systematic rather than constructive.

What he began, his pupils completed. Aruḷnanti deva and Umāpati are the chief of these. By their efforts Śaiva Siddhānta

has since the thirteenth century been a school with clearly defined characteristics and an acknowledged dogma. Tamil literature of a later date shows many traces of Śaiva Siddhāntic influences. Nallasāwmi Pillai kindly put at my disposal a list of Śaiva Siddhāntin authors who lived after the time of Umāpati and wrote in Tamil. It contains more than fifty names, and it would be pointless to quote them all.

In many of these works a Vedāntic influence prevails, while in others the influence of the Purāṇas is dominant. Those with the widest circulation are the Śiva Vākkiam of Śiva Vākkiār, one of the eighteen so-called siddhiār or yogi, the Tiru-viḷai-āḍal of Parañjoti, a Purāṇa about the games Śiva played, the mystical songs of Tāyumānavar, the catechism of Sivakkira Yogi, Siddhānta Dīpikā, Vedānta Dīpikā, Tattvadarśana, various commentaries on the fourteen Śāstras, and a vast number of Purāṇas.

Very few of these writings have been translated into European languages. Dr Graul published in the Journal of the Oriental Society a translation of the Śaiva Siddhāntin refutation of Buddhism, given in Śivajṇānasiddhiār. In 1850 the American missionary H.R. Hoisington published a free translation of the Śivajñānabodha in the Journal of the American Oriental Society Vol. No 4. In 1895 J.M. Nallasāwmi published a new translation of the Śivajñānabodha. In this translation there are additional notes, more or less based on the commentary of Śivajñānayogi. Nallasāwmi P. also translated the Tiruaruḍpayan, Śivajñānasiddhiār and part of the Tirumantra. The last two works were published in the journal Siddhānta Dīpikā, founded and supported by him, and which had taken upon itself the responsibility of researching into Śaiva Siddhānta. And in 1901 the Rev. G.U. Pope, former missionary and later Professor of Tamil at Balliol College and at the Indian Institute at Oxford, published an English translation of the Tiruvācaka. In the Introduction he also gives a translation of the Tiruaruḍpayan. Apart from these translations there are also some newspaper articles written in English about Śaiva Siddhānta, particularly in the magazine of the Christian College in Madras, and in the Siddhānta Dīpikā. The articles on Śaiva Siddhānta that Nallasāwmi first published in the Siddhānta Dīpikā during the course of the year appeared in book form at the end of 1911. In America, it was P. Ramanatha who first brought Śaiva Siddhānta to the notice of the public, and published commentaries on St Matthew, St John, and the Psalms

which showed strong Siddhāntin influence. Śaiva Siddhānta is also represented in his book, 'The Culture of the Soul among Western Nations.'

Attempts at reviving Śaiva Siddhānta were made not only by the Siddhānta Dīpikā, the journal already mentioned, but also by a periodical in Tamil published by the former Professor of Tamil Studies in the Christian College at Madras, now a sannyasin and travelling preacher, Vedachalam Piḷḷai. Many towns now have Śaiva Siddhānta societies, which publicise the sect by giving lectures and distributing leaflets. And each year there is a Conference for several days, to show the flag.

CHAPTER ONE

There are Several Substances

The most important metaphysical dispute between the various Indian schools is this: should we start from Monism or Dualism, in attempting to solve the riddle of the universe? Dvaita or Advaita, that is the basic point in debate, however much we may agree or disagree on other things. Even today, an Indian who is philosophically minded demands above all things a plain answer to this enquiry. A system that sought to evade this question would have as little claim to attention in India as a system that disregarded the theory of knowledge would have in Europe, after Kant.

Śaiva Siddhānta's position on this is its special contribution to metaphysical thought, inviting the attention of all who interest themselves in Indian philosophy. It here differs from those schools which are best known in Europe; the school of Sāṃkhya and the Buddhism that grew out of it, and the Vedānta school of Śaṃkara. As is well known, Śaṃkara bases his teaching on Monism, accepting that there is only one Reality, God. So he identifies souls with God, and explains the world, with all its joys and sorrows, as Māyā, a delusion, a deception, not really there. Sāṃkhya and Buddhism, on the other hand, base themselves on Dualism, regarding souls and matter as distinct.

Śaiva Siddhānta rejects both positions. It rejects the position of Vedānta, because Vedānta conceals practical and theoretical difficulties within itself, and so does not do justice to actuality. It rejects the position of Sāṃkhya and Buddhism because they pay too little attention to cosmic unity, and rank matter above souls. Moreover they deny that God is important, or even that he exists, and put in his place the law of karma or fate, i.e. causality (which in Indian thought belongs to Matter).

Seeking to avoid these errors, Śaiva Siddhānta holds (against Vedānta) that the soul is different from God; and that the world

with all its joys and sorrows is not an illusion, but harsh reality. Against Sāṃkhya and Buddhism, Siddhānta holds that in addition to matter and souls there is a supreme and intelligent Being, called God. And, further, that these different substances do come together in God, thus preserving the unity of all that is, yet without losing their individual reality. It thus rejects strict Monism and strict Dualism, and offers a third theory to reconcile these two, which in Vedānta and Sāṃkhya were irreconcilable enemies.

Before enquiring whether this reconciliation is effective we must first explain why Monism was rejected, and then say what substances this theory presupposes, and why. This will be our task in the present Chapter.

If we admit several substances, does that necessarily involve Dualism (as in Sāṃkhya and Buddhism), or Pluralism? Or can we still look for that unity of all that is? All this must be considered, as we try to describe those three substances, especially God's, in whom that unity is thought to rest.

1. Critique of Śaṃkara's Idealistic Monism

Our source-documents are mainly aimed at the idealistic Monism of Śaṃkara's Vedānta. Arguments are repeatedly brought against it, not only in polemical passages refuting other schools, but also while expounding Siddhānta's own position. Here we shall discuss only the most significant comments made in refutation of Vedānta, as given in Śivajñānasiddhiār:

The confusion caused by the claim of the Vedantist that he is that One, and that one can attain Mukti (Release) by realising this, causes disillusionment, and does not lead to happiness. It is like saying that a crow, which has no young, tears off a chunk of living rock and feeds her shrieking black young with it to still their hunger and their thirst. (1)

If the Vedas do claim that there is but One Thing without a second, then this claim is certainly refuted in the Vedas themselves. For the four Vedas claim that there is a knower, a thing to be known, and a state of knowing. Furthermore, this interpretation of the Vedantists harms the authority of the Vedas, as it makes these two claims contradictory. And as for the Vedantists there is no intelligent nature apart from that all-blissful Intelligence, enjoyment of salvation is not possible! (2)

If you say that the unity of God and the soul is like the identity of the sun and (its reflection) in the water-pot, consider that the Supreme cannot be confined to a form, being spatially unbounded, and is flawlessly

formless; and as there is no second place outside of him, no reflections can occur. In any case someone needs to be there, to see the reflection in a water-pot. That's the end of your 'one thing'. (3)

Knowing that one is 'intelligence, but without one's organs and mental powers (manas) having any grasp of this, and without the śāstra saying so, is as good as saying that a hare has horns. That knowledge to which you have attained, that the eternal Absolute is the only existent thing, has no value. But there is also value in accepting that a difference does exist. (4)

If you compare the One Unity with the unity between a precious stone and its brilliance, you really destroy that unity. The gem and its brilliance are inseparable; indeed, any substance is inseparable from its permanent attributes. If you then add that the One has no attributes, that means it could not be intelligent, so could not create the world. (5)

If a cornstalk is left near an anthill Fear can therefrom, in the night, generate a snake. You say the world should be thought to originate like that from Sat (real existence). In which case the people thus deceived are also a manifestation of your Brahma. This theory strengthens error without producing happiness. (6)

What folly is this? You, a well-read chap, say that the world is a nirvacanam. Does anybody say there are things which neither exist nor don't? What exists must have always existed. What doesn't exist never did exist: it can't just turn up. If you say the world is both existent and non-existent, because it gets destroyed, that only means it is resolved into its basic elements. The world is still there. (7)

You say the world like mother of pearl, is unreal yet seems as real as God is. But one really can ask (whether the world is real). You say the world was regarded as an object, just as much as God, but is now known to be non-existent. But the earth does not turn into water, nor the wind into fire. They may change their forms, but not turn into something else. The world is there, not just when we don't realize the fact, but also when we do.(8)

You say the world emerges from Brahma, as the deceptive spider's web emerges from the mouth of the spider. But that would mean that Intelligence, though unchangeable and formless, is present in the world and caught up in it. You will reply that the spider is not caught in her own net. Idiot! A pot comes from clay, not from itself. (9)

If there is in this world a sun shrouded from darkness, then there may also be a Brahma shrouded from the ignorance of taking bodies for real. You will say that the post-mortem set-up, usually called Bliss (when one

realises it's the intelligent supreme Being one is), that this state of affairs just is the All-Brahma. But saying this sets a limit, inflicting Mala on the Mala-free. (15)

Freedom from Mala could not be achieved inside time, by the Supreme, but must be without beginning. You say an intelligence subjected to what you call Māyā is affected by impurity. But then that (eternal) intelligence is also affected, as (for you) both are identical. You do not know the soul that finds itself within the body, nor Mala, nor karma, nor Māyā, nor the Highest Cause. You fool! You cite the example of fire created by rubbing; but that leads to Dualism! (16)

If you say you enjoy salvation within yourself, that results in Dualism. If you say the feeling of salvation felt by you as something distinct is therefore not in you, then you do not exist at all. You may say that attainment of a knowledge-free state is true existence; even then, some knowledge must be there. If you say all knowledge is an illusion, then what you are calling an illusion is really Brahma. If Brahma is an illusion, then intelligence will have to be left out of it. (17)

Understand correctly what those Vedic words really mean, 'That art thou'. Understand how you differ from the Highest Cause, and what non-separation is. Attain the feet of the sublime one, whom Vishṇu and Brahma find it hard to reach; follow Sādhana (Way of Release), and practise yoga and Jñāna. (18) (*Siddhiār, Parapaksha, Refutation of Māyāvāda* 1-9, 15-18)

2. Critique of Emanation-Monism

Śaṃkara's idealistic doctrine of the One Soul is not the only type of Monism found in India. It can take very different forms. Here we shall consider only Pariṇāma vāda, an older school than Śaṃkara's, and with more claim to the authority of the Vedas and Upanishads. This school teaches a transformation of Brahma, or at least of a part of Brahma into the things of the manifest world, and into individual souls. In the Siddhiār Parapaksha the doctrine of the school is described as follows:

It is intelligence that through Pariṇāma (emanation) evolves into this world and into souls. That is why Brahma is the All. The Vedas describe the means by which salvation can be reached. If one follows this means the soul loses its separate state, and becomes one with Brahma. So teach the followers of the Pariṇāma vāda.

Brahma is the sole Existent. Everything else around us emerged from him, shares his nature, and will return again into that nature.

Both the world and souls truly exist, and are nothing other than Brahma in his diversity. The starting-point and the end of existence are Brahma in his simplicity.

This more realistic version of Monism is contested and rejected by Siddhānta as follows:

What you call Brahma does not turn into the world. It is not matter, and cannot turn into matter. If you say that the One is related to matter like saltiness, which pervades the whole sea, then tell me: Can something be both subject and object? (*Salt and water differ in nature; they do combine with each other, but one cannot turn into the other. God and matter also differ in nature.*) *Why get in such a muddle? Is it earth you are going to turn into, my little conjuror?* (1)

If you say that the world is part of what you call Brahma, let me tell you that this part will sometime die, and then reappear, through Māyā. If you also say that the world reverts to Brahma, you concede that part of Brahma is matter, as the world really is created and destroyed (*creation and destruction are hallmarks of matter*). *With your Brahma the world of souls turns into a non-reality* (*matter*), *which makes your Brahma matter too.* (2)

You take as an example the growth of a tree from a seed. But that turns your other statement, that Brahma is eternal, into a lie, and your Brahma becomes matter, to be created and destroyed. For a tree to grow, a seed must first be in the earth. What counts as 'earth' for your Brahma? Follow this line, and the world will call you mad, my Brahma-chap. (3)

Different items of jewellery are fashioned from gold. Similarly, the whole world is God. Where does that analogy lead us? The items of jewellery show that there are goldsmiths and jewellery-wearers. So your example shows, that there must be both a creator and a user of the world. (4)

Suppose you lose the capacity to know, and to act (*Siddhāntins regard knowing acting and deciding as essential properties of the soul*). *Then you can't achieve Bliss. You may say you become one with Brahma at that point. But there's no You left then, to form that union. Perhaps you can achieve union without losing those capacities? If so, why do you not continue exercising them? What point is there in taking on a body, and living, just so that knowledge may cease?* (5) (*Siddhiār, Refutation of the Pariṇāma School,* 1-5).

3. Which Things are Eternal?

As this critique of Monism has shown, Śaiva Siddhānta rejects it as impossible, holding that souls and the world exist, as well as God.

This is quite seriously meant; souls and the world exist eternally, as well as God. As to origins all three are on the same level: God, souls and the world are beginningless, and therefore endless too, for what does exist cannot become non-existent, and what is non-existent cannot achieve existence; a principle of which Śaiva Siddhānta makes considerable use.

Saying that the world always existed should not be taken to mean that Śaiva Siddhānta considers the present perceptible state of the world as eternal. For Śaiva Siddhānta, that developed world is not as such eternal, being subject to an endless process of creation and destruction. But it is eternal as to its cause, its embryonic form. The material cause of the world, and that alone, is eternal, having neither beginning nor end. Everything that develops from it is quite logically considered as liable to destruction, i.e. change. This material cause is distinct from God. Śaiva Siddhānta calls it Māyā.

God souls and the world are obviously *there,* but are they independent entities, or reducible to one comprehensive Thing? Śaiva Siddhānta also enquired *how* such things exist: an enquiry which led them to posit further eternal substances, Karma and Āṇavamala.

Here the thought naturally occurs, that the mode of existence of these three substances might derive from one of them; might it not be due to God, or to souls, or to Māyā? Śaiva Siddhānta rejects these three possible explanations one after the other, and for the following reasons.

Even if it was God who had the world with all its joys and sorrows to arise from Māyā, and did set souls therein, that does not mean we should hold him responsible for the world being as it is and not a nicer place for souls; for that would make of him a cruel overlord. Some do say he created the world for his own pleasure, and with no definite purpose; but this is unworthy of God's greatness. (See III.3d. concerning the motive for world-creation.)

Our sources do sometimes say God created the world for fun, and Siva's doings are often called a dance: not that his actions are capricious, or that he made the world unpleasant for souls just to suit his own pleasure; the meaning is rather that God's actions do not involve effort.

Siddhānta did not wish to represent God as responsible for

the misfortune of the world, so naturally it tried to put the blame on souls instead. There were two ways to do this; to say God created a good world, which souls then spoilt; or that the nature or conduct of souls forced God to create a world unfavourable to them.

The first way is not even discussed, as putting souls in a world, even a good one, strikes Śaiva Siddhānta as fundamentally evil. The second alternative is discussed, and partly accepted.

It is characteristic of Indian philosophies to explain evil as due to karma. Whatever souls endure and experience, they endure and experience on the basis of their former deeds. Śaiva Siddhānta also explains that the sort of life souls experience in this world is due to the deeds of those souls. However after further enquiry into the relation between the soul and karma it concludes that souls cannot be blamed for the situation as it stands. The soul may well commit evil deeds, and suffer pain on that account, but it is not responsible for its actions, because it is not a free agent, but acts under compulsion. If souls were on their own initiative to build up karma, thus binding them to the world with its joys and sorrows, we would have to think that they by nature commit both good and evil deeds: but that cannot be the case, because the nature of a thing must be simple, as is stated in Siddhiār II.5. Karma consists of opposed elements, such as good and bad deeds, or joy and sorrow. Saying that the soul *by nature* commits and experiences this two-fold karma is to deny that the soul is simple. Water, which is cold by nature, does not have heat as a natural property, but becomes hot in contact with fire, and remains hot as long as the contact exerts its influence. In the same way, the performance of good and bad deeds is not to be attributed to the nature of the soul, but to an alien influence (Siddhiār II.5 & 6); but the soul is not solely responsible, if it acts under the influence of karma. So the action cannot really be due to the soul, but to some other entity.

The third possibility is that karma itself, on which the good and ill fortune of the soul depends, may be attributed to the third eternal substance, matter. On this view the soul performs good and evil works, which are responsible for its situation, by reason of its bondage to matter, which obscures the soul's knowledge, and leads it astray. It is shown in Prak: II.17 that this explanation is no solution to the problem. Like the question about which

came first, the tree or the seed, it never answers the question about which came first, karma, or the bondage of the soul with matter; nor does it answer the question whether the soul is bound to matter because it has committed karma, or whether the soul commits karma because it stands in bondage to matter. The assumption that Māyā (matter) is the basic cause of evil, is rejected as totally impossible, because of the service that it performs for souls. It helps souls to be released from evil, so it cannot be the cause of evil. Matter does of course provide souls with organs, and with objects for acquiring and expiating karma; so it does in a way help to eliminate karma.

You ask why the tattva (products of Māyā) become objects, and make contact with souls. It is so that souls may fully consume the very old karma, so as to set it aside, may mature it and get rid of it, so that it is no longer there. (*Siddhiār* II.79)

If matter has the task of setting souls free from karma, it is clear that matter ought not to be regarded as the fundamental cause of karma, and that karma must be something distinct from Māyā.

Now if karma brings it about that souls experience joy and sorrow, but cannot itself be traced back either to God, or to souls, or to Māyā, the only remaining possibility is to accept karma as an independent entity, like the other three. But Siddhānta does not regard this as a complete solution to the problem of evil. It further asks why souls, who do not relate to karma as substance to attribute, become involved with it, even though it brings unspeakable disaster. One may not assume that souls expose themselves to the scourge of karma without having to. Their nature does not require it. Matter helps towards the elimination of karma and God desires the best for souls. So they do not compel souls to take on karma.

Does karma itself compel souls to become involved with it? If karma could do that then it would also be capable of bringing forth the bodies, organs and objects needed for committing and expiating those deeds; otherwise the power to compel souls would remain meaningless. But to ascribe creation to karma would threaten the existence of God, or degrade him to a mere accomplice of karma. Śaiva Siddhānta seeks to resolve the difficulty by accepting the presence of a further eternal power called Āṇavamala.

Āṇavamala is evil, basic and ultimate, which holds souls bound

from eternity. It is a beginningless sickness of souls. It must be eternal, for like karma it cannot be traced back to God; for whatever begins must have a cause to start it off, and would then be always liable to return after being removed, thus making any eternal release of souls illusory. (Payan III.8) Moreover it is not part of the soul's nature, or they would both perish together if there were something to destroy it. (Payan III.7) And Māyā does work against Āṇavamala in just that way. Which makes it very clear that Āṇavamala is not the same as Māyā.

You may say there is no such thing as Āṇavamala, as distinct from Māyā, and that the evils (just mentioned) are effects of Māyā. But Māyā governs Wanting, Knowing and Doing in souls, and eliminates (Āṇava) Mala, which unlike Māyā is not separate from souls, but appears as world, bodies and organs. (*Siddhiār* II.81)

The faculties of Knowing and Acting are hidden in what we call Āṇavamala, which is intertwined with souls and could almost be called their attribute (Guṇa). Māyā, in great affection, gives Kalā and the other Tattvas (organs and objects), to abolish ignorance. Māyā and Āṇavamala differ totally, like light and darkness. (*Siddhiār* II.84)

Māyā's task is to convey knowledge as light for souls, so that they have the power to know things; knowledge which it is Āṇava Mala's task to hinder and prevent. So they are hostile to each other, like light and darkness. That is why we deny that Māyā is identical with Mala. (*Comment on Bodha* IV.2, *Ex.*)

Śaiva Siddhānta, then, admits five eternal substances:

1. God, called Pati (Lord).
2. Souls, called Paśu (beasts).
3. Māyā, the material cause, and what evolves from it.
4. Karma, good and bad deeds and their results.
5. Āṇavamala the fundamental evil.

The last three are grouped together as non-rational by nature, and called Pāśa or bandha (fetters) or Mala (dirt). Māyā is often distinguished into Māyā proper, the material cause, and Māyēya, what evolves out of it. This explains why our sources sometimes speak of six eternal substances.

CHAPTER TWO

The First Substance

1. Proofs that God exists

As we have already pointed out in our comments on the Āgamas, the schools based upon them (unlike those based on the Upanishads) always seek God within the universe. This point is confirmed by the way our sources discuss the existence of God. While they use statements from both Vedas and Āgamas as proof that a supreme Being called God does exist, they do not restrict themselves to scriptural evidence, but seek to strengthen their case by reference to experience, by what is evident to us from the existence of the universe and the happenings in it.

Our sources, therefore, look at the universe, and philosophise about its source on the basis of what they see there, as follows:

The universe, that stands before us as he, she, it — that is, as diverse in form, is subject to three stages of development, and is a created [*i.e. dependent*] *reality. When destroyed it comes into existence again because of Mala. Wise men say that the God of Destruction is the Creator.* (*Bodha Sūtra* I)

In explaining this Sūtra it is shown, first of all, that the world is truly subjected to the process of being created, preserved and destroyed; next, that it is a Reality, because 'from what is not there, nothing comes'. Then comes 'The world has an agent', to counter Sāmkhya's objection that 'The world we count as real arises from itself, from the material cause, and reverts by itself into that cause. It has no need for an agent as efficient cause.' In reply it is said that 'What exists cannot be active without an agent', a reason further expounded like this: Pots and other objects are there in the clay etc., (*i.e. they have a material cause*)*, but the pot is not fashioned without a potter, so the world too must have an agent.*

Now the argument that if anything perishes, it will evolve from that

again, and that without a God of Destruction (i.e. Śiva, in Indian mythology), no creation is possible, invites the riposte that this makes a supreme God quite unnecessary. For if the world can regress into its elements (Māyā), then surely it can evolve from them again.

Meykaṇḍadeva rejects this point with the following example: 'If the seed is placed in the moist soil, the shoot sprouts. And as Māyā works with the Śakti (of Māyā's lord), it is enabled to bring into existence individual souls, as their deeds require.' Māyā surely is the material cause of the world, but it cannot bring that world into being without a subsidiary or instrumental cause, just as the seed cannot bring forth the tree which slumbers within, except by the aid of damp soil. The śakti of Śiva is considered as instrumental cause of the world. The first Sūtra of Bodha, which was to prove God's existence, then closes by saying the Supreme cannot change (in spite of his connection, just mentioned, with the world) and that polytheism is to be rejected. (Bodha I *and comment)*

The cosmological argument for the existence of a Supreme Being is developed further in Siddhiār I. As in Bodha, the existence of a Supreme Being is inferred from the fact that the diverse world is created, is maintained, and is destroyed.

Creation, preservation and destruction all require an agent, not being part of the nature of that world; for a feature which forms part of the nature of something cannot be subject to change. Self-change cannot form part of a thing's nature, but is something suffered by it. And elements like air, fire, water or earth cannot bring about changes, because they are unintelligent matter, and are themselves subject to the process of being created, etc. The ultimate cause of change cannot itself change. To think the process of being born and perishing goes on under its own momentum, like a wheel turning, is no help; for we are bound to ask whether this world that comes and goes is real: now what is non-existent cannot come into existence, and what already exists has no need to start existing.

Here a further point may be taken: is the world truly subject to this process of coming into being, and being destroyed? This point is dismissed by reference to the changes which we observe daily within nature. But then, what we observe is the coming into being and perishing of particular parts of the world, not of the world as a whole. True, but then it is a law of nature that everything happens at the proper time. At its appointed time the world as a whole will also perish, and again come into existence.

This may lead you to think Time is the God of events. But Time is a non-rational thing. We do see things brought about by time, but only as auxiliary to the act of the Supreme, and at his command. (10)

Again, karma and the atoms cannot be the final cause of the world, because both are non-rational; moreover atoms also perish at the time of world-destruction, so could not even be considered as the material cause. Anyway the true material cause of the world (Māyā) cannot be the ultimate cause: a pot (world) does not create itself out of clay (Māyā); not without some intelligent Being taking a hand in the affair. So Māyā, which is non-rational matter, cannot be the ultimate cause; nor can souls, which need bodies and organs, products of Māyā, in order to recognise Māyā; and whose own origin needs to be explained. There must, therefore, be an intelligent nature present, who is different from Māyā and souls, and who brings forth the world out of Māyā, and allows it to revert thereto. This intelligent Being is God, whom the school of Śaiva Siddhānta calls 'Śiva'. (*Siddhiār* I.1-18)

In Prak: I.4. we find the cosmological proof of God expressed shortly as follows: *The whole world is created as he, she, it (i.e. is multiple in form), is created at some time, and destroyed when its time has come, then again created by reason of Māyā. Bodies are always changing, being created, existing and perishing. Now Māyā is motionless matter; and souls do not have the necessary knowledge to attain to the body they need. Because of all these things, and because the karma we know so well is only active in bodies, it must be the Mala-free one, God, who causes everything to happen.*

Conclusions about the existence of a Highest Nature as the efficient cause are drawn not only from the existence and essence of the inorganic world, but also from the actual state of an organic world of souls. Souls experience joy and sorrow; but how does that come about? There must be a reason. For individuals, karma is the reason. But karma, which is reckoned unintelligent, cannot be the final cause of the joys and sorrows that the soul endures. There must be another cause standing behind karma, and it must be an intelligent cause that first determines what is good and what is evil. It must also observe and judge the activities of souls, and, finally, it must see to it that they really do consume the fruits of their deeds.

Only God, who knows everything and commands all power, could possibly serve as karma's warder and executor. Denying God's existence, and then taking something else as karma's warder and executor will lead to great difficulties, as is shown in this refutation of the Buddhists:

You say that earlier your Buddha performed all good deeds, and because of that attained omniscience. Then, in his mercy, he revealed the Pidika book by which souls are released. But who told him what was good and what was evil? If you say, 'Before him was one who was like him'. Then it can again be asked, Who was it who told that one?' As you say no-one established the law of karma, this leads to an endless regress. (*Refutation of the Sautrantika Buddhists, in Siddhiār* 8).

If one does not want to stumble over difficulties, only God, existing eternally, and who is pure intelligence, can be accepted as Lord of the law of karma. He knows what is good and bad karma; he also knows what souls do, and whether they deserve joy or sorrow, and how much, and has the power to see they get their true deserts.

The Aruḷ (grace) of God is everywhere like the sun, a great light to gather deeds together and get them consumed.

The body knows nothing, the soul knows nothing; nor do the deeds themselves. Who then shall understand these things? (*Payan* IV. 2 & 3)

If there is no entity that imposes the fruits of good and evil deeds upon souls, then no-one will attain heaven or hell by reason of those deeds. You may say it is like an arrow, which once shot makes its way to its target; yes, provided someone shot it first! (*Refutation of Jainism in Siddhiār* 9)

Bodha also points out that even if karma existed eternally and unceasingly, it could not act without God; it cannot on its own and without an overlord produce fruits like joy and sorrow, any more than labour can produce a harvest without a reaper. (Bodha II. 2, Example 1) Karma, to work, needs a God. We thus have a proof from karma, as well as a cosmological proof.

In the refutation of the Purva Mīmāṃsā system in Siddhiār we find the existence of God further proven by reference to the Vedas, which require an agent; and again, in the refutation of Jainism (Nikaṇṭhavādi sect), 13 & 14, by pointing out that there can be no salvation of souls without a God. Release without God's help is no more possible than a pot at the bottom of a well getting out all by itself.

Although our sources offer various proofs of the existence of God, the main emphasis is on the cosmological proof, as this proof alone was worked out systematically to provide a basis on which to erect the whole system. Other proofs of the existence of God are mentioned only occasionally.

2. That God is One

As popular belief in India is polytheistic, and the Vedas do speak of many gods, Śaiva Siddhānta was bound to state its own position regarding polytheism. This is especially so because of its designation of the Supreme as Śiva, in a land where a trinity of Brahma, Vishṇu and Śiva is spoken of, suggesting that god Śiva was only '*primus inter pares*', (first among equals), and that there were other gods besides him. To exclude this notion, while not actually denying the existence of a plurality of gods, Śiva was called 'incomparable' (e.g. Payan I.1, Bodha IX.3), and was repeatedly said to be so high above the other gods that they could not even recognise him. And anyway he is said to differ in nature from other gods; he is not just highest among them, like a king among men, for his difference from them is not just one of degree. He is without beginning, while Brahma and Vishṇu are not, in their present forms at least; of course they were not created, any more than souls were, so they can be called 'beginningless' in just this sense. They acquired their present roles, which are not theirs by nature or from ever. It is not by their own authority, but on the instruction and under the supervision of Śiva alone that they perform their tasks of creating and sustaining the world.

How is it, you may ask, that these three tasks (creation, preservation and destruction) are ascribed to three gods, but you then delete the other two, and allot these tasks to one alone? I tell you Brahma and Vishṇu have achieved their positions of authority as a result of their service to the commands of the Supreme. (*Siddhiār* I.34)

Śaiva is eternal, remaining always the same. Brahma and Vishṇu are not. They play their roles as Creator and Preserver only until the destruction of the world.

Vishṇu, God of Preservation, and Brahma, God of Creation, also revert to Śiva, the cause of their existence. (*Bodha* I.2 *Ex.*I)

Whether they will be entrusted with the same tasks after this world-period, is dependent upon their merits. Vishṇu, Brahma and all the other gods are subject to the three developing stages of creation (entry into Māyā), preservation (subjection to Māyā), and destruction (release from Māyā, either when the world ends, to return into Māyā again, or by salvation, with no return). (Bodha I.3)

This makes it evident that Siddhānta reckons these gods not as Pati (lords), but as Paśu (creatures). Śiva is the Lord, and

Brahma and Vishṇu are his servants. Śiva is the liberator; Brahma and Vishṇu are themselves in need of liberation, because they too, are afflicted with Mala. Śiva is Pati, Lord; Brahma and Vishṇu belong to Paśu, the 'herd' of souls. Indeed they belong to a lower group of souls, the Sakalar, who are afflicted with all three fetters, Āṇavamala karmamala and Māyāmala. Because of this, it is said in the first Sūtra of Bodha, that the other gods, apart from Śiva, are not gods at all. They are souls, equipped with special authority.

The commentary on Bodha I.3 dismisses polytheism in this way:

'Polytheists say: if evolution implies destruction then the destroyer-God must be supreme; yet even so we can think of several gods of like power, just as it takes several men pulling together to get a temple-car out onto the road, which is a good deal less complex than the world. Yes, several may share in setting forth a temple-car, but then they all work at the behest of one. The holy scriptures do make Narayanan, Indra, Agni, Surya and other gods into world-causes, but only as secondary causes. The Supreme God, who is behind all doers and all deed, is Śiva alone.'

3. God's Nature as Sat-Cit-Ānanda

Describing the three eternal substances as Pati, Paśu and Pāśa picks out God as Lord of the other substances. The reason for this distinction lies in the nature of God. Other substances do indeed exist which like God are without beginning, being thus on a par with him in that respect. But they are far below him with regard to their existence, as well as to their nature and their form of life. Our sources try to establish this difference between him and other substances rationally, by the title Sat-Cit-Ānanda.

In discussing Śiva's nature as Sat-Cit-Ānanda we can confine ourselves to explaining briefly what these terms mean, as we shall devote a special section to the precise definition of God's nature, as resulting from his attributes. Quotations in support are therefore not given here, but below in section II.9 on 'Śiva as Knower and Known', and in section III.3 on Māyāmala.

The first thing said about God is that he is Sat. That describes him as existing, and as a true reality. This can also be said of souls, and of the world, and our sources do say that they too are Sat; but, according to its quite particular and complete meaning, the description Sat befits only the Supreme. He alone is Sat in the fullest sense of the word, and this is shown in emphatic detail in

the commentary on Bodha VI. Here it is shown that the expression Sat as applied to souls and to Pāśa is only partially correct, and can be used in only a limited sense, while the predicate Asat can also be attributed to them. After that, he continues by saying:

God, ever-blessed, stands undiminished in power both in the time of bondage, and in the time of Release, unlike the others (paśu and pāśa), so there is no reason to call him Asat in any sense at all. God's nature is Sat in every respect.

God, therefore, exists (is Sat) as other substances do, but in a different and higher sense. Other substances are also Sat but in a more restricted sense: God is so in every sense. How can we present this more clearly? Perhaps this is the way. We accept that, first of all, he once existed through his own power, and that neither for his existence, nor for his nature, nor for his continued permanence, had he need of any other thing. He always remains like himself, and is not disturbed by anything at all, and is subject to no kind of change. He is one who is absolutely complete, and in no way to be surpassed. His nature is dependent upon nothing, and influenced by nothing.

According to Śaiva Siddhānta, his nature of absolute and complete Being will not be damaged by the fact that, from the beginning onwards, other substances existed besides himself. That is because these substances, although not originating in him, are dependent on him and directed by him. God exists in his own right, but these subjects exist only with God, and in dependence upon him. Their existence is not conceivable without the existence of God, while his existence remains conceivable without that of other substances. His existence is the prerequisite for their existence. That is why he is said to 'underpin Māyā' and to be the 'soul of souls'. God is thus Sat in every respect, as the existence of everything else depends on his, and his existence is prerequisite for that of everything else.

Following Descartes' definition of substance, we can define God as Sat, as the substance that so exists that it has no need of any other thing for its existence and life, and as that without which nothing else can be thought of as existing. This definition is not valid for the other substances Pásu and Pāśa. They are Sat in a more restricted sense.

Genuine, complete existence is indeed not the only thing that must be attributed to God. We shall fully comprehend the nature

of God only when we move on from the mere fact of his existence to his actual life, and discover what he is really like, what sort of meaning his Being has as lived. He exists as Cit, that is, as intelligence and as knowledge. Souls also can be called Cit, but only in a very restricted sense: but God can be called Cit in every respect.

You say Śiva and the jīva (souls) are both Cit, and are therefore one. But I tell that Śiva is aruḷCit (a knowledge which confers knowledge), but souls are aruḷ-dependent Cit. Śiva is a Cit which brings about creation and destruction, knowledge and Release, and souls derive from these. Souls are a Cit needing guidance, but Śiva is a Cit knowing by-itself. So even if these two do combine during Release, they do not become one, although not alien. The soul and buddhi (the soul's thinking-system, a product of Māyā, non-intelligent in nature) are both called 'cit'. Does that make buddhi into souls? You say that buddhi is acit (i.e. not Cit); then souls also are acit, compared with Śiva. (*Siddhiār* XI.11)

God knows without organs, without objects, without candlelight, without karma, without form, without proof, without books, without a higher intelligence; God is without form, God creates everything and is different from everything. God is present in all souls, and instructs as the principle of knowledge. (*Siddhiār* V.5)

As souls know how to teach, and do not perish, they are said to have the marks of Sat and Cit. But God is by nature eternal and free from Mala, and is pure Cit and Sat. Through his aruḷ, he frees souls from all fetters that prevent the Sat and Cit characteristics of souls from achieving their due. (*Siddhiār* VII.4)

The many souls need higher help in knowing things, but our king does not. (*Payan* I.6)

These sayings, and many more like them, show that Śiva is taken to exist as absolute intelligence, whose knowledge has no limits; he has no need at all to receive information, for knowledge comes to him without effort.

The description of God as Sat culminates in the repeated claim that Sat knows nothing of Asat (Payan II.7) — using Sat in the sense of Cit, as is often done in Bodha.

You say that Sat knows everything, but I tell you Sat knows nothing. You say that Sat realizes things through Asat, but I tell you know that in the presence of Sat Asat has no standing, just as darkness has no standing before the sun. (*Siddhiār* VII.1)

When Sat is there everything is Śūnya (a nothing). So Sat knows nothing. (*Bodha* VII. *Sūtra*)

The statement that God does not know Asat is not meant to deny the intelligence of Śiva, but to assert it with all possible emphasis. If we are speaking of recognition, we presuppose two things which are different from each other, a subject who recognises and an object which is recognised. It is by these two different things confronting each other, and coming into contact with each other, that knowledge takes place. In this sense, there can be no talk of God, as God, actually knowing Asat, i.e. non-Sat, i.e. what is not God. In Payan I. 1 Śiva is said to be present in all things as pure knowledge: pervading everywhere, souls as well as matter, Māyā, and its products. Nothing exists outside him or apart from him. Neither does anything alien to him exist. Souls and matter are indeed objects to be known, but not by Śiva. He does not need to know them so as to control them, for he is in control already. He has no need to get in touch with them, he is in touch. He need not get to know them for he knows them already.

Before his complete intelligence, all objects of knowledge disappear as darkness before the sun. He is intelligence that can know without any assistance: without instruction, or means of knowledge, or objects to know.

The Supreme has no things to know, as no thing is alien to him. If the Supreme recognises Asat it is not as something alien to himself, because he cannot see bogus Asat, as darkness is not apparent in the rays of the sun. (*Bodha* VII.1 *Ex.*1)

The commentary notes that this is directed at those who say 'If it is said that the Supreme does not recognise Asat because he does not recognise anything by observation, that will detract from his omniscience'; and offers the reply that as omniscience excludes knowledge based on observation, denying such knowledge is no loss of omniscience, but rather a glorification of it.

But there is yet more to God's nature as Cit. It is only by his intelligence that the intelligence of souls can operate; which is why he is often called the 'Intelligence of intelligence', or 'the guiding intelligence'. Bodha V.2 states that 'The soul knows through the help of the Supreme', arguing 'In the same way as the senses know only through the soul, so the soul does not achieve knowledge all by itself', as the light of the stars and other instances

show. God is the only truly independent intelligence; that of souls depends on him. Without God there is no knowledge at all.

God, as Cit, could thus be called pure intelligence, having total knowledge, not obtained through any other thing, and but for which no other thing would know anything.

The third term used to describe God's nature is Ānanda, literally joy, bliss, desire, indicating God as blessed, totally blessed, not needing anything to make him so, his blessedness not being dependent or conditioned by anything, nor liable to be reduced or increased by anything; and as the basis for the blessedness of souls.

He who grants bliss to those worthy to receive it has a nature of perfect bliss. That is why he does not experience it (as he has it already). (*Payan* VIII.3)

4. God's Attributes

It is well known that in considering the attributes of God in his version of Vedānta, Śaṃkara differentiated between a higher and a lower Brahma, describing the lower Brahma as having attributes, and the higher Brahma as without attributes. God's true nature, for him, is found in the higher Brahma, who has no attributes. Brahma-plus-attributes (the immanent-God, so to say) is in the last analysis a Nothing, conjured up by Māyā, an illusion, false knowledge. For him, then, immanence is incompatible with the true nature of God.

Śaiva Siddhānta rejects this distinction between a real but transcendent God and a bogus immanent one, holding the transcendent and the immanent to be equally real; considering transcendence and immanence not as opposites, but rather as two necessary sides of one Godhead. For Śaṃkara, it is part of God's nature to be transcendent as well as immanent. So we read in Paḍiār 8:

Those people who have been instructed by a Guru, and so have no karma, do not say that God is only transcendent. They know that he is immanent as well as transcendent, and know, therefore, that he is everywhere, wherever your knowledge may reach.

It is not that God, who is pure Being, enters into relationship with other realities; for he is already connected with them from eternity. God is indeed said to be active or passive, but these are

not opposed descriptions, for he is always the same true God, pure Being, and pure knowledge, total harmony (i.e. Ānanda) whether active or not.

Śaiva Siddhānta thus holds that God in his nature is always the same, whether thought of as transcendent or as immanent. So we naturally find here a single series of statements about his nature, not two series as in Śaṃkara's Vedānta.

Śiva is usually said to have eight attributes or features (guṇa): complete independence, total purity, self-originating knowledge, omniscience, freedom from all Mala, unbounded friendship, almightiness, limitless bliss. These characteristics were not acquired in time, but belong to his nature from eternity; for Śaiva Siddhānta thinks of a guṇa as an attribute belonging to the nature of something, which, therefore, cannot exist without it.

In their discussions with opposing schools, the Siddhāntin sages are always deploying the principle that 'If the guṇa comes to an end, so does the substance of which that guṇa forms a part.' A property that does not belong to the nature of a substance is called an aṇga (member) and he who possesses such a property is called aṇgi, the possessor of aṇga.

Śaiva Siddhānta does not confine itself to these characteristics in subsequent descriptions of the nature of God; indeed, it takes almost no notice at all of enumerations of the guṇa, and it seems as if the expression 'he who is furnished with a guṇa', was taken over (from Āgamas) but then put aside as unsuited for use as a formal principle in describing the nature of God. Our account also will follow them, in this. As the commentator on Sūtra VI of the Śivajñānabodha remarks, the two words Sat and Cit include the whole nature, and all the characteristics of the Supreme. It will, therefore, be more appropriate to arrange under these headings the detailed descriptions of the nature of God, which are found in various passages in the writings of Śaiva Siddhānta.

4a(i) *God, being Sat, is Great*

Śiva being Sat in every respect results first of all in his greatness, towering above all other substances. The analogy of the capital letter 'A' is often used to illustrate this, as in the first saying in Tiruaruḍ-Payan.

Like the letter A is the incomparable God, present in all things as true knowledge, and pervading them.

The commentary at this point shows clearly how this analogy is to be understood:

The 'A' sound can stand alone or in close conjunction to other vowels and consonants, being then unseen. It is the first letter of the alphabet, and comes forth (is pronounced) unmodified, as a basic sound. That is why it is used here as a likeness for the Supreme. Which might suggest that the form of the sound is meant (which is matter), had it not mentioned 'knowledge' to exclude this. An A can leave a compound, but this aspect is excluded by 'pervading'. Other letters include an A, as is indicated by 'all things'. Finally 'incomparable' shows the Supreme is not subject to comparison, even though he is here compared, to help in instructing pupils.

The points of comparison are as follows:

(a) *'A', the first letter of the alphabet, is the simplest and basic sound.*

(b) *All other vowels are modifications of the 'A' sound, and no consonant can be produced without this 'A' sound or one of its modifications.*

(c) *In conjunction with the consonants the 'A' sound is not visible. (In the Tamil alphabet, the 'A' is written only when it stands alone; unlike other vowels, it has no separate symbol, when used in conjunction with consonants.)*

From these points of likeness, the following points emerge about the nature of Śiva. Śiva (A) is the highest. All things which differ from him in nature or origin, the twofold world of souls (other vowels) and matter (consonants), are all dependent upon God. God can exist on his own, just as the Letter 'A' can be pronounced without the assistance of any other letter; but the dual world cannot exist without God, even though it did not originate in him, just as none of the other vowels or consonants can be pronounced without the help of the letter 'A' or its modifications.

Other letters cannot be pronounced without A, and likewise nothing can exist without God. (*Bodha* II.1)

Which does not mean that God, like A, is visible. Although the world exists only in conjunction with God, God is not visible. The eye sees only the world, just as in the (Tamil) letter KA you only see the consonant K. But you pronounce it ka, including the invisible vowel A; and anyone with true wisdom recognises both realities, the world and God (though seeing only one of them).

This comparison tells against the teaching of the Buddhists. They took God's invisibility as proof that he did not exist. But this comparison with A upholds his overwhelming greatness, even though he is invisible.

Siddhiār XI.8. rejects the objection that we ought to infer God's non-existence from his invisibility, by referring to a blind man, who does not perceive the sun, however, brightly it shines. Which shows that God's invisibility is not absolute. People don't see him, because their inner eye is defective. When Release comes we shall be equipped with a faultless eye, and will then see God, unreachable though he is by ordinary reason.

Śiva, therefore, is the Supreme, ruler of both the organic and the inorganic world. He is highest, not just in degree, but in kind, for he is dependent upon nothing, and nothing else can be conceived without him. His sovereignty is not that of a Creator, for souls and matter have always existed (in seed at least), but is that of a king, and none the less tremendous and universal for that. He did not acquire his sovereignty, for it is his by nature.

(ii) *God is Almighty*

As God is absolute Reality, dependent upon no other thing, and as no other thing can exist without him (even though their existence was not due to him), so God must be almighty. He needs no support, as the commentator on Bodha Sūtra I indicates:

The soul does not stand in its own right, as the Supreme does, but like the eye, or crystal, or the ether, is dependent on something else.

Rather, he is the basis of all things and carries all in his mighty hand. Without him all else is dead, for no activity by other realities takes place without him. So in Bodha I.2, Reason it says in relation to the inorganic world that what is there does not become active without some Mover (agens). And of the organic world he says (in Bodha I.3, Reason).

The world which knows by observation (the world of souls) does not have a capacity for free action, except through the author of destruction (God).

That is why Meykaṇḍadeva traces all work of creation, preservation and destruction back to Śiva, and the commentator says it is he who is operating, directly or indirectly, in everything that occurs.

As the inorganic world is matter, and the organic world is fettered through ignorance, and exists only as intelligence that knows by observation, there must be a God, different from these, to set them in motion. And as the world appears very elaborate, the Supreme God who sets it in motion must have complete wisdom, unlimited power, great love and independence, and other wonderful qualities. (*Comment on Bodha* I.3, *Example*)

His omnipotence is so complete that a mere thought of his is enough:

He is not subject to the limitation that what is thought may not be real. (*Siddhiār* I.45)

The commentator on Bodha gives more detail on the manner of God's activity.

Active agents are of two sorts. One acts by thought alone, thinking 'This should be so'. The other sort needs instruments to act by. God can be compared to a potter in a general way and for one particular purpose, but not otherwise, for a potter can act only by the aid of instruments. (*Bodha* I.2, *Example* 3; *Comment*)

(iii) *God cannot change*

Although Śaiva Siddhānta describes God as Sat, i.e. as absolute, perfect and totally self-sufficient in nature, it does not conceive him deistically, as high over other subjects but unrelated to them; but sees him as closely connected to them, and with them in what they do. Which might suggest an activity on his part unsuited to one who is Sat. So it is no surprise to find Siddhanta discussing how God can be said to act, without undermining his nature as Sat; it is God's unchangeability that makes this possible.

Brahma, enthroned in the fragrant lotus blossom, creates the whole world; Vishṇu preserves the world; our God destroys all things, totally. That is why Vishṇu and Brahma are subject to his great might. He enlists them in his service, and through them has all things come forth. So he is not subject to change. As the sun takes up his first position in the sky one lotus is flowering, another is in bud, and another is falling, all in due course. (*Prak:* I.5)

You think God is subject to change as he creates, maintains and destroys the world? I tell you it is like a lotus flowering in the much-praised sun, or a crystal radiating brilliance, or water evaporating. (*Siddhiār* I.33)

The Supreme is like Time, unmoved; he creates without creating,

maintains without maintaining, destroys without destroying, just by his will. Hence is he fetter-free, like the man who has such a vivid dream it stays with him when he wakes (though untouched; e.g. not bitten by a tiger, as he dreamt he was).

Comment. By this he rejects the objection that if God performs the works of creation, etc., he is subject to change and thus fettered.

Time Past and Present and Future are all different; and Time brings about all changes, yet stays unchangeable; and so does God. He creates, maintains and destroys the world without help from instruments, solely by his will. So he is without Mala, fetter-free, just as the mind is not moved, in reading a book, and as someone who grasped a truth when awake is unaffected by dreams he has. (*Bodha* I.2, *Example* 3)

Whatever God may do, his nature is always the same.

(iv) *God the Mala-free*

Although he who is in union with the (organic and inorganic) world yet differs from it and takes on the form of Śakti in his commerce with it, and although as Lord he guides the innumerable souls according with their deeds, yet is he not affected thereby. He is on his own, the totally Mala-free and present in everything indiscerptibly. (*Siddhiār* II.1)

Mala, we saw, is considered an eternally existing reality; and Śiva, as we shall see, is closely related to souls affected by Mala, and stands by the world, yet he is in no way constrained by it. In his nature, he is as little touched by Mala as the sun is by the clouds.

(v) *God is Nirguṇan*

Being 'Mala-free', God is also free of attributes, as stated in Prak: I. 1, Bodha IX.2 and elsewhere. 'Nirguṇa' literally means 'without properties', or 'without attributes', even though Śiva was said to have eight guṇas; for in Siddhāntin terminology this word does not mean 'feature', in general, but is a technical term for the three guṇas of matter, Sattva, Raja and Tamas. So 'Nirguṇa' does not say that God has no attributes; but describes him as not having the characteristics of matter. The commentator on Bodha expressly rejects the interpretation of nirguṇa as 'without any properties', pointing out he was not only described as Nirguṇan but is also said to have eight guṇas.

Vedānta does indeed distinguish between a nirguṇa (transcendent) Brahma and a saguṇa (immanent) Brahma, taking

nirguṇa as 'attribute-less' and saguṇa as 'with attributes'. Here a comment should be made. Śiva is called nirguṇa both as immanent and as transcendent. It is not that as transcendent he is nirguṇa but as immanent he has eight guṇas. Both descriptions apply to him both as immanent and as transcendent. Being Sat he is free of all material qualities; but being Cit he does have qualities.

4b(i) *As Cit, God knows everything*

That God must know all things completely is clear enough from what was said about his being Cit. He knows everything directly, in the strictest sense; he knows everything simultaneously, not one thing after another. Siddhiār I.45 says he 'has perfect knowledge by nature'. Hence he is called 'great knowledge' as against the soul's 'little knowledge'. He alone knows what souls do (Siddhiār II. 45) and so is both guardian and executor of the law of karma. (see 'Śiva as Knower and Known', II.9 below.)

(ii) *God is everywhere*

A special section will be devoted to this distinctive feature of Siddhāntin teaching, which became a shibboleth distinguishing them from other schools. Here some brief comments can be offered on omnipresence as a fact.

That God *could* know everything is deduced from his being Cit: *Like the letter A, the incomparable God comes into everything, pervading it as pure knowledge, ever present.* (*Payan* I.1)

The same work considers the question, 'Is God spatially limited, or present everywhere?'

He who is everywhere and present in everything, as fire is in boiling water, is united with them though fully independent.

He is quite literally omnipresent, for by his incomparable greatness he makes room for everything, and by his subtle delicacy everything makes room for him. (Payan I.3)

There is nothing that is not in him, nothing that he is not in. He both surrounds and inhabits everything. He is for them what the sea is for water, and what life is for the body. Nothing exists outside of him, nor does he exist outside of anything. Everything is in him and he in everything. (see also II.6 below, on Śiva's Śakti, and II.8 on Advaita)

(iii) *God is not Partisan*

On what basis does God exercise these various properties? As he

is quite independent, this basis has to lie within himself, though not as a rule to govern their exercise, for that would demean God's greatness:

Some say Śiva's works are a game his Aruḷ plays, but the Siddhantins say, etc. (*Prak* I.6)

His action is completely impartial, not arbitrary, *Aversion and affection do not come near him* (*Siddhiār* I.45). All his actions accord with the deeds of souls.

He assesses all good and evil deeds, and gives joy and sorrow accordingly. (*Siddhiār* II.11)

He is good to those who approach him, but not to the others. That is not partiality, for his name is Śaṃkara (*Doer of Good*). (*Payan* I.9)

But this differential treatment of different souls is not partisan:

Those who are great have a duty to protect those who ask for it; so it is not partial for the Supreme to protect those who follow him. (*Bodha* X.2)

(iv) *God's Love*

God's actions are not guided only by impartiality, but also and most importantly by love. 'Śiva' means kind, friendly, beneficent, indicating love; as 'Śaṃkara' indicates well-doing. Most significant of all are his titles Anbu (love) and Aruḷ (grace). Modern Siddhāntists are very fond of this saying from Tirumūlār's Tirumantra:

Fools say Śivam and love are two. No-one knows that Śivam and love are the same, for if you did know, you would have attained Love, i.e. Śivam.

I am not sure that this thought from Tirumantra can be used to show Śaiva Siddhānta's God is a God of Love, as it is uncertain that Śivam here means God. I think it means release or bliss; and the whole saying describes what that bliss is, not what God is.

But even without this piece of evidence, we have to admit that edifying works like Tiruvācaka and the Tāyumānavar are forever praising Śiva as a God of Love.

The same is true of those works of pure philosophy, on which the present work is based; these also extol God as Love, and explain all his actions on that basis. It is stated so often that God is a God of love and grace, and this in connection with every doctrinal point in turn, that one could almost say that the entire system is intended to show that Śiva is Love, a god who seeks the best for souls in all his actions.

We shall later have occasion to quote many statements to this effect, so will here cite only one:

Grace is his form, his nature and his truth. Grace is his essence. Grace is his knowledge. From seclusion he comes forth to do deeds of grace. His hands and feet bestow grace, grace-givers too are his clothes and his insignia. Selfless himself, he clothes himself in grace not for himself, but for souls. (*Siddhiār* I.47)

5. Is God a Person?

Does Siddhānta regard the Supreme as personal or impersonal? Of course 'person' is not a notion regularly canvassed in Indian philosophy, as it is in the West, so it is no good hunting for proof-texts saying 'God is personal' or the reverse. But we can take the elements which make up our western notion of a person, and see if these are attributed to Śiva or denied of him; and then decide if the features he has do add up to personality in our sense.

Svatantra and tanvasa (independence, freedom) are often used in connection with Śiva, while Paratantra and Paravasa (dependence, lack of freedom) are denied of him, indicating that Śiva is self-sufficient and independent; features usually regarded as an aspect of personality. Śiva is also Sat, truly existent: another plus. The western notion of a person includes intelligence and self-awareness, features on which Śaiva Siddhānta lays great stress. Love, bliss, impartiality are also attributed to Śiva: these are not part of our notion of a person, though they can go with it. In the pantheistic schools of Indian thought omnipresence plays a large part, but Siddhānta does not take it pantheistically; regarding that divine presence as active and creative but without excluding other entities. In Siddhānta he is called 'Pati', lord of the other entities; and whereas Śaṃkara's Vedānta has God immanent with qualities different from God transcendent, for Śaiva Siddhānta both are the same in their action towards the world. We are thus forced to conclude that Siddhānta, far from throwing itself into the arms of pantheism, actually has a personal God: though it may not always have drawn those further conclusions which this discovery requires.

6. Śiva's Śakti

Śaiva Siddhānta attributes to its Supreme God features which we consider part of personality; and from this we inferred that the Siddhāntin God is personal. In this and the following section we

shall see that Siddhānta does not always seem serious about this. Accepting as it does that there are several eternal substances, and describing the Supreme as 'Lord', and equipping him with properties by which he could exercise his lordship directly, they might be expected to say that God deals direct with those other substances; which would show that their statements indicating that God is a person were to be taken seriously. For once it is granted that there are other substances besides God, his absolute and unlimited nature as a person would require him to deal directly and vigorously with those substances; if his influence is indirect that is bound to detract from his personal character.

Now Śaiva Siddhānta cannot with any precision be said to have God acting directly on other substances. Admittedly everything that happens is due to Śiva in the end, not that he actually does them himself, but he stimulates interest and activates potentialities, as we shall see later on. Substances already there outside of him he affects by his Śakti and his Form: the doctrine of the Śakti shows that he can affect the other substances, (II.6) and the doctrine of his Form shows how this is done (II.7). Then the discussion of advaita (II.8) shows how it is possible for those other substances to be affected by Śiva. Finally a consideration of Śiva as both Knower and Known will show how influence of this sort is consistent with Śiva being absolute. (II.9)

The teaching about Śiva's Śakti is set out in detail in Bodha Sūtra II, where God is said to be advaita-related to the soul (see below II.8). Section four of the Sūtra argues that this relation is both possible and actual because the Supreme is inseparable from his Śakti. This is so important that we venture to translate the whole section at this point.

Thesis. The Supreme is indivisibly bound up with his Śakti.

Comment. Mīmāmsa and others object that the Śakti is different from the Supreme; but Nyāya and others make the opposite objection, that they are not different. Thus it is open to doubt whether the Śakti, who is responsible for rebirth, thus setting off their deeds both bad and good, is different from the Supreme or not. It is to meet these points, and to resolve the last part of the Sūtra, that the thesis just given is stated.

The thesis means that although they (God and the Śakti) are alike in nature they are different in a certain respect.

Reason. The Supreme is everywhere present, without in himself being either one or two.

Comment. Saying he is neither one nor two repeats what the thesis stated, adding as a reason that he is present everywhere, to emphasise their inseparability. As omnipresence was established in the first section it can serve as a Reason here.

Example. As the given premiss states that God is everywhere, he can't in himself be one. But if you say he is two, then he can't be everywhere. Wherever an object may be, it cannot be there without the Supreme. He is like sun and light. They belong to him (they, the three Pāśa, more or less=Matter). We are his servants.

Comment. An objection: How is it that the thesis and the Reason are not different? His reply is to confirm the Reason:

As the given premiss has God as everywhere both one and different (this refers to his advaita relation to the world), so God cannot be an object. If he were an object he could not be omnipresent, but only in one place, as a man standing by the Ganges cannot also be standing by the Kavēri. So if you think the Supreme is two objects, I tell you that then he could not be everywhere, both one and different; for one divided in himself cannot be present as a single entity in other things. The statement that he is present everywhere conflicts with there being two notions (of the Śakti's relation to God); and if this leads you to think he is not present everywhere, then let me assure you that every object, however constituted and wherever it may be, could not be there without the Supreme; just as other letters cannot be there without the letter A. (God would then cease to be the Supreme). So it will not do to say that he is not omnipresent.

What are we to say then? I will tell you. The Supreme who is present everywhere exists like the sun and the sunlight, so one can say 'one' or one could say 'two' because of the inseparable union of Śiva and Śakti. If you say that souls and (the three) Pāśa must be like God, as they also are present everywhere, like that, without in themselves being one or being two, as God and his Śakti are indissolubly bound together; then I tell you that even so Pāśa belongs to God and we souls are his servants, being as objects (vyāpya, fulfilled) to his subject (vyāpaka, fulfilling).

This section of the Sūtra says that, as the Supreme is omnipresent he cannot (as subject of that omnipresence) be unitary. If therefore you say that he is two objects, you must realise that in that case he could not be omnipresent. If you say he is indeed not omnipresent, remember that Paśu and Pāśa cannot exist without him. Please note that the premiss that the Śakti is present and indissolubly linked with Śiva was given at this point to explain why that union is indissoluble; for it says the Supreme exists as

Śiva and Śakti, like sun and sunlight; though inseparable yet he is two, and present everywhere. Just as the one sun which illumines itself and (other) objects, is called 'sunbeams' when shining on those objects but 'sun' when shining on itself; and these two, being inseparable, are unitary although divided: so also that one great Intelligence has a double aspect; it can stand alone as pure intelligence, with no reference to other objects; or it can take note of them and instruct them, being called Śakti in this latter case but called Śiva as a pure self-involved intelligence. And these two roles are inseparable, so that he is one even though he has two names. (*Bodha* II.4)

These explanations in Bodha show that Śaiva Siddhānta distinguishes Śakti as an entity more or less independent of God, which can therefore relate to other subjects, and be active as their Lord. If God is regarded in a deistic way as a solo, transcendent God never going forth to make contact with other realities, then, as Śaiva Siddhānta correctly realized, he cannot be their Pati (Lord). That is why Śaiva Siddhānta rejects the idea of a God who never goes forth but is solely transcendent. But it also denies that a God transcendent in nature can become immanent, for God would then no longer be One and unchangeable, and so not the true Pati after all.

God is conceived as a person who has always been there, confronting other realities, and it would have seemed natural to say he deals with them by immediate overwhelming power. Siddhānta does not take this step, as that would make the idea of the Supreme vacuous, and introduce a pluralism which would endanger the unity of all things. The idea that God is absolute, which Siddhānta admits by saying that God is Sat in every respect, outweighs the idea of personality; and this renders the idea of a direct intervention of God unacceptable. Siddhānta, therefore, holds to the deistic maxim 'Existence has no knowledge of non-existence' (Payan II.7), i.e. God stands so high above other realities, that he can in no way enter into relationship with them. However, there is a contradiction between this deistic maxim and other theistic statements which make him Lord over the other realities.

If Siddhānta is to claim consistency then it must somehow reconcile these two statements. Its chosen strategy for achieving this seeks both to avoid the errors of deism and to preserve God's unity by not setting up a transcendent deity in opposition to an

immanent one. So it refuses to say either that 'God is solely transcendent' or that 'God is transcendent and becomes immanent' and proclaims instead that 'God is both transcendent and immanent', thus locating both transcendence and immanence in the very nature of God. In Christendom we use the notion of personality to reconcile these two, without the risk of verging on pantheism and rendering the notion of Absoluteness vacuous. Śaiva Siddhānta proposes a rational reconciliation, by introducing the idea of the Śakti. As the Śakti is there within God, Siddhānta holds that God can be both transcendent and immanent.

What is the Śakti, and how does it relate to God? Śakti signifies energy, or, more exactly, the energy of God; which relates to God as sunbeams to the sun (Bodha V. 2), or as the king's will to the king himself. (Siddhiār I.61)

The Aruḷ is his Śakti, and the one cannot exist without the other. To wise men, God and his Aruḷ appear as one, just as to the eye, the sun and its light appear as one. Just as the composition of gold remains the same, whether it forms a lump, or is fashioned into ornaments, so is the relation between Śiva and his Śakti. As Śakti is, so is Śiva. He is with his Śakti, he is part of Śakti; in conjunction with Śakti he is everywhere; he is in his Śakti beyond the end of Nāda (Śuddha Māyā), he is in his Tirōdhānaśakti; he is in the end of the Vedas; he is different from all these things. (*Paḍiār* 79 & 80)

The relation between God and his Śakti is, therefore, a very close one, but not one of absolute identity. God is said to be the efficient cause of the world, and the Śakti its instrumental cause, (see III. 3), which excludes their being totally identical. They are different, though not in nature, so their difference does not make them into separate and independent beings; yet the one is so to speak more public than the other. Sunbeams are of like nature as the sun, and exist only in closest relationship with it, yet sunbeams are sort-of independent of the sun. The king's will is of like nature to the king, and can exist only with the king, and not without him, yet they are not identical: the will acquires a distinct existence as orders, and laws. In the same way Śiva's Śakti is of like nature with Śiva and exists only in union with Śiva, but is not identical with Śiva. Śiva's Śakti, we can say, is an energy or thought in Śiva, which sometimes evolves out of him. But both are the same in nature, and form an unitary whole.

The aruḷ is Śiva's Śakti. Without the aruḷ there is no Śiva; without Śiva, there is no Śakti. (*Siddhiār* V.9)

The Śakti can evolve out of God, without affecting the whole unity, just as the sun is not affected by the sunbeams that shine out of it. God is thought to affect other realities through the Śakti, who is like him, but not identical with him.

The Supreme reveals himself through his Aruḷśakti. He does not reveal himself directly. (*Siddhiār* I.68)

As the sun does things only through its beams so God is effective and active only through his Śakti, allowing it to go forth and make contact with other realities.

As we effect all things through our hands, so does the Lord effect all things through his Śakti. (*Paḍiār* 78)

In Siddhiār I.68-70 the evolution of Śakti out of Śiva is described in more detail: Parāśakti (the Śakti not yet unfolded), is eternally allied with Paraśiva, as in the half male, half female form, where Śakti is shown as the left or female part. From this inclusive principle there emerges Jñāna. At this stage Śakti is called Śiva. Next to evolve is pure kriya. Now Śakti can be called Śakti. The combination of Jñāna and kriyā leads to the third stage; here jñāna and kriyā are similar and evenly matched. Now Śakti can be called Icchāśakti. This combination continues, but in stage four kriyā predominates, so Śakti is here called Kriyāśakti. And in stage five jñāna predominates, and Śakti is now called Jñānaśakti.

Yet Śakti is essentially one.

You ask if Śakti is multiple. I tell you Śakti in itself is a unity. But its functions make it appear multiple. (*Siddhiār* I.61)

Śiva who is present through the Śakti, pervading all things as pure intelligence, is pure Jñāna, and is called Śiva. But Śiva who through the Śakti, is the guiding and directing sovereign power is called Śakti. Śiva who through love is concerned for the release of souls is called Icchāśakti. Śiva who for the sake of the Release of souls by his Śakti allows the world to emerge out of Māyā (eternal basic matter) is called Kriyāśakti. And Śiva who through his Śakti finally ensures that the creation of the world has the intended result, that is, the release of souls from Pāśa, and their union with Śiva, is called Jñānaśakti or Aruḷśakti.

Śakti is one. By its various activities it becomes three-fold, as icchāśakti, jñānaśakti and kriyāśakti. Icchāśakti is the gracious love for souls. Through jñānaśakti the Lord recognises lovingly all the means for the saving of souls. Through kriyāśakti he creates the worlds. (*Siddhiār* I.63)

There is also discussion about a Tirōdhānaśakti of Śiva. This

Śakti is classified as jñānaśakti. It is the jñānaśakti which works on souls while they are bound down to matter. The term aruḷśakti is a general one, used for all Śakti, and even for jñānaśakti, even during the time of the direct process of salvation.

These relations can be set out in a table:

Paraśiva-parāśakti, two in one, symbolized as half man and half woman.

1. Śiva (pure jñāna, pure intelligence)
2. Śakti (pure kriyā, pure energy)
3. Icchāśakti (energy+intelligence in equal parts)
4. Kriyāśakti (some intelligence+more energy)
5. Jñānaśakti (some energy+more intelligence) (also called aruḷśakti, as it is for the benefit of souls that the Śakti evolves)

During bondage the jñānaśakti is tirōdhāna-Śakti; when release comes it is aruḷ-Śakti.

This arrangement enables the transcendent God who is 'Sat in every respect' to be Pati (Lord) for the other substances and to operate as such, and seemingly for it to be part of his nature so to do. This activity of Śiva will take place through his Śakti, but despite the close connection that, it is claimed, exists between these two, and which can be described as a 'two-in-oneness', it is not to be described as a direct dealing with other substances, but rather as the setting into motion of a power and a greatness which are already available: which is not quite how a free and absolute person should be thought to act.

That this activity of Śiva himself, made possible because he is two-in-one, is thought of as a setting-into-action and not as creation in the full sense of the word, becomes very clear from the doctrines about Śiva's form which is connected with, and develops the teaching about the Śakti of Śiva, showing how Śiva operates through his Śakti.

7. The Form of Śiva

As Śiva, through his Śakti, enters into an active relationship with other realities, he takes on a form. What this means is set out in Siddhiār I. 38-70. In the early verses, it describes the form of Śiva, and, after that, it lists his various works. In verse 38 it says:

If you ask about the form of the Supreme, whether He has a form, or has no form or both, know that he who is called 'the One' has all three forms.

It is clear from the context, and also from Śiva's form being said to be 'adopted', that statements about Śiva's form relate not to his nature but to a mode of existence taken on for a special purpose, which he can either enter or not enter without thereby affecting his nature.

Shape and form are attributes of matter, but Śiva is quite different from matter. Moreover, 'form' and 'shape' imply limitation. So saying that God has a form would undermine all other statements about his nature, if we were to treat it on a par with the statement that matter has form, ascribing shape to God just as we ascribe it to matter. In Siddhiār it is clearly stated that the expression 'God has a form', is not to be understood in the same sense as the words 'matter has a form'. Again, it is stated in verse 29, that the form of God does not require an agent in the same way as matter does, but that God adopts whatever form he thinks up. Not that this puts him on a par with yogis; they need another's help — God's grace — to take on another body, and their adopted form is a product of Māyā. But God with his perfect knowledge, total power and absolute overlordship, and without outside help, takes on a form which is free from Māyā. (40 & 41)

The form of Śiva derives from his Śakti, though not as an emanation; and it cannot be compared with anything we observe in nature. (42) It is not like objects with shape, nor objects without shape, such as ether, nor objects which sometimes have it and sometimes don't, such as the moon.

He is not an item subject to binding and release. He has neither end nor beginning. He is inestimable. So you can neither assert nor deny that it is in the father's nature to take this form, or avoid that one. (44)

The statement that he adopts a form is to be taken figuratively, not literally; it signifies activity and revelation, as the following verses show:

For us, the imaginary is unreal; but this limitation does not hold for him. By nature he has complete knowledge and complete power, and is free from Mala and does not feel attraction or revulsion; so by his aruḷ he assumes the form that he wishes. (45)

If the Supreme had not, by his aruḷ, adopted a form, and revealed to us the Vedas and the Āgamas, no-one could have come to bliss, not even Vishṇu among the gods, nor could there have come about any revered line of gurus, among men or those who dwell in the underworld. (46)

Aruḷ is his form; aruḷ is his essence; aruḷ is his knowledge. He emerges

out of seclusion and performs the works of aruḷ. Hand and foot dispense aruḷ, so do his garments and his insignia. Not for himself, but for souls, does he take the selfless form of aruḷ (grace). (47)

They do not know that Śiva's form is supernatural, and that it is within his form that the world comes to an end and passes away. They do not know that he is the life-principle of the world, and that he is the world itself. These same people who say that he belongs to the world do not know the nature of his form. (48)

They who say that Śiva is one of the gods do not know that Śiva, whose form is holy, is each of the three gods, and that one half of his form is Uma. They who could not even recognise Vishṇu and Brahma do not know that the nature of his form involves the development of the world! (49)

They do not know that, in order to provide pleasure for souls, he takes the form of pleasure; they do not know that he adopts the form of a yogi, so that they may attain the bliss of yoga. They do not know that he appears like a fury, in order to remove the deeds performed by souls. Fools who ponder over nothing say that he is but one of the gods. (50)

They do not know that he is not from this world, because he, the One, takes on contradictory forms. Nor do they know that even death is a good thing for the purpose of removing evil. (51)

When, in a love-game, Uma put her hands over Śiva's eyes, the darkness spread out everywhere engulfing everything. Through the pure eye set in his brow, he gave light to the world. They do not know that all the lights in the world are just reflections of the light-form of Śiva. (52)

They do not know that, when he of the brow-eye was absorbed in yoga, and Kāma (the God of Love) suspended his work, the gods that lived in the heavens were overcome by pangs of love.

They do not know that when Vishṇu deliberately incited the God of Love (to shoot an arrow at him), Śiva opened his fire-eye, and made everyone immensely happy by uniting with his spouse, the daughter of Imavān. (53)

If Śiva had no form, it could not be said that creation or other works were performed, that the pious receive instruction and revelation, or that by uniting with the wife who makes up his left half he ensures unending bliss for souls; or that yoga is an undertaking he rewards with mukti, and that there is the work of the destruction of Pāśa. (54)

It is also said that he assumes a shapely form, and we noted that he has a form which surpasses all shapely forms. If he is both formed and unformed, we must conclude that he has both a formed shape and an

unformed one. The three bodies named incorporate grace so we can dispense with the bodies we acquired in the womb. (55)

You may ask why the Vedas call him Adhvan mūrti. This is because he is eternally present in the world and inseparably bound to it; because he is the one who activates both Cit and Acit. So the Vedas all say that the six Adhvan make up his form. (56)

You may ask why the six Adhvan specifically attribute to the Supreme a mantra as form. Let me explain. The material cause of the world is the three Māyā, Vindu, Mohinī, Mān. Vindu is the highest of these, being linked with Śiva's Śakti, which is beyond knowledge. (57)

As the mantra emerges from the pure Vindu, and is activated by the Śakti itself, which then breathes life into it; and as it guarantees Intellect (limited wisdom, during bondage) and Salvation through the Buddhi mantra, all the Vedas ascribe the mantra-form to the Aruḷ. (58)

You may ask why the tantra specifically ascribe to the Supreme the form of the five mantra. It is because they were created first and other mantra derive from them, and because they are bound uninterruptedly to the Śakti. (*Siddhiār* I. 45-59)

It is apparent from these verses that Śiva is described as having a form because he is at work. Everything that evolves from his actions builds up his form, since all that exists is either the outcome of his work, or, at least in essence, is conditional upon it. As the Vedas and the Āgamas revealed, the word must be his form; as he allows the world to develop, the world must be his form. Because the world was created by Brahma and maintained by Vishṇu, these gods must build up his image. Because the soul can experience pleasure and meditation, it follows that he has the form of a pleasure-lover and a yogi, etc. All and each can be called a form of Śiva, as it is through him that they all are, or are as they are.

But in the Śaiva Siddhāntin writings we find a few forms of Śiva particularly emphasised. First, there are those where he is particularly active: then there are those where he specially reveals himself, and where he is an object of worship.

The Siddhāntin writings deal with these last aspects as they relate to the duty of souls towards God, so we also shall deal with them in that connection, especially as a detailed discussion of Siva's worshipful form (showing him as active) would be out of place here. But I must just mention that the insignia of Śiva worship, and the idols in the temple, can be regarded as forms of Śiva used especially for worship.

There are nine different forms which Śiva specially uses for the purpose of self-revelation. We read about them in Siddhiār II. 74.

The One Lord appears through the following nine manifestations: Śiva, Śakti, Nāda, Vindu, Sadaśiva, Māheśvara, Rudra, Vishṇu and Brahma.

Four of these are without form, and of these one evolves from the others. Four are formed, and one, Sadāśiva, both has a form and is formless.

These nine forms are the most direct manifestations of Śiva. Śiva himself stands for the intelligence that knows about the destiny of souls, and which understands the manner of their release.

Sakti is the energy or skill by which Śiva can release souls, and it is for this purpose that he allows the Śakti to emerge from himself.

The Nāda and Vindu forms are adopted when he lets his Śakti engage with Śuddhamāyā, which is original matter, and thereby gives to dead and inert matter the possibility of developing. It is in the Sadāśiva form that he wills the release of souls, and works for it through the products that he creates out of Māyā. That is the fifth among the five important works ascribed to him, and it is the work of grace or illumination, directed through the icchaśakti, as it is called. When Śiva carries out the work of obscuration, he is called Māheśvara. He assumes the Brahma, Vishṇu and Rudra forms as he carries out the work of creation, preservation, destruction. This shows that he so arranges matters that he can be described as the 'two-in-one Śiva', as the Śakti which evolves out of himself, as he who allows the natural forces of movement and space (the Nāda tattva and the Vindu tattva) to emerge out of Śuddhamāyā, and through Śiva-śakti and Śakti-Śakti (see the Śakti genealogical table just below) he enters into these two tattva and operates through them. Then as the one who enters into the highest class of released souls, the vijñānakalar, who live in bodies in the pure world, all emerging out of Śuddhamāyā, he is active in them as Sadāśiva and as Māheśvara.

Finally he enters into the more privileged sakalar souls, gods like Brahma, Vishṇu and Rudra, and works under these names. As Śiva and Śakti he stands beyond Śuddhamāyā; as Nāda he stands related to the Nāda tattva, and as Vindu he stands in relation to the Vindu tattva; as Sadāśiva he relates to the sādākshya tattva,

and breathes life into the Aṇusadāśivar (members of vijñānakalar); as Māheśvara he is related to Māheśvāra tattva, and breathes life into and animates the Vidyāīśar (also members of vijñānakalar); and as Brahma, Vishṇu, Rudra he relates to the śuddha vidyā tattva, and breathes life into, and sets in motion the gods Rudra, Vishṇu, Brahma, who are of the sakalar-class.

In tabular form, this may be represented as follows:

	Five śaktis evolve from Śiva *These bring out from Śuddhamāyā five **tattvas***		
1.	**Śivam**	links Śiva with	**Nāda**-tattva
	He is here called Śiva-Nāda.		
2.	**Śakti**	links him with	**Vindu**-tattva
	Here he is called Śaktivindu.		
3.	**Icchaśakti**	links him with	**Sādākshya** tattva
	Now called Sadāśiva, enlivens vijñānakalar souls.		
4.	**Kriyāśakti**	links him with	**Māhesvara** tattva
	Now called Māheśvara, enlivens vijñānakalar souls.		
5.	**Jñānaśakti**	links him with	**Śuddhavidyā** tattva
	Now called Rudra, Vishṇu, Brahma; he enlivens divine souls of the sakalar class.		

Śiva does, in a special sense, and through his Śakti, take on a form, enter into the finest products of matter, and from here, manifest himself through worthy souls. He is indeed active in this way, but it touches him not at all. *Śiva, like an actor, takes on a role like that of a Ravana or some other hero, and plays a part. That does not alter his nature. Every form that he assumes is Śakti. Sakti stands incorporated with Śiva, as pith is an intrinsic part of the tree.*

As crystal takes on the colours of blue and gold from objects nearby, so does he who is without Mala appear through the various hues of Śakti. His nature remains untouched. The Supreme reveals himself, not directly, but through the aruḷ or grace of the Śakti. Śiva is neither formed nor formless.

Śiva is neither Cit nor Acit. He performs neither creation nor any other work. He is neither yogi nor bhoktar (pleasure-lover). Although related to all of them, his nature is different from theirs. (*Siddhiār* I. 67,68,69)

Because, as can be shown here, he has a nature that towers above all others, as he is without beginning or middle, or end; because he is the personification of complete wisdom; because that role is unique and cannot be thought of as attributable to another; because he is the unconquerable king who is not influenced by aversion or attraction or any other emotion; and because he is present in all souls as the indestructible principle of life, He-who-is-without-Mala fashions for himself whatever form he wishes. (*Prak* I. 3)

In summary we can say that a form can be attributed to the Supreme so far as by his Śakti he relates to souls and matter; but without affecting his essence. He operates on the basis of this relationship, and we can say that this indwelling, and this binding with matter and souls will be considered inevitable, because this is the only way in which God becomes operative, and the form of Śiva, which engages in the union of souls or matter is the Śakti of Śiva.

The Śakti relates to other substances, and thereby assumes a form, thus setting in motion abilities and possibilities which had always been there, but not previously set going on their own account. While the purpose of this relation with Śiva is being fulfilled, the Śakti relates actively to other substances, (to souls and matter) and to that which resulted thereform, using them as a body or a dwelling-place. When that purpose has been fulfilled, the Śakti breaks off that connection, and its result (which by its union with Śiva was also — while that lasted — a form of Śiva) resolves once more into its cause (the other substance).

By why can Śiva be active in such a way, and not in others? The absolute state of God is threatened by the admission that there are other substances beside himself which have eternal existence. The safest way to preserve the idea of his unique state is to attribute all that happens to Śiva. This is the way adopted by Śaiva Siddhānta, but it is not without difficulties. Its teaching about the form of Śiva represents its explanation of the facts. Recognising that there are other entities as well, the Siddhāntins were not only compelled to assert that all events are traceable back to God, but also to explain this fact. Śiva wishes to free souls from the fetters of Mala, and to this end he gives them the opportunity of taking an active part. By dint of his Śakti he considers what deeds souls should perform, and how they should acquit themselves, in a world where an uncanny variety of things is associated with a single body.

As by dint of his Śakti he thinks these thoughts, everything that appears in the world is a reflection of his thought, and this is an actual reality, not a mere illusion. This coming into being and this activity endure only so long as he (through his Śakti) reflects upon it, and, to some extent, identifies himself with it. (cf. Siddhiār I.50-54)

Whatever he does not think about, and with which he does not identify himself through his thoughts (his Śakti), does not appear at all. If his Śakti is reabsorbed, i.e. when he no longer thinks of any activity or existence, then it stops being or happening. So we can say that the Śakti represents the thoughts of God, while the form of Śiva represents the materialisation of this thought. Thus the form of Śiva is really none other than the Śakti of Śiva put into effect.

But this activity of Śiva through his Śakti, or, what is the same thing, his assumption of a form, is not a direct activity, but an indirect one, as he is entering into other substances and to some extent identifying with them, so that he stimulates their latent skills and aptitudes. His thought, through which all occurrence takes place, is not a freely constructive one, but one which is qualified and constricted by the qualities and talents of other eternal substances. The world exists because Śiva conceives the idea of the world, but its form is dictated by the eternal basic material and its eternal attributes, which were not due to Śiva's thinking them up. And while the history of souls unfolds as Śiva conceives of it, he decides to conceive it just as prescribed by Karma, another eternal entity not thought up by Śiva.

Our conclusion must be that while there was vigorous doctrinal effort regarding the Śakti and the form of Śiva, this was not entirely successful in preserving God's absoluteness. His freedom and independence is limited, in spite of his lordship over other substances, by the fact that they do not have their origin in him, and this was bound to undermine his absolute state.

We might have avoided these implications if the personality of God came more to the fore, and we could take God as a free personality set among other substances now also regarded as eternal. That would have admittedly given monism something better to aim at. Perhaps, unconsciously, this is why Siddhānta did not take this route. Siddhānta relates all that happens to the will of Śiva, and in that way avoids a monism of substances—by getting

involved in a monism of events. This is meant to safeguard the unity of all existence and the absolute character of God, but it actually puts at risk God's unchangeability, which for Indian thought, in an important element in the absolute character of God. We shall need to examine this more fully later on.

We shall also have to say more precisely how the Siddhāntin can find it conceivable and possible that all occurrences should be traced back to God, given his admission that other entities beside him exist from eternity. For this reason there are two further sections showing how Śaiva Siddhānta deals with these two problems.

8. God is Advaita-related to the World

In the previous pages we saw how Śaiva Siddhānta, in the interests of God's absolute character, arrives at the idea of a relationship of God with the other realities, souls and matter so as to allow him to exercise his authority, which it does by tracing all occurrences back to Śiva. This two-fold function of God suggests yet another fundamental idea to Śaiva Siddhānta.

By accepting the eternal existence of several substances, Śaiva Siddhānta can incur blame for failing to realise that all things must form part of a united whole, which it is the business of philosophy to explain. This difficulty it seeks to avoid by saying that God relates to other substances, and, at the same time, by tracing all that happens back to God, so that although it teaches a pluralism of substances, it also asserts a monism of occurrences.

But just claiming this is not enough. The nature of the relationship must also be described, and it must also be shown how all occurrences can be traced back to him, and that, despite a multiplicity of substances, it is still possible to have a unity of events. It must make clear to its opponents that admitting several eternal substances does not exclude a unity in all that is; of which totality Śiva is indeed the sovereign Lord.

In this Section we shall be mainly occupied with God's relation to other substances, i.e. to the organic and inorganic worlds, to souls and to the products of Māyā. This will also clarify God's relation to Āṇavamala karmamala and Māyā, in their undeveloped state.

The relation of God to this dual state of the world requires special explanation, as it became a shibboleth for Śaiva Siddhānta,

and is in consequence dealt with in detail in their scriptures. A clear understanding of this doctrinal point is essential if we are to see the position of Śaiva Siddhānta as a logical possibility.

Siddhānta presents this relation as that of a sovereign to his subjects and to his possessions. They, the three Pāśa, are his possessions, and we, the souls, are his servants (Bodha II.4, Ex.), and this sovereignty of Śiva is an actuality, not merely nominal. Not only does he lay claim to it; he also practices it; and he is able to do that because he is everywhere present as pure knowledge. (Payan I. 1) However the omnipresence of Śiva should make it possible for him not only to exercise the prerogatives of his sovereign state, but also to bring everything present into a single unitary whole. Both these points come out in the discussion of God's advaita relation to the world.

The commentator on Bodha II reminds us, first of all, that different relationships between God and the world are indeed possible. One relation is that of succession and causality, like that which exists between gold and ornaments made of gold. The ornament is not different from the gold from which it was formed, and so may be called *abheda.* Another relation is that of existence with mutual exclusion, such as that which exists between darkness and light; here the two things related are totally different, *bheda.* Lastly, there is the relationship of co-existence without mutual exclusion, like that which exists between a word and its meaning, where two things different from each other are inseparately bound together. This relationship is called *bhedābheda.* Which of these three relationships exists between God and the world? The first thesis of Bodha Sūtra II gives the answer:

He is one with souls; he is different from them.

The commentator interprets this as follows:

The Supreme who, according to the previous Sūtra is the God of Destruction, is by combination one with the soul (as soul is with body), but by nature different (as eye and sun), though causally linked very closely (as intelligence to visual faculty).

Here the relation is seen as one of co-existence, not exclusion. Thus the three-fold statement says that God is one with souls by way of combination though different from them by nature, and in closest union with them, by rule of dependency; and Meykaṇḍadeva supports this by the Vedic statement that God and the world are advaita.

It you take the word advaita to mean these two are one, I tell you that something must be there, to say 'one'. The word advaita denies separateness. (*Sūtra* II, *thesis* 1, *Reason*)

The Vedic word advaita is used by Śaṃkara, the chief author of monistic Vedānta, to describe the relationship between God and the world, with a view to proving them identical, by taking advaita to imply non-dualism, and non-dualism to mean monism. Now as Siddhānta acknowledges the existence of further realities, it naturally cannot interpret the relationship between God and the world as one of absolute identity, in the way that Vedānta interprets it, though it uses the same word advaita to describe that relationship. Siddhānta does indeed use the same word that Vedānta uses, but rejects the Vedāntic interpretation of the word. The commentator draws attention to the fact that the word advaita is a combination of the prefix 'a' and the word dvaita which means 'two', indicating dualism; and that the prefix 'a' can deny existence or quality or opposition. The monistic school of Śaṃkara, seizes upon the prefix in advaita as a denial of existence, and equates advaita to 'not-two', and 'not-two' to 'one', claiming on the basis of this explanation of the Vedāntic word that God alone exists, and that the whole universe, with all that is within it, is really nothing else but this existing God.

Meykaṇḍadeva rejects this explanation when he says that the One can hardly think of himself as One, a task which has to be left to someone else, and adds that the Vedāntic concept of the word advaita is linguistically impossible, as while 'a' can indicate negation of existence, it is never used with numerals. Here he goes a little too far: in 'aneka' (many), a is prefixed to eka (one) not to say that One is not there (making 'aneka' mean 'nothing'), but to deny it is just 'one', i.e. allow that others may combine with it, giving 'many'. So 'aneka' means 'not one, but one-with-others', e.g. two or three.

Advaita, likewise, is not to say that there are not two things but only one entity (God); but rather that God and the two-fold world, of Paśu (souls) and Pāśa (fetters), are not entirely independent realities, but are actually inseparable. Thus, the prefix 'a' in advaita does not deny the existence of two things, God and the world, or of one of these, but denies to them a quality of existence wherein neither is dependent in any way upon the other, and each is unattached. Hence the commentaries paraphrase 'advaita' as 'not foreign to', or 'not separated', or 'linked to'.

Meykaṇḍadeva described the relationship further by using four analogies, and we should like to find a place for them here, and to include the explanatory classifications of the commentators.

Analogy 1. *As the soul, which is equipped with a bodily frame, and senses, etc., reacts if anyone calls the name given to the body; so also is God related to the soul. God does not become the soul, and the soul does not become God. He is one with the soul, as well as different from it.*

Comment. The obvious question now, is how one thing can have a three — fold nature, and Meykaṇḍadeva selects one statement — that God is one with the soul — and corroborates it with an analogy.

The soul has need of a body, fashioned from muscles, etc., and it has organs and five senses. And it reacts through these if anyone calls it by the name given to the body, doesn't it?

In the world, however, if two men stand side by side and hand in hand, one does not answer if we call the other by name, which shows the soul united so closely to the body as to be indistinguishable; this being the only possible reason why the soul should react to the body's name indistinguishable. In the same way, the Supreme stands in close relation to the soul as something that is not different from God: but even though they are so bound up with each other, the soul is still soul, and the body still body, and the one does not become the other; even so, we can say of the soul (though not the body) that it exists both as body and as something different.

Likewise the Supreme remains the Supreme, and the soul soul. The Supreme does not become the soul, nor the soul the Supreme. Though God can be said to exist both as soul and as distinct from the soul; which cannot be said of the soul.

Analogy 2. *If the Vedas say 'One' they actually do mean 'One'. Pati is the One. You who speak of the 'One' are Paśu, fast bound in Pāśa. As the other letters cannot be pronounced without the letter 'A', so nothing can exist without the 'One'.*

Comment. The objection is raised that the word 'eka' (one) is used in the Vedas, as well as 'advaita' (not two); so how can we go against this by saying that he stands united with souls? Taking up this objection, the author emphasises the difference between God and souls when he speaks of the true meaning of the word 'eka'.

In the Vedas, the statement that God is One means that he is the One, that God is one, that there are not two Gods. No other explanation will suit. You who call yourself the One, in your ignorance you need to learn that you being Paśu are different from any Pati.

If you then ask why it is that I call you Paśu, since you are intelligent natures, just as Pati is an intelligent nature, know that you are called Paśu because you are shackled by Mala. If you then add, 'What then is the meaning of the words in the Vedas, "Did Brahma did not exist, then nothing would exist", remember that as the other letters have no sound without the letter 'A', in the same way, nothing exists if Brahma does not exist. (*See above* II.4a (*i*))

Analogy 3. *The Śakti of the Supreme, who is omnipresent in all things, and above all things, stands in advaita relationship to the soul, just as the note does to the melody, or the taste to the fruit. Because this is so, the Vedas, at every stage at which they speak of the relationship to the soul, use not the numerical 'one', but the term 'advaita'.*

Comment. As the Vedas too say of Brahma that he is the One, and also that he is advaita, those who take advaita as the relation of two objects come into conflict with the statement that the one Brahma is advaita. This objection is examined, and, in order that it may be eliminated, it is emphasised that Brahma is One, and that he is different from Paśu.

Analogy 4. *As the dust of the earth is mixed with molten lacquer, and is bound inseparably to it, so is the Supreme inseparably bound to souls. He is different from them, and one with them, and both. Therefore, because the Supreme enters into it, the self can say 'I am the world'.*

Comment. (An objection) By deploying such different examples we shall end up in Pluralism. In reply he reaffirms all three examples, thus showing up the objection as inappropriate.

Comment. As the dust of the earth, that binds itself to the molten lacquer is one with the lacquer, and is bound inseparably to it, so is the Supreme inseparably bound to the soul. That is why he is different from the world, why he is identical with it, and why he is different as well as identical.

We find the advaita relationship very similarly described in the Siddhiār.

Although he is one with the world, different from the world, and in communion with it, he adopts the form of Śakti: and even though he directs the destinies of innumerable souls according to their deeds, he is undisturbed by that work. He is quite independent, on his own; he is the one who is completely free from Mala, and is inseparately bound up with all things.

You may make this objection: How can you say that God stands in communion with souls, and so speak of a multiplicity, when all the Vedas speak of a unity? But that is not what the Vedas mean. The Vedas say

that there is only one God, and that God is bound to souls just as the letter 'A' is present in all the other letters.

As the soul is operative through the body and the bodily organs, and yet still differs from them, so does the Supreme exist in connection with the soul. The soul does not become Śiva, and Śiva does not become the soul. God exists as one with, and as different from the soul. (*Siddhiār* II.1, 2, 3)

In Payan I. 8. we find yet another example describing the advaita relationship.

He who is over all things and present in all things is as the fire which is in boiling water, and in that way one with them in the water: but he remains the Absolute, who represents himself alone.

The fire is Śiva, and the boiling water is the universe. In the boiling water (the universe), the fire (Śiva) is contained. Even if he is invisible to the eye, Śiva is present within the universe as fire is present within boiling water. Without the fire (Śiva), hot water (the universe) is inconceivable and impossible, for the universe exists only in relation to the fire; yet as the fire is not identical with the boiling water, so Śiva is not identical with the universe. Although they are inseparable, they are different; and though different, inseparable.

This teaching about the advaita relationship of God to the world obviously represents an attempt at reconciliation between the two opposing world-views of monism and dualism. It both denies and affirms them both. The advaita teaching of Śaiva Siddhānta affirms dualism and negates monism in claiming that both God and the world exist; but it denies dualism and affirms monism by adding that God and the world do not exist independently of each other but only in inseparable relationship with each other. Śaiva Siddhānta holds that there are several eternal substances which are essentially different, even though they exist from eternity in and with one another, so that they build the combination into a unity. Thus, God is regarded as standing in the closest conceivable relationship with other substances, a relation not admitting of precise verbal description, though it can be indicated by an analogy.

The assumption of a plurality of eternally existing substances has indeed put at risk the absolute character of God and the unitary character of all being, and the present aim is to back up the tendency seen in the doctrine about Śiva's form, a tendency

to trace all activity back to Śiva, a tendency which must at least be shown to be possible.

This idea that everything that happens, everything that souls or matter undergo is to be traced back to Śiva, will appear feasible if we have to assume that Śiva, by means of his thought, his Śakti (which in the teaching about the form of Śiva is regarded as a reflection of all experience) is bound up in the closest possible way with everything; so that we must allow that he forms a unity with the other substances existentially, even if not essentially.

But this union of Śiva with all other substances still needs defending against two objections. First of all it must be shown that the unchangeable character of God is not damaged by assuming so close an alliance between Śiva and other substances as to make every experience an act of Śiva. Having set out to protect the absoluteness of God, we must not now put it at risk by this teaching of advaita. How Śaiva Siddhānta deals with this difficulty we shall see in the following section. It must also be shown how it can come about that there is such a variety of happenings, and that the experiences of souls are so different. May it be, for example, that God is present in different souls in different ways?

Umāpati takes up this problem in connection with the advaita teaching when he answers the question, 'Is God present in different souls in different ways?'

He is not good to those who do not draw near to him, but he is good to those who do. This is not partiality; Śaṃkara, the Doer of Good is his name. (*Payan* I.9)

He is present in all souls in the same way; but he shows this immanence in different ways in different souls, depending on whether they devote themselves to the Śiva eternally present within them; for souls worship God differently, and this is determined not by God but by Āṇavamala.

We should stray too far from the point if we pursued this question here, and we shall later have the opportunity of looking at the problem in more detail. Here we must just mention that the solution indicated does indeed remove from Śiva any responsibility for the variety of occurences, but does not quite establish that God is absolute.

This limitation on the absolute state of God was indeed mentioned earlier (I.7), and it meets us again at this point. The teaching about advaita shows how Śiva could undertake activities. Now

if one considers such an activity as a fact, one can (without contradicting what has already been said) refer it to a free decision of Śiva's, so that the fact of his activity does not limit his absolute nature in any way: but when we come to consider the precise manner of his activity things get more difficult. In the case of a good will, this might still be put down to a free decision; but what, once he has decided on action, he will actually do, is not derivable simply from his free will; rather is it prescribed for him by the existence and particular character of various substances. The doctrine of advaita may avoid many wrong conclusions of dualism, but it will not avoid all its weaknesses. Advaita does indeed moderate the failings of dualism, but does not avoid them altogether.

9. Śiva as Knower and Known

By granting that several substances exist eternally Śaiva Siddhānta risks falling into a dualism, or rather pluralism, which is liable to undermine the Unity of All that Is. We have already had occasion to observe that it seeks to evade this risk. This became evident in our consideration of the nature attributed to God. As we saw, Siddhānta attributes to its God a type of existence much higher, and of different quality from that of other substances. God is exalted as the highest above all others, but not in the sense of deism. No matter how hard it tries to elevate its God above other eternal substances, still it leaves God in a relation to them, as we have seen from the teaching about the Śakti of Śiva, about the form of Śiva, and about advaita. Our task now is to see whether Śiva, despite, or because of his presence in other subjects forfeits his changelessness owing to the existence of other things which are different from him, and to their experiences.

That link was meant to defend his absoluteness, by ascribing all occurrences to God and so preserving the unity of all events; but it could also affect his absoluteness by removing an important part thereof, namely his changelessness.

The statements about God, therefore, are in need of further explanation if they are not to replace earlier ones by an open question: How does God reconcile his need for the world with his unchangeability? This point is taken up in the statements about God as knower and known, because they show us further how God stands with other subjects he is connected to, and whose affairs he directs.

First let us cite Meykaṇḍadeva's comments in Bodha VI. and VII. Here the three eternal substances are compared with one another, and the relationship between them is more closely described.

Sūtra VI. If you say that the Supreme is an object of knowledge, you make him an Asat. If you say that he cannot be known, he becomes nothing on both counts; but wise men say that in the two-fold relationship he is Śiva-Sat.

Comment. If you say that it can be revealed by argument that the Supreme, as the power of understanding in the universe and in the soul, can be known by reasoning, then is he subject to death, as an Asat; but if you say that there is no way in which he can be recognised, then he becomes as hard to visualise as the horns on a hare, and so he becomes a nothing. Wise men will now call him the Śiva-Sat, because he is recognisable in one respect, but not in another. He is called unrecognisable through Pāśajñāna, that is, through the natural sense-organs, which are the natural powers of understanding in the soul, but in another respect, through Śivajñāna which is also called patijñāna he is recognisable. The power of understanding is brought about by inspiration of the knowledge of Śiva. As he is not known through Pāśajñāna and Paśujñāna, he is called Śiva; and as he is recognised through patijñāna he is called Sat. To distinguish him from the material Sat, he is called Śivasat and this term is similar in meaning to Citsat.

The whole nature, and all the characteristics of Śiva are contained in these two words.

The Nyāya school rejects the claim set out in the fifth Sūtra, that the sensory organs have on their own no power to acquire knowledge; but says there is evidence whereby we can recognise the Supreme, in the same way as there is evidence whereby we can recognise the world. And the Sāmkhya school denies that there can be more than one sort of existence. The claim in section I of the sūtra, that everything you can come to know about is Asat, is directed at these two schools.

The claim states that that which does not have either of these two natures (that is, one which can be recognised through the senses, and one which cannot be so recognised, because, like the horns on a hare, it does not exist), which cannot be known by thought and word, is Śiva. Now objects which we can get to know require no explanation. But unknowable objects cannot be explained.

Comment. At this point some people will ask why objects not called

either recognisable or unrecognisable (being non-existent) are not called unidentifiable (anirvacana), but rather objects unreachable by word and thought.

In reply, the original claim is re-stated with emphasis. We do not need to recognise nirvacana objects (objects described and known by word and thought, and by those means yet to be discussed); and anirvacana objects (which cannot be known at all) cannot be known by those means. That is the point of the statement.

Example 1. If you say that the Supreme is said to be neither Sat nor Asat, by what right then do you claim that he exists? The thoughtful scholar will realise that Asat comes in two varieties. Consequently, the true substance (not recognised by reasoning) is Sat, the foot of Śiva.

Comment. (An objection) Some say the Supreme should not be called 'something knowable', as our ignorance results in his being known differently (as knowing subject, jñātṛi, and as known object, jñeya); but once that ignorance is dispelled he is not jñeya at all but pure jñāna (knowledge), and could be called either Sat or Asat as the difference (jñātṛi/jñeya) has then disappeared.

If you say that the Supreme Good is neither Sat nor Asat, tell me, how do you intend to prove that there is anywhere a Supreme Good? Perhaps you are worried that your saying that there is a means of knowledge which enables us to know Śiva could lead me to say that the Supreme Good is then a prameya proven by your pramāṇa; maybe that is why you say that there isn't any such means of knowledge (pramāṇa). But let me tell you that thoughtful scholars assert that all objects knowable through reasoning, and also Nothingness, which is not knowable at all, are, in the previous mentioned sense, Asat or non-being. That is why the Chandogya Upanishad and other scriptures call the Highest Good Sat and unrecognisable by proof. In the Śiva Upanishad it is called the aruḷ of Śiva, which can be recognised only be patijñāna, the knowledge of God that is bound up with the soul; which is not, as you say it is, a nothingness.

If you say that the Highest Good is neither Sat nor Asat, what evidence have you that he even exists? If you say that he is an exalted Nothing, set over other things, let me tell you that, (as shown above), that Nothing, as a transitory object, must be called Asat, and the Supreme must be called Asat too. That thought is contrary to holy scriptures, that call him Sat or Supreme Śiva, recognisable through Patijñāna; and he is not, as you say, a nothing. This thought is against the Vedāntists, who say that he can be known.

Example 2. The organs of knowledge are Asat. Consequently, nobody can recognise the One from these. Even you, when you know through them, do not know the One. If you think about it, you will see that he is different from you, who are knowing. The wise man knows that, since he knows 'through him', he cannot know the Supreme as separate from himself.

Comment. The previous statement is corroborated in respect of those whose say the Supreme cannot properly be called an object unreachable by thought or by word, as things always need lighting up, in order to be known, and even those lit up already need fresh light brought, to examine them afresh from another angle.

All sensory objects are Asat (as being subject to destruction); and if Asat then also Acit. So no sensory organ can know the One highest Good. If you reflect on this, you will understand that the highest Good, like other things we know, is distinct from the knower. He who has understood that it is God who communicates wisdom to the soul knows (because his knowledge is immersed in the aruḷ of Śiva, and has become one with it, and he knows 'through it') that the Highest Good unlike other objects is not to be known as something distinct from the knower.

Śiva, who is Sat, cannot be discerned through Pāśajñāna and Paśujñāna. If he could be recognised in that way, he could be compared with material objects like a pot, which the soul can recognise, and which differ from it, and he could not bring about joy or sorrow, which derive from ignorance, nor bring about the indescribable salvation that is free from all ignorance.

(The sense here is, that so long as the soul is confronted by something knowable but separate, this does bring about joy and sorrow, but no genuine knowledge. So God should not be thought of as something separate, confronting the knowing soul.)

The wise man will, therefore, realise that the highest Good, which is not Asat, is present in a special way, not as other objects are, but in union with him. This thought emphasises his position as against that of the Nyāya school, among others.

Example 3. If the Supreme is something to be meditated on, then he becomes an Asat. If, on the other hand he is beyond even meditation, he becomes a mere fantasy. If he is neither, he becomes like a nothing. If you say 'I meditate upon him', he becomes a mere fantasy: but what one meditates upon through the aruḷ of Śiva is the Supreme. He is no Nothing.

Comment. This emphasises that it is only 'through himself[2] *that he*

2. The phrase 'through him' alludes to the statement 'The wise man knows that, since he knows 'through him', he cannot know the Supreme as

is knowable—as against those yoga-supporters who say that as he is unknowable he cannot be known by the soul; so one should not take 'knowable through himself' as referring to the Aruḷ. Rather one should say that something not reachable by word or thoughts may still be a topic for meditation, as discussed in books on Yoga.

If this meditation you mention is a meditation like other meditations, carried through by bodily organs, it becomes Asat, as something known by the senses. If you say that such meditation has no recourse to organs, and so lies outside ordinary meditation, then the soul has no opportunity of knowing anything, having no organs to hand for the purpose: it is in the kevala state, in which the soul is as good as dead. (*see* V.1)

Thus your supposed meditation is an empty fantasy of the brain, and an unprofitable pursuit. If you say, 'Not so, I meditate upon him, by conceiving as reachable that which I cannot reach', then this meditation is purely imaginary, and like a meditation without sense organs is a mere fantasy, and quite useless.

So if you say that an object by no means unreachable by meditation must be a nonentity, let me inform you that what is meditated on through the Aruḷ of Śiva after those other meditations have been set aside, is the Highest Good. You have no business to call something a Nothing just because it cannot be reached by your particular form of meditation.

Example 4. *As he is not something apart from the soul, indeed could not be, if the soul is to know, and as he being there in the soul's faculty of knowledge cannot be known by that faculty, therefore he being present in that faculty to instruct the soul may indeed know that but cannot point it out, just as the eye cannot see the soul.*

Comment. There is no need to meditate through Śiva's aruḷ on an object not reachable by the meditation mentioned. As the Āgamas say that the soul, once its fetters are struck off, possesses omniscience as Śiva does, and the other seven guṇas. (*see* 4. a (v) *above*), *so the soul's faculty of knowledge is then like his, and is not just Paśujñāna* (*faculty of knowledge in the fettered soul*)*; so that the Supreme could properly be said to be knowable through that faculty.*

Here he is emphasizing, as against a certain Śaivite sect, that Śiva is an object of knowledge only through the aruḷ.

---

separate from himself' (Ex. 2 above). It would be grammatically possible (taking *tān* as a pronoun) to make the phrase 'through him' refer to the one who knows. But the argument at this point requires that *tān* be taken as a noun, meaning 'the same one', like the Sanskrit *tat*.

He is not separate from souls (for the Śaivāgamas do speak of their advaita-relationship) for them to know him by their own faculty of knowledge, externally. He is present in each soul's faculty of knowledge; not as identical with it, but as the soul is in the body. Not that even this makes him knowable through their faculty of knowledge. Rather the soul's faculty of knowledge knows the Supreme as instructor and guide of its knowing faculty and life-principle of the soul; which does not of itself know Him, its guṇi (i.e. to whom that faculty of knowledge is an attribute) nor does the soul regard him as an object of knowledge (cp. the eye, which cannot know the soul even though present in it inseparably and acting as its guide).

Example 5. Śiva can be called 'Act', but not all on his own. For there would have to be another, the soul, to know that Act. In order that the act may be known, he is not distinct from the soul, but right there in it. Thus the soul becomes Śiva (i.e. can be called Śiva, though actually remaining a distinct entity).

Comment. This refers to Śaivite sects which ask, 'When the soul in mukti has reached the Supreme, and become one with it, can we still speak of a subject and an object of knowledge?' In reply to which he emphasizes that there is a subject and an object, even though (Śiva and the soul) are one.

You agree that Śiva, as Sat, is a specially knowable object. So you cannot follow the Vedāntists who regard Śiva as unknowable, anirvacana, a thing without characteristics, a nothing. And anyway this jñeya (object of knowledge) must have a jñātṛ (subject of knowledge) which knows the one thing different from them and unreachable by word and thoughts. If you now ask whether they are one, let me tell you that as the Supreme is not different from souls in such a way that the soul could know it through observation, like objects in the world, and as it pervades the soul's faculty of knowledge as salt pervades water, indistinguishably, so this soul, whose knowledge goes beyond its own faculty of knowledge, can also become Śiva (i.e. can in a certain sense be called Śiva).

These five examples contradict in turn several philosophical schools:

1. *Vedānta, which says it is quite alright to say that God is unreachable by word or thoughts, but not alright to call him an object of knowledge.*
2. *Nyāya, and some others, which are happy to say he is an object of knowledge, but not that he is unreachable by word and thoughts.*
3. *Pātañjali, for which he is a subject for meditation.*
4. *Samavādaśiva, which thinks the soul has a special faculty, to know him with,*

5. *Śivātmaśiva and others, who say the soul cannot have knowledge of God, as in mukti they are one.*

Sūtra VII. *In the presence of Sat all is sunya (a Nothing). So Sat knows not. Asat is a Nothing. So Asat knows not. But there is something that knows both of them: the soul, which is different from them both.*

Section 1. *Thesis. In the presence of Sat, Asat is not visible.*

Comment. God's knowledge of the world is not like our observation of it, when we say this is a pot or that is an article of clothing. So he denies that 'in the presence of Sat all is sunya' conflicts with Siddhānta, and reaffirms that Sat does not know.

Reason. Lies vanish in presence of the truth.

Comment. Some say, 'What sort of lie is it to say that Śiva, who is pure knowledge, knows Asat observationally?' It was in this connection that Reason was given. Artificial observational knowledge lies dormant in presence of natural knowledge, which He is.

Example. For the Supreme, no object is remote or strange; but none are objects of knowledge. If he knows Asat, it is not strange to him, and anyway ignoble Asat becomes invisible when he is there, like darkness in the presence of sunlight.

Comment. Some complain that if the Supreme does not know things observationally, that will damage his omniscience. In reply it is claimed, by reference to the Reason, that no such damage is done.

For the Supreme, who is inseparably bound up with Pāśa and Paśu, there is nothing that he needs to observe, in order to know. So the Supreme, so placed, if he does know Asat, knows it not as we do, as something apart from him, but as something bound up with him. As darkness flees before the sun so is ignoble Asat invisible before God.

Spatially limited knowledge, with Asat as its object, is a limitation of complete knowledge; so a denial of such limited knowledge is no loss for omniscience, but really serves to increase it.

The problem with which Meykaṇḍa engages is this: given that God is absolute, and that substances different from him do exist, is this consistent with his knowledge of them, or theirs of him?

Surely each of these facts will destroy the notion of God's absolute state, and lead to a pluralism which undermines the uniformity of all beings. If there are other substances besides God which exist eternally, he must, of course, know about them. Naturally, it cannot be claimed that he does not know about them, for that would degrade God to unintelligent matter; but if he does know about them, he becomes an understanding subject over

against other substances, which are objects of knowledge to him, and which he grasps: but strictly, in that case we can no longer speak of Śiva as absolute God. Is God then subject to limits? Yes, other subjects limit him by his knowing them. Faced with this problem, can we still maintain the absolute state of God, and with it the unity of all beings, despite the assumed existence of other eternal substances? Must we not abandon either the one or the other? And will not deeper reflection on this problem lead to a solution like that of Vedānta, which denies that there is any genuine world, and takes God and souls to be identical? Is not the Siddhāntin critique of Vedāntic monism bound to fail at this point?

After all, how do we know that God exists, and what his nature is? Since the Siddhāntin rejects the Vedāntic teaching of identity he cannot say we know about God through our identity with him, reducing knowledge of God to knowledge about ourselves; so he has to say that God is an object of knowledge for us: otherwise all his statements about God become idle prattle. But once grant that souls have some knowledge of God, and God is ranked alongside the soul as object of knowledge, and even below the subject knowing it. Surely this destroys God's absoluteness and, in a way, subordinates him to the souls. Are the Vedāntins perhaps right after all when they say that distinguishing souls from God destroys the notion of his absolute state? Faced with this problem, can we still admit a plurality of substances while maintaining that God is absolute, and all Being somehow one? Is the Siddhāntin criticism of the Vedāntic theory of identity here shown up as false?

Meykaṇḍa did not dodge this problem, but engaged with it, mounting new attacks on Vedānta, not making concessions to it. Let us see first how he proposes reconciling God's knowledge about other substances with his absolute state. He does not retract what he said elsewhere about God's knowledge in regard to karma, or about God as efficient cause (in creation). Now God can be guardian of karma and efficient cause in creation only if he has knowledge of the deeds of souls and of the nature of Māyā, the material cause from which, under his leadership, the world emerges.

For Meykaṇḍadeva, it is impossible to deny that God, as knower, knows objects. Nor need he deny this, because he believes that through the teaching about advaita he can defend the statement 'God is both knower and known' against all complaints that it

limits God's absolute state. According to his teaching of advaita God is closely allied to other substances; he is in all things, and all things are present in him. He is what underpins Māyā in its undeveloped state; he is the moving principle of causation in all that happens in developed matter in the world; he is inseparably linked to souls, and all their actions and instincts depend upon him. Thus matter and the world of souls do not confront him as something alien, but form a unity with him. This unity of the one Life has always been there; it did not come about in Time. We cannot say he took charge of souls and the world; he just is in charge. Nor can he be said to observe them, for observation involves a subject and an object, distinct and opposite entities; but God and other substances exist in and with one another. God knows other substances, not from observation, but by his eternal connection with them. Indeed, nothing exists outside him, for everything is contained within him. He has no need to learn or observe what is in him, for he knows that automatically.

In knowing other substances he is not knowing something alien, but knowing himself, and his manner of existence as the All, pervading all things, and mediated or confined by nothing. His knowledge is not artificial but natural, so his knowledge of other substances can constitute no barrier to his absoluteness, but rather is a prerequisite for it. Denying him complete knowledge does not preserve his absolute state and his independence from anything else, but rescinds it. God knows everything because he is the absolute One; but he need not learn it, for learning indicates (previous) ignorance. But God cannot be ignorant, being all in all, before (or outside) whom nothing else exists. Thus the other substances are not things that he knows objectively, but familiar because they are a part of him.

Can God be known and still be God, the Absolute? Here also Siddhānta deploys its advaita doctrine against monistic Vedānta. God is something that the souls can know, otherwise he would be useless to them.

If you say Sat is an unknowable object, he is useless, for then he has no connection with us, nor we with him, and can complete no lasting work. He will be like a bouquet bound with air, or like an etching made from the hair of a tortoise. (*Siddhiār* VI.5)

If God exists, he must be knowable; if, that is, he has any relation to the world. And if he has no such relation his existence

becomes a pointless assumption. If God is transcendent and not immanent at all, what possible difference can his existence make to us? So we are compelled to say that God can be known by souls.

Now this could lead to some reduction in his absolute character; but it need not do so. It would, if God were known as we know the things of this world, i.e. as objects outside ourselves. We recognise material things with our sense organs, but we cannot recognise God in this way, because he cannot be reached by the sense organs. They are the products of Māyā, and as such are subject to destruction. We can get to know by sense the things of this world, which like those organs are products of Māyā; but we cannot get to know the Supreme in that way, for his essence is superior. The lowly thing cannot take charge of the higher one, nor the transitory thing have power over the intransitory one. Not even by meditation can God be known.

There is one form of meditation which employs the organs of thought. These, on the Siddhāntin views, are products of Māyā, i.e. matter, so come under the same principle, that the finite cannot have power over the infinite. People also speak of a meditation beyond the organs of thought, but this cannot make God knowable, for the soul can reach knowledge only by bodily organs, as we shall see when we come to discuss the soul.

The other types of meditation taught by the Yoga school are also rejected, because they do not achieve their ultimate goal. One might also suggest that the soul knows God by some innate and natural faculty, but Siddhānta also rejects this way of knowing God.

The human soul (unlike God) learns only under guidance, i.e. takes note of what is in front of it. Now Śiva is not separate from the soul, but exists in indissolubly close union with it, so he does not confront the soul as a distinct and second entity. Moreover, the soul's faculty of knowledge comes into play only when Śiva sets it in motion: he is the cause for its activity. But a cause cannot also be the effect.

> *As he is not separate from souls; as he is present in the soul's faculty of knowledge; as by dwelling in the soul, he causes all thought to arise; as he eliminates the pride that says 'mine' and 'I', Īśa (Śiva) cannot be recognised by the soul's own proper faculties.* (*Siddhiār* VI.8)

Some said that souls need not know Śiva, for in mukti the soul

becomes God. This suggestion also is rejected. How then does the soul know God? Through the aruḷ-Śakti of Śiva. He is not known by lowlier things, nor by organs related to matter, nor by the soul in virtue of its own powers, but by something on his level; i.e. by his own Śakti, who is his essence, the other member of his Binity. The soul can know God through his Śakti because that Śakti is from ever present in souls, advaita-wise. Now if Śiva is said to be knowable not by base matter, nor by inferior souls, but through the Śakti, who is of like nature to Śiva himself, then no-one can say we make God less absolute by saying he is knowable.

Just how the soul gets to know Śiva through his Śakti, is explained later. (VI.4c)

Although God is so closely bound up with substances that he knows them without having to observe them, and souls know him by the aid of his Śakti dwelling within them, it can still be asked whether a plurality of eternal substances is a limitation of his absolute state. The question is this: suppose Śiva to be very closely linked with other substances, so that they although of different nature do combine with him into a unity, does that not bring him down to their level, making him part of the nature of substances quite different from him, or at least part of their history and experiences?

We have already seen that for Siddhānta God is unchangeable. (II. 4a (iii)) But the proofs there given need supplementing, for the question now is not just about his activity, but whether he can still be unchangeable when so closely linked to other and quite different substances.

This problem is all the more pressing as in Siddhiār I.50-54 (see II.7 above) it is said (while describing the form of Śiva) that every event mirrors an act of Śiva's owing to his identifying himself with the substances he is advaita-related to, so that in the last analysis every event is taken as something Śiva did.

Śaiva Siddhānta does not conceal this problem. Prak: 7 denies that Śiva is affected, saying:

The sun makes crystal which has taken on various colours shine, enabling it to let these colours stream forth. But jñāna (Śiva as pure intelligence) does not mingle with the worldly soul nor with matter. Wise men call the complete jñāna Jñāna.

Siddhiār offers further reasons for this denial:

Śiva takes on these forms, as an actor takes on the form of Ravana,

or another hero of the theatre, but his nature is not affected by that, for every form that he adopts is Śakti. The Śakti is combined with Śiva as pith with the tree.

As crystal takes on gold or blue, or other colours nearby, so does he-who-is-without-Mala appear through the Śakti variations. His nature remains untouched. The Supreme reveals himself through the aruḷ-Śakti. He does not reveal himself directly.

The nature of God as Śakti and Śiva makes the whole world appear both alike and different, as something with both male and female qualities. Our welfare is totally dependent on the Śakti. Those who do not know this do not know the significance of the altar and of the linga, (symbols of Śiva and his Śakti, found in temples).

Śiva has no shape, nor is he shapeless. He is neither Sat nor Asat. He is neither yogi (meditator) nor bhoktar (enjoyer). Although he is linked to everything, yet his nature is completely and entirely different from theirs. (*Siddhiaār* I.67-70)

Although he is one with the world, and different from it, yet in common with it takes on the form of the Śakti; and although rewarding countless souls in accordance with their deeds, he still comes as their leader and their Lord, yet that work never touches him. He is his own man, totally free from Mala, and is inseparably present in all things everywhere. (*Siddhiār* II.1)

We can hardly claim that these statements solve the problem. The analogy of crystal is not really apt, for the objects it reflects are outside of it, and the crystal itself remains colourless. Their link with it is very loose. But Śiva is supposed to be so closely united with other substances, that they blend and become one. So the question is whether he is touched, not indeed by things outside himself, but by the things that exist in and with him as one entity.

This untouched-ness is alleged but hardly explained, let alone proven. Paḍiār 87 attempts an explanation without getting much further.

Do you suffer all that the worm in your stomach suffers? No. Nor can you impose upon perfect Śiva the death and the coming into life of a soul.

This analogy is better than the analogy of the crystal, because the item compared is contained in another, and is not just standing beside it: but the analogy does not explain what has to be explained. Probably we do not suffer all that the bacilli in our stomachs suffer, but the body does suffer by the bacilli that are contained in it.

Meykaṇḍadeva also occupied himself with this problem, whether Śiva is detrimentally affected by the experiences that he brings about in souls whose experience is closely bound up with his. We find his attempted solution in Section 2 of Sūtra V.

Thesis. The soul knows by the power of the Supreme.

Reason. As the senses know things through the soul, so the soul cannot know itself.

You who forget the Vedic text that the world (of souls) is active in the presence of Śiva, must understand that, by the aid of Śiva as 'eye', the soul knows according to its deeds. As everything material is as nothing, Śiva does not recognise Asat.

At this point, some people raise this objection: If we here use the simile of the soul knowing things through the senses, the joy and sorrow of these souls who experience, and with whom he is bound in union, must also be felt by Śiva, just as sense-experience in living souls who are one with Śiva must also be experienced by him.

This point is denied, and the denial explained in this way.

You fool! You do not know the pramāṇa, nor the text of the Vedas, and have perverted them. They say that the world (of souls) becomes active in the presence of the Supreme. You must understand that the senses act for no reason of their own, but only so that the soul can know: but the soul's knowledge depends on its acts, so that he who is called the Supreme in the Vedas, uses the soul as an eye. Notice this difference! Although he does serve as an eye, the Supreme does not experience objects as the soul does, because Asat is as nothing in his presence.

'Does not experience' is meant to indicate that He is undefiled. 'Presence' here means the resulting thought that the Śakti of Śiva is what those objects look up to.

Example 2. As (at sunrise) the light of the stars wanes in the light of the sun, and they become invisible, but do not become the sun, so it is with the soul. Through the help of the Supreme, who is truth, the soul knows the objects of touch, taste, hearing, smell, feeling, and becomes one with the Supreme.

Example 3. The aruḷ exists eternally with Śiva. It is his Śakti. The aruḷ does not exist without him, nor he without the aruḷ. For those souls who have attained aruḷ knowledge, God is like the sun.

Comment. Some say that as souls have different sorts of knowledge, the instruction must vary: but by granting this we make God subject to change, contradicting the holy scriptures which say he is unchangeable. In

reply we repeat that God is unchangeable, and emphasise that point. Aruḷ which unshackles the soul and confers Śiva's nature (i.e. gets the soul to share his nature), exists eternally with Śiva. This aruḷ is the Śakti. Now as the aruḷ and Śiva stand together as guṇa and guṇi, the aruḷ cannot exist without the Supreme, nor the Supreme without the aruḷ. As the sun is inseparably one with its light, so also, for the faculty of knowledge which has reached patijñāna, the Supreme exists bound to his aruḷ. That is why the Supreme, who is independent and powerful, is unchangeable. All his work occurs only through the thoughts of his Śakti. (*Bodha* V.2)

Meykaṇḍadeva's answer to this problem could be put like this:

Śiva is united with other substances as the soul is united with the body. What the body experiences, the soul experiences also; but it does not follow that Śiva experiences what other substances experience, for the analogy of the soul and the body does not apply in every relationship. The body is not an end in itself, and its organs do not experience things for their (the organs') sake, but for the sake of the soul. Now the soul is an end in itself. It experiences for itself and not for Śiva. He is not the subject of its experiences, as the soul is subject of the body's, but he serves it as a mediating organ. (See V.5)

Everything that souls bound to him experience happens through him, not directly, but through his Śakti; and not by his doing anything, but by his thinking it. These thoughts appear as realities in other substances; but for Śiva they are just thoughts of his Śakti. Properties of other substances due to these thoughts of the Śakti are nothing extra for him, just as starlight which at sunrise combines with the sun's light without adding to it. The stars' light is as nothing to the sun's light; and what souls experience through their link with Māyā is as nothing for Śiva, and makes no impression on him at all.

Now this solution to the problem is better thought out than the one mentioned earlier. Yet the problem is not solved. The analogy of the starlight is not much better than the analogy of the crystal, for the point is not whether Śiva is affected by things outside of him, but whether he is affected by what is so closely linked to him, and has experience by his help. Now the light of the stars is something added to the sun from outside, and without the sun asking for it.

Matter offers a more relevant analogy; for all events take place by its means, including the experiences and adventures of the

soul. Matter would need to be such as made no impression at all upon Śiva, so that in his presence it is as good as non-existent. This thought might have helped, if only Śaiva Siddhānta had not been so keen to preserve Śiva from direct connection with matter. This undermines the analogy with matter. Moreover, Śaiva Siddhānta's teaching about salvation shows how far matter can resist Śiva. If matter can make no impression upon Śiva, why not let him deal with it direct? Why bring in all these intermediaries, such as Śakti and gods, and (yet to come) a spiritual-material compound of Śakti and Māyā called the Śuddhatattva or Śivatattva? If in the presence of Śiva matter is really a nothing, how comes it that with Śiva working so hard to abolish it, such a successful opposition is mounted for so long?

That Śiva is untouched by the eternal existence and histories of other substances, is surely asserted but is hardly proved, and indeed does not quite make sense. There is even less evidence that admitting other eternally existing entities does not limit Śiva at all. May be he is free to do what he wants when he likes, but that does not imply control over the object or the result. Here the presence, the tendencies and the goals of the other substances do restrict what Śiva can achieve. And this limitation on his dealings was not taken on by him voluntarily, he was saddled with it from eternity, and confronts it still, as the tendencies and goals of those other substances were not put there by him, but belong to them, as they always have.

Saiva Siddhānta's attempt to reconcile monism and dualism suffers from some of the weaknesses of dualism. Whether it fully avoids the weaknesses of monism we cannot here decide, but it should appear from the teaching on salvation.

CHAPTER THREE

The Third Substance, Matter

Next let us consider the teaching about Pāśa, the last of the three eternal substances; for the soul resembles both God and Matter, in different ways. Our main sources, Śivajñānabodha, Śivajñāna-siddhiār and Śivaprakāśa also take this topic next.

We saw in Chapter I why Śaiva Siddhānta takes Pāśa or Mala to exist eternally. Mala is really three distinct entities, Āṇavamala Karmamala and Māyāmala. All three are equally eternal; but Āṇavamala is thought of as Mūlamala, the fundamental evil, the logical (though not the temporal) cause of the other two. Karmamala is further regarded as responsible for Māyāmala.

These three entities are however, commonly taken together, when contrasted with God and with the soul; for all three share a single nature. They do indeed have different effects: that is what makes them distinct; but all three share one inner essence, an absence of intelligence. In Indian terms all three are 'Asat' and 'Acit'; all three fetter the soul. In our terms all three are, more or less, 'Matter'.

As is clear from Śivajñānabodha Sūtras VI and VII (quoted at II. 9 above), Asat can be used in different senses: firstly for what does not exist, then for things that do exist but are subject to change, and finally for whatever is, but is not Sat. In the statement *The substance which includes these three, Āṇavamala Karma and Māyā, is Asat,* the first two meanings are inappropriate: the statement must relate to nature or essence, saying these three are non-intelligent beings. Now as Sat is a substance which needs no other, in order to be what it is and how it is, and without which nothing else can be supposed to exist or to function; so Asat may be taken as a substance which does have need of other substances, to be what it is and how it is, and which cannot exist or function with-

out some other, even though no other brought it into existence. (On Asat see also below III. 3f)

The word Asat describes Āṇavamala, Karma and Māyā as related to God, not to souls. Here their similarity in nature is expressed by Pāśa and Mala. They are called Pāśa, bondage, because they hinder souls from enjoying their advaita-relation with Śiva. They are called Mala, dirty, because they conceal the true nature of the soul.

'Matter' best describes the nature common to Āṇavamala, Karma and Māyā, but it is an European word, and one which philosophers have used in different ways. For Kant, matter is what we perceive through hearing, sight, etc., unlike space and time which are the forms our sensible experiencing takes. Others, such as the ancient Greeks, took matter as what underlies appearances; though for Plato matter was quite different from Ideas, and it was these that for him underlay appearances. Descartes' view was different again: starting from a contrast between thought (spirit) and extension, he defines matter as what is spatially extended, impenetrable, moveable and divisible. Others again say matter and spirit are identical, some meaning that both are really material, and others that each is really spirit. Still others set matter in contrast to power and to form, while others treat matter and power, like matter and form, as correlates. But in every case matter refers to the world of phenomena, and unlike 'Spirit' describes some kind of 'stuff' which may or may not have a form; and it always refers to something unintelligent and unconscious (except in materialism, which is quite confused).

Now if we use the word 'material' to describe the common nature of Āṇavamala etc., we must take 'matter' in a rather wider sense than usual. For Śaiva Siddhānta matter is not thought of mainly as 'stuff', though any and every 'stuff' does count as matter. The main emphasis is on matter as unconscious, so that everything that has no consciousness belongs to the category of matter, whether or not it is any sort of 'stuff'. But the notion goes even wider. Anything that hinders the working of consciousness in a conscious being counts as matter; including anything that fails to impart right knowledge, or which does impart false, partial or incomplete knowledge. Thus while Kant regards space and time as distinct from matter, Śaiva Siddhānta makes them part of it, because they convey things to a conscious soul as restricted by space and time, and not as they really are.

As space and time belong to matter, so also do the organs through which they come to us, or we to them. The senses of sight, hearing, taste and feeling do impart information about how things appear, but not about how they really are, and certainly not about the world beyond the senses. So the senses also come under the category of matter.

The same applies to the organs of thought; they do not provide us with knowledge of things as they really are. Most psychological processes, such as being attentive, abstracting, understanding, making judgements, drawing conclusions etc. are, for Śaiva Siddhānta, physical occurrences. (see III.3b, and especially V.5) Thus much that we usually take to belong to the psyche is regarded by Śaiva Siddhānta as material.

In deciding what is to count as 'matter', then, Śaiva Siddhānta does not ask whether it is some sort of stuff, but whether it helps souls to attain complete knowledge, or is useless, unnecessary or a hindrance in that quest. With this criterion Śaiva Siddhānta can regard karma (which compels souls to toss and turn in this world), and even thoughts, as material.

The Siddhāntin concept of matter thus comes close to the concept of evil; but we shall prefer the word 'matter' as indicating more clearly the opposition to knowledge.

We now turn to consider the three Mala one by one.

1. Āṇavamala

The word 'Āṇava' comes from the root *Aṇu* meaning very minute, an atom. It is applied to the soul, which by its nature is omnipresent, though adherent evil makes it spatially limited. Āṇavamala is thus the Mala which makes a soul spatially limited, makes it an aṇu. Put simply, Āṇava means pride, presumption, self-will.

As a metaphysical concept Āṇavamala seems to occur only in Saivite writings. Avidyā (ignorance) is frequently used in place of it; so is iruḷ (darkness), to disperse which aruḷ (grace or enlightenment) is required.

I have not been able to discover why the concept Āṇava was introduced. Dr. Pope suggests that it derives from the aṇu teaching of the Jains: historically, this is a possibility. He discusses the point in his English translation of Tiruvācaka, p. lxxxvi.

The word Āṇava (from aṇu) means the state or character of the atom. As far as could be ascertained, the word aṇu meaning 'soul' is not

used at all in Sanskrit nor in the more ancient Tamil.[3] *But it was used later, notably in the Jain system.*

Our best information about the Jains comes from four Tamil books, the Jivaga Chintāmaṇi, the Śilappadhihāram, the Mani-Megalai and the Śivajñānasiddhiār. From these we learn that the Jains (or at least the sect of Ajivagar or Śuvēthanar) taught that the whole universe consists of five kinds of atom (aṇu). Earth, fire, water, air and soul (the same word 'uyir' is used for life, soul, breath and spirit; and for ānmā, a corruption of ātman). These five types of atom are eternal, uncreated, indestructible, indivisible, and never combine, though linked together in every sort of substance in the phenomenal universe. They are invisible, except to those divine spirits who live inside the circle girt by golden walls, in the homeland of the perfected spirits.

When these atoms join together (without any guidance or control), they form a body, which a soul-atom then enters.

Thus every soul that has an eternal burden of deeds to be forgiven, expiated, and so consumed enters a body, thus acquiring a blind, unavoidable and quite incomprehensible destiny. Here their doctrine partly overlaps with that of Śaiva Siddhānta. Jains also speak of the atoms as coloured: pure white, red, gold, blue, green, and normal white. These six colours belong to the four elements: earth, water, fire and air. Because the body is composed of these elements in different proportions, the innate characteristics or talents which the indwelling soul possesses are symbolised by these colours. If a pure white colour is finally achieved, it entitles the soul to Release, and final salvation. Thus a soul's state and character depend on the fate by which it set out with a load of good and bad deeds, different for each individual; and on its atomic make-up, which also has irresistible influence.

Dr. Pope's discussion has hardly proven that Jain usage of aṇu was responsible for Āṇava taking its present sense. Perhaps those Agamas which have yet to be discovered will clear up this point.

In Siddhiār II.80 we find the following objective definition of Āṇavamala.

Āṇavamala is one. It has many powers; is linked to souls; is without beginning; obscures the knowledge and action which souls are capable of; raises a false illusion of autonomy; and like verdigris on copper is always present in the soul, and is the cause of ignorance.

3. Āṇavamala is used in Tirumantra.

The definition in Prak: II.2 is similar:

Āṇavamala is one; it is created out of the innumerable powers (which, may at some time leave the soul); it gives rise to dark confusion so that the darkness appears as light by comparison; it is as verdigris on copper; it is the eternal original Mala. It completely conceals knowledge.

In Kroḍai, this definition is further developed:

Āṇavamala is like the shell of a rice grain, like verdigris on copper, like salt in the sea. Like the Supreme, it is beginningless; it is without form; it enshrouds all souls; it is like the snake which hides a pretty jewel inside; like firewood which conceals the fire within. This Āṇavamala it is that beclouds the soul's faculty of knowledge. (3)

Bodha goes into even more detail (IV.2):

Thesis. The soul is without knowledge through Āṇavamala.

Comment. Here the innate Mala is emphasised, to distinguish it from other malas yet to come. Although the soul is an intelligence, like God, and so is distinct from the antaḥkaraṇa and other senses and organs; yet being shackled with Āṇavamala, for no reason, as copper is with verdigris, it is not able to know things directly, but needs the help of the sense organs.

This statement reveals the true nature of Āṇavamala, whose presence was mentioned earlier in Sūtra I.

The kevala state (V.1) *reveals the peculiar nature of Āṇavamala: it causes ignorance. In the sakala state* (V.2) *we see its general nature: aided by organs it brings about inaccurate knowledge.*

Reason. It cloaks the faculty of knowledge.

Comment. But then how is it that the soul, which lacks knowledge owing to Āṇavamala, is able with the help of bodily organs to achieve knowledge? The answer is that Āṇavamala cloaks the faculty of knowledge so thoroughly that you think there isn't one. Which refutes those who regard ignorance as knowledge not being there, available; for what isn't there can't do anything.

Example. If the soul does not know by the light of the bodily senses, which are products of Māyā, then it knows nothing at all. Mala is everlastingly linked to souls, just as firewood is linked to fire, which is concealed in it and identified with it, the fire conforming itself to the firewood it is hidden in.

Comment. Some say this cloaking is due to a dated Mala (come at some particular time); so it's a bit too much of a good thing, to have another one as well. This objection is refuted by re-affirming the Reason, which shows that a dated Mala is very different from Āṇavamala.

The function of Māyā is to convey knowledge as the light for souls, so they can recognise things. The function of Mala is to prevent such knowledge. These two are in opposition, like light and darkness; so Māyā and Mala cannot be identical.

If fire is hidden in the firewood, it is existent in the firewood, and if it is hidden in the rays of the sun, it exists as a sunbeam. Therefore, so long as it is hidden in any object — firewood, sunbeam — it does exist, but not separately. And it is not extinguished either, for it becomes evident by rubbing etc. It is concealed within the firewood, and is also identical with the firewood, so that one could say, there is no fire.

Nothing follows Āṇavamala (unlike Māyā and karma); a comment which shows how they differ in respect of Time as well.

Some say Mala means the absence of a faculty of knowledge; that it is a knowledge that causes confusion; that it is the Guṇa Tamas, that it is ignorance, that it is one of the five states, that it is Māyā and karma; that it is Śivaśakti (tirōdhāna Śakti); that it is a guṇa of the soul. Some say that souls afflicted with Mala are not nothing, but are material in nature; and some say that the soul is just knowing, pure and simple, and not a guṇi equipped with attributes. Then again some say the soul has a faculty of knowledge available for use, or that it cloaks the whole body or has the form of an atom; for some it has form, for some it doesn't, for some it both has and hasn't. All these views are false, as the Śaivāgamas show.

Āṇavamala is a veil obscuring the faculty of knowledge; it is matter; its nature is ignorance; it is a defect of the soul, as verdigris is a blemish upon copper; it is a beginningless fetter. It is matter; it is single, for were it manifold it would be subject to destruction, so could not be beginningless. It is Āṇavamala that distinguishes souls as Vijñānakalar, Pralayākalar and Sakalar.[4] *Its powers are various, and enshroud this or that soul at different times and again disappear in their own time. It is the main reason why souls endure the three states (avasthā); it is eternal; it penetrates all things; and is called Āṇava, for it makes the all-pervading soul take on atomic form; and it has other names like Mala, avidyā (ignorance) etc.*

As the eye that is covered with a shade cannot see the sun because of that shade, and so finds itself in darkness, so the soul too, though it has the ability to learn (gradually and under guidance), yet owing to

4. Vijñānakalar souls are bound only by Āṇavamala, Pralayākalar by both Āṇava and Karmamala, and Sakalar souls by all three, Āṇava Karma and Māyāmala. (Ed., cp. IV. 2 below)

Āṇavamala it cannot learn even though guided for ever and a day, and by this incapacity is lost and sunk in ignorance even in the presence of the Supreme. That is why Mala is like a fetter for the soul. All the Saivāgamas agree on this, that being eternally liberated from Mala is a characteristic of God, one of the eight eternal characteristics, and being eternally burdened with Mala (they further agree) is an evil proper to the soul, one of its natural infirmities. (*Bodha* IV.2)

Āṇavamala, then, exists from eternity, without beginning. Though really a single entity, it is clever enough to appear in every soul. Not that it turned up there in Time, for it was always there. Umāpati was asked by his disciples *Did Āṇavamala not arrive in Time?* and replied.

If Āṇavamala had a beginning, what reason did it have to attack souls (just then) ? That would make it like a sickness, which souls could encounter for no reason, even in mukti. (*Payan* III.8)

There is no time when the soul is without Āṇavamala; nor any time when Āṇavamala exists apart from souls. Āṇavamala co-exists with souls, as a grain of rice does with its husk, or copper does with verdigris, or sea-water with the salt contained in it.

The husk on the grain of rice, and the verdigris on copper are something old, not new. Māyā, Mala and karma also exist from eternity. (*Bodha* II.2, *Example* 3)

Although by nature material, Āṇavamala is without form, and invisible. You can't see it in souls, any more than you can see a jewel in a snake[5], or fire in the firewood; yet it must be there in the wood, else how could rubbing it produce fire?

The connection between Āṇavamala and the soul is such a close one, that one can, in a certain sense, call Āṇavamala an attribute of the soul. (Siddhiār II.84) But this will not quite do.

If ignorance were a guṇa (an attribute) of the soul, then souls would be material. Tell me, is a blind man's eye-complaint an attribute of his eye? Mala has ignorance as its guṇa and exists as Acit. But souls have knowledge as their guṇa, and exist as Cit. (*Siddhiār* II.85)

Umāpati agreed that souls are not related to Āṇavamala as substance to attribute, saying.

If Āṇavamala were in souls by nature, then if anything could get rid of it, the souls would be despatched as well. (*Payan* III.7)

5. Indians say some snakes have jewels inside, and may spit them out.

Although not essential for their existence, and not a constituent property of souls, Āṇavamala is still really there, in souls, and linked to them as intimately as Śiva to Śakti, i.e. in advaita-relation. The reason why Siddhānta accepts an advaita-relation between Āṇavamala and the soul becomes very clear in Irupā 4:

You say three-fold Mala is material; how odd, for you seem to mean the opposite. For if you say that Mala really is matter, but achieves activity through its link with souls, then I would like you to know I don't notice any activity in things linked to me like fabric and clothing. If you say Mala is like a poison forced into the body, then it must disappear the same way it came. And on this view there can't be many guṇas. And it can't take possession of me, on its own initiative, for I won't have anything to do with it. You, O Mala-free, please don't impose it upon me. If you say that Mala is a part of my nature, then it can never be removed. Please resolve my doubt, you that had no beginning and will have no end: how did the fetter get there to begin with?

The shackling did not happen at any Time, it was always there, as the husk is fettered to its grain of rice, and verdigris to copper. Mala didn't do it, nor did souls, nor even God.

As its effects demonstrate, Āṇavamala is present in souls, affecting them as darkness affects eyes. When his disciples asked what Āṇavamala was like, Umāpati replied in Payan III.2 *Darkness is the only thing that appears when all else disappears.* This point is developed further in the commentary:

Only darkness can enshroud all separately existing things along with all their various qualities, to make them seem one thing, concealing their differences. And what enshrovd birth and death and salvation and its cause (God) so that souls do not recognise it? Āṇavamala.

Actually, Āṇavamala is even worse in its effects, for *while darkness reveals no object, it at least shows its own form. But Āṇavamala reveals neither.* (*Payan* III.3)

While concealing everything else, darkness does not mask itself. So one can avoid the evil consequences of that darkening, by not entrusting oneself to it, or, at least by not doing anything while darkness is around. But Āṇavamala masks itself as well as everything else, thus luring all souls into its pernicious net, and inducing them to act, despite the ignorance in which they find themselves. But acting in darkness and ignorance is bound to lead to catastrophe.

Umāpati brings home to us the whole tragedy of the soul's bondage, by showing that it is almost impossible for souls to evade the influence of Āṇavamala.

Though involved with many, the black maiden has a certain modesty which her husband never gets to see.[6]

Need I say more? What made us such as not to know just what we need to know? Generous Darkness did. (*Payan* III.5 & 6)

Āṇavamala is here compared with a cheeky lass who is always deceiving her husband, while pretending modesty. The husband knows nothing about the adulterous pursuits of his wife, and he believes in her chastity, so he holds fast to a union with her that can bring him nothing but humiliation. In the same way, the soul does not suspect how Āṇavamala deceives it, but lives in ignorance of the harm that bondage will bring, and so does not see the need to break off the union.

Has the soul then no way to counter these tricks of Āṇavamala? The girl needed an external power, the power of darkness, to help conceal her disloyalty; which is why she sometimes found that difficult. But Āṇavamala needs no help in concealing its calamitious activity from the knowing soul.

Āṇavamala can thus conceal, unaided, the harm it does to the soul, shrouding the soul's natural light, so that souls do not know Śiva, though advaita-related to them, nor the fetter binding them. Āṇavamala's power to conceal what it is doing and also to enshroud the soul's faculty of knowledge makes it quite impossible for that soul, without outside assistance and enlightenment, to get even with Āṇavamala's tricks, and get free of its union thereto.

Even so, souls can be set free from Āṇavamala. Not that the Mala itself is destroyed. It cannot be, for it has no beginning, but is a genuinely eternal substance, which cannot be destroyed. But it can cease to act. This is shown by the fact that souls can know things, while in the body, even in spite of Āṇavamala.

If light (*i.e. the sense organs, products of Māyā*) *could never, despite Āṇavamala's predominance, gain the upper hand at least to some extent, then would darkness never leave the soul.* (*Payan* III.9)

As Māyā through its products the sensory organs does remove some ignorance, there is hope that in the end it may all be removed; a possibility due to the advaita relationship. Because

6. The interpretation requires 'which only her husband can perceive' (Ed).

soul and Āṇavamala stand in an advaita-relation, the soul can become free from Āṇavamala without its inner nature becoming affected by it, just as the nature of a grain of rice is not altered by removal of its husk, nor that of copper through removal of its verdigris.

The close but beginningless bond between Āṇavamala and souls raises this question: surely it excludes the equally eternal and beginningless bond with Śiva which we learnt of in Chapter II? For his nature and activity is quite opposite to Āṇavamala's, as light is to darkness. Umāpati answered this question in Payan III. 4.

Darkness is from eternity bound up with souls, it is present in them along with the inner light, and is still there today.

Despite its link with Āṇavamala the soul is still linked to the Śakti of Śiva. The fact that, from the beginning, the rice-grain is bound up with the husk does not prevent its containing a living germ; and the presence of Āṇavamala in the soul does not exclude the presence of Śiva's pure intelligence. But this joint presence of Āṇavamala and Śiva in the soul does not affect Śiva. Āṇavamala has no power over him. It may be said to hide him, without implying that he was at all touched by it. Śiva is unchangeable intelligence: not increasable, not reducible. Śiva remains undisturbed by Āṇavamala as the sun is undisturbed by an umbrella. The umbrella does not hide the sun, but us, who put it up. In the same way Āṇavamala does not hide Śiva, but only the faculty of knowledge, in souls.

Light and darkness (the aruḷ of the Śakti of Śiva, and Āṇavamala) share one place, the soul: if one is preponderant the other is hidden. But even so, darkness (Āṇavamala) does not suppress the light (the Śakti of Śiva). The knowledge (Śakti) that is present in souls and guides them does appear in full splendour, though not visible because of the three-branched Mala. Here I erect a banner, so that souls may achieve aruḷ. (*Koḍikkavi* I)

Thus Āṇavamala cannot lay down conditions for Śiva, though Śiva does for Āṇavamala. He is Lord of Āṇavamala, having power to free souls therefrom (see VI below), and also because Āṇavamala cannot even begin to act, without him.

As the sunbeam brings one lotus blossom to its unfolding, and another to its close, so do the three Mala carry out their duties through God. (*Bodha* 2. *Ex.* 3)

Here the commentator remarks that the word 'through' indicates that tirōdhāna-Śakti does exist. It is present in Mala, to bring about maturity, and it caused that thought of Śiva which started off the confusion and other effects of Āṇavamala; so it is called Mala.

Prak II.2 also states that Āṇavamala is set going with the help of Śiva's Śakti.

Siddhiār 2. 87 makes a similar point. *The Śakti of Śiva induces the three Mala that hold the soul in bondage to carry out their works. We call it Tirōdhānamala.*

Unfortunately no more detailed account is given of Āṇavamala's dependence on Śiva. We must assume that its activity depends on him as the growth of the plant depends on rain and sunshine, though these do not confer their qualities upon the plant. Because the tirōdhānaśakti of Śiva influences Āṇavamala, it brings about desire in souls, *confusion, pride, desire, worry, sorrow, weariness, curiosity, which bring souls under the law of karma and subject them to transmigration.* (*Bodha* II, Comment)

Āṇavamala, we said, cannot lay down conditions for Śiva. But does it affect his activity, in some way? In the very first Sūtra of Bodha we read that the universe is being created, maintained, destroyed because of mala, i.e. with a view to eliminating Mala. So it is Āṇavamala that occasions Śiva's activity. Not that this makes Śiva dependent on Āṇavamala, or touched by it. But it does suggest that Śiva by a free decision resolved to eliminate Āṇavamala. Nor is his power the less, because its activity derives from him: for by supposing a period of world-sleep, during which Śiva does not work on Āṇavamala, we are freed to suppose that when he does so work it is by his own free will.

Once set in motion Āṇavamala brings about confusion, pride, desire, etc., as we saw, and these are noisy, evil things. Does Śiva set Āṇavamala in motion so as to bring about these evil things? No.

All these properties (due to Āṇavamala) are in me, inseparably, taking me their way. The choice is theirs, not mine. Listen, O divine jewel, who appeared in Veṇṇey, encircled by River Peṇṇār, and took a place, a name, and a form so as to do away with my place (spatial limitation), my name (individuality), my form; you truest among the truthful have said that the three-branched Mala is matter; how odd, for you seem to mean the opposite. For if you say that Mala really is matter, but achieves activity through its link with souls, then I would like you to know I don't

notice any activity in things linked to me like fabric and clothing. If you say Mala is like a poison forced into the body, then it must disappear the same way it came. And on this view there can't be many guṇas. And it can't take possession of me, on its own initiative, for I won't have anything to do with it. You, O Mala-free, please don't impose it upon me. If you say that Mala is a part of my nature, then it can never be removed. Please resolve my doubt, you of no beginning and no end: how did the fetter get there to begin with? (*Irupā* 4, *quoted above p.* 100)

The evil products of Āṇavamala, mentioned just now, are Āṇavamala's fault, not Śiva's. True enough, he did set it going, and it did have these results, but not those that he wanted. How come? Because Āṇavamala has an inner drive to produce them. Śiva can't alter that. He can't make Āṇavamala produce better results. The sun helps the seed to grow, but can't determine what sort of plant shall result; and Śiva can't control what sort of things it is that Āṇavamala produces with his help. He sets Āṇavamala going, and must then leave it to follow its own eternally innate tendencies.

As we shall see in Chapter VI, what Śiva can do is to harry Āṇavamala until it is exhausted. But this would expose souls (for whose benefit it was set in motion) to dreadful suffering. So Āṇavamala's inner drive is undeniably a limit on God's absolute power, for it was always there; moreover the restriction it places on Śiva does not flow by some reason from his nature, and diverges from the direction he would naturally take; so this restriction is inappropriate to his true nature.

To conclude, we may point out that souls are not responsible for the Āṇavamala which affects them, or for the bad qualities resulting from it. The fundamental evil and the inclination to harm that spring from it are not their fault, but a fate to which they are subject. This evil is intellectual rather than ethical, though it does have ethical consequences.

2. Karmamala

The second fetter for the soul is karmamala. Karma firstly means work; so comes to be used also as a technical term for the works or deeds done by souls. As cause and effect are closely connected with each other, the joy and sorrow, reward and punishment resulting from the soul's deeds get dragged into the concept of karma, which now includes both the deeds and their consequences.

As we saw in Chapter One, karma is thought of as an entity distinct from the soul. It is linked to souls very closely, indeed it can exist only in connection with them, but it is not dependent upon souls for its existence.

The wise say that Mala (Āṇava) co-exists with the soul, and that all the other fetters co-exist with it, as inner and outer husks do with a grain of rice. So say the Śaivāgamas. (*Prak* II.7)

As the husk is distinct from the rice-grain, though developing from it and integral to it, so karma also is distinct from the soul, though accompanying it from eternity. Karma thus forms no integral part of the soul; it is something accidental, and the soul can be conceived of without it.

In the commentary on Bodha IV.2 (see above III.1), karma and Māyā are referred to as extra malas which arrived in time. Similarly we read in Prak: II.18 that Māyā and Mala come and go, unlike Āṇavamala. Does this mean that karma has a beginning? Presumably these comments refer to karma's acting and so becoming evident. Āṇavamala engaged in its obscuring activities all the time, and most freely at the time of cosmic destruction; but karma and Māyā afflict souls only when linked to them, and not in the period of world rest (between universal destruction and creation anew). Only when the world is there can souls perform actions and consume their fruits.

Actions good and bad are eternal. They are done, so they have a beginning. They are consumed, so they have an end. They are there, linked to Mala, and enter into bodies (products of Māyā), and shackle souls, and in due time ripen fruits, according to their deeds. Though without form, they obey the commands of the Supreme. (*Siddhiār* II.40)

Karma is described as here from eternity, but not always active, as the necessary conditions are not always present.

Is there anything done by souls, which does not fall under karma? As karma consists of deeds both bad and good, people have answered no. But some qualification is needed here. As we shall see later (in IV.3), the soul has three innate capacities, including that of initiating action. Āṇavamala hinders that, at least in part, or misdirects it; a misfortune for souls from which they must be freed.

If Śaiva Siddhānta were determined to regard every activity of the soul as karma, and so as an evil, it would not take the soul's faculty of action as something natural to it, and would have said

it got destroyed (as identified with karma). But in its actual teaching on release it does not speak of destroying that faculty, but of restoring and purifying it. So we cannot regard every activity of the soul, whatever it may be, as belonging to karma, and therefore evil. (cp. VI.5 below)

Which activities then do come under the category of karma, and which do not? Every activity due to the influence of Āṇavamala and coming about with the assistance of Asat, and with Asat as its aim, is karma. Any activity carried out without the assistance of Āṇavamala, and which has no affinity with Asat, has nothing to do with karma. We cannot yet say what any such activity is like, or how it occurs; though we shall get some light on this in Chapter VI. At this point we only need to realize that not every soul-activity has to be karma; some actions have nothing to do with karma. Though we should mention that only released souls are in a position to engage in karma-free actions. For unreleased souls, every action is karmic.

This limitation will help us to understand the teaching about release; for we can now say that karma is soul-activity directed at Asat, and its results. The soul is by its nature capable of action; not that their nature compels them to act in such a way that karma results, nor are they responsible for that. It is no-one's fault, but just inherited bad luck, which the soul must come to terms with. It is by their resignation to this fact of karma that souls can come to act morally.

How then does karma show up, i.e. begin to act? We can't get back to the very beginning, for it is beginningless. But it can re-appear, at the time of world-creation, starting up after a quiescent period of world-slumber. This re-appearance re-tells an old story as though it were new. Our sources describe in detail how one act gives birth to another, but unfortunately they do not say how karmamala, which was inactive at the time of general world-rest, then starts up again when the world is re-created. But from the various hints provided we can easily construct a description of Śaiva Siddhānta's view of the process.

Karma, according to its nature, is matter; so it can move, but not under its own steam. It cannot start itself. Now Bodha says *it is by the Śakti of the Supreme that souls achieve actions of both sorts.* (II. 2, Ex) This remark refers not only to the transference to souls of the fruits of their actions, but also to the fact that it is Śiva who

at the time of world-creation sets agoing the inactive karmamala present there. Now Śiva's sole aim is to set souls free from Āṇavamala, and he, therefore, sets his tirōdhānaśakti to work on the Āṇavamala which anarchically holds the soul bound and completely motionless. As a result of these actions of the Śakti, souls begin to be filled with desires and the longing to satisfy them. For their sakes, Śiva not only stirs up the desires, but also provides an opportunity for their satisfaction. As a mother notices the needs of her child, and out of pity lays it at her breast and gets it to drink, so does Śiva notice the desires of the soul, derived from Āṇavamala, and feels pity for those yearning souls and gives them the chance to act out their desires, by setting them within a world with bodies and objects, sprung from Māyā.

Aruḷ is a great light over everything, like the sun, enabling the soul to collect deeds and consume them. (*Which the commentator explains as follows*) *As the sun enables many men on earth to acquire treasures and to enjoy them, so too does the aruḷ, who is present everywhere like light, cause the soul to gather and consume its fruits, joy and sorrow.* (*Which says the Arul is responsible for all deeds of the soul*). (*Payan* IV.2)

Souls need the world, a body, organs, time, effect, organization and act, to do and enjoy karma. Not that souls think about these things, or think they are linked to them. It is the Śakti of the all-knower that out of grace links them with souls.

Now souls do deeds of two kinds in the world, by thoughts, words or act: good deeds and bad ones.

Karma is either good or bad, performed through mutually hostile thoughts, words or deeds. Doing what benefits the soul is a good work. Doing what harms it is an evil work. (*Siddhiār* II.13)

The following comments show which works are considered good:

Good behaviour, love, pity, observing Vedic prescriptions, courtesy, friendliness, goodwill, faultless asceticism, charity, the showing of respect, acknowledging worth, sincerity, a complete rejection of the world, curbing the senses, knowledge, temple service and other virtues are the good deeds done for the merciful one.

If anyone honours his favoured god by thinking of him, praising him and praying to him, and by strewing flowers upon him: and if anyone gives up anger and other evil qualities, and so lives virtuously, then the Supreme, who is recipient and rewarder, accepts those deeds.

To whichever god you pray, Uma's consort (*the Sakti*) *will appear in his place. The other gods are born and die and suffer pain. They execute*

karma. Śiva does none of this. He recognises and rewards your intention when you prayed.

If we honour people here, will they come and reward us in the other life? Those gods are in the same position. All gods wherever they may be remain under the direction of the Supreme. He rewards the deeds men do for the gods, by means of his Śakti present in them.

If Śiva is the rewarder, then the duty of love that one pays to him is a specially good deed. All the works which one performs without thinking of Śiva are futile. What the Supreme has prescribed is virtue. Perform the worship which the desireless Supreme desires.

The High God, who is present in both living and lifeless forms accepts the worship ascribed to each form and shows his grace to souls. If you really worship the Supreme directly within yourself, that is perfect worship. Knowing this, show your love for the Supreme, and worship him. (*Siddhiār* II. 23-28)

These so-called good works, however, can also be bad works, if they are performed without thinking of Śiva, the Supreme God, or in deliberate opposition to him: and deeds commonly considered bad may really be good if undertaken from love of Śiva, that is, from religious motives.

All acts performed without thinking of Śiva are vain. The sins committed by those who offer worship to Śiva become good deeds. The good deeds performed by non-worshippers of Śiva are like sins. The great sacrifice offered by the gifted Daksa brought about evil things[7], *and the evil deed committed by a human child produced good.*[8] (*Siddhiār* II. 27, 29)

---

7. Dakśa sacrificed to the gods, but did not invite Śiva. When Nārada-Muni reported this to Śiva, Umādevi, Śiva's wife, longed to see her father's sacrifice, and begged for permission to go. Śiva finally granted her permission, against his will, because she kept on begging. After Umādevi got there Dakśa slandered her and her spouse. Umādevi returned to Kailāsa very angry, reported what had happened, and begged her husband to destroy the sacrifice. As soon as Śiva agreed to destroy Dakśa's sacrifice, a heroic son was born from Śiva's forehead. Of various gods present at the sacrifice, this child knocked out the teeth of the sun-god, threw the moon-god to the ground, and broke Indra's bones. Besides dishonouring all these gods, he struck off Dakśa's head and destroyed the sacrifice root and branch. (Tiruvācaka I. 4; the same legend also occurs in Mahābhārata.)
8. The 'human child' is Sandēśuranāyanar, a Śaivite saint whose legend is in Periapurāṇa. Noticing a herdsman beating a cow, he took over the herding to prevent this. Overflowing with piety, he used to carry out the ceremonial sacrifice in the field, copying what he had seen his father the brahmin do. But when his father heard of it, he thought it blasphemous. One day he caught

The test of a good or evil deed thus lies not in the deed itself, but in the agent's religious or irreligious attitude. For Śaiva Siddhānta it is this that decides whether the deed is worthy or not; and this does preserve for souls some degree of ethical personality, much endangered by the karma-doctrine, so that the soul has at least some responsibility, in connection with karma. It is not responsible for the fact of the deed being done, eternal karma must answer for that; but it is responsible for the way in which the deed is done. If the deeds karma compels it to do are done with an evil intention they earn suffering and prevent progress along the path to salvation: but the same deeds done with good intentions earn a reward and move the soul onward towards salvation. Thus immoral activity halts or reverses such progress, but ethical activity inhibits regress and brings gradual progress. Religious activity, however, brings rapid progress, being based on actions which are correct and karma-free. So religious activity is much the best. It still comes under karma, which the agent needs to transcend (by mystico-religious activity); but it is the soul's best way forward, taking it on the point where action ceases to be karmic. Thus doing good karma is a duty, neglect of which leads to evil consequences.

The good and bad deeds done in one birth by a soul guided by Āṇavamala are called Āgāmyakarma. They then become prārabdhakarma, the results of good and bad deeds consumed by souls over time, and saṃcitakarma, fruits not consumed but stored up for consumption later. Good and bad deeds have their seeds in desires, and grow in the soil of Āṇavamala, brought on by the sunshine of the tirōdhānaśakti, like blades of corn bearing ears and fruit in due course. Now the fruits brought forth by good and bad deeds are joy and sorrow, well-being or poor health, high caste or low, earlier or later death etc.

Possessions and poverty, joy and sorrow, high station or low and despised, these six things are already decided while the child is in the mother's womb. This destiny comes from the efforts (of souls during their

---

him at it, scolded him, and struck him with his stick; but the son, absorbed in silent prayer to Śiva, took no notice at all of that, and continued in the performance of the sacred service. Finally, the father knocked over the milk-pan which the boy needed for the service. Angry at this crime against Śiva and at being disturbed in his devotions, the boy picked up a stick, and struck off his father's legs, thus committing both murder and Brahminicide; an act rewarded by a vision of Śiva.

life on earth). It is deeds done in previous lives which are responsible for these six factors in your present life, and deeds you do now will enter your body in the next birth. (*Siddhiār* II.9)

Still further fruits are the joys of heaven, and the torments of hell.

No deed dies without generating fruit. Consuming the fruit is unavoidable; they don't decay, and you can't pass them on to someone else. Each soul must consume what it has sown. As one deed does not cancel another, a good deed does not make up for a bad one.

These two kinds of deed are built up by the thoughts, words and actions. One deed is not destroyed by another. If you think carefully you can see that consumption is unavoidable. (*Prak* II.13)

Admittedly this same verse notes, with apparent approval, that in the Vaidiga-Śaiva system one deed can replace another, i.e. by giving money for holding sacrifices. But no other text supports this suggestion, so perhaps it was not the Siddhāntins in general, but just Umāpati, the brahmin of Chidambaram temple, who mentioned the value of spending money for ritual-purposes.

Fruits of the two-fold karma cannot be consumed until they are ripe, when the time comes as set by eternal law. The ripening of the fruits follows a definite sequence, though this may not be the order in which the deeds were performed.

Although the fruits of deeds must be consumed in due order, this need not be temporal, but may relate to their importance. (*Prak* II.11)

A deed can bear its fruit in the same life. Others ripen after death, and are consumed in hell or in heaven; and others again in the next life. All these fruits that ripen and are consumed are called prārabdhakarma (achieved, eaten up). It is Śiva that makes souls consume their ripe fruits. He is custodian and executor of the law of karma and he observes the action of the soul and keeps account of its deeds.

The great fire (*hunger*) *due to desire for nourishment blazes on for quite a while; and if the soul undertakes some manageable task to help in quenching it, then will the Supreme be there, and his book shows what karma the soul is doing now* (*āgāmyakarma*) *and what old karma is there* (*saṃcita and prārabdha*). *Praised be this work of the Supreme.* (*Kroḍai* 8)

God makes souls consume the fruit of each deed, just as a magnet makes the iron come to it. Unless the soul enters a body (*where karma's*

account has to be set straight) and under God consumes the fruits of its deeds, who else will have the knowledge to bring those deeds home to the soul and its body?

The soul which will do those deeds combines with the body in which those deeds will be done, and under God consumes the fruits of its deeds, (as God requires of it inescapably, just as a magnet attracts any nearby piece of iron, without human intervention). Indeed, if that is not how the soul consumes those fruits, who else is going to know about them and see to it that they get consumed; for in the time of bondage the soul lies there shackled by mala, without knowledge and without free will. For souls have no knowledge of their own, and karma is material, and Māyā is rooted in God, so only God can know the deeds and ensure that they are consumed. (*Bodha* II.2, *Ex.* 2)

There is the objection that the law of karma could work without the Supreme taking a hand. This is rejected:

You say the deeds themselves produce the fruits, and God need not help. Then let me tell you that the deeds which are done are completely dead. How can they bear fruit? (Reply) As manure spread over a field, or medicine swallowed, take effect after they are gone, so also deeds generate fruits as they disappear.

Understand this, then. If food and betel-nut die away in the belly, what use are they to the body except as dirt?

(Anyway) the examples given are not comparable to the deeds. Objects die and bear fruits in the place where they are. Deeds die in this life and bear fruits in the next. All the water in a hot pan disappears then and there, where then will be its fruit? (The point is that the water evaporated comes back as rain elsewhere, not on its own, but by various causes working together.)

You say that all deeds are in the manas of the doer, and enter the body later, causing fruits. But think about this: are heaven and hell and the earth there in manas? Is that where they come from? That's terrific, pure fantasy!

We see that a gift given, and the receiver, and the donor, and the giving, all pass away. That is why there is need of someone to give the reward. This unfailing work is the task of the Supreme. If we do anything, he weighs up its value as if the deed were ours, and has the fruit consumed, so as to halt the suffering (rebirth). (*Siddhiār* II.17-21)

The following sayings explain why Śiva undertakes to enforce the law of karma:

You ask why the Supreme appraises good and bad deeds? The Supreme,

who is omnipresent in all things, does it out of love for souls. Gracious to those who do good works, he shows anger to those whose works are evil.

It is his love that prompts his anger. He punishes evil deeds, and so eliminates them. He instils fear into souls, saying they should do good works, by that law. In each case his action is a gracious one.

Fathers and mothers shout at their disobedient children, and strike them with a stick, or even tie them up; but close inspection shows they do it out of love. The anger of the Supreme is like the anger of a loving parent. (*Siddhiār* II.14-16)

In order to prevent souls from piling up bitter fruits, he has given them the Vedas, and through them he shows which deeds bring really bad fruits and should be most avoided. Yet souls do perform deeds against which they have been warned, so God makes the damage good again by imposing punishment, to avoid complete subjugation to Āṇavamala.

If we follow the doctor's instructions, no sickness occurs, but if we ignore them we do suffer sickness; though even when people ignore his instructions the doctor still gives healing medicine. Again, if sickness develops without any error on our part, he heals that too. So too this Śiva of whom the scriptures tell will remove karma by having them consume the fruits.

In this world the doctor heals some sicknesses by surgery; love makes him snip and cut. Some sicknesses he heals by prescribing a mixture of sugar and milk. The Supreme removes the deeds of the soul by allowing it to consume joy and sorrow. (*Siddhiār* II.34 & 35)

Because the deeds of the soul are quite diverse, and because each deed brings forth its relevant fruit, the individual soul will have quite diverse fruits to consume. To cope with this diversity, Śiva subjects the soul to the process of transmigration, thus producing a variety of situations to suit the various fruits.

It is on account of their consumption of good and bad deeds that souls are born for joy or sorrow, and die, and go to a heaven or hell, and then return again to earth.

Like a doctor or a king the Supreme gives a reward for the deeds which souls have produced. Bodies, and the fruits of deeds, do not turn up in the next birth all by themselves. (*Siddhiār* II.4; *on transmigration see also* V.3)

Souls have to suffer manifold consequences of actions during their soul-journeying. These come about in three ways; so people speak of a three-fold prārabdha.

Karma's effects on souls comes about through both intelligent and unintelligent beings, in three groups: gods, lifeless nature and living nature. (*Prak* II.11)

Karma, called prārabdha, can thus be either ādhidaivika, ādhiyātmika or ādhibhautika. Ādhibhautika arises through matter; ādhyātmika through souls linked to matter, ādhidaivika through God. (*Bodha* II.2, *comment*)

To ādhibhautika belong good and bad luck, the pains of cold, heat or rain, storm, thunder and other natural phenomena.

To ādhiyātmika belong sickness, possession, violent attacks by men or beasts, and all the punishments and commendations that kings impose.

The kings of this world order punishment for those who do not obey their commands, and cast them into prison. To those who obey they give villages and other treasures, and legal authority too. All the power that is in the land is in the hands of the king. (*Siddhiār* II.31)

Whatever the king does is an act of Śiva's grace. If men sin grievously, the king lays a grievous punishment on them, threatens them, and thus erases the sin. If after that they obey the law they are good, and do not go to hell. The king's punishment is similar to hell. (*Siddhiār* II.31 & 32)

To ādhidaivika karma belong lowly birth, old age, and above all the joy and sorrow that await souls in the heavens of the gods, and in the hells.

The Vedas are the words of the Supreme. The hells are the prisons into which he casts those souls who violate his words. Those souls who perform the duties commanded by him dwell in the world of the gods, in perfect bliss. Joy and sorrow come to the soul through the will of the Supreme. (*Siddhiār* II.30)

If one does not keep to the Vedas, revealed through his grace, and wanders away from them, committing sins, then God lays upon the soul the pains of the darkest hells, and so removes the grievous sins. He rewards good works through the treasures that are in the heavens, and through other pleasures. This is the medicine with which he, the physician, removes the dark Mala. (*Siddhiār* II.33)

Kroḍai 9 gives more details on the punishments of hell:

He carries out this labour of love for all the innumerable souls, not just the human ones. At a set time he separates souls from their bodies and sets them in the heaven of Vishṇu or the heaven of Brahma; as their good deeds deserve, he makes them gods, or Indra, and bestows on them other stages of bliss. After the time in which they have variously enjoyed these

good things, there come the cruel and ever-triumphant servants of the God of the Dead, and seize them in haste, and bring them before their Lord, who, friendly and impartial, enquires: O sinner, have you yet to achieve non-rebirth? Then he turns angrily to his servants and says, 'Do unto them according to their deeds', and the servants take them away, and lay them in an oil-press, and crush them. Then they make a long bar hot in the fire and make them clasp it; and heat an iron pole red-hot, and bore through their ears with it; they cut off the point of their tongue, and make them eat their own flesh, and beat them; and so that they will not come back, they plung them deep in hells, and sadistically make their stay in hell full of torments which here on earth can be neither imagined nor imitated.

Now a mother or father or relative, knowing that a family member is sick, is full of pity, and dutifully calls a doctor. And the doctor, who understands the nature of the sickness, makes a needle red-hot in the fire, and cauterises the sick person with it, or does surgery, or operates on the eye. His relations are pleased, and give great gifts to the surgeon. And a king anxious to extinguish here below a great sin his son had committed by running over a calf, ran over him and killed him.[9] *May God take note how the servants of the god of the underworld are crueller than poisonous snakes, and inflict tortures in their anger. Praised be his grace!*

The very bad and very good deeds are consumed in the hells and the heavens, and the soul then comes back to earth to expiate those that remain.

Since the soul commits innumerable āgāmya, and so has mountains of prārabdha to consume, Siddhāntins think it cannot consume it all, so has quite a lot of unconsumed prārabdha left over for each birth, even following a spell in one of the heavens or hells. This remainder is called saṃcita (accumulated), being stocked up by Śiva like a farmer stocking up uneaten corn, to eat later. As each new birth adds to this stock, it eventually grows into a great mountain, almost impossible to destroy.

Let us take some figures to illustrate this: Suppose that in one birth a soul performs 1,000 good and 1,500 bad deeds. (Āgāmya). Within this same birth about 50 good and 50 bad deeds ripen

9. The son of a king of Tiruvārūr, a town in the fertile district of Tanjore, once ran over a calf and killed it. The mother-cow went complaining to the king by sounding the judicial bell at the door of the king's palace. When the king learnt what had happened, he gave orders for his son to be run over by a cart in the same way that he had run over the calf. (from the Peria Purāna)

(prārabdha). As bad deeds predominate the soul arrives at a hell, and there expiates about 800 evil deeds. After this, the soul is born to another human life, and does justice to some 600 of the 950 good deeds that still remain, and 500 of the 650 bad ones. That leaves 350 good and 150 bad deeds to be consumed. Here the first 1000 + 1500 are āgamya, and of these 50 + 50 + 800 + 600 + 500 get consumed by the end of birth II, as prārabdha. The 350 + 150 that remain unconsumed are saṃcita.

A soul that in one birth has built up more good deeds than evil ones attains to a heaven after death, where it consumes further good fruits, leaving bad ones behind as saṃcita.

It is not easy to decide the best policy for the soul, as the ratio of good to bad deeds left in saṃcita affects the future destiny of the soul. Expiating more bad deeds would improve the outlook.

Siddhānta's view of karma is rather different from that of Vedānta, which has deeds both bad and good (āgāmya) consumed partly in that same birth and partly on the moon, which souls visit after each life on earth (prārabdha). Saṃcita (the leftover), which resembles the thick fluid left behind when you empty a bottle, brings about the next birth, to use up more karma. Thus Vedānta does not visualise any piling up of Saṃcita during the whole transmigration, but allows that the fruits of all deeds done during that birth or the next or in between do get consumed; prārabdha during or just after the first birth and saṃcita in the second birth. Now Śaiva Siddhānta takes Saṃcita to refer to deeds piled up over countless births, as we shall see when we come to consider how karma can be eliminated.

Why does new karma keep on coming? Our sources make these comments:

What causes future deeds (new Āgamya)? It is your like or dislike for consuming the deeds (i.e. their fruits, prārabdha). This is all due to those earlier actions. If you find this unacceptable, let me tell you self-pride ripens, according to the wise, and its fruit develops within the person. There are two sorts of action in this world, deliberate and unintentional. So one and the same karma gives rise to both attraction or aversion, when it touches the soul, thus generating two karmas (prārabdhakarma and new agamyakarma); so good and bad deeds inevitably result. (*Prak* II.12)

If we reap the consequences of earlier actions in the strivings of this life, how can this fruit-consuming cause something further? If in consuming

former deeds there come joys and sorrows then these in turn must cause future ones. No consumption of fruits takes place without further activity. Such activity always accompanies the soul.

Whatever grows on earth serves both as food and as seed for the future; and all joys and sorrows resulting from our deeds ripen into the appropriate fruits, and serve as causes also in their turn. (*Siddhiār* II.11 & 12).

When there is a re-birth, a soul unites with a body. As the soul duly consumes earlier deeds, new ones arise. By the farmer's labour a field yields a cultivated crop; so here the Gracious One is the labourer. It is not karma that unites souls and bodies.

It was agreed earlier that what does not exist cannot come into existence. Now saṃcita karma comes from good and bad deeds which did really exist, and its yield is joy and sorrow, and the body to enjoy them in. Matter cannot consume them, so the soul, which is Cit, has to enter a body and consume them there.

But how can new karma arise, you ask, when previous deeds are being consumed? The arrangement is the same: previous acts cause consumption, which involves new actions. What is the Supreme for, then? Is the new karma just a yield (from the old) ? I tell you the field which the farmer works brings appropriate yields (his work by itself does not do this); and the Supreme in his generosity links to each soul deeds which had always served as food and seed. The deeds do not link themselves up to souls, as a yield. It is aversion and attraction that help to ensure consumption of earlier deeds. (*Bodha* II.2, *Ex.* 1 *and comment*)

These passages show clearly enough how Siddhānta thinks new āgāmyakarma arises, and in consequence holds that karma, though ever and again consumed, will never come to an end in the normal way; that is, unless Śiva takes a hand. What was cannot just disappear, so past actions not yet consumed strive to re-appear, causing a body to be formed into which the soul responsible for them then enters and consumes their fruits, as far as possible. Such consumption relies on the tirōdhānaśakti (present owing to Āṇavamala), and on a certain vigorous tendency e.g. to harvest diligently (or fraudulently) pleasures earned by earlier deeds; and feelings of desire or aversion also play a part, as those fruits turn out pleasant or unpleasant.

Now this activity, with its accompanying pleasure or aversion in consuming prārabdha (unconsumed former deeds), generates fresh actions which like earlier ones strive to mature and be

consumed, thus developing into prārabdhakarma or saṃcitakarma. As the Prārabdhakarma thus generates new Āgamyakarma, and as with all that Saṃcitakarma stored up the consumption of earlier karma can never be complete, the theory of karmamala naturally leads in practice to the doctrine of endless soul-journeying. But before describing that in detail, let us first consider the elements involved: the world, bodies, and the soul.

A word may be added here to show how the teaching about karma harmonises with the claim that God is absolute. It is clearly consonant with that claim to urge that Śiva guides the working out of karma, which cannot operate without him. It is less clear that making karma dependent on Śiva will really help to guarantee his absolute state. The law that souls are to receive punishment and reward according to their deeds is established from eternity. It is not God's decision, but has always been there alongside of him, independently. It cannot function of its own motion, being material. It starts up because Śiva enlists it and sets it to work, presumably by his own free choice; but he cannot influence the way it works. He cannot change the inner purposiveness of Āṇavamala, nor the inner purposiveness of karma, which has always been there and was not put there by him.

Thus God determines whether karma shall operate, but not how it operates. Having set it off he has to let it run its course and complete the work it has undertaken. Karmas even restricts the manner of creation; for if God wants to create a world he must create it as karma requires. The commentator on Śivajñānabodha Sūtra II thus rightly calls karma the instrumental cause of an instrumental cause, as it determines what all created things are like. Śiva thus appears not as an absolute monarch, but a constitutional prince, operating through laws not due to him but there before he came.

3. Māyāmala

We have seen how the shackling of the soul by Āṇavamala leads to that by karmamala, and how this causes the soul to enter the world, and to live in a body. This world with its bodies is the third fetter of the soul, called Māyāmala. Māyā properly refers to the cause underlying the world with all its bodies; more generally it includes whatever derives from that cause.

The difference between the schools of Śaiva Siddhānta and other Indian schools is particularly evident in their teaching about

Māyā, so our exposition at this point will not be restricted solely to Śaiva Siddhānta, but will seek to place this in its philosophical and historical context. Otherwise a reader might wonder if our account of Śaiva Siddhānta on Māyā were correct, being accustomed to quite another train of thought. A full philosophico-historical treatment is of course beyond the scope of this book.

First we shall describe the teaching about Māyā which we find in our sources; and then try to set the result in its historical and philosophical context, that is, within Indian philosophy. (If we started there and then came to Śaiva Siddhānta, we might be led astray by statements of other schools.) Despite all the researches of European (especially German) scholars, our knowledge of the history of Indian philosophy is far from complete, so error could well result were we to start from a general historical and philosophical survey, and interpret our sources on that basis, instead of seeing what they actually have to say.

The danger of being misled is all the greater as writings such as the Śaivāgamas, on which Śaiva Siddhānta claims to be based, and of neighbouring schools such as Sri Nīlakaṇṭha's Vedānta, are practically unknown, and tend to be ignored in a historical survey. And too much significance has in my view been given to the opposing school of Śaṃkara's Vedānta.

(a) *Māyā, the World's Material Cause*

We saw in Chapter One that Śaiva Siddhānta holds Māyā to be a reality, something truly existent. This eternally existent something is *eternal, without form, unchangeable; seed for the world; without intelligence; pervading all things. It is a force for the Mala-free (Śiva) to use, and provides souls with a world (bhuvana), objects of enjoyment (bhoga), a body (tanu), and organs (karaṇa). It is a Mala. Māyā also brings about confusion.* (*Siddhiār* II.53)

This definition shows Māyā as an eternal reality, unchangeable by nature, not restricted to this place or that. It is energy without form or thought, but it is not intelligent, so is not self-motivated, though it can achieve effects (*seed for the world*) once God sets it going (*a force for the Mala-free*). Māyā is a Mala controlling the soul, while itself being under control (*force for the Mala-free*). To be in bondage to Māyā is a disadvantage for the soul (*Mala brings about confusion*), but also an advantage (*provides the soul with bhoga, tanu, etc*). But as Māyā is without intelligence, and is a Mala, we must not think it part of God, as Śakti is. It is quite different in nature

from God, though some mutual dependence is conceivable. God is related to Māyā and makes use of it like a tool (*force for the Mala-free*). Māyā is dependent on God for existence (Bodha I, Sūtra 2, Ex: 2), and for activity, as the following passages also show. That is why Śiva is called Pati, i.e. Lord of Māyā too.

How does God use this eternal energy, formless and without intelligence, this non-mover which is moved, called Māyā? Bodha I. 2 answers this question, so we translate it here complete with the comment, where appropriate:

Thesis 1. *The world is a reality.*

Reason. From what is not there, nothing can arise.

Thesis 2. *The world has a Mover.*[10]

Reason. What exists cannot begin to act on its own.

Thesis 3. *Nothing arises without Śiva, the God of destruction, in whom it also perishes.*

Reason. The world is destroyed in Śiva.

Example 1. *What perishes arises* (*again*) *from that in which it perished. This occurs by reason of Mala. Everything has a tendency to arise just as it perished. If things reverted to Vishṇu, the God of preservation, the world would not perish. Vishṇu and Brahma, God of creation, also perish in their origin.*

Comment (*on this second part of the example*). *This is directed at the Pāñcarātra party* (*Vaishṇavites*) *who say 'You, who represent Realism, say that all things revert to their material cause, in which case the world would revert to Vishṇu* (*Mūlaprakṛiti, the material cause of the world, being a form of Vishṇu*)*; not to Śiva the God of destruction, who is the efficient cause, which is different from the material cause.'*

But this will not do. If the world reverted to the God of preservation (*personifying your 'basic stuff'*) *then only the little lower world will perish, not all the products of Māyā, for the higher worlds stand above mūlaprakṛiti. You may ask where the products of Māyā all disappear to. In the God of destruction, I say, to whom the gods of creation and preservation owe their existence, and in whom both they and Māyā meet their end.*

If the school of realism (*Siddhānta*) *says that the world perishes, then there must be something in which the essences of things would then survive, in some more subtle form. This we call the material cause. This proves that Māyā is there, as material cause for the world.*

---

10. Here Schomerus has *agens* (Latin). A mechanism or process once set up still requires switching on or starting, which requires intelligence. (*Ed.*)

The Supreme is efficient cause of the world, not material cause, but the world can correctly be said to perish in him and arise from him, for Māyā, the material cause, is ultimately based on him, as the next example shows:

Example 2. When the seed is in damp earth, the shoot begins to grow. And as (Māyā) is linked with the Śakti (of him on whom it ultimately rests) it is enabled (to arise) according to the deeds of individual souls. As (for example) to the grub which intends turning into a beetle he gives the form it desires.

Comment. The word 'perish' in the previous example shows there is a reference to Māyā. Once set going by the Śakti, Māyā brings forth individual things according to the deeds of the souls, and in the right order, just as shoot always comes from seed when sown in damp earth (its ultimate support); for Māyā is to World as shoot is to seed.

Māyā has no power without the Śakti, just as a seed cannot bring forth a shoot unless it falls on damp soil. Which shows that when the world meets its end and again arises in Māyā, this ending and arising is through the Śakti of the Highest, for it is on him that all this ultimately rests.

These passages clearly show that Meykaṇḍadeva regarded Māyā as the material cause of the existing world along with all the material substances present there, i.e. as the subtle basic matter, the original element from which by Śiva's Śakti everything material evolves. Other sources also regard Māyā as the material cause of the world.

What is Māyā for, you ask. It is the material cause of the world. No cause is needed, you say, except God. But Acit (non-intelligence) is not created from Cit (Intelligence). Then what is God for, you say, if Māyā is there. But Māyā is Acit, and connot assume a form through its own power. Even the Highest creates nothing without Māyā.

Is God then powerless? No, but Māyā also is eternal. The Highest spreads out that Acit and so creates all things. No wise man believes that Māyā empowers God (to create). (*Prak* II.5)

You have forgotten that the world says that creation, maintenance and destruction are works of Māyā. In the same way, you have forgotten that a tree germinates when all complete and ready as an atom in a seed; but will not germinate otherwise. This shows you that Māyā is the cause.

The world is real, and arises from Māyā and reverts to it. You say the world is not included in Māyā. No? Then a horn must grow from the head of a hare.

You say that would mean all the fallen leaves going back into the trees and growing again in their season. No, for the cause remains. (The leaves decay, break up into their chemical components, and go back in that form into the tree, and again appear as leaves).

If the named cause (Māyā) exists then the world it causes must also be regarded as existent; so we could say it is beginningless. But we could also say it has a beginning, as a god got it to arise. You ask why Māyā needs anyone else, to help. Well, I'm going to give you the real answer.

The world is the workmanship of someone endowed with reason. Now souls become conscious (only) when they get bodies and organs, and it is Māyā that sets them going, knowledge-less Māyā. So there must be someone (else) about, who makes all this happen.

Everything produced has three causes: material, instrumental and efficient. Thus for a pot, clay is the material cause, a potter's wheel is its instrumental cause, and the potter is the efficient cause. You work it out. Māyā is the clay, Śakti is the wheel, and God the potter, the Doer who makes the entire world. (*Siddhiār* I.14-18)

To summarize: Māyā is an energy, existing eternally. It is without form and without intelligence; but through the Śakti of Śiva the whole material world with all its varied hues can develop. In short: Māyā is the ultimate basic stuff or matter for the world.

(b) *The Products of Māyā*

So far we have taken Māyā in its narrower sense. It was also used more widely, to include all those things which arise from this material cause. Māyā in this wider sense is all that Śiva allows to develop from Māyā (in the narrower sense). Sometimes this wider set is called Māyēya (products of Māyā), and reckoned an independent entity (see Chapter One).

This wider Māyā divides into śuddhamāyā (pure) and aśuddhamāyā (impure); the latter then being subdivided into aśuddhamāyā and mūlaprakṛiti. (Popular treatments give: śuddhamāyā, śuddhāśuddhamāyā, aśuddhamāyā, a clearer division but not adopted here as it does not figure in our sources.)

Śuddhamāyā is Māyā in its narrower sense, set going by the Śakti, and including products evolving directly therefrom. Siddhiār I.24 explains what these are:

Vindu or śuddhamāyā is the material cause that produces words, letters, worlds, mantras, tattvas, bodies, objects of pleasure and organs needed by the Vidyas (or Mahāmantrar) Vidyāīśar and Sadāśivar, the very highest souls.


Māyā divides into śuddhamāyā and aśuddhamāyā. From śuddhamāyā emerge the five kalās, the four vāc, the five Śivatattvas and the thirty-one tattvas from śuddha kāla to śuddha pṛithivī. (*Bodha* II. 2, *Ex.* 3, comment)

The products of Māyā, including those of aśuddhamāyā and mūlaprakṛiti, are called adhvan, ways or means:

I. *objective* (*artha*) *adhvan*:
   a. 5 kalā, forces for evolution and reversion;
   b. 36 tattva, on which all material existence is based;
   c. 224 worlds, deriving from the tattvas.

II. *phonetic* (*śabdha*):
   d. 51 sounds (and letters), the subtle basis for thought;
   e. 81 words, derived from the sounds;
   f. mantra, statements expressing complete thoughts.

Table I: PRODUCTS OF MĀYĀ



Nādā is usually reckoned as tattva 1, Vindu as tattva 2.
Adhvans a, b, c make up the world of objects; d, e, f, that of thoughts.

These are collectively called ways or means (adhvan) to indicate that all the products of Māyā are means for releasing the soul from the bondage of Āṇavamala.

The adhvan are all supposed to derive from Vindu. The bodies, objects of pleasure and organs, mentioned in the first quotation need to be arranged under their tattvas. The four vāc mentioned in the second passage are not usually regarded as a distinct adhvan, being taken as the common source for letters, words and mantra.

The three sound-adhvans d, e, f represent ideas arising from the world of objects, though not in Plato's sense; though one could compare his ideas to the Śakti coming forth from Śiva before the worlds arise, as instrumental cause of all that happens, and of which those happenings really reduce to mere copies. Not that these sound-adhvans precede or control the world of objects; they result and derive from it. Although without shape they are material and non-intelligent (compared with Śiva and the soul, which are spirit, intelligence); this is why we have grouped them together as a world of thoughts not of spirits. The Sanskrit term is śabdaprapañca (i.e. sound, a tone-world). In cosmology they form an item distinct from the world of objects and perceptible to a soul, a knower; a cosmos resolved into thoughts, without which it could never be known. We shall have to discuss later their meaning for psychology.

Our sources do little to explain these groupings of Māyā. The commentaries refer to the Āgamas for further detail, and offer brief and muddled remarks, which make things worse. The sketch given above is just one attempt, part evidence and part construction. Future research into the Āgamas should show how far it is correct.

In our sources, detailed discussion is mainly about the tattvas. Thirty-six of these are subtle; another sixty are gross (but rarely mentioned). The thirty-six divide into three groups, those deriving from śuddhamāyā, from aśuddhamāyā, from mūlaprakṛiti. The first group are called śuddhatattva or Śivatattva: nāda, vindu, sādākshya, māheśvara and śuddhavidyā. They are not intelligent, and belong to matter, yet are of such infinite subtlety as to differ very little from the intelligent Śakti of Śiva, and are easily confused with that power; and are subtle enough to be bodies for Śiva's Śakti. (see above II.7 on Śiva's form; further details below III.3d)

Somewhat grosser though still unthinkably subtle are the products of aśuddhamāyā:

Āśuddhamāyā is four-fold (as to products): bodies (tanu), organs (karana), worlds (bhuvana), pleasurable objects (bhoga). These (products) vary individually. It is eternal, and essentially undivided, ever formless, uncreated. As long as karma is there it causes ignorance in all souls, being Acit. Though motionless it is present in its extensive products, and is responsible for their extension. Being duly present in them all it gives all souls a home when everything perishes. Such is Mala, holding its position by Śiva's grace. (*Prak* II.4)

There is, therefore, practically no difference in nature between śuddhamāyā and aśuddhamāyā, but their products and definition differ considerably. The products of śuddhamāyā are here mainly for Śiva and only indirectly for souls, enabling him to do things for their benefit. The products of aśuddhamāyā benefit souls more directly. By their power eternal and omnipresent souls are brought within the limits of time, space and experience, thus preparing them to enter the world, and opening up the way to their release from Āṇavamala.

In Table III of Substances and Tattvas (see end of book) these two groups of the products of Māyā occupy places six to twelve:

(6) aśuddhamāyā itself,
(7) time (kāla), ripening and distributing karma's fruits,
(8) niyati, imposing karma on souls, in a regular manner,
(9) kalā, prising open Āṇavamala's hold, and letting in some light (knowledge),
(10) vidyā, linking the faculty of knowledge with its organs,
(11) rāga, linking the faculty of will with its objects.

These five tattva from kāla to rāga thus link the soul, with its faculties of knowing willing and acting, and the organs and objects on or by which they operate.

Number 12 is the soul, as equipped by items 7-11, and called purusha. Although purusha does not derive from Māyā, it is Māyā that enables the soul to be there in just that way. By its link with Māyā the soul becomes a purusha such as we come across in experience. We see and experience souls as subject to the limitations of time, place, and fate, and with powers of knowledge, will and activity, all because of their bondage to Māyā. Standing as they do between the subtle tattvas deriving from śuddhamāyā and

the crude tattvas deriving from mūlaprakṛiti (Asat), all seven tattvas together (nos. 6 - 12) are commonly called śuddhāśuddhatattva, tattvas both pure and impure.

The gross or aśuddhatattvas evolve from mūlaprakṛiti, the basic matter of our world, which includes three guṇas: *Mūlaprakṛiti consists of all the guṇas put together, which bring about rebirths in accordance with deeds. Mūlaprakṛiti is the three guṇas. Wise men call them sattva rajas and tamas. Each guṇa includes the other two.* (*Prak* II. 23)

In mūlaprakṛiti these three qualities are undeveloped, as the fragrance of the flower is undeveloped in the bud. The guṇas turn up along with the souls, the one there is most of in a soul deciding its character, on entering the body.

The sattva guṇa represents the ethically good principle, and produces good characteristics like wisdom and gentleness in thoughts, words and deeds. The second guṇa, pride or presumption (rajas), indicates the less noble principle of worldly cleverness and ambition, bringing qualities useful for attaining a position of authority, such as diligence, learning, steadfastness, liberality. Tamas is the ethically bad principle, bringing qualities such as lust of the flesh, wrath, murder, idleness, drunkenness, lying, etc.

Prior to their development these three guṇas make up the thirteenth tattva, called citta. It does perceive, but does not achieve anything, as the guṇas are not developed. As the guṇas develop there emerges buddhi (14), which makes judgments; what sort of judgments, depends on which guṇa predominates.

From buddhi emerges ahaṃkāra (15) which talks about I and mine, and says, Who is like me? Ahaṃkāra comes in three varieties, taijasa, vaikārika, and bhūtādika, corresponding to the three guṇas. From taijasa evolves manas, the questioning organ (16) and the sense-organs (jñānendriya).

These four tattvas, citta, buddhi, ahaṃkāra, and manas, are grouped together as internal organs (antaḥkaraṇa). There are five jñānendriya, organs of hearing (17); touch (18); sight (19); taste (20); and smell (21).

From vaikārika ahaṃkāra evolve the five organs of action (karmendriya): mouth (22), feet (23), hands (24), anus (25), and reproductive organs (26).

From bhūtādika ahaṃkāra derive five subtler elements called tanmātra: sound (27), touch (28), shape (29), taste (30) smell

(31); and the corresponding gross elements called bhuta: ether (32) air (33), fire (34), water (35), and earth (36). These gross elements are not the perceptible gross substances found in the outside world, but capacities located in bodily members like eye, ear, etc., enabling them to become aware of outside objects (as a lens does).

The subtle elements (tanmātra) are to be taken as capacities which process the external objects captured by the bhūta, extracting their special features (sound, feel, shape etc.) to convert into ideas (rather like a photographic plate).

Thus the jñānendriya should be seen as various nerves that convey to citta the ideas captured through sense-organs, and, after the mind and the other internal organs have worked upon them, pass them on to the soul. (For the psychological significance of this tattva see V.5).

But the significance of the five tanmātras (sound, touch, etc.) and the five bhūtas is not merely psychological but also cosmic; for they are not just organs of knowledge, but objects in their own right. As cosmic principles the tanmātras differ in this way from the bhūtas: each tanmātra is unique, one providing the material basis for sound, another for feeling, and so on for shape, taste and smell, in a general way (not separately for each sort of sound, etc.); but each bhūta in turn includes all its predecessors' properties, so while ether can only be heard, earth can be heard, felt, tasted and smelt, containing all these different nuances within one bhūta.

Then from the five named bhūta derive those elements that inform the bodies of all organic life from plants upwards. These are the so-called bhūtakārya, or products of bhūta; five from each bhūta, totalling twenty-five. From earth come hair, bone, skin, bloodvessels, flesh. From water, urine, blood, semen, brain and marrow. From fire come nourishment, sleep, fear, sex-drive and idleness. From air we have running, walking, sitting, lying and standing. Ether contributes anger, avarice, lust, passion, envy. Further elements are the ten vital breaths, ten nerves, and the business of speaking, moving, giving, evacuating and begetting, (corresponding to the five organs of activity).

(c) *Bodies composed from the Tattvas*

These tattvas then come together to form bodies, into which souls

are to enter. The body with which the individual soul is endowed is further distinguished into two, a gross body called sthūlaśarīra, and a subtle body, the sūkshmaśarīra. The gross body receives from the tattva, properly so called, its own five sense organs (jñānendriya), five organs of movement (karmendriya), and five bhūta. It is subject to continual creation and destruction, expiring at death, and at birth arising again from the sūkshma body, which actually accompanies the soul uninterruptedly from world creation to world destruction; and so is not separated from the soul by death, but shares its destiny after death. This subtle body is formed from eight tattvas: manas, buddhi, ahaṃkāra, and five tanmātras; but also includes three even subtler bodies, guṇaśarīra, kañcukaśarīra, and kāraṇaśarīra.

In the Śivajñānasiddhiār these five bodies were equated with what Śaṃkara's philosophy had called five husks or wrappings (kośa). Thus the karāṇa body was taken as Ānandamaya (blissful) kośa, kañcuka as vijñāna (knowing), guṇa as mano (understanding) kośa, sūkshma as prāṇa (breathing), and sthūla body as annamaya kośa (tasty-food husk).

The soul's relation to these five bodies can be pictured as a circle containing four more concentric circles, kāraṇa being the smallest one. We shall discuss later what this means. (see V.4)

Mention is also made of a bhūtasāraśarīra (body consisting of the essence of the elements). This replaces the soul's gross body during its stay in heaven or hell: taking over its place at death, and giving way to it again at birth.

If the gross body dies, the subtle body receives a yātāna body (corpse of suffering, i.e. bhūtasāra body of the soul, in hell). Thus each soul by the will of the Supreme enjoys all the joys in heaven or sorrows in hell, and then as a faultless atom enters a mother's womb. (*Siddhiār* II.36)

Eyes and ears (i.e. gross bodies) perish. The soul goes to heaven with the bhūta body produced by the remaining sūkshma body, forgets, as a dreamer forgets his waking life, and driven by manas according to its deeds, enters as an atom into a mother's womb. (*Bodha* II.3, *Ex.* 1)

These statements about the bhūtaśarīra show that the sthūlaśarīra is subject to change, unlike the subtle body, for it has to make room for another body, while the soul is in heaven or hell.

This is not the only change undergone by the gross body. We read in Prak: II.29 and Siddhiār II.89 that there are more groups

and many more types of body; and from Siddhiār II. 41-50 that souls when born do not always get a body of the same type or group, but may take any body of any type or group. (see further V.3 below on transmigration)

Bodies fall into seven groups:

1. Plants	1,900,000 species
2. Water creatures	1,000,000 species
3. Creeping creatures	1,500,000
4. Birds	1,000,000
5. 4-footed beasts	1,000,000
6. Humans	900,000
7. Gods and demons	1,100,000
totalling .... bodies of	8,400,000 distinct sorts.

We can also sort bodies by what they are born from:

(a) plants, from a germ (in seed)
(b) worms, vermin etc., from sweat (damp heat)
(c) birds, creeping things, water creatures, from eggs
(d) gods, humans, four-footed beasts, from wombs.

Bodies of these four types belong to sakalar souls. Bodies of vijñānakalar souls are composed of tattvas evolved direct from aśuddhamāyā; and tattvas evolved direct from śuddhamāyā and aśuddhamāyā (not mūlaprakṛiti) make up pralayākalar souls.

(d) ***How the World arises from Māyā?***

The five sorts of bhūta, we saw (III. 3b above) are also cosmic in character. They are what the world is made of. Bodies (tanu) and organs (karaṇa) are made from Māyā, and so are worlds (bhuvana) and pleasurable objects (bhoga). Bhuvana and bhoga are coarser than tanu and karaṇa, for they derive from the bhūta, coarsest of the tattvas. Bhoga includes anything done enjoyed or suffered, e.g. items eaten or drunk, chewed, tasted or swallowed; or put on to clean or smarten oneself up, or anything given, received, seen, walked or lain on; also wives, children, relatives, gold, jewellery etc.; and things enjoyed or endured in the heavens or hells.

There are two hundred and twenty-four worlds, with attached heavens and hells; some made of the subtlest elements, others of the coarsest. Topmost are those deriving directly from śuddhatattva (from śuddha-māyā); here live the vijñānakalar souls. Souls of the second class, the pralayākalar, live in worlds created from

śuddha-tattva and śuddhāśuddha-tattva. The worlds reserved for sakalar souls are the coarsest, deriving in part from aśuddha-tattva.

How came these worlds to make up a Universe? Siddhāntin teaching on creation refers only to the empirical world, disregarding statements about other worlds. Their attempts to understand the origin of the world started out from experience and matters of fact, from which metaphysical conclusions were then drawn. This very proper approach was soon subject to dogmatic influences. Expressions used in our sources show very clearly that empirical research had to take second place e.g. to the dogma that whatever is there cannot have come from nothing, but must derive from some fundamental stuff which is underived. This doctrine, accepted though unproven, hindered Śaiva Siddhānta from accepting a divine creative act as conceived in strict theism, viz., creation out of nothing. Combining it with empiricism, they regarded the world as evolved rather than created; though their theory of evolution was not atheistic, like that of Sāmkhya and its ready disciples, the Buddhists, but theistic in character.

The first Sūtra of Bodha shows clearly how they moved from observation of nature (with a dogmatic slant) to theistic evolution. We now translate this, mainly without comment (some were given earlier), but adding some explanatory remarks from Siddhiār I.

Sūtra. The universe confronts us in many forms, as 'he, she, it'. So it is real, but has been brought about. On perishing it arises again, because of Mala. Wise men say that the God of destruction is the cause.

Comment. This Sūtra shows that the first cause of the world is the God of destruction. The intention of this Sūtra is to corroborate by empirical evidence the claim made in Vedas and Āgamas that the manifest world known as he she and it has as its Supreme God the Lord who by the five destructions included in the five kalā (the kalā-Adhvan, not the kalā-Tattva) brought about the last great destruction.

The 'Universe' comprises both word-universe and thing-universe (conceivable as well as factual). We know it as manifold, as 'he, she, it', and in three-fold development (arising, continuing, perishing); which shows it as a reality brought about by a mover.

Its arising must therefore, be from the God who caused it to perish; so that any remaining Mala can be dealt with. Which proves that the god who brings about destruction is the Supreme God of the Universe. Those who have studied logic-books say that the other (gods) are not Supreme.

Section I, *Thesis. The world, which truly exists, and which confronts us in different forms as he, she and it is subjected to the process of creation, maintenance and destruction.*

Reason. Because maintenance and destruction are closely bound up with creation.

Example. The world is so constructed that it is maintained only by the help of creation and destruction. We see A arise from B, continue and then die. And will not the wise, on enquiry, say that the world as a whole has its time to arise, etc. That's obvious!

Comment. Can't you learn from experience, you fool? If creation takes place in the world, it takes place with the help of destruction and maintenance as contributory causes. True enough, you may say, but we only ever see one thing arising, continuing and perishing, not everything at the same time. Yet at certain times of the year you do see whole species coming to life, flourishing and then dying, all at the same time; so surely we can conclude from this evidence that the world as a whole has its own times (*to come and go*).

Section II, *Thesis. As what is non-existent cannot arise, and what is there cannot start to act without a mover, there is no arising without the God of destruction, in whom it perished.*

This thesis has three parts:

a. *'The world is a reality': for what is non-existent cannot arise, cp. horns on a hare.*

b. *'The world has a mover'.*

Comment. This is aimed at the Sāṃkhya school, which says the world we know as reality arises by itself, out of its material cause, and is later resolved into it automatically. No mover is needed, as efficent cause.

Reason (*for thesis* b). *What exists will not act, without a mover.*

c. *There is no arising of things apart from the God of destruction, into whom they were resolved.*

Reason. It was in him that they met their end.

Comment. Things evolve out of what they were resolved into, e.g. a pot, from clay. By the law of inherent qualities, as the world was resolved into the Lord of destruction, it must on return arise from him.

Example 1. *Whatever perishes arises from that again, on account of Mala. Everything has a tendency to come up again in the same form as before.*

Comment. The world is a reality, but when the time comes it is destroyed, and when the time comes for creation it arises again from the Lord of destruction, the site of its destruction. Here you remark that what

is destroyed does not have to come back immediately or in just the same form; if that were required, it would make more sense to suppose the world stayed there, not got destroyed. What is all this going in-and-out of existence for? But I tell you that the actual world does get destroyed so that karmamala may reach maturity; and arises again, so that Āṇavamala may mature. You may go on to ask what proof there is that the same world comes back again, and not a different one. The answer is that everything tries to arise again out of that into which it was resolved. Why otherwise would a rice-grain grow into rice and not into a palm-tree?

Example 1, *part* 2. *If you say the world is resolved into the god of maintenance, that would mean the world is not destroyed. The gods of maintenance and creation also revert to their causes.*

Example 2. *When the seed is in damp earth, the shoot begins to grow. And as (Māyā) is linked with the Śakti (of him on whom it ultimately rests) it is enabled (to arise) according to the deeds of individual souls. As (for example) to the grub which intends turning into a beetle he gives the form it desires. (for comments on these two paragraphs see* III.3a *above)*

Example 3. *The Supreme is undisturbed, like time. He creates without creating, maintains without maintaining, destroys without destroying, just by deciding to. He is unshackled, like a man who had a dream and, on waking, knew it was a dream (and is no longer affected by it: e.g. he was not bitten by a tiger, though he dreamt he was).*

Section 3. *Thesis. The Supreme is the God of destruction.*

Reason. The world whose knowledge is indirect (the world of souls) cannot act freely, but only through the unknowable cause of destruction.

Example. As the world is maintained by the incomparable One, in him it will also be destroyed. That is why the incomparable God of destruction is the Supreme. The One eternal as he is (the world of souls) is subject to him there (in Mukti) in another way. (Bodha I)

(comments from Siddhiār I.1-29)

1. *The whole world, characterised as 'he, she, it', arises, is maintained, and destroyed in the ordinary course (of nature). So there must be a Mover. He who brings about destruction (Śiva) is this Supreme one, as he is there without beginning, blessed and intelligent, and makes things arise.*

2. *Why allege creation and destruction (of the world)? Some people (Lokāyata, the materialists), say the existing world had no beginning. But*

neither deduction nor any other evidence is needed, to refute this objection, as we see everything arising from elements and being resolved into them, just as we said.

3. *If you say that arising and being resolved are natural to them let me tell you that attributes forming part of a thing's nature cannot change. If you say the change also belongs to their nature, it would follow that their nature is change and nothing else. If you say that the elements are the essential things, and that these bring about change, I tell you a Mover is required, as these objects are not intelligent.*

4. *'There are four elements, air, fire, water, earth. Of these, air lets the others appear, destroys fire, produces water, and causes earth to bring forth fruits. No mover is required.' But I tell you they are subject to the very obvious process of creation, maintenance and destruction, so there is need of a more exalted mover who is not subject to these processes.*

5. *You may say everything comes from itself, like (the motion of) a swing, so no mover is required. But who arises? Is it an existent or a non-existent thing? Think carefully, and answer! You are sure to say that the non-existent cannot arise, while what is already existent has no need to do so. So what arises must have been there all the time, not existent, not non-existent either, but halfway between. (This last sentence states the view attributed to the opponent, and dealt with in the next verse.)*

6. *If something neither has nor lacks Being but does really exist, it is really a Be-ing; and, if not existent, a non-Be-ing. It can't 'arise'. Clothes don't 'arise' from clay, though a pot etc. may (with the help of a potter).*

7. *You say a thing can be existent or non-existent without any mover. No. An existent thing cannot while existing have the property of non-existence. If it is non-being then it cannot arise. You may say that a thing which is not has a cause which is; but then the thing of which you said 'is not' did exist (in its cause) and a mover got it to appear.*

8. *'We do observe passing away and arising in bodies, but not in the world.' Really? So what are you saying here, about the world? I tell you that the concealing world arises through the five elements of earth, water, fire, air, and ether, one working through another, and so continues and is then destroyed: which establishes the truth of my position.*

9. *Perhaps you will say this: even if one region of the world is destroyed, another is preserved, but the world as a whole does not perish. But let me point out that in the rainy season, the seed brings forth its shoots, but it rots in the time of heat. When the time comes the whole world perishes, and is then recreated.*

10. *You may say we observe time, as the god of happening. But time is without intelligence. Yes we do see time causing events; that is, helping God the Cause and Commander to bring them about.*

11. *If you say that, after the destruction of the world, karma gets the atoms to arise as a world, which is then maintained and destroyed, let me inform you that both karma and atoms are material (yet to be described). So action is not open to them. In any case the atoms are destroyed when the world perishes.*

12. *You may think no world can be made once the atoms (its cause) are destroyed. But the appearing of what is made (the world) is due to Māyā. 'How can Māyā be the cause? The cause we observe is the atoms.' No. when we see something arising from the atoms, Māyā is the cause.*

13. *'How can atoms, which are causes, come to be called 'made' (product)?' We recognize effects, such as pots, by their shape. As whatever is made and shaped gets destroyed, you must see that Māyā, which is shapeless, has to produce them all.* (for verses 14-18 see III. 3a above)

27. *This manifold world, in which something with form derives from something formless, and from one thing with form arises another thing with form, this world gets bigger and smaller. It is one with Māyā, or else both one and different. But the One (God) is one with the world, is distinct from the world, and remains linked to it.*

28. *You may say that what has form does not bring forth the formless, and from the unchangeable no changeable thing can arise. But the wind and other elements arise from ether, and clouds, cloud-shapes, banks, noise, lightning, thunder and other things also arise from the ether.*

29. *That vessels arise from clay, is due to the potter. The maker of everything we perceive is God. All objects arise from their causes. (Siddhiār* I. 1-13; 27-29)

In its theory of the origin of the world, Śaiva Siddhānta starts by observing that in nature what is there gets destroyed and what was destroyed arises again. From this it derives three laws for matter:

1. All existing things have arisen and must at some time be destroyed.
2. Everything that gets destroyed must arise again; something that exists cannot become a nothing.
3. Whatever arises must have existed before; a nothing can't turn into an existent something.

These three laws are applied to parts of the world and also to the whole of it. This leads:

by Law I, to the thesis that the world in its entirety must have been created at one point of time, and, again at one point of time, will in its entirety be destroyed; the world has a beginning and an end.

by Law 2, that the world's history will not end with its destruction, but that after a certain time it will be created anew out of itself; a new world-creation will follow a world-destruction.

by Law 3, that an eternal living something must form the basis of this world, out of which it was created, and into which it will at some time be resolved, and from which it will at another time again be created.

So there are several creations, not just one. No-one can say when the first creation was, any more than when the first oak tree grew out of the first acorn.

That is why Śaiva Siddhānta does not speculate at all about when the world first came about, but just explains that the world is subject to a beginningless and endless process of creation and destruction.

The power governing the creation and destruction of the world is God, the Supreme God, called Śiva, Lord over everything. With him eternally is his Śakti, of like nature to himself; and when time comes for the world to arise he lets his Śakti issue forth, or rather become active, subdividing into Śiva, Śakti, icchāśakti, kriyāśakti and jñānaśakti. (cp. II.6) This extended Śakti is then set to work on Māyā, the eternally existing material elements, in which the world is present in germ.

Māyā is like a seed, the world like a tree, and Śiva's Śakti like moist soil. What the moist soil does for the grain of seed, Śiva's Śakti does for Māyā. Without moist soil the seed can neither spring up nor bear fruit. Without Śiva's Śakti Māyā can neither exist nor produce anything. (*Bodha* I.2, *example* 2, *larger commentary*)

The rigid and immobile elementary matter is brought to life by Śiva and his Śakti. Śiva decides by his Icchāśakti to develop a world from that elementary material; by his Kriyāśakti he guides that development to make a world, and by his jñānaśakti he ensures that the world aims at what he developed it for.

The connection between Māyā and the Śakti results first in the five pure tattva arising, in this order:

1. Nāda, sound, arising from the union of pure knowledge (called Śiva) with śuddhamāyā. This material is so subtle that Śiva uses it as place and body of his activity. Very probably we can take it to include the natural force of motion.
2. Vindu is form, created from the union of pure kriyā or energy (called Śakti) with śuddhamāyā. The Śakti uses this subtle basic material as place and body of its activity. Here we may set the natural element 'space', the principle of delimitation.
3. Sādākshya results, by the Icchāśakti, from the union of nāda and vindu. It provides place and body for SadāSiva. The natural process of arising belongs here, for life comes about by the union of form and motion.
4. Maheśvara comes from these tattvas, through the Kriyāśakti, giving place and body for Mahēśan. It provides the natural tendency towards maintenance or continuance.
5. Śuddhavidya or pure knowledge, evolving from the previous tattvas by the Jñānaśakti, serves as place and body for Rudra, Vishṇu and Brahma. It is destruction, seen as a natural tendency.

These five tattvas are extremely subtle in character, but should not be confused with Siva's Śakti. The substance they constitute, although material, is specially full of the spirit of God, having the properties and powers of Cit (Spirit) because it is filled with Śiva's Śakti. This material now finds a manifold purpose in the successive creation, maintenance and destruction of the world. As we have seen, it also supplies Śiva and his Śakti with matter for the bodies which activity requires. (see II.7)

We also saw (III.3b) that from him, or rather from the vindu-tattva, there evolve first the five Kalā, the natural evolutionary powers, and the 4 Vāc (words), starting-point for the world of thought. Through the forces of evolution vindu-tattva then develops further, and there arise worlds for the Vijñānakalars, the highest class of souls. Basic matter next combines with aśuddhamāyā (taken either as an evolute of śuddhamāyā or as there already, from eternity), producing the tattvas ranging from kāla (time) to rāga (desire), i.e. the psychological powers of time and ordering (for soul's kriyā-faculties), of knowing and getting to know (for soul's jñāna-faculties, and of wanting (for their iccha-faculties).

(see III. 3b) Last comes mūlaprakṛiti, the actual rough basic raw material of the world we see and experience.

Aśuddhamāyā would be dead, a nonentity, but for the matter due to the indwelling of Śiva's Śakti in Śuddhamāyā. That basic matter is like an seed-germ, a nerve conveying life, which by growth produces the tree with all its branches leaves and cells (or worldly bodies with their members and organs), and keeps them full of life and activity. Hence the five śuddhatattva are also called 'the starting-off part' of the tattvas.

All expressions of life in the world are to be attributed to the presence of that basic matter. Where it is not, there are death and decay. If God withdraws his Śakti from śuddhamaya and that spirit-matter ceases to exist, then everything everywhere will break down and revert to Māyā. That basic matter is like a vehicle for God's omnipresence in the world, and could be called God's spirit, provided we remember it is partly material: the Śakti is the proper representative of God's spirit.

Apart from the remarks already quoted (III.3b) our sources give no detail on the creation of the world: how with Śiva's encouragement and guidance (as efficient cause) from the Māyā prepared as just described (as material cause) through Śiva's Śakti (as instrumental cause) the manifold world comes about. But we can add that to souls described as gods Śiva allots (as though to odd-job men) various tasks necessary in creating a world through evolution. This conscription goes so far that each tattva is animated by a divinity, which sets that tattva going in obedience to the Śakti's impulse, to achieve its proper function.

The difference and variety in a world which evolves out of Māyā seems to be due to the presence or absence of certain tattvas, or the predominance of one or another. Any object represents the mix of tattvas from which it came: if mainly from the subtlest elements, subtler objects result, and vice versa; but without a tattva no object can arise.

Everything with or without form is a construction from the tattvas. These consist of sthūla (gross), sūkshma (subtle), and para (spiritual). Souls and Sādākshya (i.e. divinities which animate the Sādākshya and other tattvas) which combine with tattvas are named after the relevant tattva. All things are tattvas, even souls and gods, so far as tattvas are required to set them going. (*Siddhiār* II.71)

Karma is the inner cause for that variety in the world. Bodha I.2, example 2 has Māyā as the power which produces a world in

accordance with the deeds of the individual soul, i.e. produces the sort of world karma requires. The comment adds that *in accordance with the deeds* is put in to answer the query, how God comes to set Māyā going in such a way as to bring about variety; and expounds the second part of the second example of Sūtra I as follows:

You may say this makes God produce the world not as he wants but as karma requires. I tell you that the grub which intends turning a beetle acquired (from a beetle) a tendency towards that desired form. So also does the Supreme give to each soul the form it desires, and bestows upon it fruits according to its deeds. How does that damage his freedom?

That karma is held responsible for the world being the way it is can also be seen from its description as the instrumental cause of the instrumental cause. After each death and also before world-creation, souls have a pile of deeds not yet atoned, called saṃcitakarma. The fruits of these deeds are keen to be enjoyed. For this to happen, God has worlds arise with their tanu, karaṇa, and bhoga. As the deeds are many and diverse, there are various different possible ways in which they could ripen and be consumed. God meets this demand by letting a very complex and varied world arise.

Here a query can be put: Maya is a formless energy, but the world with its bodies and energies have form. Can something with form arise from something without? The following reply is given:

You may say something with form will not arise from something without it; nor something changeable from what is changeless. But wind, and other bhūta (fire, water, earth), come from the ether; clouds and their formations, thunder and lightning all have form, and like thunder all come from the ether. (*Siddhiār* I.27)

A world that has arisen needs to be maintained. God maintains it through his Śakti, the power by which he brought it into being. So long as God has his Śakti linked to Māyā, it has the power to expand, has form and the power of movement; but after the world has fulfilled the purpose God meant for it, he withdraws his Śakti from Māyā, with the result that the world is destroyed and resolved into Māyā. This process of resolution into Māyā mirrors the process of evolution. As through evolution grosser matter develops from subtler, so by resolution grosser elements revert back into subtler ones.

In this task of creation, maintenance and destruction Śiva employs for creation the highest among souls, the so-called gods,

especially Brahma; he uses Vishṇu for maintenance, and Rudra for destruction. The gods do not carry out these tasks at their own choice, but only at Śiva's command.

Why does Śiva have the world created and destroyed? Here Siddhiār I.36 refers to his cosmic activity:

You may ask what reason Śiva has for doing these three tasks. Some say it is his 'sport'. Others, that it is to ensure knowledge and happiness for souls, and to remove all the Mala which has clung to them from the beginning.

It is quite clear on which side Siddhānta takes its stand. The fact that the Śakti through whom Śiva acts is called aruḷ-Śakti rules out the notion that God has things arise and perish without purpose, as a joke; and suggests that he acts from a gracious disposition. That his motive is good is made clear by Siddhiār:

Grace is his form, his nature and his truth. Grace is his essence. Grace is his knowledge. From seclusion he comes forth to do deeds of grace. His hands and feet bestow grace, grace-givers too are his clothes and his insignia. Selfless himself, he puts on grace not for himself, but for souls. (I.47, *cp. above* II.4b(iv))

He has the world created and destroyed for the good of souls. This is made quite clear in Bodha Sūtra I: *the world that goes to destruction also arises because of Mala.* The commentary adds, *so that the Mala not already destroyed may be destroyed.* Siddhiār gives more detail:

You may ask why souls and the world perish, and then arise again from God. I tell you this happens because of corrupting Mala. You may ask why it perishes. I tell you that the created world perishes so that souls can take a rest. The created world, lying hidden in its cause, and giving the opportunity for activity, is later brought on again, as before. (I.32) *Destruction is so that souls can recover. Creation is meant for the setting aside all karma of individuals. Maintenance of the world is to allow consumption of the fruits of deeds.* (I.37)

In agreement with that point, we read in Prak: I.6:

Some say these works he does are free play for God's grace. (Siddhāntins) say that he does them to free souls from the ocean of misery, and to give them continually abiding grace. Through the work of destruction he relieves souls from fatigue: by creation he aims to bring Mala to maturity: he performs the work of maintenance so that souls may consume their fruits.

Thus the aim of the three works of creation, maintenance

and destruction is to free the soul from its bondage to three-fold Mala. We shall see later how the world with its bodies and objects contributes to the release of souls.

(e) *Māyā fetters Souls*

Having understood the nature of Māyā and its products, let us now enquire how far these fetter souls. Siddhānta says they have always been fettered by Māyā, as we saw in Chapter I:

Does Īśan (Siva) produce things to inflict great pain on souls so that they repent their deeds? Which got hold of souls first, karma or Māyā? A fair point, were it easy to get hold of things unfettered from eternity. Wise men say that Mala co-exists with souls, and that all the other fetters co-exist with Mala, like the inner and outer husks of a grain of rice. So say the Saivāgamas. (*Prak* II.7)

According to this there was never a time when souls were not subject to Māyā. So Māyā is one fetter always there for souls, but it does not oppress them all the time. *Māyā and karma come and go,* as we read in Prak: II.18. It does not oppress them when the whole world slumbers and souls are completely bound by Āṇavamala. Then the souls sleep bedded down, so to speak, in Māyā, which in turn rests on God.

As soon as the world's slumber is over and a new world is created by Śiva's Śakti, the soul consciously or unconsciously begins to feel its bondage to Māyā. Torn from sleep it has to enter (as if a prison) one of the bodies made out of Māyā, finding itself surrounded by innumerable tempting objects which want to get involved with it. The tattvas composing its body increase its exposure to temptation from external objects:

(a) the five śuddhatattva arouse and set in motion the faculties of knowledge, decision and action, which were inactive while the world slept, as Āṇavamala reigned unchecked;
(b) the śuddhāśuddha tattva direct these awakened faculties on to outer things;
(c) the aśuddhatattva serve them as (sense-) organs, so by recognising and making contact with outer things they can take charge of them. (Siddhiār II.70)

Now once the soul, by the tattvas Māyā has provided, gets control of external things, which Māyā surrounds it with, then these external things surging back disturb the soul by arousing desire or dislike, joy or sorrow, and subject it to the law of karma and to the never-ending whirlwind of transmigration. Thus Māyā

is the fetter which oppresses the soul most directly, and which discerning souls feel and recognize first, long before they notice karma and Āṇavamala.

This badgering of the soul by Māyā takes place without interruption from the time of the creation of the world and until its destruction, and begins again after the period of world-sleep; and the process continues until the soul attains release. The badgering of the soul by Māyā even goes on while the soul is staying in the heavens, which are themselves products of Māyā, for the soul enters the heavens with a body (sūkshma) composed of Māyā's products.

The power that allows all these products of Māyā to be created, and puts a soul in them, and directs and supervises their oppression of it, is Śiva. Not that we should regard him as cruel, or an enemy of souls; he allows oppression so as to save the soul from a greater evil. That is why our sources are always discussing the benefits of Māyā. Our discussion of these must however, wait until we come to consider Śiva as doing what is best for souls.

(f) *How Māyā and its Products exist?*

We have often noted that Siddhānta, by accepting several eternal substances, is liable to make vacuous the idea of God as absolute, and to damage the unity that should embrace all being. In expounding their doctrine of God Siddhānta sought to avoid this danger by elevating Śiva as Pati over all other substances and seeing his existence and nature as quite distinct from that of others. But what is his special mode of existence? How does his nature differ so decisively from that of other substances? We must look into this to decide if the theory of God is successful in guaranteeing God's absolute position and the unity (in spite of pluralism) of all beings.

When discussing Āṇavamala and Karmamala we went into God's relation to them, and finally raised the question whether his absolute status is threatened by their eternal existence and nature, as described. Our present task is to say how Māyā and its products are actually supposed to exist, and to delimit their nature from that of God. We may then be able to decide whether Siddhānta has found a satisfactory answer to the pressing problem posed by its starting-point, of how this basic pluralism can be reconciled both with a God who is absolute and with the search for Unity in all that is.

As we saw, Siddhānta describes God's particular way of existing, and his all-surpassing nature by the two words Sat and Cit. So Māyā's special nature and manner of existence are denoted by Asat and Acit.

Here let us first examine what Siddhānta (unlike Śaṃkara, for example) means by Asat. This is set out in detail in Bodha VI and comment. (see above II.9)

Since it is obvious that the general nature of Pāśa and Paśu (of souls) is something to be known through Pāśajñāna, both these are to that extent knowable. So they cannot be called Śivasat. But as in Śaiva Siddhānta Asat is not the opposite of Sat, so Paśu and Pāśa, whose nature is knowable , can in a general way be so described, though this is not entirely accurate. So it is quite in order, in view of their special nature, to call them Sat.

Unlike both Paśu and Pāśa, the created world is knowable in general and in particular, and has the unusual property of being there and staying there, though clearly we cannot say for how long, and of appearing, perishing, and becoming invisible. That is why the world is in a special sense called Asat. Asat is the same as Acit.

Section One. Thesis. All knowable objects are Asat.

Comment. This thesis attacks the school of Nyāya, which does not accept that Śiva cannot be known by proofs (as was claimed in Sūtra I). *They say both the Supreme and the world can be known in this way. It is also directed against the Sāṃkhya school, who say knowable objects are Sat as all objects are.*

Reason. Though the world can be known yet it is unknowable.

Comment. This backs the thesis, against the following query: 'How can one call the world Asat? For as object of positive knowledge it must be perceptible; whereas a non-existent thing, as object of negative knowledge, must be imperceptible. So how can both be called Asat?' It also refutes this remark 'It does seem a mistake, in a philosophy which affirms existence, to call the world (which is Sat) Asat solely and simply because it is knowable.'

Knowable objects are perceivable, having a predominance of rajas guṇa; and unknowable objects are imperceptible, having a predominance of tamas. This backs the comment, as against the school of Nyāya.

The reason can also be given another explanation. The world when developed is sthūla and can be known, so is open to proof. But its end is sudden; becoming sūkshma it is unknowable in that undeveloped state. As the developed world unlike the primary material is subject to such a change,

the world can properly be called Asat. Hence the thesis. This explanation is directed at the Sāṃkhya school.

Example. You really do not understand what Asat is. So listen: If someone gets to know the truth, then all everyday knowledge becomes Asat for him.

Comment. This is against the Nyāya school, who reply: Even if that reasoning held for some things, how does that entitle you to say that in this way all perceptible things become Asat?

Second part of this example. Although you reflect on examples which show the world as a nothing, you do not consider the world Asat. Would you now please consider letters which appear in water, dreams and mirages. These are examples too.

Comment. The previous remarks about the Sāṃkhya school are here reinforced. As water-letters appear one moment and disappear the next, and similarly in the other cases mentioned, all will agree that they can be called Asat. Because of that, it is appropriate that this world to which the same thing happens should also be called Asat.

In order to prove wrong those who say that letters upon water are lies — that is, a complete nothing, the writer used the word 'appear'.

Letters written on water disappear the moment they are formed; things seen in dreams become obscure part-way through, before the dreams come to an end; a mirage formed in the desert because of the great heat of the midday sun disappears again by itself if the sun is hidden by a cloudbank: thus each disappears for just one reason. That is why these three are chosen as examples.

These three analogies supplement one another. The first says that the world exists for a short time; the second that the world has been destroyed without our being able to say that its purpose has been fulfilled; so that a new beginning is necessary. The third says that an effective cause underlies the destruction of the world.

(Sūtras VI.2 and VII.1 describe God's nature and his mode of existence of God, as opposed to that of matter; see II.9 above)

Sūtra VII.2, *Thesis. Asat has no faculty of knowledge.*

Comment. The Śivasaṃkrāntavadi make this objection: 'Although Sat does not know Asat, the organs do, being called Asat and belonging to Tanukaraṇabhuvanabhoga (products of Māyā). In the time of bondage they know Asat-objects (the soul meanwhile standing by, unchanging like a light), but in the time of release they are organs of Śiva, and know him. And as a reflection arises in a mirror, so does knowledge arise in these

organs, in the presence of the soul.' It was to meet this objection that the thesis in the second part of the Sūtra was put forward.

Reason. On closer enquiry we find there is no such knowledge.

Comment. This relates to the objection that organs cannot properly be said to have no knowledge, when they are taken to have Pāśajñāna along with Patijñāna and Paśujñāna.'

It seems at first as though Asat (i.e. the organ of knowledge) had knowledge, but it doesn't, as a more precise consideration will show.

The knowledge that reaches the soul through Pāśa is called Pāśajñāna out of courtesy. It is stupid to suppose that this is genuinely knowing by Pāśa; a mistake due to not studying the matter sufficiently, that's all.

Example. Fools who mistake a mirage for water, find when they get there that the mirage is Asat. And for those who have not yet had instruction, and so have no real knowledge, Asat will appear as Sat. But the really knowledgeable man sees it as Asat.

Asat is thus the word used by Siddhānta to distinguish the world's existence from that of Śiva. The school of Śaṃkara also uses the word Asat to describe the nature of world-existence. It interprets the negative prefix as existence, not quality, and so takes Asat to mean a nothing. Thus the school of Śaṃkara takes the statement 'The world is Asat' to mean that the world is a nothing, unreal. Now Siddhāntins take Māyā, the underlying matter of the world, as an eternal substance, so presumably do not use Asat in quite the same way. Linguistically, the negative prefix 'a' can be taken either as denying existence, or as denying its quality: i.e. as not existing *in that way*. Thus taken, Asat means something that does not exist in the same manner as Śiva, the paradigm of Sat. Siddhānta really does take Asat in the sense 'something that is not Sat', or 'different from Sat' as is sufficiently shown by the passages just cited from Bodha. So a Siddhāntin who says that the world is Asat means only that he understands the world to be different in nature from Śiva, who is Sat. Of course this negative statement says only what mode of being it is the world does not have, not what it does.

Genuine existence is found in God, i.e. he does not in being there and being as he is have need of any other thing; nor can anything exist or operate without him. Such an existence belongs to the world neither in its developed nor in its undeveloped state. So what sort of existence does befit the world? Bodha states (as we saw above) that there are two sorts of existence the world might

have, both different from Śiva's. It might exist as a hare's horns do. But this is really non-existence, an unreal fantasy, and Siddhānta does not say the world is that. The world exists really and positively, though not as Śiva does.

This can be put this more precisely by following out the definition of God as Sat (in II. 3, and repeated above). This implies that our non-Sat world does not exist for itself alone, but only in connection with something else. Not that it has a derivative existence, like an emanation or a creation-from-nothing. Māyā is the material, the seed for the world; so in that way the world has always existed (actually, or prospectively); but its existence has always relied on the support of something else.

The definition of Sat also shows it is Śiva that matter has always existed with, and never could exist without.

Following on these two conclusions and in conformity with them, it is said that Māyā, the world in embryo, has God as its point of origin and source of growth. This clearly means that Māyā, the basic matter, although existing eternally, does not exist outside of God and separately from him. Each is independent of the other, though they have always been related, as the theory of advaita indicates. For Māyā this relation is an essential attribute, constitutive of its very nature, and so ever-present; but for Śiva it is accidental, and in no way essential to his nature.

This is the basic theoretical difference between Śaiva Siddhānta and its chief rival in southern India, the school of Rāmānuja, which (unlike the school of Śaṃkara) does regard matter as a reality, though one which exists only in connection with God. But while Siddhāntins say that Māyā is an entity different from God, Rāmāṇuja sees it as a property of God, a concrete attribute in addition to all the abstract attributes like omniscience and omnipresence. This is why the school of Rāmānuja bears the name of Viśishtādvaita i.e. the non-dualist school for which world and souls are attributes of God.

For Siddhānta, Māyā cannot act on its own, as it exists only in dependence on Śiva. Whether Māyā is to be developed or undeveloped is for Śiva to decide. It cannot activate itself. How Māyā exists depends on Śiva; though here a slight qualification is required. Māyā develops into the world of appearance, and reverts again, if and only when Śiva so decides; but he is not thought to determine the form which that developed Māyā takes, for this

depends on Māyā's inner tendency, on the aim and purpose of basic matter, and on karma. Yet the fact that the world did develop, and now exists, and that changes take place in it, and that it does get destroyed, all derive from the link with Śiva, for he is the cause of all that happens, and apart from him nothing takes place at all. Thus matter is a substance, and has always existed, and although Śiva is not responsible for that inner tendency, he is responsible for Māyā being there and taking the form it does.

The passages from Bodha just referred to speak also of another possible type of existence, different from Śiva's; an existence subject to constant change. Śiva always exists in the same way, undisturbed, unchangeable; but the world does not. At one moment it is undeveloped, invisible, and so without either form or shape; at another it is visible and has form; so we must amend the definition further, by saying it is a substance that does exist eternally, but in an eternally changing form, and which has need of something else to determine its existence and nature, and that something is Śiva. The constant change is made possible because of its peculiar nature, and comes into play through the activity of Śiva.

This all applies firstly to the undeveloped world, to Māyā, but also to the developed form which is there in Māyā as its seed. But we must also enquire in what manner the developed world as we know it does exist. The opposing school of Śaṃkara claims that the world of appearance has no reality, but is only an illusion, a deception. So we must make it quite clear that Siddhānta regards this world as a reality. The very first Sūtra of Bodha lays it down that the world, that complicated world that we see, which is subject to creation, maintenance and destruction, is indeed a reality. This claim is repeated in Section Two: *the world is a reality*; and this reason is given: *What is not there cannot arise.* And in the larger commentary to Bodha at Sūtra VI it is said that the world may be called Sat in a special sense, where Sat is used in the sense of something existing.

However, in saying that the world of appearances is a reality it is not implied that the world as it appears to us is eternal and unchangeable. The larger commentary on Bodha expressly adds that the world can be called Ṣat in the sense of being an existent something; whereas Śiva is called Sat in every sense. The world is a reality, but not one remaining constantly the same; rather is it a reality subject to ceaseless change. The form it has today is

unlike yesterday's, and will be different again tomorrow. Sometimes it has no visible form at all, existing only in embryonic form, in the time of world-sleeping.

As the visible world, though real, soon becomes invisible, Bodha compares it to words written upon water, to a dream, or a mirage. The choice of these analogies seems surprising at first: can he really regard the world as real? Here we must note that these analogies are not used in Sūtra I, which discusses whether the world is a reality or not. There the analogy of a hare's horns is used, negatively. Sūtra VI, where the three analogies are used, is not about whether the world is a reality, but about what sort of reality it has, and how its reality differs from that of Śiva. These analogies should therefore be taken as showing only that the world is changeable, not that it is unreal. As a letter written upon water exists for a very brief time, hardly measurable, and then disappears, so the world in which we live lasts very briefly, compared with eternity, and then disappears again. This analogy is then supplemented by the other two, as indicated.

Changeability, then, is a main ingredient in the concept 'Asat'. As the visible world is very obviously changeable, the term is uniquely appropriate to it: it is pre-eminently Asat. But Māyā (the original matter on which the world is based), karma and Āṇavamala are also changeable to some extent. They also can be called Asat, to indicate their liability to change. Thus we read in the larger commentary on Bodha VI:

Should Paśu and Pāśa be called Asat, as anything knowable is so? Surely that is against Siddhānta doctrine, which says Pati, Paśu and Pāśa are all three of them Sat (beings, realities)? This is a rather elementary point. Śaiva Siddhānta emphasises the reality of things, regarding everything as Sat (reality), not as Asat (unreality). That is why the world was earlier called a reality. But it does not always exist in the same form, being visible when developed (sthūla) and invisible when resolved again (sūkshma); and it is to emphasize this difference that it is called Asat. What is wrong in calling Māyā and karma Asat even though they exist (are Sat), just to emphasise the change they undergo in moving from an undeveloped to a developed state? There is no harm in calling Āṇavamala Asat when it really is Sat, just to emphasise that while it does have the upper hand during soul-migration (as darkness does triumph over light at night, before the light arrives), yet when Release comes that power shrivels right away.

Pāśa, unlike Śiva, then, is subject to ceaseless change; although itself eternal, yet it is Śiva that ensures it is there, and is as it is, and is changeable.

We must also consider Māyā's relation to knowledge, as we earlier did for Śiva. He was indicated by the word 'Cit', meaning that he does not learn things by observation, but knows everything; though he can be known only through patijñāna, and not by pāśajñāna or paśujñāna.

The position of matter in relation to knowledge is by contrast indicated by the word Acit. While matter can in a sense be called Sat, it can't be called Cit at all, for it is Acit in every way. This means it is not a knowing subject. The tattvas, products of Māyā, are indeed the organs by which the soul knows, but they are not what does the knowing: a point we shall return to when discussing the nature of the soul. Furthermore, the description Acit implies that matter is an object that can be recognised by our ordinary faculty of knowledge. Śiva also is knowable, for he is known, through patijñāna; but he is not knowable through the ordinary faculty of knowledge, as matter is (though its inner nature is knowable only by patijñāna). This is especially true of the visible world.

In our sources, the concepts of Sat and Cit, Asat and Acit, are not sharply distinguished from one another, so matter is seen as Acit just as part of its being Asat, and Śiva is considered Cit as an element in his being Sat. Adopting this approach we could distinguish matter (called Asat) from Śiva (called Sat) like this: it is a substance, which is obliged to another (Śiva) for its presence and its present state, though not for its origin; is subject to constant change; and is entirely without knowledge, though knowable by others in the ordinary ways.

Siddhānta is here undeniably influenced, in these statements, by a desire to avoid conflict between the eternal existence of matter and the absolute state of God; and by a yearning to comprehend all being as unified. Great care is taken to avoid anything that casts doubt on Śiva's absolute state, or even suggests that his power is limited. Nothing is said to imply that matter is necessary for Śiva. He does indeed enter into a connection with matter, as we have seen in the teaching about Śiva's form, but nowhere is it stated that he is under any external pressure to do this. He does it of his own free will, directed by his desire to save souls. His nature is not affected by matter, whether as Āṇavamala, Karmamala

or māyāmala. But is not Śiva restricted just by matter being there? The Siddhāntin denies this, saying matter has no opportunity at all for acting independently. Anyway matter hardly exists, in Śiva's presence, but vanishes like darkness banished by the light.

It can readily be granted that matter, as the Siddhāntin understands it, can have no influence at all upon Śiva; and also that matter does not restrict Śiva, by having always existed. But one cannot allow that Siddhānta has managed to preserve a divine absolutism entire and complete. An absolute state requires a freedom to act on the *how* as well as on the *that.* An absolute God must be free not only to create or not as he likes, but also to create in the way that he prefers; the outcome must depend entirely upon him, and on no-one else. Now it cannot be denied that the Siddhāntin God is free to create or not, just as he wishes; but he clearly is not free to create just the way he likes. His absoluteness only survives to the point where he starts doing something; after that he is limited by the material he is working on, which is given already, in Māyā. Moreover, he is not free to deal with this stuff just how he likes, for it has and has always had its own innate tendency, a purposive striving not put there by Śiva, but natural to it. This tendency of Māyā can take various directions, resulting in considerable complexity, but no one explains that the direction taken was chosen by Śiva, but rather by karma, which also exists eternally, and is not determined by Śiva. So this variety is not ultimately due to the will of Śiva, but to karma.

Why did Siddhānta not say that Śiva prescribed the route that Māyā should take? Because that would have meant giving up its starting-point, the existence of several eternal substances. If Māyā's chosen route were to be traced back to Śiva, Māyā would have to be a substance without attributes, which is unthinkable — and would lead to karmamala and ānavamala being also described in that impossible way. And that would trace evil all the way back to Śiva, indeed would make him the sole author of it. This conclusion they preferred to avoid.

(g) *An Assessment of Māyā Theory*

Having now been introduced to Śaiva Siddhānta's own teaching about Māyā, we can try to make sense of it as part of the general development of philosophy, without being in consequence misled by theories drawn from foreign schools of thought. The questions we must wrestle with are these:

1. Why does Śaiva Siddhānta give the name 'Māyā' to the material cause of the world?
2. Is this concept of Māyā an historical anomaly, or does it fit well enough into the philosophical development (as far as we know it)?

In discussing these points we shall be seeking an historical understanding of the Siddhāntin doctrine of Māyā; and shall try to indicate what philosophical problems Siddhānta set out to resolve, and its particular position in the development of philosophical thought. The reader has by now enough background to consider these points.

The second and more historical question could indeed have been left to the end of the book, but is better dealt with now, in relation to Siddhānta's most characteristic doctrine, rather than by bringing all its doctrines in at once, i.e. the content of the whole book, and some of the theories of other schools as well. That would make the whole enterprise impossible.

Why does Śaiva Siddhānta call Māyā the material cause of the world? Presumably it is following the Vedas and Śaivāgamas, in calling the material cause of the world Māyā. And why does it bear that name, in those sources, and what did it mean for them? In the Vedas Māyā nowhere appears as the material cause. Gough did claim that in the Hymn of Creation (Rig Veda 10. 129) 'It was not being, and it was not non-being' refer to Māyā into which a former world was being drawn back, and from which a new world had not yet arisen; but he has no evidence for this interpretation. The word Māyā is indeed found in the Rig Veda with the meaning 'supernatural power', 'divine wisdom', or 'divine faculties'. Could it then be that Siddhānta took the idea from the Vedas, though not the word? The Vedas certainly do contain several descriptions, not easily reconciled, of the creation of the world. But Deussen may well be right to take as common to many of them: (1) a basic principle, who from himself (2) creates matter, and then (3) enters it as the first-born.

If this crystallisation of Vedic thinking about the creation of the world is correct, then Siddhānta in its teaching about Māyā is not based on the Vedas. The Vedic picture of the world is basically pantheistic. God creates the world by changing into it: the world is just God made manifest. Siddhānta, however, is realistic. It accepts that matter exists as well as God, and always has, and regards God as a world-constructor (Greek *dēmiourgos,* a workman or contractor).

As we cannot trace the doctrine of Māyā back to the Vedas, it is only natural to look for its roots in the Āgamas, which for them had even higher authority. But unfortunately the Āgamas are still not accessible to us, for that purpose. That the Āgamas operate with the concept of Māyā, and understand it in general terms as our sources do, seems a reasonable suggestion, though unproven. So we must disregard it here, as we are not dealing in suggestions. Our present aim is to see if we can come to an historical understanding of the teaching of Siddhānta about Māyā through schools and writings known to us.

The Upanishads must be considered first. The older Upanishads do not refer to Māyā as a world-principle. They regard Brahman as the material cause of the world (as the Vedas do), and see creation as an emanation from Brahman, indeed a transformation (complete or partial) of Brahman into the things which appear in the world (Pariṇāmavāda). Thus it takes Brahma as the material cause of the world, which it regards as fully real.

We do however, come across the word Māyā, infrequently and tentatively, in the later Upanishads, in connection with world-creation. Thus we read in Śvetāśvatara Upanishad:

There are two selves; one has understanding, but not the other; both have no birth. One is sovereign but not the other; one, unborn, enables man to enjoy the fruits of his works. And then there is the infinite self, in many forms, but not doing anything. Where these three are found, that is Brahman. (9).

What is transitory is the most noble (pradhāna); the immortal, the non-transitory One, is Hara (Śiva). The one God is in command over transitory things and the self. By meditating on him, joining up with him, and becoming one with him, all deception also comes to an end. (*Śvetāśvatara Upanishad* I.9-10)

One, unborn, red, white and black
Brings many natures like herself to birth,
One, unborn, loves and sleeps with her:
If used, then that other departs. (5)
The hymns, the sacrifices, rituals, laws,
What was and what shall be; what the Vedas say;
All this from 'him' did the magician make,
And the Other lies trapped in there by magic skill. (9)

Take note: Prakṛiti is Māyā,
The great Lord is the magician.
He is in it and of it, indeed all
This moving universe is shot through by him. (10)
(*Śvetāśvatara Upanishad* IV.5, 9, 10)

We may reasonably suppose that this writer took Māyā as a cosmic principle. In what sense the world is to be traced back to Māyā, whether it exists in Brahman himself, or arises from him, or comes to him or into him from outside: all this is unclear. But in Śvetāśvatara Upanishad Māyā or its cause Avidyā seem to be included in Brahman himself:

In the immortal infinite, most high Brahman, in whom both ignorance and knowledge lie concealed, one perishes (ignorance), yet is the other indestructible. (1)

He rules over all natures, living forms, and origins. In the beginning mother-like he carried seers in his thought and when that flame-coloured son was born he wanted fatherlike to gaze on him. (2)

(Here 'golden embryo', and 'flame-coloured son' are related ideas; so the 'son' must be taken as the embryo.)

The God who spreads out a varied net around others also draws it together again in this area. After the Lord Īśvara, (Īśvara is the first manifestation of the pure Brahman after his union with Māyā) he further creates the Lords, (personal beings) and as sovereign Spirit lords it over all. As the waggon (the sun) lights up all points of heaven above, beneath, and across it, so does the sole blessed and praiseworthy God govern everything appearing as his progeny. (3, 4)

Brahmā, (the next personification of Brahman) knows what lies hidden in the Vedas and in the secret Upanishads, as in a mother's womb. The ancient gods and seers who knew it became immortal, sharing in his nature. (6)

The lower god also, only as big as a thumb, but like the sun in his appearance, he who is furnished with will-power and self-consciousness, with the property of reason and the attribute of self-consciousness, is seen to be as small as the point of an awl.

The individual self (jīvātman) is one hundredth of a hundredth part of the point of a hair, destined for infinity. It is not man: it is not woman; it is not neuter by gender. It is protected by the body which it takes to itself at any one time. (*Śvetāśvatara Upanished* V.1-4, 6, 8-10)

The writer clearly supposes all that exists, including souls, to derive from Brahman; basing his thinking on the doctrine of

Pariṇāmavāda (modification), as the Vedas and the older Upanishads do. However, he also accepts the evolution of both the organic and the inorganic world as brought about by Māyā, so his notion of world-creation does not quite match that of the Vedas and the earlier Upanishads. Rather we here find a development of the earlier and purely pantheistic concepts. The author of the Śvetāśvatara Upanishad does not venture to claim as openly as his predecessor did that the world arose directly from Brahman, for he was afraid of bringing God down to the level of Matter (as people commonly argued back from effect to cause). By inserting the idea of Māyā he tried to back matter off from God a bit, and to exalt God above matter; though without reaching any satisfactory solution of this point.

His development of the old pantheistic views leads us, paradoxically, to Realism, which regards matter as an independent entity outside of God. It can also lead towards idealism, for which God alone is real, and nothing outside him has reality; and the world is a mere cobweb of the mind, spun out by a reason unable to understand the true being of God. For inserting Māyā as middle cause, in either sense, invites the belief that the manifest world, even if it has God to thank for its existence, is unlike him in nature. Here 'unlike in nature' can either be taken realistically (differing from him) or idealistically (not existing at all). For the Upanishads left it undecided how that intermediate cause called Māyā is to be regarded. Is it an entity alongside God (or within him), as statements like 'Prākriti is Māyā' do suggest, in which case the manifest world must be regarded as a reality? Or is Māyā a deception, an appearance, as the word may also indicate (the word itself is ambiguous); in which latter case the world would be a bare illusion, a non-reality. This second view could lead to both monistic and dualistic schools; but the pantheistic starting-point of the Upanishads did favour the development of idealistic monism rather than dualistic realism.

The theory of world-creation is developed along the lines of dualistic realism by the Vaiśesika school, which traces the world back to atoms which are eternal and without cause. The atoms unite to form all the diverse various items of the manifest world; not by the act of a Mover, nor by dint of some innate power, but driven by an unseen power or fate, called adrishṭa, the accumu-

lated fruits of former deeds. This power of destiny causes the atoms to attract each other and form themselves into objects. There is no place for God in this system, though later members of the school did say that God exists. Even so this system is one of dualistic realism, for it asserts the existence not only of eternal atoms but also of eternal souls.

As a consistent representative of dualistic realism we may turn to the Sāṃkhya school, led by Kapila, which claims that impure Matter cannot derive from pure intelligence. This school regards the manifest world as actual, developed from basic matter (Prakṛiti, what everything evolves from). This Prakṛiti is also called mulaprakṛiti, i.e. root or basic matter, and also amūlamūla (rootless root); occasionally it is called Māyā. This basic matter is eternal, without beginning, and without end, and it includes within itself three basic substances, sattva (light, joy, goodness); rajas (twilight, sorrow, pain); and tamas (darkness, insensitivity, badness). The world in its manifold forms evolves from Prakṛiti, while the three basic substances lose their equilibrium (they are called guṇas, but are really substances rather than qualities or attributes). The stimulus for this is provided by the purushas, the innumerable individual souls, equally eternal with matter and eternally linked to it (although they are not responsible for Prakṛiti being there). The purushas act unconsciously and unintentionally (like iron drawn to a magnet) using possibilities and dispositions already there in Prakṛiti, to start off a world-building, all because of Adṛishṭa, of whose ultimate origin no account can be given.[11] Prakṛiti develops so as to make individual purushas realize their difference from Prakṛiti, and thus bring about an actual separation between these two entities. Prakṛiti's development accordingly is also individual, as the roster of things developed from it indicates.

The Sāṃkhya philosophy lists 25 tattva or principles, at whose head stand purusa and Prakṛiti as 25th and 24th. Out of Prakṛiti comes buddhi (23rd), reason, the organ for decision and judgement, and out of buddhi comes ahaṃkāra (22) the I-begetter, self-consciousness. From the ahaṃkāra arise manas (21) which produces ideas, the five jñānendriya (20-16) and the five karmendriya (15-11), capacities located in the visible organs, but not identified with them. Lastly come five subtle elements, the tanmātra (10-6), from which come the five gross elements, the

11. Omitting 'the remainder of the task' (des Restes der Werke) after Adṛishṭa (*Ed.*).

bhūta. As in Śaiva Siddhānta, their significance is psychological as well as cosmic; i.e., they are not just objects but organs of knowledge. The individual objects that Prakṛiti, under the influence of the individual souls, puts forth for their benefit, now together make up the world, the cosmos.

Sāṃkhya regards matter as eternal, so like Siddhānta it is realist. So Siddhānta might have taken over this doctrine from Sāṃkhya. Now the twenty-five tattvas described in Sāṃkhya also turn up in Siddhānta; and as we do not at present know the Śaivāgamas we shall be inclined to accept Siddhānta's dependence on the system of Kapila. It is in any case interesting that both schools adopt this evolutionary scheme, for it suggests that the products of matter are mainly of pschological significance; which was to be expected in Sāṃkhya where even the evolution of matter is due to individual souls, but not in Siddhānta, for which the creation of the world from matter is done not by individual souls, but by God; for Siddhānta logically requires the cosmos first and the organs afterwards.

The Sāṃkhya school regards the world as the collection of individual things which derived from basic matter on the initiative of countless individual souls, so it can move logically from microcosm to macrocosm. For the Siddhāntin a move in the other direction would be more natural, as he regards the world as created by a craftsman (dēmiourgos) from matter so that soul may be able to act and enjoy. So we would expect Siddhānta to have macrocosm arrive first, and microcosm afterwards: house first, then furniture. But Siddhānta does not in fact start with objects and then provide souls with organs to get in touch with them; which suggests that here they are borrowing from another system, rather than developing their own.

Siddhānta, then, may well have borrowed from Sāṃkhya, but it was not a slavish borrowing. Sāṃkhya has twenty-five tattvas, but Siddhānta recognises thirty-six; and has a more subtle basic matter, in addition to Prakṛiti; not something that a dependence on Sāṃkhya can explain. This suggests that Siddhānta intended to be different, as indeed was obvious from its craftsman-creator (Sāṃkhya locates the creative power in matter itself), and from its theistic realism (Sāṃkhya teaches atheistic realism). Moreover, Sāṃkhya is definitely dualist, contrasting matter very sharply with individual souls, while Siddhānta's dualism is much weakened by

advaita teaching, which links the eternal substances so they exist in and with each other, not side by side.

We can, therefore, take it as probable that Siddhānta borrowed from Sāṃkhya, as unlike Vedas and Upanishads it holds that Matter had existed eternally as an independent entity. But that does not explain why Siddhānta calls this Māyā. It may help at this point to compare the eponymous Vedāntist school of Māyāvāda. We saw how Sāṃkhya and Vaisesika developed the concept of Māyā (already there in the Upanishads) to show how the world could arise from Brahman; and this paved the way to dualism, turning the Upanishadic Māyā into an independent entity of atoms and Prakṛiti, existing alongside Brahman. Vedānta also offers such a development, but leading to monism (to which the Upanishads could also lead).

Realism also can be found in the Upanishads, leading either to a dualism that undermines the unity of All that is (Sāṃkhya), or to a materialism which denies God or despiritualizes him, as actually happened in Carvaka, a school of some importance. To rule all this out at the start, Vedānta adopts as its highest principle a theme taken from the Chāndogya Upanishad, 'ekam evädvitiyam', 'only one thing without a second', a fundamental principle which clearly professes the strictest monism, to which Vedānta is determined to be even more loyal than the Upanishads. So it explains that individual souls are identical with Brahman, the one and only Thing; and that the manifest world is non-existent, a sham, a figment of the imagination or fantasy. To explain how it came by this conceit, it takes up the concepts of Māyā and avidyā, already found in the Upanishads, saying that the One, Brahman, is and always has been linked with Māyā, or avidyā ('ignorance', or rather 'false knowledge'); all this so that souls and the phenomenal world can emerge from himself, for his own gratification. Here, the souls are not independently existing beings, but only manifestations of his own self; and the world is not a genuine reality, nor even a product of his own pure being, but mere phenomena.

Here the individual souls, who are manifestations of the All Soul Brahman and identical with him, are subject to false knowledge (avidyā) or illusion (Māyā), and thereby deceived into taking the non-existent world as real, just as in a wilderness a cloudbank may seem real, nearby and comforting. Things thus acquire, for

souls, a certain existence, imaginary rather than actual. But as soon as an individual soul attains to truth that bogus world will vanish as a dream vanishes on awaking; and individuality also disappears, and only Brahman remains.

We cannot here describe in detail the teaching of Vedānta, but only say just what Vedānta understands by Māyā. Śaṃkara did not regard Māyā as a material cause from which somehow a non-existent world emerged, built out of phantasy. As a resolute monist he had to derive the world (even if unreal) from God as its cause, making God the sole reason for world-appearance (efficent cause as well as material). He also had to explain somehow the derivation of a manifold, non-spiritual and grossly material world, even as illusion, from the One and spiritual Brahman. Otherwise the principle that cause and effect must be similar in kind would expose the entire system as illogical.

In order to explain how the world in its manifold forms could arise out of Brahman, he resorts to the claim that Brahman has all sorts of powers, for doing this: *That unitary Brahman brings forth such a manifold spread of appearances is explained by his being connected with all sorts of powers.* Which powers? The Names and Forms, he says, on which everything is based, and in which the now developed world was previously present, like the life-force in a seed.

Were we to acknowledge some original and independent state of the world as cause, we would be conceding a material (world)-cause. But we say it was not independent, but dependent on the highest God. So we have to accept this power, and with good reason, for God's creative activity would be impossible without it, as God cannot be thought to act directly, without powers. This seed-power, at rest in the Highest God, and called unobvious (avyakta) is by nature similar to false knowledge (avidyā), a profound sleep consisting of deception (Māyā), in which those soul-wanderers lie who have not awoken to their true nature (realized their identity with Brahman).

This passage clearly indicates that the creative powers (Śakti) are the same as Māyā; from which Vedānta infers that Māyā is the seed-power of things, and especially of individual souls, though itself being ignorance personified; an ignorance which was always there in Brahman and a power which had us taking a version of the only-existent Brahman as the world, and thinking we saw one part of it as a multitude of individual souls. God lets this power

play by itself and for no reason, just for fun (līlā), like a prince or a celebrity who has everything he wants, but undertakes something just for fun and pastime; or like breathing out and in, which just goes on for no special purpose.

This shows that Māyā has a cosmological significance for Vedānta. Not recognising Māyā as the material cause of creation, and seeing Brahman as the sole efficient cause, it was forced to take Māyā as the instrumental cause. Brahman already contains non-knowledge (a mongrel entity, half-being, half-nonentity, comparable to an illusion or a dream) and thus can expand into a world, part of which is a multiplicity of individual souls; all by means of the Upādhi (conditions, lit. 'addition', sc. surreptitiously) by which we attribute to Brahman what does not properly belong to him, so he becomes (a) a personal God with attributes, then (b) the world, and finally (c) individual souls.

It is pretty obvious that Śaṃkara's main interest was in monism. He wanted to be a monist. There were two ways, by which he could turn wish into act: either to regard the world of appearance, Matter, as sole existent, dropping the assumption of a God, and so taking the materialist road into monism; or to explain Spirit, God, as the sole reality, and preach spiritualistic monism. Śaṃkara adopted the second way.

Spiritualistic monism encounters various difficulties. To remove these, he would need (in direct emulation of the Vedas) to allow that the manifest world is a reality arising from Brahman; thus spiritualizing that world, even deifying it. Which would have led in practice to a pancosmological pantheism. Śaṃkara did not follow this line, for his study of the Upanishads had shown that it was liable to un-deify God rather than deify the world, reducing God to the level of Matter. But if matter was not deified, there would be great danger of dualism. To avoid this, he took the way of idealism, already explored in the Upanishads, and denied the existence of everything but God. God alone exists. Matter is a mere illusion, and simply does not exist. The intelligent beings, the souls, that appear to us to be different from God, are identical with God: so, while nothing else remains but God, monism is secure. In practice, however, monism then turns into pantheism, and an acosmic pantheism at that.

Let us pass in review this sequence of ideas. The Vedas by their pantheism pull God down into matter. The Upanishads, by

introducing a new cosmic principle named Māyā, try to draw God back up again from matter. Sāṃkhya and Vaiśeshika tear God and matter apart, when they attribute to matter a reality independent of God. Vedānta then completes what the Upanishads began, by having God alone real and denying the existence of other things.

But Indians could not in their philosophical thinking rest content with Śaṃkara's solution. It was unacceptable on practical and moral grounds, as practical thought had to reckon with the world as real, and moral thinking was bound to assume that souls were distinct from God. Nor could it satisfy theoretical thought, for the Śaṃkaran system is illogical in more than one respect, and inspires doubt. The very fact that Vedānta offers a popular world-view, in addition to the esoteric one described above, must lead thinkers to seek some other solution which avoids such duplication.

Śaṃkara himself did not entirely avoid dualism. As we saw, he made much use of the concept of false knowledge (avidyā) or deception (Māyā). But how does such a powerful and momentous principle come into play alongside the absolute Brahman? Śaṃkara has it unborn, non-transitory, eternal, and pre-existent in Brahman, without declaring it identical with Brahman in nature, or explaining how an absolute Brahman, attribute-less and simple, can acquire these powers.

There is a clear contradiction in saying both (a) that God is absolutely uncomplicated and without attributes, and (b) that an eternal power, Māyā, pre-exists in him. This might be tolerated if God and Māyā were similar in nature: but they are not. God as absolute Being and absolute knowledge is the direct opposite of Māyā which is absolute sham and total ignorance. You can't combine knowledge and ignorance (especially if absolute); nor can you conjoin reality and sham. By trying to do so Śaṃkara brings an intolerable contradiction into the very idea of God, a contradiction hardly different from dualism; for he actually arrives at two eternal principles, not one, just like dualism; as for obvious reasons he cannot derive unreal non-existent Māyā from the real and only Being, Brahman.

The realisation that pure monism, which Śaṃkara sought but could not quite achieve, was actually impossible, soon imposed itself upon quite a series of philosophies. The various commentaries on Bādarāyana's Vedānta-Sūtra (there are at least thirty of these, apart from Śaṃkara's) are proof of that. The nine most

important ones, in date order, are those of Bodayana, Bhaskariyam, Sri Nīlakaṇṭha, Sri Śaṃkara, Yadaviyam, Rāmānuja (founder of a widespread Vishṇu sect), Mādhvāchārya, Vallabiyam, Somanadiyam. (see Siddhānta Dīpika II.215f)

Two quotations from commentaries certainly written later than Śaṃkara will show that his solution was widely regarded as unacceptable. Rāmānuja writes:

All holy scriptures speak to us of two principles, knowledge and ignorance, virtue and vice, truth and falsehood. They all go in pairs; and so do God and human souls. How can these two be one? I am sometimes happy, sometimes miserable. He, who is spirit, is always happy. That is the difference. How can two different natures be one and the same essence? He is the eternal light that nothing can darken; pure is he and master of the world: but the soul of man is not so. Thus does the lightning shatter the tree of Onlyism. You silly man, how can you say, 'It is I who created this immense universe in all its fulness?' Just examine your capabilities with honest sense. Through the grace of the All-Highest a little understanding is given to you. It is hardly for you, you madcap, to say, 'I am God'.

Madhva protests as follows against the monism of Śaṃkara:

The highest God is different from individual souls, for he is the One whom they obey. An underling who obeys his king differs thereby from the king. In their overweening desire to be one with the Supreme Being, the hangers-on of Śaṃkara claim for themselves the majesty of God's exalted state. That is pure fantasy; about as easy as eating a big banana after your tongue has been cut out.

As souls differ from God, so also does matter. As Madhva says:

There is a difference between the souls of men and God, and in the same way there is a difference between the material world and God.

Not that dualism is bound to result from this argument. Mādhva has the elements from which the world is fashioned existing eternally in God's nature and thence unfolding, thus opting for an Emanation-theory. Rāmānuja starts off with three eternal principles; God, Cit, (the empirical individual souls), and Acit (matter): seeking to avoid dualism by the theory of viśishtādvaita.

The word viśishtādvaita is made up from viśishta (made distinct by peculiar attributes) and advaita (non-dualism); and means 'a non-dualism which does ascribe attributes'. It teaches that God alone exists, but has always had attributes: namely Cit, the individual souls, and Acit, matter. These attributes are realities, not just

appearances. During the period of world-rest, they are dormant in Brahman. Then, when Brahman so decides, they make their appearance, as the world begins.

Before summing up our findings about the origin of Siddhāntin teaching on Māyā, it will be useful to make a short review of the position.

Two different attempts had been made to solve the mystery of the world left unsolved by the Vedas and the Upanishads: one via monism, the other ending in dualism. Both solutions were inadequate; which suggests that the solution should be sought through a compromise between the two trends. As the statements about Rāmānuja and Mādhva indicate, reconciliation between monism and dualism was the watch-word for later philosophy. The Siddhāntin philosophy also accepted this guidance, which also makes philosophical and historical sense of its Māyā-doctrine.

The Siddhāntins saw, from the Śaṃkaran fiasco, that pure monism is impossible, and concluded that they had to consider matter eternal, here taking dualism's side. Not that they could surrender completely to dualism, thus abandoning their interest in the simplicity and uniformity of all things, an interest present in India ever since the time of the Vedas, and a justified one, as the outcomes of the strictly dualistic schools had shown. But how could justice be done to this interest, without inevitably involving some degree of dualism? The most obvious way to avoid the mistakes of dualism and yet satisfy that interest in the unity of all beings, was to return to Śaṃkara. He was the main opponent of dualism, and chief champion of the monistic interest, so they would not approach him as uncritical disciples but as critical researchers. They saw that Śaṃkara sought to assert the unity of all life by borrowing the concept of Māyā from the Upanishads to explain the world. This was a guide for them, particularly if they took up the passages previously quoted from the Śvetāśvatara Upanishad I, IV and V where the Māyā concept is first employed as a cosmic principle; passages which need not carry the meaning Śaṃkara put upon them. But his use of the notion of Māyā did show them the way.

He used this concept in the hope of achieving pure monism, but they used it as a way to reconcile monism and dualism, a project all the more attractive as the concept of Māyā far from excluding dualism actually brought it back again into the Śaṃkaran

system. Which encouraged them to try and use it as a bridge between monism and dualism.

Thus they took over the concept of Māyā, explaining it as the material cause of the world (which was different from God). Calling the material cause of the world Māyā makes several things possible. Take the verbal connections first. According to the lexicographers, Māyā means:

(a) skill, extraordinary or marvellous power, a knack.

(b) trick, treachery, plot, betrayal, illusion, conjuring.

The word comes from the root mā meaning 1. to measure, 2. to prepare, to make up, to build, to produce, to construct, 3. to unfold, to reveal, to show, 4. to develop one's ability, to educate oneself.

Śaṃkara used Māyā in sense (b), but the Siddhāntins took it in sense (a) (as in Rig Veda), but with an extra nuance taken from the root and from meaning (b). For them Māyā could thus mean a power or energy able to unfold itself, as a delusion does in meaning (b). Which suggests that Māyā is a reality other than God, conditioned, and not always the same. The term was thus suited to describing the material cause, which after the Śaṃkaran fiasco was understood to be different in nature from God; especially as the Śvetāśvatara Upanishad had said 'Prakṛiti is Māyā.'

There were advantages in using this notion. Through Śaṃkara the word Māyā came to signify non-intelligence. This made it easy to show that God had to exist, as a guiding intelligence, and to prove that the material cause was dependent on God, thus bringing the two ultimate causes near enough to interact without getting mixed. And full justice could be done to the unique Being of God, as Māyā (meaning delusion) could be used to attribute to the world a different sort of being, variable and constantly changing. Indeed the material cause could itself be declared limited by God in respect at least of its continued existence and activity, though not of its origin. Thus although they took the material cause to have always existed, by using the term Māyā they were able to set God and matter in relation to each other. This averted the danger, to which their starting-point had exposed them, of a crass dualism, destroying the unity of all that Is.

All this they could achieve without turning God into Matter, or Matter into God. They could bring these two entities together, without abrogating their different natures, and without making

monism's mistake of simply denying the compelling empirical differences.

There was another reason why they should favour a description of Māyā as the material cause of the world. Vedānta had completely downgraded knowledge about matter. Now Śaiva Siddhānta did describe the world as a reality, and indeed regarded its material cause as an eternal existent; yet the notion of Māyā enabled them to treat knowledge about matter as inferior and insubstantial, and thus to avoid being called materialists.

CHAPTER FOUR

The Nature of the Soul

1. The Soul exists and is Distinct

The concept of soul plays, of course, an important part in Indian philosophy. So it is not surprising that in the course of time quite dissimilar theories should have been developed about its nature. Meykaṇḍa himself discusses a number of such theories in Sūtras III and IV (first part), leading to a proof for the existence of the soul, and several positive statements about its nature. We shall translate these here in full; the statements found in other texts can then be disregarded.

Sūtra III. *The body is a product of Māyā, but within it is a soul, as these facts show:*

(a) *people say 'The soul does not exist';*

(b) *people say 'my body';*

(c) *people know the five sense-objects;*

(d) *people know how the senses withdraw;*

(e) *in deep sleep there is no enjoyment or activity;*

(f) *people know things by instruction.*

Thesis, part one. Because people say the soul does not exist, there is a soul.

Comment. Is this like arguing that ghosts must exist if someone (mentions them when he) says 'ghosts do not exist'?[12] *This suggestion is refuted and the thesis reaffirmed: for those who deny the existence of the soul do give some reasons, saying the body is not the soul, nor are the senses, etc., and only after all these denials asserting that the soul is a nonentity. Which itself shows there must be an intelligence there, to deny that this or that is the soul; and it is this intelligence that is said to be the soul (as the previous Sūtra assumed, on the basis of scriptural evidence).*

---

12. The text uses the standard example of a hare's horns. (*Ed.*)

You may say this knowing intelligence is a nothing, but that is like calling my mother barren.

Example. When everything not-I is excluded something like a Sri Pañcākshara is still there.[13] *That is what you are. But in this time of bondage the Māyā that is bound to you exists as the All, and reflects objects like a mirror: so you are not that Māyā. Neither are you the Absolute. You are different from both.*

Comment. The example shows how this intelligence recognises itself as differing from the body, the senses etc., and that it is the soul. There is something that exists in the body, and in the senses, as an independent entity, and if by turns all those are recognised as not-I and set aside, still it is knowing (in the form of the subtle five-syllable), and is an intelligence. You may say 'I am not that either' to exclude this knowing intelligence, but that would require an intelligence to do the excluding, and so on and so on... So you are the intelligence that understands through the subtle Five-syllable. You may say that as the previous Sūtra mentioned Māyeya and Śiva as also existing, they could well be having that knowledge and making that distinction (thus avoiding a regress). But I tell you that as the Māyā linked to you as earth etc. remains linked to you and during this time of bondage conveys knowledge to you, as a mirror does to the eye (without itself knowing), so you cannot be that Māyā. Gaining your knowledge through Māyā, you cannot be identical with Śiva, who stands beyond Māyā. You are different from both of them.

Part two of this thesis. There is a soul, as people say 'my body'.

Comment. This is in reply to those who regard the body as the soul; reasoning that this intelligence is observed only in conjunction with the body, and that it is customary to call the body 'I', saying 'I am wasting away' or 'I am growing fat'. Now when one says 'I am fat', 'I am thin', 'I am a man', 'I am black', 'I am a Brahmin', the qualities of the body are, by courtesy, carried over to the soul; yet we do not, in the same way, say of the body, 'I am the body', 'I am the hand', 'I am the foot', we say 'my body', etc., and so we clearly differentiate the soul from the body. Meykaṇḍa thus refuted them from their own usage, remarking that this way of speaking showed that the soul was different from the body. For there has to be something to say not only 'my house', 'my wife', but also 'my hand', 'my foot'; and that something is the soul. It is said in reply that 'my body', is said to identify it, and not possessively; as we say 'the head of the serpent' (i.e. that constellation), when the head is all that is there.

13. The five-syllable formula Śi Va Ma Na Ya used in meditation; see below VI. 9. (*Ed.*)

But that is different. Expressions like 'head of serpent' are occasionally used, and meant just for identification. But expressions like 'my hand', 'my foot', 'my eye', 'my ear', 'my sense', 'my breath', 'my knowledge' are used in various ways, usually in the same sense in which we speak of 'my house', 'my wife', 'my possessions'; and must be taken to indicate distinct possession (i.e. used possessively). Which means the object thus introduced is different (as 'my' and 'body' refer to different items).

Example. It could happen that you refer to something identifyingly, not realizing it belongs to you (and so is different). Thus in your ignorance you could call your hand or foot or body 'mine' just to identify them (though they are different from you), and regard them as your soul. But on reflection you will realize that they are different from you.

Comment. The objector continues: We do say 'my' identifyingly for hand, foot, etc., whereas with house, wife etc. 'my' is used distinctively, as we recognise straight away that these are different from ourselves. How then can these two different ways of speaking be treated as identical? In reply the thesis is confirmed by the above example: I suppose before you heard about Materialism you mistakenly regarded house, wife and other external things to be your soul? As at that time you did not realize their difference from yourself, you used the possessive 'mine' identifyingly of hand, foot or body (which are not you) and even of your Pāśa knowledge. But by so saying you did actually exist, separately. So having thus with the help of the materialist writings realized by arguments that house, wife, etc., are objects genuinely different from yourself, you should also be able to see that hand and foot are also different from you.

Part III. *Thesis. As one knows about the five sense-objects, so the soul exists.*

Comment. (A further objection) All agree that the five senses each get acquainted with its proper object (e.g. only hearing detects sound) so those senses are not material, as the body is. And as we do not often call these senses 'mine' they can properly be said to represent the soul. In reply Meykaṇḍadeva expounds Part III *of the Sūtra, reaching the thesis given above.*

Each sense recognizes only one sense-object, and not the others, so there must be something that through the five senses recognizes all five sense-objects. This is the soul.

Example. The senses are to be found in the body. Each sense recognises one (sense-) object and not the others. If there is something by which the five senses (which know those sense-objects) are known, you must be

it.[14] *What you need to grasp is this: as each of the senses recognizes only one sort of thing, you and they cannot be the same.*

Comment. (A further objection). Yes, each of the sense-organs recognises only one sensation. But what is wrong with saying that the five senses are five souls? You say there is one subject recognising things through the five senses in five different ways but provide no argument for this. Our view is that knowledge can come little by little; we look at a pot, then touch it too, a process justified by the five senses being all in one body. In reply the above thesis is re-affirmed. One sense, found in the body, recognises one object but not the others. Now is there a subject that realises the eye perceives shapes and the ear sounds, etc., i.e. knows the business of all the five senses; viz., that being set off by the subtle Five-syllable they recognize the five different sense-objects? It the answer is no, then such sense-knowledge ought to be quite impossible. If Yes, then that recognising subject must be you. What was wrong, you now ask, with saying it was the five senses that did the recognising? Well, the senses do get to know their proper objects, step by step, but they do not realise that is what they are doing. So, if you understand how the five senses work and benefit from what they achieve, you must be different from them. I hope you realise that fact.

Each of these three parts describes the manner of existence of the waking soul.

Part IV. *Thesis. People do know things even when dreaming; so there is a soul.*

Comment. (An objection) As you also take the desiring senses to acquire knowledge by means of the subtle body (Siddhiār II.64), *this knower distinct from the objects known could well be the subtle body, which though not externally perceptible is there inside and sets the senses off externally and knows them.*

In reply he expounds the fourth part of the Sūtra and asserts the thesis just stated. As you know what you experience in a dream (when the five senses lie inactive) the soul must be different (from the subtle body). And afterwards something (awake) says 'We had a dream' or 'We had no dream'; so this must be the soul. But, you may say, this knowing may just be remembering, for it is the sūkshmaśarīra that in a dream knows what is going on. No, for 'know (what happened) in a dream' means to have an approximate idea, when awake, what was going on in the dream; so this is not remembering. If the Sūkshmaśarīra (the dream-body) who had the dream knew it when awake, he would remember it as he had it, and

14. In place of 'senses' the text has *Five-syllable (i.e. five senses, set going by the divinities present in the Five-syllable).*

not inaccurately. But if it is the soul that knows, then imprecise knowledge is possible, for the soul is not of a single nature, as Sūkshmaśarīra is, but may be either incoming or outgoing. So a soul which knows in this way is something different (from the Sūkshmaśarīra).

Example. When the five senses which are active in the (Sthūla-) body lie there inactive (during sleep), then you could move painlessly to another (Sūkshma-) body, do things there, and again exchange it on waking (for the Sthūla-body). Which shows you are different (from the Sūkshmaśarīra).

Comment. Here it is described how the soul enters into the dream state, how it exists there, and how it returns to the body; confirming the above thesis. It was shown earlier that the Sthūlaśarīra is distinct from the soul. So when the five senses, which are active in the Sthūla body, lie inactive in sleep, then all external activity is suppressed, and you enter painlessly into the dream body, taking it on just as previously you had taken on the sthūla body. You then see, hear, eat, smell, and feel in a different way, and on waking exchange this body for the waking body. So you are not this Sūkshmaśarīra, but are different from it.

This part describes how the soul exists in a dream.

Part V. Thesis. As the body does not eat or move, in sleep, there is a soul.

Comment. (An objection) The breath is active when dreaming, unlike the Sūkshmaśarīra, and also in deep sleep and in the turīya state; so it must be the soul, allowing organs to move in and out, and recognising them.

In reply he expounds Part V of the Sūtra, to confirm the above thesis. Feelings of joy and sorrow do not occur in the body during sleep, nor can it do anything; but they do occur in the waking state; so it must be the soul that is responsible.

(Further objection) It is said that during deep sleep there is no feeling and no activity. Is this remark about the body or the breath? Clearly the reply can be given that feeling and activity are not aspects of the body, for the body is non-intelligent. As to the question whether feeling and activity belong to the breath, let me say this: we infer on waking that we have slept well (no other way to know this being available) which implies that in deep sleep we do experience sorrow and joy. Moreover, there is some activity (breathing) that goes on during sleep as well; so it is silly to say no activity and no feeling can belong to the breath during sleep.

In deep sleep, all the organs except breathing are inactive, so there is no activity or enjoyment in the body, though breathing continues; but in

the waking state enjoyment and activity do occur in the body, unless the organs are suppressed. So it must be the soul that by activating the organs (or suppressing them) causes enjoyment and activity to occur (or not) in the body.

Example. When the organs lie inactive in the body (with whose help we know things) and breathing goes on, but without any feeling or activity, then the knowing subject must be something else. If the soul is active in the body, and not withdrawn, then the body has feeling and activity.

In this part the presence of the soul is considered by reference to its nature as evident in deep sleep and in the turīya state.

Part VI. *Thesis. As one learns when instructed, the soul exists.*

Comment. Some object that maybe Brahma is the soul, being Cit, and unlike the material things mentioned.

In reply to this objection Part VI of the Sūtra is expounded to support the statement just made:

Someone lying there naked (helpless) in atītāvasthā has no capacity for knowledge, though later on he acquires it, instructed by kalā and the other organs; and the soul which in this way knows must be different from Brahma, of whom all those things could not be said, as he is eternally changeless, and pure knowledge. Now the word 'instructed' shows that this person's previous existence was not an informed one. After receiving the instruction that God is pure knowledge he is 'instructed'; and it is the soul that receives the instruction.

Now this objection is raised: We take it that Brahma is pure knowledge, but that in the time of ignorance he knows nothing without organs. That makes it inappropriate to say that the soul is different from Brahma. In reply to this he expounds his thesis further: There is something that receives instruction, for the Guru teaches instructively through the Vedas and Āgamas that the Highest does not forget and then know, as the soul does; for the soul even when equipped with sense-organs cannot know its own nature, but knows, and forgets; but He is absolute knowledge, knowing knowingly. So the subject which here knows must be that soul which was earlier shown by scriptural proof to exist.

Example. What is it that learns one thing but then forgets it when learning about the next thing, even though awake? This cannot be pure knowledge. Anyone who has known truth and considers the matter will know it is the soul that does this, identifying itself with whatever it may meet.

Comment. (Another objection) Though equipped with sense-organs, one can only know objects but not one's own nature; for ignorance is still

around. But one can by instruction know one's nature. So we are not wrong to say God is the soul.

Taking up this objection, he emphasises the difference between various objects of knowledge, reinforcing his thesis. (Though the example may be meant to bring out the difference between God's omniscience and the imperfect knowledge of the soul.)

What is this thing that when awake and equipped with all its sense-organs is able to know objects, one at a time, but when getting to know object B no longer perceives object A which it knew previously, and whose knowledge even of these serially perceived items is not continuous, as it forgets, and who even when awake is subject to the five states (avasthās)?

We have already shown that this thing cannot be Matter, and we shall show this again later. Since Brahma is a mighty knowledge knowing everything directly and simultaneously, it cannot be Brahma. Anyone who has really studied Siddhānta, and reflected on it will realize that it must be different from that intelligence, as the sight of the eyes is different from the sunlight; and that such knowing-by-identifying is characteristic of the soul.

The example is also taken like this: What on reading something knows it straight away, and knows it repeatedly by reading in this way, but even after repeated reading does not know it, forgetting what it has learnt?

This describes the soul in the Atīta and Śuddha states.

Part VII. Thesis. The soul is within the body, which is a product of Māyā.

Comment. (Another objection): The soul certainly is not any of the named objects such as body, etc., for if one of them is lacking, no knowledge can occur, though it does if all are present. So why not call them all, collectively, the soul?

In reply he expounds the last part of the Sūtra in support of the last thesis.

In the body, made from products of Māyā, and resembling a machine which has been started, we find a soul, quite different from the named parts of the body. As they are all products of Māyā, they cannot last for ever, as the soul does. So they cannot be the soul.

Reason. Each part has its own name.

Comment. (An objection) We do not agree that citta and its derivatives (all the five inner senses) are products of Māyā. So why should we take the soul to be different from them? In reply he offers different support for

his thesis: These products of Māyā, that you call the five senses, are not called 'soul' as each has its own name.

Example. On reflection we must allow that the organs all consist of tattvas, from kalā to earth. These are products of Māyā, with no permanence. If someone resolutely acknowledges the intelligence present within himself, and then examines all the organs, he will see that they are a body resembling a light. The soul is different from them.

Comment. (Objection) Our view is, that although each individual part has its own name, taken all together they can be called 'soul'. What is wrong with that?

In reply he shows that their 'having different names' must be taken in another way, as they are all products of Māyā, so some name other than 'soul' should be given to them collectively, which reinforces the reason given.

Scientifically studied the individual components of that totality turn out to be the tattvas from kalā to earth. Because they are all products of Māyā, they have no eternal existence, but exist for only a short while, and then perish. If we then study carefully and resolutely the nature of the intelligence which is in that collectivity and proceed from that to further enquiry into the nature of that collectivity itself, we shall realise that it (the Sthūla Sūkshma and Paraśarīra bodies) exists for the soul, for which it has the same significance as light has for the eye. From this we conclude that the soul is different from the body, just as the eye is different from the light.

Sūtra IV. *Although the soul is not identical with any of the organs which gather sense impressions (antaḥkaraṇa), it is connected with them, as a king is connected with his ministers; for, owing to Āṇavamala, the soul does not know and so is subject to the five Avasthā (stages of consciousness).*

Part I. *Thesis: The soul is not identical with Manas, with Buddhi, with Ahaṃkāra, with Citta, or with the four Antaḥkaraṇa.*

Comment. At this point the Antaḥkaraṇātmavādi philosophers object that while all other things have their own names, so cannot be the soul, the Manas and other Antaḥkaraṇas are called 'soul' (in Śivajñānasiddhiār IV. 28)*, which can't be just a figure of speech, as the term is not applied to the senses, etc., so these antaḥkaraṇas can be taken as individual souls.*

In reply he expounds the first part of the Sūtra, reinforcing his thesis: not as a fresh point (for Grammar abhors repetition) but as something recalled from the previous Sūtra, in support of the thesis that the soul is linked to the Antaḥkaraṇa as a king is to his ministers, and is subject to the avasthā.

To ensure that 'antaḥkaraṇa' is not taken as kalā, etc., (the inner antaḥkaraṇa) he specifically says Manas, Buddhi, Ahaṃkāra, Citta. Now as those who accept the existence of kalā etc., all admit, the soul is different from them. On this point no objection is raised. Moreover, it was Manas etc., that was compared with the ministers, and causes the states of mind, not kalā etc., the latter being rather compared with a garment, and being linked inseparably with the soul even in Atīta. So he has no reason to mention them (kalā etc.) here, as he is speaking of Manas and the other Antaḥkaraṇa.

Reason. They (the Antaḥkaraṇas) are both knowing and unaware.

Comment. (An objection) Even Śivajñānasiddhiār IV.2 *says Manas Buddhi Ahaṃkāra and Citta are so closely linked to the soul that they seem to be the soul; so it is quite in order to say the soul is one with the Antaḥkaraṇa.*

In reply he re-emphasises his thesis. The Antaḥkaraṇa are Cit when compared with the lower tattva, but Acit when taken on their own. But the soul is Cit when considered on its own; so it is different from them.

Citta, inspired by the soul, considers something perceived through the five senses, to see what it is; but it does not know who is doing the considering.

The Manas says 'maybe so' and then asks 'Is that right?'; saying something and then questioning it. But it does not realise it was the assertor and the questioner. The Ahaṃkāra, however, is convinced that it does know the object, and explains, 'I say it is so-and-so'; but does not realize who had that conviction.

The Buddhi decides categorically what it is, but does not know that it has so decided.

The soul, that does not know in this way, but combines with the Antaḥkaraṇa and says, 'I consider, I question, I am convinced, I decide', taking one view and then another, and recognises the modifications of the Buddhi tattva which come upon the soul in the form of joy and sorrow and desire, these the soul when linked to Kalā etc., knows as joy, sorrow, desire and is conscious that it is experiencing joy, sorrow and desire. Thus it shows itself to be Cit, in relation to others and to itself; so it cannot be identical with the Antaḥkaraṇa which are not Cit in respect of themselves.

Just as, to someone not close at hand, one could convey what is special about being right next to the king by calling a minister 'king' out of politeness, so too the Antaḥkaraṇas are (in those sentences quoted from the Śivajñānasiddhiār,) called 'soul' by courtesy, to bring out what is special

in their being right next to the soul. As they offer advice they are compared with the ministers, but the other organs are compared with their retinue.

Example I. *The objects recognised by the Antaḥkaraṇa are permanent objects of knowledge. As the Antaḥkaraṇa are different from the objects, so is the soul different from the Antaḥkaraṇa. The soul knows what the Antaḥkaraṇa perceive. Perception reaches the soul, as the wave reaches the shore.*

Comment. Here the reasoning is confirmed by the description of how the Antaḥkaraṇa are Cit in relation to more humble beings, but are Acit in relation to higher ones and to themselves.

That which continuously reaches the soul is perception through the five senses, then perception through Manas, and finally perception based on joy and sorrow.

Example II. *The soul knows in various ways (through the Antaḥkaraṇa); when identifying with citta it considers; with Manas it expresses doubt; with Ahaṃkāra it draws false conclusions, and with Buddhi it makes a definite decision. So it must be different from them, as time itself is not the same as this or that stretch of time.*

Comment. Here it is emphasised that the soul is different from the Antaḥkaraṇa. Their nature was described above in general terms, and can now be set out in more detail by showing that even in rational perception a different sort of knowledge is involved.

The soul does not always react in the same way to the rational perceptions by which through Manas and the other Antaḥkaraṇa it masters some item perceived by the five senses; but when identifying itself with Citta it considers, when with Manas, doubts, when with Ahaṃkāra, makes wrong inferences, and when identified with Buddhi it knows precisely; thus knowing differently with each of the Antaḥkaraṇa. So the soul must be different from the Antaḥkaraṇa, just as the Kalātattva which combined with the sun etc., produces time-segments like hour, day, month and year, differs from the sun etc. (*Bodha* III.1-7, IV.1)

That is as far as Bodha goes in proving that the soul is present and is different from all those things that may be confused with it. The soul is not Brahma, with whom the Vedāntins of the Śaṃkaran school confused it. Neither is it identical with the bodily organs and senses and skills, as the materialistic schools suppose. It will be understood well enough from Meykaṇḍadeva's comments (above) why it can be identified with none of these. We may also remark that the proof for the existence of the soul is similar to that for the existence of God. From the existence of the world

and the events in it we infer an intelligence different from the world and controlling it; and from the existence of living beings and their activity we infer an intelligence different from their outward form and from their organs of activity, and regulating these.

2. How many Souls there are, and what sorts?

Souls take the second place in the list of eternal substances. Having no beginning, they cannot come into existence, whether by creation or by emanation from something else. So the number of souls can never be increased. As souls also have no end, but exist always without interruption, so clearly their number cannot be reduced. So their number always stays the same. The size of that number cannot be calculated. Their number is infinite. Umāpati declares *wise men say that souls are so many that their number is beyond counting. And again:*

As is the number of days in which souls have been born (i.e. entered bodies), or in which they will be born, so is the number of those who have been released, and of those yet to be released. (*Prak* II.1; *Payan* II.1)

Comment. The period in which souls have been born, or will be born, and the number of those who have attained the holy presence of the Highest, or are yet to attain it, are all the same, i.e. infinitely many...This asserts that souls exist, and how many. (*Payan* II.1 *and comment*)

One Śiva, innumerable souls. Countless days of their births, not just in this age, but in earlier ages of the world; and countless days of future births in this world or in others yet to come. Countless and boundless too are souls released or unreleased: which includes all humans, all beasts, all plants, all demons, and all gods; everything living anywhere in all the 224 worlds. There are 8,400,000 different kinds of creature. (III.3c above) The seven classes and 8,400,000 kinds there mentioned are so many different kinds of body which souls can enter on their wanderings; not different souls.

In their inner nature all souls are alike. Their bodies differ, as their bondage does. In Payan II.2. Umāpati answers the question *Are all souls alike?*

Some souls suffer from all three Malas, some from two, and some from only one.

Souls afflicted only with Āṇavamala are called Vijñānakalar, as enjoying right knowledge; those afflicted with two Mala, Āṇavamala and karmamala, are called Pralayākalar, with access to Release,

annihilation or death. Those afflicted with all three Mala (Māyāmala as well) are called sakalar, as confronting all these possibilities. The Vijñānakalar souls are gods, and the Pralayākalar souls are minor gods. The sakalar are all the other souls from plants to men, plus the demons, and even gods like Brahma and Vishṇu. These groups differ in degree only, not essentially, as Umāpati states in answer to the question *Is one class higher than another?*

All three classes are afflicted with Āṇavamala'. The Invisible One helps his own. (*Payan* II.1)

All three classes are basically alike, all afflicted with Āṇavamala, and all needing the help of the Highest. Release is naturally easier for the Vijñānakalar and the Prayalākalar, as their bondage is a lighter one, but all are indeed bound and can attain none of the three forms of Release through their own efforts. All three are dependent upon the help of Śiva, and have to undergo a process of purification.

3. Basic Nature of the Soul

In section 1 above we gave a negative account of the soul, showing that for Siddhānta the soul is far above matter. The soul is not for them a product of matter, nor a power that is physically explicable, nor a collective concept of the higher capabilities of the human body. In their experience it is something fundamentally different from matter, contrasted with it and set over it. The soul is also different from God, the pure intelligence; as shown by their calling God 'Lord of the soul'.

What then is this entity which is neither matter nor pure intelligence? According to Siddhānta it is beginningless; otherwise, on their basic assumption (that what does not exist at all cannot arise) it could not be an independent entity, but would have to be classed as God or as Matter, whichever it arose from, or as a nonentity. And as the soul is without beginning it must also be immortal; as they hold that existent realities cannot completely disappear but must somehow continue, throughout eternity.

Human thought has a peculiar tendency to seek out some form or type of existence to which a given reality could be held to belong. This drove the Siddhāntin scholars to write long discourses about the forms of existence proper for the Supreme Being, and to enquire into the soul's form of existence. In Siddhiār

IV. 5 Aruḷnanti rejects, first of all, the idea that the soul is like an atom. Had it this form, he thinks, it would leak out through the many openings of the body, and would not have to stay there; and it would become something transitory and non-intelligent, matter, in effect; and be subject to death. The following lines provide further reasons why the soul cannot belong to any form, visible or invisible.

If you say that the soul has a form, this would have to be visible in the body. Whatever is brought by emanation to appear is not eternal, and is created from material elements. Also you would also need to show how it entered into a womb. If you say that it is not visible to the eyes, you admit, with your own mouth, that it has no form.

You may say it has a Sūkshma form. But I tell you this form, which is made up from Manas and the other Antaḥkaraṇa and the tanmātra, and is the cause of the Sthūla body, is non-intelligent. If you say there is a still finer body than the one just rejected, you need to realize that all bodies which have form are non-intelligent, and non-eternal.

You may say that the soul has a formless form. But you can't have it both ways. Even an object cannot have contrary characteristics. Maybe you mean it is like wood and fire; but then you would need to see the soul (fire is visible if wood is burnt). But if the soul were visible, it would no longer be Sat.

Suppose you mean the soul's form is without shape, like the moon's, this would require the soul to appear visibly from time to time. Again, saying that the human body is a product and a manifestation of the soul would turn the soul into a fetter, a non-intelligence and matter.

If you say that the soul is formless and unchangeable like the ether, then say what it is that fetters the body, causes it to move, to run, and go slowly again, makes it rest, allows it to stand, sit, lie, to roll in the sand, and causes all its other changes of occupation! (*Siddhiār* IV. 9-13)

What is the point of saying the soul has no sort of form? Is it to suggest that the soul is by nature far above all spatial limitations, and is, therefore ubiquitous, as God is ubiquitous? Aruḷnanti denies that the soul is omnipresent as God is:

If you say you know the soul is ubiquitous, you must explain how the soul can experience various different states. Furthermore, you must tell me how it comes about that the soul can recognise individual transitory objects. Finally, you must explain to me how the soul can exist if everything else here has perished. (*Siddhiār* IV.18)

Nor can the soul be formless and omnipresent, like Māyā, (basic matter):

The soul is without form, and penetrates all things, but not in the same way as the formless and all-penetrating Acit. (*Siddhiār* IV.20)

Were the soul omnipresent, like God, then God would be superfluous, for the soul could not be distinguished from God. If it were omnipresent as basic matter is omnipresent, it would become an unintelligent mechanical something. Finally, Aruḷnanti makes this positive statement *It's nature is to permeate that in which it dwells'.* (*Siddhiār* IV.20)

So it is omnipresent, but subject to conditions. The soul itself has no form, but it has the urge to assume some form or other, which then sets bounds to its omnipresence; though within that form it has no bounds. If the soul dwells in a corporeal body, it pervades all of it, and after Release it dwells in God, and so is present in all of God.

The conditional omnipresence of the soul fits in with what we might call its self-adapting nature, as this passage suggests:

O you who are the companion of the moon-eyed Śakti, you who appear in Veṇṇey (dwelling-place of Meykaṇḍa) to bring me salvation; you have come to me; entered into me; you have brought light to my inner self; you have revealed to me your boundless life, and also my own life. Even so, my Guru, I still need to learn this from you: If I consider how I am both gross and subtle, and have learnt everything from the underworld to Śakti, it seems to me that I am all-pervading. Yet I creep in through the tiny openings of the senses, and am there confused, enduring the five states of consciousness; then, on leaving the body, I am busy coming and going. You must tell me how I can both be all-pervading and incarcerated in a body, and how I can reach the place where I would be.

If it is true that 'what does not exist is forever non-existent', and that 'what exists always exists', then there can be no decline or increase of the self.

You may say it is like an elephant being born as an ant. But that is no answer, as it concerns only the body. You may say souls are proportioned to the bodies they get, but that can't be right, or we would have to say souls enter the holes left for them and always known to them. You, O great One, can be big in a big body or small in a small one; but I can't. You who are always agreeable to me must explain that to me.

It is clear from this passage that the soul's nature is like that of crystal, which reflects whatever lies close to it, and is omnipresent in

whatever place it is, and identifies with those things it is connected with. (*Irupā* 6)

In Payan II.8. Umāpati himself describes this self-adapting nature of the soul in connection with the question whether the soul is intelligence or not.

Are there not objects in the world that become dark in the darkness and bright in the light?

Comment: Yes: the eye, crystal and the air.

This makes it quite clear that the soul is not regarded as Acit (non-intelligence), nor as pure and perfect intelligence; as these quotations show:

You may say that the soul is Acit, but that would mean that it cannot know anything. You may suggest that Acit turns into Cit (when connected with Manas etc.), but Acit does not become Cit, nor can Cit turn into Acit. A thing cannot sometimes be Acit and sometimes Cit. If you say that the soul is not Acit but Cit, then it need not take on Acit (Manas and the sense organs) in order to have knowledge. (*Siddhiār* IV.14)

Similarly, we read in Prak; III.3 that the soul is not non-intelligence, as it does possess some knowledge — how much, does not matter. Anyone wanting to deny this flies in the face of all experience, and ends up in scepticism and absolute nihilism.

Where is the use of light or darkness or the world, if the open eye has no power of sight? (*Payan* II.6)

Umāpati here offers proof (of the sort just indicated) that the soul simply must have a faculty of knowledge. Without it no sense could be made of the existence of God (light), or of Āṇavamala (darkness), or the universe; indeed they would be quite superfluous. The existence of the sun, and of darkness (which makes us realize the significance of the sun) and the objects in the world would all have no proven purpose and would be unintelligible, if there were no eye to see them with. Likewise the existence of God, which we realise through the natural events we perceive, and of Āṇavamala, which we experience daily as a bitter reality, and of the world that we see about us, these would all be pointless, or scarcely intelligible, if we souls had no ability to understand these things. Only the assumption that the soul is able to understand makes sense of those three realities. But they are there, and we know they are; and from this a wise man must conclude that there is a power of understanding in souls.

This power of understanding in souls is not, however, complete,

as God's is. It can't be, for if it were, the soul would have a complete knowledge of everything. Which it doesn't.

As the soul knows an object only through its sense organs, and as it forgets what it knows, and as it remembers things, when reminded: and as it does not know itself, the knower; so it is not an intelligence which knows unaided, but one that knows things only under guidance. (*Siddhiār* V.3)

For Umāpati, the soul cannot be pure intelligence:

What is experienced each day is then mixed up again each day in our dreams. What can such a faculty achieve? (*Payan* II.4)

The soul does not always operate as intelligence in the same way; as it would if the soul's knowing capacities were as pure and complete as God's. In the following quotations, Umāpati gives further reasons why the soul cannot be pure intelligence:

Fancy calling the soul 'knowledge' when it knows nothing without the five senses! (*Payan* II.5)

This says that the soul does not know things immediately and directly, as it would do if it were complete intelligence. It does so consequentially and indirectly, with the help of several sensory organs.

Siddhiār IV.31 makes a similar point:

If the soul were pure intelligence, what need for the organs and senses of the soul to pass on this information? Knowledge comes about through the products of Māyā, such as tanu and karaṇa. The soul is shrouded by Mala from eternity until now. It is without form, and governs by aid of the senses etc., as a king governs with the help of ministers.

Further, we read in Payan II.7:

Sat does not know Asat; Asat knows nothing. That which knows both is the soul, which is Sat-Asat.

Comment. Śiva, who is eternal wisdom, can know the non-eternal products of matter without having them pointed out afresh. The tattva, which are unconscious, know nothing at all. So souls which direct their attention on those products and so know them, must, therefore, be neither Sat nor Asat, but Satasat.

Because he is complete knowledge, God can grasp things without observing them. He knows without any object to know. (see II.3) The soul, on the other hand, understands only if confronted by objects of knowledge. Without them, the soul's powers of recognition cannot operate. In Payan II.8 (cited a little way back) the soul and its knowing capacities are likened to an eye or

crystal. The eye needs light to discern these objects: crystal needs it, in order to shine. The soul likewise, if it is to make use of its cognitive powers, needs some knowledge-sun to set them going. Śiva is this sun of knowledge, for through his Śakti he is present everywhere in souls (more detail on this, below). For although the soul's cognitive capacity is there and ready in the soul, it cannot go to work without the Śakti of Śiva.

There are further sayings on this point, distinguishing God's intelligence from that of the soul. Thus maxim 9 says:

To the eye of the night-owl, light is deep darkness; so are the eyes of the souls who do not see Vāman (Śiva the Shining One).

The soul is here likened to an eye, needing the sun; not a good eye, however, but a night-owl's; meaning, an eye which has cataract. Although the owl has eyes, and although the sun shines brightly, she does not see in the daylight. Her eyes are covered with a skin that the sun does not penetrate, and if this skin is not removed, and even though she has eyes, and the sun is shining, she sees nothing. And so it is with the soul. We may have all the needful: occasion, organs, object, sun of knowledge; yet our seeing brings no true knowledge. Something like an obscuring skin wraps itself round the soul. This is the Āṇavamala that remains bound to the soul throughout eternity, and prevents the soul from knowing, even though it has all the needful items. The soul may perhaps know a little, with that obscuring skin on, just as the night-owl can indeed see a little: but the soul will obtain true knowledge for the first time only when that skin is completely removed, and the sun of knowledge can without hindrance arouse the slumbering capacities of knowledge.

Unlike God's pure and perfect intelligence, that of souls 1. is subject to variation, in knowing, 2. requires organs, 3. and objects, 4. and a knowledge-sun to shine on it, and 5. it is fettered by an obscuring power. Unlike Śiva's unconditioned intelligence, then, that of the soul is conditional. Unlike Śiva, who knows and directs from his own resources, the soul knows only under guidance. His intelligence is great, hers is small. For her, knowledge comes indirectly, whereas he is knowledge absolute.

The soul has other faculties besides knowledge. It can wish (or decide), and it can act. Not so much has been said about these two functions as about sense-perception, though all are equally important for the whole system. Had not the soul this

double power to will and to act, the whole teaching about karma would be incomprehensible, entirely up in the air.

The power to will and to act is of the same kind as the power of knowledge, i.e. is subject to the same limitations, being liable to variation, and able to act only when the organs and objects are available, and hindered in their working by a fetter. To prove that Siddhānta does actually attribute the three named powers or aptitudes to the soul the following quotation from Siddhiār IV. 6-8 should suffice:

You may say that all souls originate from Brahman, and receive similar powers of knowing, willing and acting, and differ from Brahman as fire does from heat, but are like him otherwise, related as attribute to substance; but in that case souls would not need all the senses and organs, to understand.

You may say that the soul has no attributes, but only the property of being simple, but then wishing, knowing and acting could not occur. If you say that the three powers are bound to the body under the guidance of the soul, and are, therefore, aptitudes of the body, not of the soul, don't forget they do not function in a corpse, or during sleep. If you say that is because the organs are not functioning, then the soul must have abandoned its leadership or its presence.

If you say such leadership is a quality, (turning up sometimes) like that of a magnet near iron, why is it a magnet can attract, but not repel? How, then, can we explain that the soul can perform such acts as those of thinking, forgetting, running, sitting, lying, standing, and so on?

That is, we could not perform all these various tasks, if the soul did not have the three-fold capacity to know, to will and to be operative. This threefold power is not something acquired over time; it is not an accident, but an attribute, essential, constiritive, and a permanent characteristic of the soul, which cannot be thought of as not having this power.

The soul, then exists eternally, equipped with skills of understanding, willing and acting, though these need to be set going from outside.

4. How the Soul relates to the other Substances?

Yet more must be said, in describing the soul. It has always existed alongside other substances. So Siddhānta, to do justice to the unity of all that is, has not just to describe the soul as it is in itself, but must also say how it relates to other substances.

When we described the Siddhāntin teaching about God and Pāśa, we saw that both God and the three-fold Mala are very closely linked to souls. Siddhānta infers the presence of God within the soul from its native skills of knowledge, etc., arguing that the soul cannot by itself set these to work (see above). The presence of Mala is inferred from the fact that even with infallible Śiva's enlivening presence, those skills operate very ineffectively.

Their presence and close connection with the soul must naturally affect the description of the soul's nature. If they are to have the very direct and beginningless effects that our passages describe, then there must be something in the soul's nature which allows and requires this.

We have already seen in III.1 how Siddhānta explains the simultaneous presence in the soul of two influences as different in nature as Śiva and Mala. This explanation did not relate to the nature of the soul, but to the nature and manner of existence of those two influences on it. As to the soul, Siddhānta considers that these two opposing influences can both be present in it at the same time because of the soul's nature as Sat-Asat.

What precisely does this mean? Let our sources speak on this, starting with Bodha, who describes the nature of the soul in Sūtra VII.4.

Thesis. That which knows both sorts (Sat and Asat), while differing from both, is the soul.

Comment. Asat has no standing in the presence of Sat, nor can Sat know it, so the subject which knows them both is different from both; this is the soul, which like the eye has acquaintance with the sun and other objects although these in their turn do not know the soul or have acquaintance with it. Now they would have been valueless and as nothing if the soul had not been able to recognise them; which shows that the soul does have those powers.

Reason. The knowing subject which knows them both and is guided, and remains linked to both, is the soul.

(The word Irutiṟan (two kinds), which has no case-ending, is now taken three different ways: accusative (knows both), instrumental (known or guided by both) and locative (known in both, or connected with both).

Comment. The general expression 'that which knows both sorts' (or, which has two fold knowledge) has different meanings, which shows that here all those schools are refuted, which describe the soul's nature otherwise.

The first explanation shows that the soul's capacity for knowledge is quite different from that of the two other substances, as the eye is different from both darkness and light; the second shows that this capacity comes to the daylight (becomes active), if anything is at hand to shed light on it; thus resembling the quality of sound, which is a property of ether. Through the third explanation we learn that the soul is like crystal in taking on the nature of what it is connected with.

Example I. *The soul that studies books that are difficult to understand recognises Sat and Asat: it is, therefore, neither Sat nor Asat, though it appears like one or the other. Actually its nature is not like either of them, yet it exists only by appearing as one or the other. It appears in the way that fragrance appears in a flower.*

Comment. This affirms the first explanation, showing that the soul is neither Sat nor Asat.

Some ask whether the soul that understands these two things also understands itself, and are told, yes it does. On this an objection is based: how can it be appropriate, when the soul recognises three things, to say it understands only two? If on the other hand the soul does not recognise itself, then it becomes as nothing; yet nothing knowable is a nothing. Now hear my reply: The true nature of the soul is not, to come into the daylight like those two and to be identical with them; nor is it to walk without the daylight, and to exist as a nothing. Its nature is to join itself to Sat or Asat; to be hidden away in them, and to come out into the light of day; as the fragrance of a flower is hidden away, and emerges into the daylight. This implies that the soul is not, as those two (substances) are, something known in its own right, but something that can only be known in connection with them.

Example II. *You, who are subject to confusion, achieve clarity of thought only by means of medicine, and then know now this, now that; but that does not make you Sat, not even with the help of meditation. You when knowing still have to consume some of the fruits of past deeds, whereas Asat does not know anything nor enjoy anything. So you are not Asat, but something different.*

Comment. The remark that it is by instruction that souls know is emphasised as against those who say that the knowing soul is Cit just as Śiva is Cit.

Unless the organs which enlighten your knowledge-faculty were present, you would be unable to understand objects and would remain confused; but if they are there, they cure confusion as food cures hunger; then confusion vanishes, and you recognise the objects.

You, who know now this now that, do not possess the same power of understanding as Śiva-Sat. Does that mean you are then incapable of knowing? Let me tell you: those earlier deeds which you did knowingly, when those organs were present, you must now knowingly consume; unlike Pāśa, which is different from you and is Asat, and as it is not knowing cannot consume them. So you are not, like Pāśa, incapable of knowing.

You are like the air. It can produce sound. You are able to know (if, but only if, the sensory organs are present). You are Citacit, and are different from both.

Example III. *Because ignorance is Asat it cannot arise from pure knowledge (Śiva), but exists in conjunction with the soul. Ever since pure knowledge existed the soul also existed, burdened with ignorance, as sea-water co-exists with its burden of salt.*

Comment. The third explanation is given to get rid of the objection that ignorance also must apply to the Supreme as well, as he is linked to souls; and to explain when ignorance took possession of the soul.

The ignorance mentioned cannot spring from Śiva, as ignorance has no standing before Śiva who is unchangeable knowledge, just as darkness cannot stand up to sunbeams. Ever since Śiva existed the souls have existed, burdened with ignorance. The soul being burdened is like the salt being there in the sea, without affecting the sea, but only the water in it. As the sea, the water and the salt, they say, meaning that the three substances are related as Vyāpaka and Vyāpya: Śiva is Vyāpaka, to soul as Vyāpya; soul is Vyāpaka to Pāśa as Vyāpya. (Vyāpaka means all-inclusive; Vyapti included, Vyāpya inherent in Vyāpti: here sea is Vyāpaka, water Vyāpti, salt Vyāpya.)

The soul is said to 'know both', showing that both Sat and Asat are Prameya (objects of knowledge), that the soul which knows them and is Satasat is Pramātri (subject of knowledge), and that the Citśakti, the principle of knowledge for the soul, is Pramāṇa (instrument of knowledge); and the existence of that knowledge is Pramiti (right notion, established).

It is also said that the soul knows 'by both'. It follows that when knowledge does arise from both, through Asat, then the three-fold Paśajñāna, which is Asat, arises from experiential, logical and scriptural proofs, and while distinct from the soul serves it as a light; and when knowledge arises through Sat, the Sivajñāna which was always founded on the soul, linked to it and illumining it, will out of courtesy be called Pramāna because it serves as a sensory organ.

It is further said that the soul 'is connected to both' showing that

when illumined by Asat it knows Asat and is linked with it in existence; and when illumined by Sat it knows Sat and takes on its nature, standing in direct connection with it: but these moves do not make it perish in either place. (*Bodha*.VII.4)

From the above statements it is not difficult to determine the relation of the soul to the other two substances: it is not identical with either, nor a product of either, being neither non-intelligence nor perfect intelligence. It is an independent entity existing beside both of them, but linked to both, not accidentally or at this time or that, but by its nature, inherently. The soul is constitutionally unable to live just for itself, but must always attach itself to something or other. The soul can attach to Sat and Asat, the other two eternal substances; in fact, it is already and always linked to both; not one after another, but both at once.

The soul linked simultaneously to Śiva and Pāśa is the field of operation, so to speak, for both simultaneously; and their presence is an active one. Both work on the soul seeking to influence its character. Śiva seeks occasion to get the soul to model itself on Him, as Pāśa also looks for imitation in its direction too.

The other two substances are able to work on the soul like this because it is like a paper not written on or (as our sources have it) like crystal. Though itself colourless crystal can pick up and transfer to itself, and thus reflect as its own, the colours of objects nearby. A passing stranger who casts a superficial glance over them believes that the colours streaming from the crystal are its own, although they belong to objects found nearby. It is a matter of indifference whether the object is bright or dark: the crystal adapts itself alike to darkness and to light.

If two objects of differing colouring are found nearby, the crystal tries to adapt itself to both of them, so that the colours that radiate from it represent a mixture of the colours in both objects. That colour that can most unrestrictedly influence the object, is the one that prevails. It is the same with the soul. We can say that it represents a completely neutral power which can be moulded this way or that, depending on the influence received.

O holy Meykaṇḍa, sometimes I know and sometimes I don't, so am I intelligent, or unintelligent? Give me an answer and stop me doubting any more!

Here it is said that the soul is neither Sat nor Asat but Satasat, and that it takes on the nature of what it associates with. (*Irupā* 3)

The presence of two influences in direct opposition to each other and both working upon it bodes disaster for the soul, for each seeks to shape the soul in accordance with itself. All the sorrows that the soul must suffer are to be traced back to that struggle, and its history consists entirely of these two forces fighting over it. Each seeks sole dominion; the soul is the booty they dispute.

As the soul stands neutral between Sat and Asat, being influenced by each as they strive to conform it to their own image, the soul appears as neither Sat nor Asat, nor neither, but as both Sat and Asat, and also as both not-Sat and not-Asat. It is in fact a mixture of Sat and Asat, sharing in the nature of both without acquiring the nature of either. In itself neutral and so to speak characterless, but connected both ways, to both Sat and Asat, it appears as a mixture of the two and is called Satasat. Not that this is a mere phenomenon or manner of appearing, for it is based in the essential nature of the soul; so it could be called a noumenon, an attribute, as it results from the soul's own nature. This Satasat character that we see, then, is not something conferred on the soul by some fiat, but is a natural and necessary result of what it really is.

As we have seen above, the soul exists eternally, and it is, by nature, equipped with faculties of knowing, willing and acting; though these skills cannot operate by themselves, but need some external force to set them going. Having a faculty of knowledge, the soul participates in the nature of Sat. But as that faculty cannot set to work by itself, the soul participates in Asat. The soul, so to speak, conceals itself and its skills within the substance it is linked with, and so appears non-existent: but as soon as the other substances work on it, it emerges out of seclusion into the daylight, just as the fragrance of a flower emerges into the daylight if sunbeams cause the bud to unfold, though the bud was already alive before.

Thus the soul provides so to speak a common dwelling-place for other substances, and a showplace for their activities. Various analogies are used to explain this.

Sūtra VII of Bodha, Example 3 (see above) offers the analogy of sea, water and salt. The sea represents Śiva, water the soul, and salt is Pāśa. The analogy is to show how these three substances can exist in and with one another, while retaining their individual peculiarities. In the advaita teaching, as we saw, the way Śiva dwells

in the soul is explained by several analogies: soul and body, A and the other letters, sound and tune, taste and fruit, stone dust and lacquer, fire and hot water. These analogies indicate not only the close link between the soul and Śiva, but also that Śiva is influencing the soul and leaving an impression on it; so that the soul is not just a dwelling-place, but a workshop and is indeed an object for Siva's attention.

The way that Asat resides in the soul is also portrayed through analogies: verdigris and copper, husk and rice-grain, salt and sea-water. (see III.1) By its residence Asat also influences the soul. If we examine copper superficially, we see only the verdigris that covers it. In the same way, at first glance, we see only the husk that covers the rice-grain, and taste only the salt in sea-water. Similarly, on first examination of the soul, we see only the Asat which covers it like a veil, and this means that, so far as it appears outwardly in its life, Asat stamps its own nature upon the soul. Thus the soul is an object of attention for both Śiva and Asat.

Consideration of the detailed working of both Śiva and Asat upon the soul must be postponed for the present, though we will add here a comment on the actual working of the two-fold influence. First, that the soul is an object for other substances only in appearance, not in its inner nature, which is invariable: it is essentially and always something different from both Sat and Asat, equipped with the powers of knowing, willing, and acting, but relying on something else to set these skills to work. It is something half-way between Sat and Asat. In appearance it is variable like crystal, and dependent on the entity which controls its powers.

If the soul is completely under the influence of Asat, as it is in the kevala state, it appears as Asat; if it stands completely under the influence of Sat, as is the case during the so-called Śuddha state, it appears as Sat; and if under the influence of both, as during the sakala state, it appears as Satasat; which is of course its true nature at all three stages of its existence.

This neutral Sat-Asat character of the soul not only makes it an object for the other substances but also enables it as subject to have dealings with them: to adapt itself to them, and (more importantly) to get to know them. Now Sat and Asat are not related as subject - and object-of-knowledge, for Sat as pure perfect knowledge knows everything; it does not have to find out about something before grasping it. In any case Asat is essentially

non-intelligent. It is the soul as subject that knows both Sat and Asat. This is possible because the soul as Satasat shares in both their natures and can identify with both. By sharing in the nature of Sat it is Cit, i.e. intelligence, and so is self-conscious. Because it can adapt to God's nature and almost identify with him, it can so to speak rise up to his level and know him as an equal. Since it participates in the nature of Asat the soul is not a perfect intelligence but one needing the impetus of an external influence.

This fact is helpful in getting to know God, for the soul's own faculty of knowledge when totally surrendered to God's higher intelligence (which it then employs as an organ of knowledge) reaches the highest possible development, until commensurate with God's greatness. Yet it can also adapt to Asat, and in a way identify with that also; so it is no stranger to Asat. Just how it can get to know two such very different objects will be considered in more detail later on. For the present it is enough to state that it is thanks to its Satasat nature that the soul is able to recognise both Sat and Asat.

We can summarise in a sentence our statements in the last two paragraphs about the nature of the soul. The soul is an essence that exists eternally with capacity to know, decide and act; but always depending upon something else whose nature it then assimilates; and requiring some impulse from outside to activate its faculty of knowledge. Following Descartes' definition of substance we can define the soul even more briefly as 'something which exists in such a way that it has need of something else, in order to exist (and to know)'.

After this study of the soul's nature, both true and apparent, as Satasat, we must take a further look at its three inherent capacities of knowing, willing, and acting, to see how they fit in. The soul cannot set these capacities going without help from outside, which does reduce their value somewhat. And what laws govern their activities? Does they come from within, or from their possessor, the soul; or from beyond them both?

From what was said about the Satasat nature of the soul we are forced to conclude that for Śaiva Siddhānta the laws governing the operation of the soul's capacities are imposed from outside. Confirmation of this will come from the account, yet to be given, of the soul's own history. While ascribing to souls the ability to be

active, Śaiva Siddhānta refers to other entities not only for the fact that such activity does occur, but also for its aim or direction.

It is Sat and Asat (to which the souls who own those capacities are eternally linked in advaita relationship) that must set the norms and guide-lines for such activity. In other words, the soul can know, will, and act, but what and how it acts or wills or knows does not depend upon the soul or on norms proper to its capacities, but on the nature of the power under whose influence it stands. The 'that' and 'how' of activity are not up to the soul.

Every activity of the soul, therefore, is a task done under constraint; not the soul itself at work, but some other entity. In fact, the soul is just an instrument, a labourer.

Does this not reverse in practice the claims that the soul is Cit, and degrade it to a level lower even than Matter? Śaiva Siddhānta does suggest that a soul can to some extent refuse to lend its capacities in service of this or that power. It is and ever has been in the service of matter — which is not to say it must always continue so. It can refuse to give its loyalty to matter, and can turn towards God. This leaves the soul with some element of Cit; for if it can welcome or rebuff then while the 'that' and 'how' of activity do not originate in the soul they must leave a certain impression there, of which the soul is somehow conscious. Furthermore, as far as habit is concerned, this must all lead to the position where if not by individual action yet by the whole tenor of its conduct the soul does shoulder some responsibility for its fate.

Even so, if the powers of the soul are subject to norms laid down by matter, is not matter then a power higher than the soul? Actually, on the face of it, it does appear that the soul is a slave to matter, but that does not make matter of higher standing than the soul. The soul is a slave to matter, without matter's being its true lord. Matter takes over the powers of the soul, not by its own absolute power, but through a natural relationship, with help and permission from Śiva as true Lord of the soul, and Lord of matter too. The service which the soul provides for matter is like the service which the body provides for the soul, which has come to dwell there. Matter does not consciously influence the soul but quite unconsciously, and the soul can withdraw from that influence.

It is easy to see why Śaiva Siddhānta does not allow that the

soul's faculties are its own. Setting out from a dualism of substances it then sought by asserting a monism of act to preserve God's absolute position and the unity of all that is; so they would naturally hesitate to allow the soul any free will or freedom of action, preferring the path of determinism.

And if the soul's capacities have no internal norms, then God will be all in all, once perfection is achieved (when the soul derives its norms solely from God). And even while Matter is providing those norms, still every event can be related back to God in the end, as Matter on its own can do nothing, and has to rely on an impetus from God. This monism of events admittedly does not fully guarantee God's absoluteness, for while matter may depend upon God for everything that happens, God is not entirely responsible for 'how' it happens. God finds limits for his actions set by Matter's tendency and purposiveness. This doctrine, however, can only be fully appraised after study of Śaiva Siddhānta's view of the soul's fate under the joint overlordship of matter and of God. (see Conclusion)

CHAPTER FIVE

Matter in Charge

1. Under Āṇavamala's Sole Control

As the soul is by nature dependent, and tends to look like what it depends on, a soul can quite properly be said to have a history. There are two totally different powers with which the soul has always been linked from eternity, and which both strive to possess it: Śiva and the threefold Mala. Now the soul can devote itself either to one of these, or to both; so Śaiva Siddhānta appropriately divides the progress of the soul's destiny into three phases.

The first period covers the time during which the soul is entirely under the influence of Mala; the second, when it is influenced by both Mala and Śiva; and the third when it is under the influence of Śiva alone. These periods are called the kevala, sakala and śuddha avasthās, in that order.

The soul is subjected to three avasthā (states) of existence, kevala, sakala and śuddha avasthā. When existing solo the soul is in the kevala state. If the Highest gives it a body, and all its organs, it is in the sakala state. When all Mala is eliminated, then there is no more rebirth, and the soul is in the śuddha state. (*Siddhiār* IV.37)

In this chapter we shall deal only with the state of the soul during the first two avasthās, starting with the kevala period. The word 'kevala' means 'being alone', so 'kevala avasthā' suggests a state where the soul is 'alone'. But this does not mean that it has no contact with other substances. At no time does the soul exist all by itself, for the link with Śiva and Mala is eternal and beginningless. This 'being alone' rather means being dependent upon oneself, and receiving no kind of help.

As we have seen, the soul in this state cannot without assistance make any use at all of its faculties; the kevala state is thus one of

absolute inactivity, when it knows nothing, desires nothing, and does nothing.

In the kevala avasthā the soul is without knowledge, without form, eternal. It is not connected with Rāga and Guṇa, nor with Kalā and the other tattva, it does nothing, has no distinguishing features, is not in control of itself, cannot experience joy and sorrow; it is inseparably bound with Āṇavamala; and spatially unlimited. (*Siddhiār* IV.38)

During the kevala avasthā, the soul's condition is like that of death. Not the slightest activity occurs. It is just there, that is all. It has no place to stay, no organs to do things with, no objects there to engage it in activity. It is naked, exposed. It is *'without a body, without Guṇa, without Kalā, Kāla and the other tattva'*. (*Kroḍai* 14)

The kevala avasthā is thus a time when the soul has no body, and no contact with the world; not the time before birth, nor that between death and birth, but the time before the creation of the world, between world-destruction and world-creation. For the soul is supposed to occupy a body during the whole time of world-existence, including that between death and re-birth. The kevala state thus coincides in time with the general world-sleep, when all things rest, and no activity takes place.

During this time of general world-sleep there is no perceptible world. It then exists only potentially, in Māyā, the basic material, as the tree exists in the seed. Māyā, which also exists during the period of world-sleep, lies there inactive. In its womb lies karmamala, also inactive and inoperative. The complete inactivity of Māyā and karma is because Śiva does not allow his Śakti to emerge, thus restraining all activity. Māyā and karma, which are matter, are already there, but can become active only if they are set in action by the Śakti of Śiva. Thus while during this period Śiva Māyā and karma are closely linked to the soul, it cannot rely on their help to undertake activity, as it cannot without assistance make any use of its faculties of knowledge, etc. There remains only Āṇavamala as a possible arousing agent, but not during this period, for it too is matter, and so cannot be active without the help of the Śakti.

Confusion, pride, desire, worry, grief, weariness, and curiosity are all brought about in the soul by Āṇavamala, but not during the kevala state. This happens during the sakala state, with the help of Tirōdhāna Śakti. The one thing that can be said of

Āṇavamala is that it stands bound to the soul during the kevala state, and that nothing occurs to loosen that bond. This statement is sufficient to make us understand that the state of the soul in this period is one to be pitied. The nature of Āṇavamala is, as we have seen, like that of darkness. (III. 1) Where darkness holds sway, and is not relieved by anything, everything, even if it has another colour, appears as black. It loses its own appearance, and takes on that of darkness, becoming more or less identical with it, even without the darkness doing anything. Its mere existence is enough to bring about this result. This is also the case with Āṇavamala during the kevala avasthā. Because nothing opposes it, it spreads unimpeded. It casts a veil over everything, and impresses its appearance upon everything. It stamps them with the mark of ignorance.

Now during this deep dark night the darkness prevents the eye from using the power of sight that lies within it: but darkness does not infringe upon the power of sight itself, nor destroy it: and, in the same way, Āṇavamala does not allow the soul to employ its capacities during the kevala avasthā; not actually destroying them, but blocking them off from other things.

Cut off from everything else that could influence it, and unable to stand alone, the soul surrenders itself unconditionally to the influence of Āṇavamala, to which it becomes assimilated. This means that it takes on the appearance of Āṇavamala itself, and although in its own nature intelligent, lies there as a mindless somewhat, bearing all the features of Matter.

This is the true awfulness of the kevala period. It is not the non-activity that makes this period so terrible, for activity is not the soul's highest good. The reason sakala avasthā (which includes some activity) is an improvement on kevala avasthā is that this activity helps the soul to some degree of knowledge. The same applies to the lack, during kevala avasthā, of body, organs etc., equipment which it does have during the sakala state, not that the sakala state is the better just for that, but because having them makes action possible, which leads to some knowledge.

The awfulness of kevala avasthā is reduced by the soul's total lack of knowledge during that period. Though itself intelligent, it exists in this avasthā as unintelligent matter. Knowledge is indeed the highest good for the soul; but mercifully the soul does not perceive or feel the horror of its position during kevala avasthā.

Which in no way mitigates the fact of that abysmal descent, indeed it makes it worse by showing that the soul is as far as it could conveivably be from the goal it has to reach.

The kevala state may be entered more than once, for after entering the higher state of sakala avasthā the soul may be sent back again to the kevala state. It is Śiva who does this, by his work of destruction, though he is not to be called cruel on that account. He performs the work out of love, in the interests of the soul.

The sakala avasthā, which follows kevala avasthā, is a higher state, though still terrible; as terrible in fact, and more terrible as experienced, for the soul can feel and perceive its horror. Śiva knows this, and out of pity for the troubled soul he occasionally interrupts the sakala state, allowing the universe with all its worlds, bodies, organs and objects, to revert to Māyā, thus granting the soul a bit of peace (cf. III. 3d). In this way even the kevala avasthā is of benefit to the soul.

Sending the soul back to the kevala state at the time of world-destruction does indeed interrupt its progress, but does not set it back; for having once completed the kevala state it need not start all over again, but is in a position to continue with its development from the point it reached before reverting to kevala avasthā. For this reason kevala avasthā is subdivided: Marudkeval (beginningless); sakala kevala (after world-destruction and causing its return); pralaya kevala (for pralayākalar souls, not bound to Māyā); vijñāna kevala (for vijñānakalar souls, not bound to Māyā or karma); and Arudkevala (coming after purification from tattva, souls being transferred here when the world perishes at sometime after that purification but before the final end. (Commentary on Bodha VI.2 Ex.5)

2. Features of Sakala Avasthā

In everything that happens Śiva is at work; and all that happens is in the best interests of the soul, 'because of mala' (Bodha Sūtra I), i.e. to free the soul from mala's influence. This suggests that Śiva's works should be considered together with the destiny of the soul.

Śiva is said to have five works: creation, maintenance, destruction, veiling and release. The most important work is the work of release. All the other works are directed towards that end, and so can be seen as stages in the work of release.

Some people say the works undertaken are a sport of Śiva's Grace. Siddhāntins say that Śiva performs them in order to set the soul free from the sea of misery, and to give to it the stable presence of the Aruḷ. Through the work of destruction he removes fatigue. He undertakes creation to bring Mala to ripeness; through the work of maintenance he provides time for souls to consume their fruits; he performs the work of obscuration so that souls persevere in the consumption of those fruits. Release, the priceless work of grace is true grace; and the other works mentioned can only be called works of grace. (*Prak* I.6)

While describing kevala avasthā we have already mentioned the work of destruction and its importance for the bringing about of salvation. Destruction and kevala avasthā are very closely linked, for kevala avasthā occurs only because Śiva is at work as destroyer of the universe, and it lasts until the work of destruction is replaced by that of creation. Śiva has a purpose in allowing the universe to disappear and the souls to enter into the kevala avasthā; and once that purpose is fulfilled, namely, once the souls have by complete inactivity sufficiently recovered, Śiva re-makes the universe just destroyed (as described in III.3d above) and puts souls back in their places.

When that happens, kevala avasthā comes to an end and sakala avasthā begins. Thus creation has to happen first; and souls are then transferred from kevala avasthā to sakala avasthā. There the soul remains, owing to the work of maintenance, which preserves what has been created, thus continuing the work of creation.

The fourth work of Śiva also falls within the sakala avasthā. This is the work of obscuration. This work is closely connected with the development of the soul during the sakala avasthā, so we shall often return to it. The sakala avasthā continues as long as Śiva performs these three works of creation, preservation and obscuration. Once Śiva appears as destroyer, sakala avasthā gives way to kevala avasthā. If he appears as redeemer, sakala avasthā is replaced by Śuddha avasthā.

The word 'sakala' means 'the all', 'the whole', 'that which is universal'; here signifying that state of the soul in which it is linked to everything that exists. In the kevala state also the soul is linked to what then exists, i.e. to the other eternal substances: to Śiva, Āṇavamala, Māyāmala, and karmamala, but this is no active alliance. During the sakala avasthā, however, all these substances are active and influence the soul. First of all there is Śiva, the

highest of all substances. As soon as the time for general world-sleeping is over he has his Śakti go forth, and this power at once awakens all other slumbering powers of the soul and stirs them into motion. Then it awakens Āṇavamala and stirs it into activity. The soul and Āṇavamala now have a mutual influence upon each other, and there is born within the soul a desire that continues throughout the sakala state, and takes the form of pride, worry, grief, weariness, curiosity etc.

In addition to this, Śiva, through his Śakti, allows Māyā to take a hand, producing from itself tanu (bodies), Karaṇa (organs), bhuvana (worlds), and bhoga (a variety of objects), so the soul can act out its desires. Finally, Śiva causes karmamala to become active, and through that same Mala allocates to the soul a place in the manifest world that is in accordance with the deeds that it has previously done (in sakala avasthā). Śiva watches over the soul's activity in the universe, and takes care that each activity of the soul bears its appropriate fruits, and that these are consumed by the soul.

The difference between the kevala avasthā and the sakala avasthā becomes immediately apparent. During the period of solitude, which is characteristic of the kevala period, the soul is isolated from all influence and activity. But under sakala avasthā there is a characteristic link with all that exists, i.e. receptiveness to all influences and activities.

In the kevala state, the soul is in isolation, having neither body nor organs. When it receives a body and organs from the Highest, it is in the sakala state.

In the sakala state the soul has a body and is equipped with bhoga (Śuddhāśuddha tattva) and bhogya (aśuddha tattva). The soul now has desires, speaks, and is active; enjoys sense-objects like sound, and can go into all places; it dies and is born again (is subject to transmigration). Siddhiār IV.37, 39: *comments bracketed*)

The time when the soul goes through those various births and deaths and by the Aruḷ (Śiva's Śakti) does deeds good and bad and consumes their fruits; that time is called Sakala avasthā. (*Prak* II.30)

The soul, although in nature it is basically the same throughout both states, is yet manifest in two different forms, appearing in one way in the kevala state, and in another way in the sakala state. During the period of world-sleep, there are no such entities as space and time, for these belong to developed matter; so the

soul cannot then be spatially limited, but can only be said to be indiscernibly 'one with' Śiva and with Pāśa, with no evident independence. Nor can one speak of experience, in this state; for that involves time, past, present and future, and is so closely linked thereto that time appears as the (relative) cause of all events and the basis of all experience.

In the sakala avasthā, having acquired a link with matter, the soul is subject to limits of time and place, and from a vyāpti it becomes an Aṇu, feeling itself distinct from other things, able to have dealings with them and to recognize this experience.

Thus in sakala avasthā the soul comes across as a more or less independent entitity, distinct from other substances; whereas in kevala avasthā it had no distinct existence; though even there it was different in nature from the other substances. The sakala state is thus one of differentiation, unlike kevela avasthā, which was undifferentiated.

In kevala state that difference was real, but invisible, being always concealed by Āṇavamala. Now in sakala state that difference does begin to show; aided by a process of assimilation. This allows the soul, though invariable by nature, but in appearance subject to all sorts of changes, to develop as a separate entity, and to latch on to something else whose appearance it then adopts.

In the kevala avasthā it is completely exposed to Āṇavamala, and so has the appearance of Āṇavamala, seeming a completely unintelligent Asat (which it isn't, really). But in sakala state the soul is in more active association with Śiva, who is Sat and Cit; and with the three-fold Mala which is Asat and Acit.

Therefore, because it is influenced on one side by Sat, and on the other side by Asat, it is understandable that the nature of the soul during the sakala period is that of Satasat (Citacit); a mixture of intelligence and non-intelligence, now seeming to be knowing, now ignorant. (There is a difference between the soul seeming Satasat, in sakala state, and its actual proper nature as Satasat.)

This Satasat appearance varies according to the influence of the two powers on the soul. As Āṇavamala is still there, Śiva cannot work unhindered on the soul. And as Śiva is present and active there, Āṇavamala cannot influence it continuously. These two consequently are less decisive than Māyā and karmamala in making the soul what it is, for in the sakala avasthā the powers of

these latter forces are fully developed. That is why the soul is so often confused with products of Māyā (cp. IV. 1 above) and its history taken to be the history of its karma, in the sakala avasthā (the only state in which we can observe it and get to know it).

The close connection of the soul with the products of Māyā and its surrender to karma are thus the principal features of sakala avasthā, and distinguish it clearly from the other states. Sakala avasthā, we said, is a state of differentiation; and we must add, of involvement in the world, actively and passively.

Since Māyā and karma, the principal factors at work in the Sakala avasthā are, like Āṇavamala, an evil and a fetter for the soul, the soul is there enslaved by three evils, and bound by three fetters; whereas in kevala avasthā it had only one fetter to bear, Āṇavamala. Even so, sakala avasthā is a rather superior slavery, and a great step forward on the way to release. For Māyā and karma, though evils, serve also to eliminate Āṇavamala, a still greater evil; they are fetters, but they also help the soul to break open the bigger fetter of Āṇavamala.

We have already discovered from Bodha Sūtra I that Śiva puts the soul under the power of Māyā and karma solely to free it from the power of Āṇavamala. It says there that the universe comes into being by reason of Mala, i.e. as the commentator says, so that Mala (and by that is meant Āṇavamala) can be eliminated, if that has not already happened. This assuredly means that the universe must actually help in the work of freeing souls from the shroud of Āṇavamala. That this is, in fact, the view of Śaiva Siddhānta becomes clear in this saying:

Why, you ask, do the tattva turn into objects, and become bound to souls? Let me tell you. It is to allow very old karma to be completely consumed by the soul, in order to bring it to ripeness so that it no longer exists, and to expel it finally, completely and entirely, and to remove it, and so to banish the evil Āṇavamala that co-exists with the soul. (*Siddhiār* II.79)

How the binding of the soul with Māyā helps the elimination of Āṇavamala is apparent from the following quotation:

If you say that there is no such thing as Āṇavamala, distinct from Māyā, and that the effect mentioned is due to Māyā, let me tell you that Māyā stimulates the skills of knowing, willing and acting in the soul, which Mala tends to suppress. Āṇavamala is not something apart from

souls (i.e. it never appears separately), but Māyā is separate from souls, and is manifest in the world, the body and the organs.

Māyā veils the faculties of knowledge and activity in the soul, as the clouds veil the sunbeams. As soon as the clouds have disappeared, the sun shines in its old splendour. So do knowledge and ability re-appear as soon as the body disappears. (This is the opponent's view).

If the clouds veil the sun, the light of the sun is hidden; so, if souls are hidden by bodies, knowledge and activity would have to be destroyed. But in fact it is when souls get bodies that they acquire Knowledge, Decision and Action. It is bodiless souls that get veiled.

It is Āṇavamala that veils these three skills. Its link with souls is so close it could be called a Guṇa (attribute). Māyā kindly produces kalā (elements) and the other tattvas so that ignorance may disappear. These two are as different as light is from darkness. (*Siddhiār* II.81-84)

The products of Māyā equip the soul with sense-organs. With the help of faculties which lay inactive in kevala avasthā the soul can now become active, know a little, and so raise itself a little above matter, and draw a little nearer to Śiva, the pure intelligence. We shall see in more detail later how by the help of the products of Māyā it arrives at knowledge, and what that knowledge is really worth. (V.5 & 6) For the present it is enough to remark that it is by means of the products of Māyā that in the sakala avasthā (which occurs at the same time as the world does) the soul achieves knowledge and so raises itself above matter.

Although itself unintelligent matter, inflicting all sorts of evil upon the soul (see above III.3e), Māyā does in a way transmit knowledge, so can euphemistically be called 'a light for the soul' just like Śiva; though more often and more suitably it is likened to a lamp that lightens up a dark room during a dark night, whereas Śiva is compared with the universal light of the sun.

If the soul does not achieve knowledge by the light of the body, a product of Māyā, then it knows nothing at all.

It is the task of Māyā, as light for the soul, to convey knowledge so it can get to know things. It is the task of Mala to prevent this knowledge. Since these two are in opposition, like light and darkness, the idea that Māyā and Mala are identical must be dismissed. (*Bodha* IV.2, *Example and comment*)

Like a light it gets rid of Āṇavamala to some extent, so can be regarded as a help towards removing ignorance and achieving mukti.

Unless the light (i.e. Māyā) not only predominates over this One thing (Āṇavamala) but is also in some way its overlord, darkness would never leave souls.

Māyā takes on forms, on account of karma, and is like a light until the light of day. (*Payan* III.9 & 10)

The advantage souls receive through the products of Māyā are similarly described in Kroḍai 3, only here more weight is laid on the way it enables activity.

The Supreme, full of mercy for souls which owing to Āṇavamala lie there inactive and without knowledge, grants them tanu, karaṇa, bhuvana, bhoga (evolved out of radiant Śuddha Māyā), like the stick we give blind people to carry; so he gets souls interested (through Manas etc.) in the two sorts of actions, and brings about re-birth, perceiving the deeds and also ensuring knowledge. For doing which may the Supreme be praised! (*Kroḍai* 3)

Yet the knowledge to which Māyā helps the soul is not perfect; and the activity to which Māyā brings the soul in the sakala avasthā is not perfect either. Being unintelligent matter, Māyā can hardly be expected to enable souls to have perfect knowledge or activity. This nature of Māyā is not forgotten, however, much we may praise it for what it does to help.

The limitation of Māyā as a helper of souls is indicated in two ways. All its instructive and encouraging activity get referred back in the end to the Śakti of Śiva which is present and active within the soul. And it is specifically stated that although Māyā is a light and a staff, it still creates confusion. (See Siddhiār II.53, quoted above III.3a & III.3e) For all the advantages Māyā does produce, it is and remains a Mala, an evil that must be removed.

As the rice-grain has a seed with inner and outer husk, so the three Mala (and Māyā too) create confusion, hide the true form of the soul, and bring deceptive joys, bondage, and the possibility of experience. (*Siddhiār* II.86)

Māyā does convey knowledge, not about everything, but about those things which emerge from Māyā itself: though these are not known as they really are, but only as they appear. The soul learns the true nature of things not through Māyā, but by the help of Śiva as the central light (see VI below); though Māyā does prevent his having unimpeded access to the soul. Above all, Māyā does not pass on knowledge of Śiva, the Highest good, who alone is Sat. Māyā cannot, therefore, complete the rescue of the soul

from the power of Mala, but only make a start, enabling knowledge and actions of lesser value to souls who use it as an organ. (see above III.3f)

For a soul to achieve complete knowledge, it must break free from Māyā and its guidance, and Māyā like Āṇavamala must be detached from the soul. Which shows that although the soul is a knower in the sakala avasthā, this state is not final but only intermediate. If the soul is a Being capable of complete knowledge, then there must be a higher state for it to reach. That higher state is the śuddha avasthā, to be treated in more detail in chapter VI. But first we must investigate more closely the experiences of the soul in the sakala avasthā.

Māyā does not entirely free the soul from its link with Āṇavamala, but it does make a start. Śiva uses it, one could say, as a means of purification, to cleanse the soul from the dirt of Āṇavamala. Which sounds paradoxical, for in essence Māyā, like Mala, is dirt, just like Āṇavamala. Our sources resort to analogies to explain this paradox.

As we said previously, the deeds of Arans are deeds of love. By bringing forth earth, heaven, hell, bodies, organs etc., we could say that he gets rid of the eternal Mala as if by medicine, gives supreme bliss (i.e. makes a start thereto) and crowns the soul with his lotus foot.

Are the created bodies and organs then Mala (dirt)? Why do you say Śiva removes dirt with dirt? The launderer smears new clothes with cow-dung and soap, thus removing all stains clinging to the new material. So does the Supreme eliminate Āṇavamala through Māyā. (*Siddhiār* II.51 & 52)

Through being smeared with cow-dung (a popular cleansing agent in India), and with soap, the material that comes from the hand of the weaver with all sorts of dirt on it now appears even dirtier. Of course the launderer smears the material with cow-dung and soap because he knows this will by combining with the original dirt draw it out of the material; and that the old embedded dirt which otherwise is difficult to remove will wash out easily when rinsed with clean water. And the inborn Āṇavamala can only be successfully eliminated by pure intelligence once the close link between soul and Āṇavamala is broken by adequate contact with Māyā.

The launderer, to get his results, must not only smear the cloth with cow-dung, but also rub it hard and beat it; otherwise

the old dirt will not be loosened from the cloth. For the soul it is karma that sees to the rubbing and beating, inciting it by objects of Māyā and compelling it to get involved with them (body and organs being all ready for this purpose). Now any involvement with objects of Māyā, by deeds, words or thoughts, has consequences which the soul will have to expiate, and each such expiation involves fresh contact with objects of Māyā, which in their turn need expiating. So the soul is continuously in contact with Māyā, and so to speak pervaded by it; just as the cloth is by rubbing and beating completely pervaded by cow-dung. The soul feels, tastes, etc., the pleasant objects that Māyā presents to it, and it does this so completely that it eventually realises their worthlessness, and gradually gives up all longing for the objects that Āṇavamala presents to it with such uninterrupted vigour, and learns to yearn for the Highest Good, Śiva. Now if the soul's experience with Māyā has conquered Āṇavamala's work (the desires), then has the moment come for Śiva to remove all the dirt (Āṇavamala Māyāmala and karmamala), as the launderer after adequate rubbing removes all the dirt, the cow-dung as well as the old dirt, by rinsing in clean water. That is how Māyā and karma work hand in hand to prepare for the salvation of the soul through Śiva.

To sum up: the sakala avasthā is a state of differentiation and of active and passive worldly concern. In this state the soul brings its faculties of knowledge etc. into play, achieves a certain degree of knowledge, and starts on the way to final release from Mala by enjoying under karma's direction the products of Māyā. The sakala avasthā is thus a transitional stage leading to a higher state.

Śiva through his works of creation and maintenance enables all three Mala to work on the soul, during sakala avasthā; and he also directs that task by his work of obscuration, through the Tirōdhāna Śakti.

The products of Māyā are also called Māyeya; the Śakti of Śiva, which induces the three-fold Mala, that hold the soul in bondage, to perform their work, is called the Tirōdhāna-Mala. These five Mala hold the soul in shackles. (*Siddhiār* II.87)

The Tirōdhāna Śakti is called Mala because it creates an obscuration in souls in order to achieve the ripening of Āṇavamala. (*Prak* II.2)

The task of the Tirōdhāna Śakti is first of all to arouse desires in the soul through the influence of Āṇavamala, and thus get the

soul involved in the created world, so as not to realise the true character of earthly pleasures and joys and renounce them before due time. It is, so to speak, like a launderer smearing the Mala-inflicted soul with Māyā, as cow-dung is smeared upon soiled cloth, and rubbing and beating it with karma as a beating-stone. Thus the Tirōdhāna Śakti causes pain in the soul, and holds the soul in bondage to the three Mala, as long as need be, and so comes to be called 'Mala', though it is really just the opposite, the Śakti of Śiva. The purpose of this work of obscuration is clearly stated in Siddhiār I.36:

So that all Mala ripens (and leaves the soul) by the soul achieving Iruvineioppu (first stage of the śuddha avasthā).

The following pages will describe the saga of the soul from its entry into sakala avasthā until it moves on into the śuddha avasthā: i.e. the course of transmigration, how it lives in the bodies provided, during sakala avasthā, the organs by which it acts and the value of the knowledge acquired during sakala avasthā, and the activity undertaken. Finally, we shall try to determine the individual stages to be traversed during the sakala avasthā on the way towards Release.

3. The Course of Transmigration

Strictly speaking, the soul's history has no beginning, for the soul is beginningless; but in narrating that history we are bound to choose some definite time to start from. As starting-point we choose kevala avasthā, the time of general world-sleep. Not that the story really starts there; and in any case it would have include the yield of Saṃcita karma brought forward from the previous period. But let us suppose that this balance brought forward is the smallest conceivable, so that when the world is created the soul is at the very bottom of the ladder which its relation to Śiva (as one Cit to another) calls on it to climb. Though the yield from earlier avasthās be extremely small, yet the soul never starts out quite empty, when the world is created. It always has a body, though in the case we were considering this may be of very low status and with the poorest of prospects, e.g. if it belongs to any one of 1,900,000 kinds of plant at the lowest stage of development.

A soul which discharges the tasks appropriate to the body given may through the destruction which death causes move up from plant to something higher. In the case considered above this

would not be easy, as the organs of a plant are not very developed, and the veil of inactivity and ignorance created by Āṇavamala is hardly lifted. There is, it seems, no need for that soul to migrate through all 1,900,000 types of plant. In Siddhiār II. 44 we read:

The spider was born of the lineage of the sun, of a king's lineage; he ruled the whole land, and was a king without equal; and the rat became a powerful king in the world, so that the whole world praised him (because of their special services to Śiva).

Which shows a soul can skip several stages on the way up. It can also fall back down, owing to unfortunate karma; for the same passage says *Akalyā* became a stone.

From the plant world, the soul has to work itself up in the normal way through birth first to a water-creature, of which there are 1,000,000 kinds, then to one of the 1,500,000 types of crawling creatures, then to a bird (1,000,000 types), a quadruped (1,000,000), and lastly to a human (900,000). There are also the 1,100,000 types of body belonging to gods and demons. We shall later hear more about the position of gods within the soul's course of transmigration, but for the time being these bodies can be left aside, as they are a very special case.

It was previously said that souls located in all the various forms of life from plants onward are not restricted to that life-form but can pass on to another. Thus a soul living the present life as an animal can in the next life take human form, or vice versa. Our sources give several reasons for accepting such type-changes:

You may say that mobile and immobile life-forms get another body, according to their deeds, but one of the same type, for the type does not change. In which case tell me whether those humans who are due to consume a surplus of joy in heaven, earned by their deeds, will enjoy this as gods or as men?

If you say they enjoy it as humans, the world of gods becomes a human world. If you say they enjoy it as gods, that destroys your claim that the type of life does not change. They may take their pleasure as gods, but if they appear again on the earth, they will be born as men. Gods do not come to this earth.

Caterpillars change into butterflies; grubs of another sort change their old form for that of a beetle. What the form is, is dependent upon its karma. All religion is in agreement about this. On what grounds, then, do you claim that the form does not alter?

Akalya became a stone. Hari (Vishṇu) endured birth in different forms. The spider was born in the lineage of the sun, ruled the whole land, and became a king with whom none could compare. The rat became such a powerful king in the world that the whole world praised him.

You say that some are transformed because of fate, but a change of form does not result from karma. Remember how we said previously that the Supreme is the witness to every deed. Everything happens in accordance with his will.

Karma by itself cannot make out what types are appropriate or what worlds suitable for putting souls into. Nor can souls choose where to be, that is up to the Supreme, who alters the body he made, as the karma requires. (*Siddhiār* II.41-46)

Thus the soul during sakala avasthā has to journey through different kinds of body, of varying subtlety. A gross body indicates that the soul dwelling within it is still at a lower stage of existence; a subtle body that the soul has reached a higher stage. Thus a bird's soul is nearer redemption than one in a plant; and an animal's soul nearer than one in a bird. A soul found worthy of a human body must already have come a long way; though it also has a long way still to go; for some men rank higher than others, and there is always a danger of being sent back to a lower stage. Thus a human birth, though a poor basis for boasting, does show cause for striving on.

Souls which get born as men must first pass through 8,400,000 *types of those born from plants, from sweat, eggs or uterus; so being born as a human is like swimming through the sea with one hand.*

On earth where people live, major services are required to get born in a land where the four Vedas are read, and avoid being born in a land where they are not read. It is far from easy to avoid the lowest caste in the land, and to achieve birth in a caste where devotions (tapas) are practised, and strange religions are not accepted.

It is difficult to progress far enough to abandon the pride that springs out of riches, and avoid the baseness that arises out of poverty, and thus humbly obey the Śaiva religion. Those who worship the Supreme through the glorious Śivajñāna will attain to his Aruḷ, his grace.

Birth as a Śaivite is necessary for release. Even the gods must be born as Śaivites, to achieve final redemption.

For the purpose of worshipping Śiva, who sitting upon an ox performs his five works in thought, words and work, the human birth is preferred as highest. The gods in heaven must also come to earth and

worship Śiva. O misery! Those fools equipped with a body who just wander around are ignorant.

The body may perish in the womb; or at birth; or in childhood, or in youth, or in old age. So seek salvation while you live, if at each age the body may perish.

To seek to gratify the senses is unworthy of a wise man.

If one sense is gratified, the other senses are not, so complete satisfaction can never be got by gratifying the senses. Each joy and sorrow either perishes immediately, like an illusory perception, or quite soon, like a dream-experience. To one who grasps this, Release is near.

If great people smear sweet-smelling spices upon their bodies, adorn themselves with ornaments of coral, and wear expensive clothes; if they go about in a litter, with a great retinue, with drumbeats and trumpet-blasts and an umbrella (symbol of royalty), if they strut about proudly, though ignorant and unable to speak (wisely), they are like corpses. Now, you who like a corpse follow that great one's living corpse and spend your love, your life and your knowledge in their service, let me tell you your body arose of a sudden and will suddenly perish. Worship Śiva! He will so guide you that even the gods have to worship you. (*Siddhiār* II.89-96)

Human birth is reckoned the highest, even higher than birth as a god. The gods come do last in counting the seven life-forms, because they have more subtle bodies; but humans are better off as regards Release, which they can achieve but the gods cannot. Gods would have to get born as humans to have the good luck to achieve Release.

Strictly speaking, we would not make the unprovable assumption that gods exist, were it not for the authority of the Vedas and of popular belief and the requirements of the karma-doctrine. But the observable disparity here on earth between work and reward leads us to assume such divine beings, so we can claim that the law of karma really works unerringly, with rewards and punishments always appropriate to the deeds. What is said about the race of gods also applies more or less to the race of demons.

The kind of body that the soul receives in the new birth that follows every death depends directly upon karma, i.e. the soul's merit.

If the Sthūla body dies, the Sūkshma body becomes the yātanā sarīra; so, according to the will of the Supreme, every soul will savour in heaven or hell all its sorrows and joys, until its unblemished essence shall return again to a mother's womb.

Sometimes the soul immediately enters another womb and again takes on a body; in other cases it remains bodiless, lying there like a stone because of its sins, and reaches hell later, when its time comes, and there suffers pain. The body which the soul then assumes is in accordance with its previous karma. (*Siddhiār* II.36-37)

Śiva sees to it that the soul gets an appropriate body.

If a seed is placed in the damp soil, the shoot grows. Now we know how Māyā (which is founded on Śiva) has a permanent link to his Śakti; that is why Māyā is able (to emerge and to fashion bodies) suited to the deeds of individual souls: just as, to a larva that wants to turn into a wasp, he gives the appropriate body.

Comment. Some ask: How is it that Śiva can so activate Māyā as to become manifold? In answer to this he says 'suited to the deeds'. You may say that takes away Śiva's freedom of action, for now he is to make the world not as he wants, but as those deeds require. But just listen: the wasp provides a suitable body to the larva that intends to be a beetle; and the Supreme gives each separate soul the form it desires, bestowing fruits as well, appropriate to its deeds. What loss of freedom is there in that? (*Bodha* I.2, *Example* 2; quoted III.3d above).

The soul's desires, which Śiva respects when handing out bodies, is evident from the deeds done in its previous birth. Does this mean each soul forges its own fate? Not quite, for those previous deeds were themselves done under constraint of yet earlier deeds, no longer remembered. So the soul is in a way forging its own fate — unconsciously.

How does a soul move from one body to another? Meykaṇḍadeva goes into this in detail, in the second Sūtra of Bodha. This passage also raises other important questions about transmigration. Let us first translate the third part of that Sūtra, which deals with this.

Thesis. Souls die and are born again.

Comment. (An objection from Krīdābrahmavāda): You said earlier that souls achieve deeds both good and bad by the Śakti of the Supreme; which suggests that rebirth is fitted neither to body nor soul (Cit), and that the previous deeds do get consumed in the present birth. Also to resolve the problem whether rebirth does occur, they quote the scripture which says when a pot breaks the air inside mingles with that (outside); and when the body dies the soul unites with Brahma; thus claiming that souls which die are not reborn. His exposition of the third part of the Sūtra re-affirms the thesis and thus deals with these points.

Reason. Only things arise, being subject to arising and passing away.

Comment. This is in reply to the query, by what means of knowledge (pramāṇa) all that was discovered. Or perhaps it is dealing with the comparison with air in a pot, from which they conclude that 'rebirth due to good and bad actions concerns Śiva who seeks the best for souls.' It also answers Sāṃkhya's objection that it is the buddhi tattva evolving out of mūlaprakṛiti that experiences rebirth. In reply to these it is re-affirmed that 'Arising and perishing is only for those it is meant for, not for others.'

Example 1. Eyes and ears (i.e. the Sthūla body) perish. The soul goes to heaven with the bhūtasāra body which Sūkshmaśarīra (the remaining body) brings forth. The soul now forgets its former state, as in a dream one forgets experiences had while awake. Then, driven by manas, it enters as an atom a mother's womb, suited to its deeds.

Comment. After the body made up of eyes and ears, etc. perishes, the Sūkshmaśarīra (which does not die from world-creation till world-destruction) becomes a bhutasāraśarīra, joins up with the soul, and enters heavens or hells, and forgets, as we forget in dreams what we experienced in the waking state. Unaware now that the sthūlaśarīra perished, that the soul with a body derived from Sūkshmaśarīra went to heaven, enjoyed there etc. and suffered a change of knowledge, it now follows its fate as resulting from deeds accumulated when that earlier body died (i.e. is driven by Manas to desires suiting the remaining good and bad deeds, which ensure its ongoing destiny) and as a Sūkshmaśarīra enters a mother's womb suited to its fate and to which Manas had steered it.

How can the Sthūlaśarīra, product of the base bhūta, be called a product of the Sukshmaśarīra? The Sthūla bhūta such as ether derive Sūkshma from bhūta such as sound; so the Sthūla śarīra which derives from Sūkshma śarīra (and has the form of Tanmātra, or Sūkshma bhūta) is said to derive from the five base bhūta.[15] *That is the only reason. Siddhiār makes this quite clear, and also explains how the Sthūlaśarīra arises from the Sūkshmaśarīra. (These passages will be quoted below)*

The phrase 'which the remaining body brings forth' shows that the body changes; and 'goes to heaven' shows that the place changes; and 'forgets' shows that the consciousness changes. (See Example 1, just above)

The phrase 'which the remaining body brings forth' indicates that the Realist doctrine is not damaged by stating that the body is forever arising anew; and 'goes to heaven and then as an atom enters a mother's womb' indicates that the soul's omnipresence is not put at risk by coming and

15. See Table II below, V. 5. (*Ed.*)

going (IV.3)*; and clearly in 'owing to the remaining deeds' a cause is being given for rebirth even though the deeds were consumed in heaven or hell; and 'driven by Manas' shows why there are some left over.*

Example 2. While the analogies of the snake who pulled its skin off, of the dream, and of the yogi who entered another body are widely circulated, the analogy about the air in a pot and the atmosphere is not permissible at this point, as it refers to the end of the Sūkshmaśarīra.

Comment. The analogy of air in a pot and in the atmosphere was introduced by opponents to show that there is no rebirth, but by explaining its true meaning he confirms his point.

The analogies of the snake which shed its skin and put on another one, and of the purusha (soul) who left his waking body and entered a dream-body, and of the yogi who left his own body and entered someone else's, are all widely used to explain how the soul leaves the sthūlaśarīra and enters the Sūkshmaśarīra. But you can't counter this by referring to the merging of the air inside the pot with the atmosphere outside when the pot is broken; for that analogy was meant for the soul's leaving the Sūkshmaśarīra.

These two groups of analogies are both used in the Āgamas in relation to the end of the body; so the analogy of the snake, etc., should for consistency be used for the end of the sthūlaśarīra, and the analogy of the air in a pot and in the atmosphere should be used for the end of the Sūkshmaśarīra. If in breach of this distinction the analogy of the air in the pot is applied to the ending of Sthūlaśarīra, only confusion can result. (*Bodha* II.3)

As the commentary indicates, these statements are either established or supplemented in Siddhiār:

When the sthūlaśarīra perishes, the Sūkshmaśarīra becomes a yātanāśarīra. Thus by the will of the Supreme each soul experiences all the joys or sorrows in heaven or hell, becomes a blameless embryo, and enters again into a mother's womb. (II.36)

As the snake casts off its skin, the bird its egg, the yogi the body, and then adopts another form, so the souls just mentioned leave the Sthūlaśarīra and with their bodies enter another as from wakefulness you pass into a dream. (II.38)

You may say the soul has a Sūkshma form. No, the form compounded from manas and the other antaḥkaraṇa, and tanmātra, which brought about the sthūlaśarīra, is non-intelligence. You may say there is a body subtler than the one that you reject; but actually all bodies which have form are neither intelligent nor eternal. (IV.10)

You may ask where all these bodies come from; I tell you the bodies spring from the sūkshmaśarīra we mentioned. Perhaps you will infer that all bodies would in that case be alike; but in fact there are different sorts of bodies. The pieces of jewellery which a goldsmith makes from gold are not all identical. So, all this occurrence comes about through Śiva. (II.47)

It is not by the death of the sūkshmaśarīra that the sthūlaśarīra is born, neither is the sthūlaśarīra already there in the sūkshmaśarīra. The sūkshmaśarīra has the power to bring forth a sthūlaśarīra, and does bring forth a body, as a taller tree can spring from the root of an old tree that has been felled. (II.48)

The sthūlaśarīra emerges out of the sūkshmaśarīra by the will of the Supreme, and not just by the operation of karma. Trees grow from seeds, and both tree and seed perish. Does the sūkshma body perish in the same way? No, it behaves like the moon, whose seven crescents appear and disappear. (II.49)

The cause of the sthūlaśarīra is the sūkshmaśarīra, whose cause is mūlaprakṛiti, whose cause is Mohinī (Aśuddhamāyā). Above these stand Vindu Śakti and Śiva, who are above all. All of which ceases, once the soul has attained Śiva. (II.50)

So long as the soul finds itself in the sakala avasthā, it is subject to death and rebirth without end. Strictly speaking, it is not the soul that dies and is reborn, as that is without beginning or end; nor is it the sūkshmaśarīra. We saw earlier that when the soul enters sakala avasthā it receives a five-fold body. (III.3c) In death the soul abandons only the outermost body, the so-called sthūlaśarīra which then becomes dust and ashes. The other four bodies, the sūkshmaśarīra and its contents (Guṇa-Kañcuka - and Kāraṇa-śarīra) accompany the soul as it leaves the sthūlaśarīra. After death the soul must go with the sūkshmaśarīra to heaven or to hell, as its karma requires. There it takes on a heavenly or hellish body (Bhūtaśarīra) in place of the sthūlaśarīra it left behind, and enjoys the joys and sorrows that are its portion. When the appointed time in heaven or hell is ended, it leaves the Bhūtasaraśarīra and its sūkshmaśarīra and as an embryo enters a living womb. There a new sthūlaśarīra takes form for it, and it finally appears again in this world, so as to perish again and be born again.

Thus during the sakala avasthā the soul is for ever exchanging its visible body, but not the sūkshmaśarīra, which is made up of

buḍdhi, manas, the ahaṃkāra, the five tanmātras, and concealing within itself three finer bodies made of even more subtle tattvas. This sūkshmaśarīra stays with it loyally from world-creation to world-destruction, or until the soul attains release.

During its wanderings the soul moves around from earth to a heaven and also to a hell. And all this time its consciousness is changing too, as Meykaṇḍadeva particularly emphasises. This sounds illogical at first, for the organs of thought belong to the sūkshmaśarīra, and so accompany the soul throughout its wanderings; but in the next chapter when we consider how the soul lives and works within the five-fold body we shall see how Siddhānta can claim that the soul has no memory at all of what it did in earlier births.

Kroḍai describes very vividly how the soul passes from one sort of existence to another:

He (Śiva) determines every different kind of birth (named in the Āgamas) according to its former deeds. He protects the soul when it lies like dew on the grass within the human seed, which it enters when mother and father unite in the fulness of their love. So the little mite is not destroyed through the great heat of the mother's womb, which is like a little hell, or through the hunger of the worms while it is there, or through any other reason; he equips it with hand, foot and perfect members, transposes it to the yoga state, and leads it out by the same narrow way along which it passed into its mother's womb. Praise be to the non-deceiving might of the Supreme! (4)

May God be praised, that when the storm of Māyā confuses the soul so it knows no difference between good and evil, he makes the child feel hunger and cry out; and because he has instilled love into all souls, the mother who lies there feeble from her birth-pangs, when she hears the child's cry she also cries and, full of pity, reaches out her breast, and is delighted if she sees the child drinking the sweet milk that flows from her breast; thus everyone, bound by the great fetter of longing for issue, cherishes and nurtures their offspring. (5)

Praised be God that he serves the soul like its servant, fostering knowledge all through its tender childhood, and helping it grow day by day through youth; and by giving the child opportunity for knowledge provides the necessary means, the tattvas, and remains inseparably joined with them. (6)

4. How the Soul exists during Sakala Avasthā?

We saw in IV.3 that the soul attains a kind of omnipresence by pervading what it is in. Now during kevala avasthā it lives in the undeveloped Māyā, which has no limits in space or time; so the soul must at that stage be free of spatial limits, and so omnipresent. But in sakala avasthā it dwells in Māyeya, which is subject to the limitations of place and time. Here the soul is spatially confined, as its dwelling-place is so, yet it is in some sense above spatial boundaries, as it has the faculty to pervade them.

Spatially the soul is restricted, insofar as it is confined within the body as in a prison, from which it cannot escape during that period (see below). But its life in the body has a special character, which raises it above spatial boundaries:

If as you say the soul were spatially confined within the body, then it would have a form, and be transitory. There would then be no knowledge spreading overall. If you object that it is like the light of a lamp, I say that lamp light sets an object alight only by touching it. So wherever there is contact, there knowledge would arise. In which case knowledge would arise equally in all the organs in contact with it. (*Siddhiār* IV.16)

The analogy of the flame suggests that the soul is present in every part of the body, and lights it up from there, as a lamp which is placed in one part of a room lights up the whole room from there. Aruḷnanti, however, does not draw this conclusion, for he takes burning, not the light, as the only possible point of the comparison. The flame can only burn something if it touches it. In the same way, the soul can influence only those objects with which it comes into contact. If it were fettered in one place, it could not set all its organs in motion, as it does.

In the last sentence Aruḷnanti goes on to show why the light cannot be the point of comparison, for in that case all the organs would have to activate themselves at one and the same time, as a flame lights up all around equally. But experience shows that the organs do not all act at the same time. If the soul can know or influence only that with which it comes into contact, then it must permeate the whole body, for it does act on all the bodily organs. Aruḷnanti does not draw this conclusion, but rather rejects it as unsuitable.

You say that the soul permeates the whole body. If that were the case, then sleep would not be able to overpower the soul; and knowledge would occur in all the senses equally; and there would be more of it in a big body

than in a small one; and when the body shrivelled up the soul would too and finally perish. (*Siddhiār* IV.17)

The following verses offer a positive description of how the soul exists during sakala avasthā:

When the soul enters Māyā it acquires some limited ability to act, to know, and to will. Through Kalā Vidyā and Rāga it receives these three abilities under spatial restrictions. Through the three Guṇa and the antaḥkaraṇa, by which some knowledge does occur here on earth, the soul becomes shackled to the body, and stands in advaita-relation to the three-fold body (*Kāraṇa, kañcuka, and Guṇa śarīra*). (21)

It then receives a Sūkshma-body, enters the sthūla-śarīra, and exists both in the waking state and in other states; it goes unceasingly from one state to another, performs good and bad deeds and enjoys the fruits of the same. (22)

The five kosa (*shrouds*) *that envelop the soul are Ānandamaya, Vijñānamaya, Manomaya, Prāṇamaya, Annamaya. These are bodies for the soul, given in increasing order or subtlety, and leading up to Annamaya. Māyā is the material cause of them all. The formless soul finds itself fettered within the individual kosa and acts accordingly, internally and externally.* (23)

The soul finds itself (*in a particular kosa or body*) *and activates the five bodies it is linked with, as a coachman starts a waggon going, or a showman sets a wooden or leather puppet moving, or as a yogi enters a body, and as the actor desiring to please others dresses up in someone else's clothes and plays a part.* (*Siddhiār* IV.21-24)

The soul, therefore, does not have just one body, but a five-fold one. (see above III. 3c) This was often compared to the different courtyards of a king's castle, or the different storeys of a great house. The soul is not restricted to one of these, it can wander from one to another, and settle down in any one of them. Since the organs with which Māyā equips the soul, and by which it is active, cannot accompany all bodies, the soul finds it has different organs, depending on which body it is in; and as its activity depends on organs, this also varies from one body to another: i.e. it knows decides and acts in various ways. As the soul's activities thus vary along with the place where the body is, and the organs it is equipped with, it is said to be in various states or conditions during its stay in the body; there are five such states or avasthā, corresponding to the five-fold body.

If the king, who has made a procession with his retinue, turns back to his palace, one part of his retinue leaves him at every gate, remaining behind to act as guards; and he enters the last room alone. And the soul likewise goes through five avasthā in the body, with his life-breath (Prāṇavāyu) as guard (in the innermost body at the last stage). (32)

In Jāgara avasthā 35 are found round the chest; in Svapna avasthā 25 in the larynx; in Sushupti avasthā 3 around the heart; in Turīya avasthā 2 near the navel; in the turyātitā avasthā the soul finds itself alone near the mūlādhāra. (*Siddhiār* IV.32 & 33)

The 35 organs of the Jāgara avasthā are the 20 internal organs (purusha, four antaḥkaraṇa, five jñānendriya, five karmendriya and five tanmātra as objects of jñānendriya); and 15 external organs (10 vital breaths, and the functions of speaking, moving, giving, evacuation and reproduction, corresponding to the work-organs). Note the inclusion of purusha, which indicates that the soul undergoing these avasthā is taken to be equipped with śuddhāśuddha tattva.

The 25 organs of the Svapna avasthā are purusha, four Antaḥkaraṇa, ten life forces, five tanmātra, and five functions of working organs.

The three organs of Sushupti avasthā are purusha, the chief life breath, and citta.

The two organs of the Turīya avasthā are purusha and the main life breath.

In the turīyātīta avasthā the soul stands by itself alone.

Before going on to describe these five avasthā more closely, it will be helpful to see what the other sources say about them:

Thesis. The soul is subject to the five stages of Jāgara, Svapna, Sushupti, Turīya and Turīyātīta.

Comment. (an objection) But an eye which comes from darkness into light can see things straightaway, without going through various avasthā. And a soul afflicted with Mala but equipped with organs knows things in just this way. Is that not sufficient? How then does the Sūtra claim that the soul knows the five sense-objects, and knows things in a dream, that in deep sleep there is neither pleasure nor activity, that it needs guidance in order to learn, and so is subject to the different avasthā? The above thesis is to resolve this point and explain the last part of the Sūtra.

As a king who takes a walk with his retinue leaves behind one guard at each door, and then goes back into the innermost chamber by himself, so, in the same way, the soul passes through five avasthā.

Reason. Although under the power of Mala, the soul exists as a nature that is both formed and without form.

Comment. Here he meets the objection that saying the soul is subject to five avasthā conflicts with its admitted omnipresence. In reply the thesis is re-affirmed: As the soul when veiled with Mala like a garment exists as a formless tattva, so various avasthās arise as per the activity of the tattvas.

Example 1. *Here the tattva taken as active in the individual avasthās are enumerated.* (*Bodha* IV, Part 3)

In a grand house built of flesh and inhabited by worms, the Supreme, in his pity, fits out five floors as a dwelling-place for the soul, and fetters it by enduring Āṇavamala, for otherwise this beginning state (*kevala avasthā*) *would never end. He veils its powers of understanding and determines in accordance with karma, how long it must lie there completely without knowledge in the mūlādhāra stage. Then in the next* (*navel-*) *stage he provides the soul with the main life-breath and equips it with the three Guṇa which evolve from prakṛiti* (*i.e. the citta*) *to assist the faculties of knowing, willing, and acting, which the soul had already been enabled to use by Kalā, Vidyā and Rāga.*

He now moves the soul on to the heart stage and ensures that, as a result of the darkness of Āṇavamala, the soul cannot rightly tell what object it is perceiving by citta. When the Supreme sets it up in the throat stage complete with organs (*except for the five jñānendriya and the five karmendriya*)*, and determines its destiny, its daily needs are provided for and it is accompanied by joys and sorrows for old deeds, as in a waking state.*

The soul then passes into the sthūlaśarīra, in the highest part of the forehead, and surrounds itself with all its organs. And the Supreme sets up the four vāc in the sthūlaśarīra, so that the enduring ancient darkness may not shroud the soul; and they are like a light that drives away the darkness in a house. This light of intelligence enables the soul to perform its duties. Praise to the work of the Supreme! (*Kroḍai* 7)

These five avasthā are effects of kevala avasthā. There are five more, which result from the sakala avasthā. These are different:

The avasthā (*Jāgara etc.*) *have a dual nature, either drawing the soul down and occasioning rebirth, or raising it and eliminating that evil. In yoga one attains samādhi and other avasthā. These conditions fall and rise.* (34)

It all happens in the chest, where the first avasthā (*Jāgara*) *occurs. Even the wise whose knowledge is indelible experience the five avasthā in*

that same place (chest), in order with Aruḷ's help to be freed from rebirth and achieve salvation. (35)

All five of these are active in Jāgara-state, four in the dream state, three in the sleeping state, two in the Turīya and one in the Turīyātīta state. Consider the operation of the organs that are mainly active in each avasthā-region (this 5 4 3 2 1 *must refer to the five śuddha Tattva).* (*Siddhiār* IV.34-36)

The soul which has reached the Jāgara avasthā in the chest experiences the five avasthā there. Through them and the organs it gets to know both them and the objects, and distinguishes itself from them again. There are five states in śuddha avasthā also. (*Bodha* IV.3, *Example* 2)

The passages just quoted make quite clear how the soul exists in the five-fold body, and what it experiences at each stage. They do not make clear what is the point of this discussion about different avasthā, but this becomes clear from deep study of our documents and of other philosophical writings: first, the soul is independent of its organs; second, it is not always present in quite the same way in its body (where it works with the organs), which indicates how various its activites are and the remarkable weaknesses they are subject to. Were the soul always present in the same way in the body, the activity of its organs would always be the same.

We turn now to examine individual avasthā. As a result of creation the soul leaves kevala avasthā and moves to a body. It will naturally take a little time to get to know its new situation, and to make full use of its new faculties. So it was thought that the soul is drawn first into the innermost parts, the mūlādhāra; this is right in the middle of the body and forms the basis for the important higher parts. Here during Sakala avasthā the soul exists only as a purusha, an embodied soul, attentive only to itself, enclosed completely and entirely against the outside world, and enduring what is called the Turīyātīta avasthā. This mode of existence could be compared to the soul's experience in the seed of a man, or to a severe fainting-fit, when even the breath is suspended. In any case, it is very certain that there is next to no difference in knowledge or action between the Turīyātīta state and the kevala avasthā.[16] The power of Āṇavamala is virtually unbroken.

When the soul has grown somewhat used to the connection

16. Turīyātīta avasthā is also used in another sense, as we shall see later.

with the body, it leaves the mūlādhāra, climbs up to the area of the navel and experiences the so-called Turīya avasthā. In that state the soul makes use of the life-force of the nerve centre i.e. it breathes. Perhaps one can liken this condition to the manner of existence in the womb, or to a fainting fit, in which one thinks and feels nothing, but merely breathes. In matters of thought and action, this condition also differs very little from the kevala avasthā.

From the region of the navel the soul now moves up higher to the region of the heart. There it enters the sushupti avasthā or state of deep sleep, and acquires the citta, the least developed organ of thought, by which the soul feels, very vaguely, what is going on. As the name suggests, this state can be likened to the dreamless state of deep sleep, during which a man does breathe, and experiences nothing (though the soul may do so).

Then from the area of the heart the soul-consciousness moves up into the larynx and there experiences the svapna avasthā or dream-state. Here it is surrounded by the ten organs of respiration, by four Antaḥkaraṇa, by five tanmātra (objects of the jñānendriya), and by the activities of speech, movement, handling, excretion and procreation, corresponding to the five karmendriya. In this condition, which is likened to a light sleep in which one dreams, the soul breathes, thinks, and experiences sound, touch, taste and hearing, without using the senses, and undertakes affairs without using the work organs; that is, it acts although the visible body lies there inactive.

After this dream-state the soul enters the Jāgara avasthā or waking state; here the soul is located near the forehead, and uses the same organs as in the dream-state, and also the five karmendriya and five tanmātras. Like the four avasthās already mentioned, this state derives from kevala avasthā, and ranks below those other five yet to come, which derive from sakala avasthā. It is not the clear waking state, in which perception is definite and in full awareness, but resembles the state just before or after sleep, when senses and organs of activity are certainly there, but as sleep is either creeping up or is not yet banished, the senses perceive and act very vaguely. This is clearly not being fully awake, as the soul is not yet said to possess the five bhūta (organs relating external things to the senses).

During all these five stages the soul is like a king within the five courtyards of the palace, more or less shut away from the

outside world by high walls. The soul is still under the sway of Āṇavamala or darkness, though this darkness is to some extent broken by the light of Māyā: how far, depends on how many organs it has operating. The last three states (Jāgara svapna and Sushupti) can be experienced daily, if one is subject to the need for sleep.

The Turīya state of the soul is experienced like a fainting fit when the breath is still active; but the Turīyātīta is like a really severe fainting fit, where the breathing also is interrupted; or like the state just before death when the breathing has already stopped, but the life has not fled: or to the state of apparent death.

When the soul is centred in the forehead, with organs all round, it still endures five avasthā, called: Jāgara-Turīyātīta, Jāgara-Turīya, Jāgara-Sushupti, Jāgara-Svapna and Jāgara-Jāgara. These five conditions, called Madhyāvasthā (middle-), are taken to result from the sakala avasthā; indicating that the soul is now less under the influence of Āṇavamala than in the five conditions already mentioned, but is more influenced by Māyāmala, the little light. It is because of this last influence that the understanding of the soul is significantly clearer during these five middle avasthā, but it is still not quite free from error. This is because the śuddhatattva, through which Śiva's Śakti works, are not quite free for this because Āṇavamala is still there. In the jāgara-turīyātīta avasthā only one śuddha-tattva is thought to be present and active, so the activity and understanding of the soul in this avasthā are still only slight, though greater than in the previous jagra-avasthā because the soul is now equipped with bhūta which bring it into direct relationship with the outside world. In the Jāgara-Turīya avasthā two tattva are active and so on, until at last in the Jāgara-Jāgara avasthā all five śuddhā-tattva are present.

In Siddhānta Kaḍḍaḷai, a Siddhāntin catechism, Jāgara-Turīyātīta avasthā is compared to the total confusion of someone who realizes he has forgotten an important object. Jāgara-Turīya avasthā resembles that person partly recovered and beginning to ponder where the forgotten object may be. In Jāgara-Sushupti avasthā he reviews all the places where that he has been, and where the missing object might be. In Jāgara-svapna avasthā he remembers where he put it down. In Jāgara-Jāgara avasthā he goes there and retrieves it. Thus in Jāgara-Jāgara avasthā one is fully awake, in full possession of one's faculties, and with clear knowledge of the world around.

These ten avasthā of the sakala-avasthā studied so far show how the embodied soul gradually achieves full use of its organs with a view to controlling external objects. From a death-like state in kevala avasthā it gradually climbs to one both lively and wakeful. Control of outer objects however is not the soul's highest task; it is necessary, but transitional. Knowing itself and God are yet higher achievements, to which these ten avasthā do not lead.

To reach such knowledge, the soul must break free from the organs which Māyā provided, rejecting those it had acquired in those ten avasthā. This can be seen, to some extent, in yoga; fully, in śuddha avasthā, as will be explained in the next chapter.

Here a few words may be said about the yoga-state, as that takes place under the sakala avasthā.

To enable it to become active in this world, the soul assembles about itself the organs of the body and makes use of them. Thus the Jāgara-Jāgara avasthā (to which development from Tūryātīta onwards leads) is 'world-related', a transitional stage only, which the soul puts up with, realising that true knowledge (of itself and God) is not to be had through the organs of Māyā.

Once the soul realises this it will first seek to suppress the organs concerned with the world of Asat. It will do this first of all by yoga practice, that is, by concentrated meditation. The suppression of the organs proceeds step by step and in reverse sequence to the process of learning.

First of all the soul must flee the world, directing its attention away from the outside world towards the inner world, thus arriving at the Yoga-Jāgara state. In this condition the soul is still surrounded by organs but holds itself in check so as not to get involved with the outside world. Specific practices are stipulated in text-books on yoga. Making use of these, the soul has to work its way up from the yoga-jāgara by suppressing the five jñānendriya and the five karmendriya, until it reaches the state of yoga svapna. By further suppression of the other organs it arrives at the yoga Turīyātīta avasthā, the highest avasthā within the sakala avasthā. From the yoga Turīyātīta stage the soul then moves to the śuddha avasthā, where the soul is completely emancipated from the organs. (More is said about this later.)

The systematic significance of the teaching about the soul in its different stages of existence can be readily appreciated. It explains the obvious fact that the organs, which are dependent

upon the soul for their activity, are not equally active at all times. According to Śaiva Siddhānta this can only be explained by saying that the soul's influence on the organs is variable. In order to explain this intermittent influence it says the soul does not fill the whole body, and is not located in a special place within the body, but has individual control of spatial arrangements and of organs of the body.

This means that it can be everywhere in the body, but can also withdraw from parts of the body, leaving some organs there unused.

The doctrine about different avasthā also helps Siddhānta to defend its teaching about rebirth against the objection that the soul does not have any remembrance of an earlier birth. In reply it offers a parallel case: Memory does not accompany the soul from one avasthā to another, so *a fortiori* it will not be passed from birth to birth, from one sthūla body to another. The avasthā-doctrine also shows that the soul can get totally free of the body and its organs, without losing its character. Its existence is not dependent upon that of the body, and its link to the body can be broken. The doctrine thus serves as a preliminary and basis for the teaching about salvation.

The soul, however, dwells not only in the body, but in the universe as a whole; and this must be allowed for, in describing its existence in sakala avasthā. Now the soul's nature in relation to space and time, as set out in IV.3 above, raises this question: what spatial restrictions if any apply to the soul, in the universe at large?

It is at that stage fettered to some body, so must be subject to spatial restrictions in the world. What presence it has in the world depends on its body at that time. But that body may be so constituted as to allow it to overcome to some extent those barriers of place and time, to which all parts of the universe are subject.

Thus if it is in the sthūlaśarīra (the most material body), it can dominate the universe so far as its feet can carry it, and can also by means of its sense-organs and its mental power, take in the surroundings so far in all directions, and be a part of past and future as well as present. It also has a spiritual body (in addition to the gross one), so can withdraw for a time from the gross body that is shackled in space, and make extensive trips in its very mobile subtle body.

At death, when it finally leaves the material body, the soul can in its sūkshma body reach the highest heaven or the deepest hell. The soul is by nature omnipresent, but can exercise this only through the body it is in at the time. In the sthūlaśarīra this is not much in evidence, but more so in the sūkshmaśarīra; and it can be seen fully at work only when the soul is free of any and every body, i.e. in the state of release, for then it is not assimilated to matter (which is subject to limitations of place and time), but to God who is beyond these barriers.

5. How the Soul can act?

The soul has three faculties, of knowledge, will and action, but cannot activate these directly, for it is not pure knowledge (jñāna), pure will (icchā), or pure action (kriyā). So what activates these eternal faculties? When we were studying the nature of God, we saw that Siddhānta, to preserve his absolute character, attributes all happenings to him, treating them as a mere (though admittedly actual) counterpart of God's thought. For the same reason they also traced back the creation of the world to Śiva as its efficient cause. As independent activity is thus denied to the soul, its activity will clearly be thought to depend upon Śiva. The same applies to material things, which can be moved but do not move themselves, and so cannot even be considered as a first mover.

Our sources make it quite clear that the basic and original mover behind the activity of the soul's talents must be Śiva. As Bodha V.2 claims 'The soul knows by aid of the Supreme.' The context shows that this statement is not only about higher knowledge but about any sort, even everyday; and that the same must apply to other faculties.

The following verses explain why the soul, although equipped with the sense-organs, still needs Śiva, and Śiva alone, as a means of knowledge.

The soul knows, if instructed through its sense-organs, through objects (60 *tattva*), *through lamps* (*Kalā etc.*), *through time, through karma, through the body, through logic, through books, through people; but on its own it is formless, knowing nothing. There must, therefore, be someone who by his grace instructs the soul through all these means.* (4)

God knows the entire world without the help of organs, without objects, without light, without time, without karma, without form, without proof, without books, without someone higher to guide him. He is without

form; he creates all things; he differs from all things, but is present in them all as life-principle, and instructs. (5)

You fool! You forget the Vedas. They teach that the events in this world (of souls) take place in the presence of the Supreme. Śiva does not associate with Māyā, and Māyā being Asat cannot stand before Śiva. In all souls equipped with bodies, consciousness arises in the presence of the omnipresent Highest. (6)

The world constitutes his form; the various sorts of living souls make up his members; icchā, jñāna, kriyā provide his inner organs. As he instils knowledge into innumerable souls he performs the five great works of goodness as a dance. (7)

The Highest grants knowledge which after choice links up with individual senses; gets hold of objects and enjoys them, and objects of enjoyment likewise; and sees that souls wander about through the different kinds. He takes note of the soul's activity, gives all souls complete knowledge, and grants release. (*Siddhiār* V.4-8)

The soul knows nothing, on its own, not even the tattvas and cannot take them on. The tattvas also know nothing by themselves, and do not know how to form an alliance with the soul. The soul which by itself knows nothing has the form of the taava. The soul must experience everything by God's help, for God knows through his own self. (*Prak:* V.2)

For the soul, equipped as it is with a faculty for knowledge, to activate that faculty, intervention by Śiva is required. This is brought about through his Śakti, by whom he is inseparably present in all souls. Given the soul's nature, as stated, and that of matter, the third substance, it should be easy to work out the condition necessary for any exercise of the soul's faculties. There is no activity of the soul, in any part of the body, in which Śiva through his Śakti does not participate. Unless he puts his Śakti at the disposal of the soul, activity is totally excluded.

As the soul knows, etc., by Śiva's aid, he could be called an activating organ for the soul: not in the sense of an organ distinct from and controlled by a subject, for then Śiva would be subordinate to the soul. His service to the soul is not due to any action or request of the soul, which is only an object for such influence, and does not act as subject here. The soul does not get hold of the Śakti of Śiva and hold on, as a carpenter takes hold of an axe, and holds on to it; for the soul is passive in this case. Śiva's service to the soul as organ of knowledge is like the sun's service to

crystal, where the sunshine enables the crystal to shine too, without the crystal becoming responsible for the sun's shining.

Thus when Siddhānta calls Śiva an 'organ of knowledge', insofar as he assists the soul to activate its powers of understanding, it is not putting Śiva alongside the other organs (tattvas). Prak mentions specifically that Śiva is not an organ of knowledge in the same way as the others are. (On this see further below)

'As the knowing senses know through the reason, so does the soul know through the jñāna of the One (the Jñānaśakti of Śiva)'. By that remark you make the soul overlord of Śiva'. (*Prak* V.3)

How then should we conceive this activity of Śiva as an organ of knowledge in the soul? Prak: V. 3 gives a negative answer to this question:

If you say that the All-Intelligence takes charge of objects and knows them for the soul, tell me this: If A wants to eat, can B eat for him?

Though Śiva is indeed active in each instance of knowledge, that does not mean the soul is passive, leaving all the work to him. Śiva's activity in the matter does not exclude that of the soul, or render it superfluous, but stimulates it.

Bodha, Sūtra V, explains how this works. Śiva's sharing in the work of knowing is there compared with the soul sharing in some organ's perception. To avoid repetition, we shall postpone discussion of this sharing by Śiva until we have seen how the soul does it; merely remarking here that all the soul's activities are traced back to Śiva. We shall also postpone the closely related question, in what sense the soul's activities are 'traced back' to Śiva. For it is not only in knowing that he participates; he is also involved the activities of the other organs of knowledge.

In addition to this help from a superior Being, in knowing, the soul also employs an inferior, Matter, Māyā, and in particular the tattvas deriving from Māyā. Although Māyā is one of the three fetters, or evils, it is also a great help to the soul. Though itself a sort of Mala, it helps the soul to get rid of the basic Mala, Āṇavamala, by helping the soul towards knowledge, as its organ of knowledge. By nature it is non-intelligence, acit, yet it helps to bring knowledge about. In this it is often likened to a lamp or a small light. (cp. e.g. Payan III. 9, see above III. I), and its activity runs counter to that of Āṇavamala (see Bodha IV.2 and Siddhiār II.81 & 84).

The organs of knowledge provided by Māyā for the soul were discussed in III. 3b above; they are the tattvas which evolve out of Māyā. (See table of tattvas, at the end) These tattvas being products of non-intelligent Māyā are themselves non-intelligent (acit), so cannot mediate knowledge to the soul, but only help the soul in obtaining it. The texts cited in IV. 1 above show clearly that these tattvas are not knowing subjects at all but merely material organs of knowledge, whereas Śiva's is an intelligent organ. Only a soul can really *know.*

That intelligent organ of knowledge (Śiva) is a subject distinct from the soul; the material organs by contrast are not subjects at all, nor is the soul their object. They are objects for the soul, though not for that reason entirely passive. They do act, just as Śiva's organ of knowledge does, but the difference is that his organ acts on the soul, but they act on objects which are to be known. The material organs of knowledge, then, are capacities within the organism which the soul inhabits from birth, and which in a sense bring external objects to it, a sort of unskilled labour.

That the soul is the subject of knowledge, and that the sense-organs come in only as helpers, is specifically established by Meykaṇḍa in Bodha Sūtra V Part 1; and was already implied by statements in Sūtras III & IV.

For the understanding of the psychology of Siddhānta it is very important to be aware that senses and organs all belong not to the soul, but to the body, which is matter, and that therefore, strictly speaking, a great part of what we Europeans regard as belonging to the soul is material. So we here translate Bodha V.1 which brings out the implications of that concept, by denying to the senses any independent activity and particularly the capacity for conscious understanding.

Thesis. It is by the soul's aid that the five senses know.

Comment. At this point the Sāṃkhya school object that 'the soul has no pull, any more than water has on a lotus leaf, so one should say it is just in the presence of purusha that the buddhi tattva perceives things through the five senses. What reason is there to say that the soul combines with the senses and so is subject to the avasthā?' Exposition of the first part of the sūtra is in reply to this, leading to the thesis stated.

Reason: The senses know nothing, but for the soul combining with them to know.

Comment. This is stated negatively so as to emphasise the necessity of the soul's presence.

Example. The soul is there in the head, ruling the five senses like a king; so they do not know the soul. If the soul does not know through them, it knows nothing. Unless the soul is actively knowing, the eye does not see, the ear does not hear.

Comment. Some say: 'How do you know it is the soul that by combining with the senses sets them to work, and without it they can do nothing?' So the reason is re-iterated: A king who dwells in his castle sees that his subordinates do their allotted work, which shows he is boss. The soul also guides the five senses to their proper objects; which shows it is boss, enthroned in the head. The king's subordinates do just the work allotted; it is not their job to do more. Which explains why the five senses do not know the soul. You may say that while the five senses know nothing without the soul, the soul might very well know something without them. But no: the king, his ministers and the other officials depend on each other in getting something done, and so do the soul and the senses, in knowing an object; as can be seen from the fact that when the senses take a holiday, the soul reverts to the dream-state. (*Bodha* V.1)

What is said about the physical sense-organs is also true about the other senses, from buddhi downwards, and this emerges clearly from Sūtras III and IV.

As the five senses and the other organs of comprehension from buddhi downwards are not of the nature of the soul, they participate in the nature of matter. It is, as we saw, a characteristic of matter that it is without intelligence. This makes it very obvious that when these organs of knowledge are at work, this cannot include any knowledge of those same organs. It is not in their nature, or their job, to take control of external objects by knowing but only on the guidance and instruction of an intelligent soul to carry out certain dispositions which enable the soul to know those external objects.

By entering into the body, the soul becomes subject to certain spatial limitations. (see IV.3) In knowing external objects it has need of an intermediary, just as a king, who cannot be present everywhere, needs an intermediary in order to rule his country. Buddhi and the other tattvas, starting with 'earth', fulfil this function; and we shall see later just what their contribution is. The tattva are 'sent out' by the soul in all directions, and their reports received back again, in an organized way, strictly observed to

guarantee correct knowledge. Buddhi is the final court of appeal, and because of that, it is likened to a prime minister. Ahaṃkāra manas and citta are his subordinates and colleagues. Then follow in due order the five jñānendriya, five tanmātra, and five karmendriya. These last are not discussed here, as work organs are for doing something, not for knowing anything.

We shall now describe how these tattvas help the soul to achieve knowledge. Texts will not be cited, as those that matter have already been quoted from our sources. (IV.1)

In the lowest class of organs are the bhūta. These are earth, water, fire, air, ether; but the bhūta are not the perceptible elements from which the visible world is constructed, but certain inner powers corresponding to the perceptible elements and their substantial visible parts; which powers are thus enabled to detect the effects flowing from those external objects.

The bhūta thus act like tentacles, or — if one may use a modern analogy, like a camera lens. Above the five bhūta stand the five tanmātra, touch, taste, form, feeling, sound. These also are not properties of perceptible elements, but certain inner powers corresponding to these and residing in their visible parts. That correspondence means that the effects of those objects can be distinguished from their proper attributes, so that we can form a mental picture of them. They work — to develop our simile — like a photographic plate, which takes the effects of external things, as captured by the lens, and works these up into an image corresponding to those objects.

The tanmātra having completed their work the jṇānendriya appear; senses of smell, taste, sight, touch, hearing. Beneath all this are powers matching the five elements, and ranging throughout the body, making use of the nerves. These take what the five bhūta captured and the tanmātra worked up into an unshaped image, and pass these on to the Antaḥkaraṇa which are even nearer to the soul. They are often compared to huntsmen always on the lookout for impressions from the outside world to capture and bring back to their lords as booty.

Each sense can register only the corresponding effects, as presented in shapeless images by the tanmātra. Thus the sense of smell is quite incapable of registering an impression made by the air. The same thing is true of the five tanmātra, and the five bhūta. If the object under observation contains all five basic

elements, then each bhūta registers the effects it can capture, passing these on to the tanmātra and thus to the jñānendriya; these five separate processes go on independently. If the object consists of three elements then only three bhūta, three tanmātra and three jṇānendriya come into play, namely those corresponding to the elements in the object.

The five jñānendriya then convey to the citta the impressions received from tanmātra. The citta, lowest of the Antaḥkaraṇas, has to unite in one whole the various separate sense impressions received. It passes no judgment on this material, but simply asserts that some object or other has appeared within the visual range of the soul.

Table II: HOW THE SENSES WORK?

An object made up from the five gross elements				
Earth	Water	Fire	Air	Ether
has effects captured by the five bhūta				
earth	water	fire	air	ether
and made into images by the five tanmātra			**(senses of...**	
smell	taste	shape	touch[17]	sound
then conveyed by the jñānendriya				
smell	taste	sight	touch	hearing
to the Antaḥkaraṇa				

Citta
Manas
Ahaṃkāra
Buddhi
SOUL

The soul is also influenced by

1. superficial knowledge from the Citta,
2. dubious knowledge, from the Manas,
3. false knowledge, from Ahaṃkāra, and
4. correct knowledge from the Buddhi.[18]

It has to report to Manas, its immediate superior, that an object has appeared, passing on the information received and

17. reading *Tastbarkeit,* as in the Table of Tattvas. (*Ed.*)
18. In the German this table comes the other way up, with gross elements down below and the soul—like king—at the top. Thus the tanmātra rank 'above' the bhūta, etc. (*Ed.*)

assembled. The Manas forms a view about the object concerned, on the basis of the information received, formulating various suggestions and hypotheses. The results of its researches are reported to the Ahaṃkāra, which, without further enquiry in overweening pride delivers rash and false verdicts about the nature of the object under consideration. However the last word rests not with the Ahaṃkāra but with its superior the Buddhi, which like a chief minister examines carefully all the material from the other organs and pronounces judgement, final and correct. On the basis of this judgment the soul knows the object.

The relation of the organs to the soul and to one another can be put like this: Every organ is a knowing subject in respect of those organs which stand below it, and an object known for those which are above it in rank. Consciousness belongs to no organ, but only to the soul.

Now a knowledge of external things (if sensible acquaintance is properly termed knowledge) can be guaranteed correct only if gained by these official channels and procedures; which in real life does not always occur. Sometimes the soul will rely on information direct from Citta, Manas or Ahaṃkāra. Skipping one, two or three Antaḥkaraṇas leads to knowledge which is superficial, doubtful or plain false.

The process by which knowledge of external things is achieved can be set out as in Table II.

The soul, then, is the only true subject of knowledge. Buddhi and the other eighteen organs are indeed called subjects of knowledge, but only in a very restricted sense. They do perceive objects, but not consciously, being entirely devoid of consciousness. Only the soul is a conscious subject of knowledge; even so, this is not true of the soul all by itself.

As we saw, the soul does have an innate aptitude to know, decide and act; but while subject to Āṇavamala it cannot undertake any of these without outside assistance. The subject which knows external objects is therefore not the soul acting on its own, but as 'purusha'; i.e. the soul equipped with the five tattva next above. (see Tattva table) These five tattva (Niyati Kāla Kalā Rāga Vidyā) are collectively called Pañcakañcuka, the five-fold garment. Once equipped with these five elements the soul is able to know external things, to engage in any other activity and to enjoy karma.

Kalā which comes from Aśuddhamaya removes some Āṇavamala and gives suitable guidance to the soul. So that Buddhi may pass on to the soul what has been gathered by the five senses, Vidyā stands between and enables the soul to attain knowledge, by linking it with the Śakti of the pure One.

'Rāga', which is difficult to explain, arouses desires to suit what the soul must achieve because of its karma. As the statutes of the king reward or punish the activities of his subjects, so Niyati weighs up the karma which the souls desire, and imposes it. The Kalā, more nearly described as the past, the present and the future, works in conjunction with the Śakti of Śiva, determines the end of karma, brings it to fruition, and preserves it for the future. A soul which through those five tattva consumes the fruits of its deeds wise men call the purusha. (*Prak* II.21-23)

From Māyā arise Kāla Niyati, Kalā etc. Kāla is threefold, including creation maintenance and destruction, subjecting the body and the entire world to time, and rules the entire world by command of the Supreme.

Niyati arising therefrom ensures that each soul consumes its karma. Thence arises tireless Kalā, which removes some Ānavamala and unfolds in souls the active Kriyaśakti. From Kalā arises Vidyā and ensures that Jñānaśakti begins to work.

From Vidyā arises Rāga, producing desires for objects of enjoyment, as per the karma. When the soul is equipped with these organs of action knowledge and will it is able to act, to know and to decide, and is generally called purusha. (*Siddhiār* II.54-56)

These quotations show that these five tattvas (Niyati etc.) are organs in a different sense from Buddhi and the other 18, which the soul as subject makes use of. But Niyati and the other four are not objects for the soul, but subjects along with it, arousing and setting off the three eternal faculties of understanding, willing and acting, which lay dormant because of Āṇavamala.

To put it another way, these five are organs which cause the soul to capture and experience those external objects which Buddhi and the other organs present, whether as objects of knowledge, will or action, and in spite of the Āṇavamala which hinders such activity.

At this point a question arises. These tattvas are material and so by nature unintelligent, but the soul is by nature intelligent. How then can those tattvas stand as subjects alongside the soul, and set in motion the faculties of knowledge, etc., which lay there inactive because of Āṇavamala?

Śaiva Siddhānta answers that these tattva are not independent subjects, but are really just tools in the hand of One higher; as indicated in the closing words of the recent quotations: 'by linking with the Śakti of the Pure One', 'combining with Śiva's Śakti' and 'by command of the Supreme'. That is, they are tools in Śiva's hand, used to direct the soul's faculties to the objects presented to it by other organs of the soul. But that by itself will not bring to bear the powers required for knowledge to occur. The soul's native faculties of knowledge etc., are shackled by Ānavamala and so inactive, and the first thing is to put the soul in a position to deploy those faculties. Śiva brings this about by means of the five so-called śuddha tattva, Nāda, Bindu, Sādākshya, Īśvara (neuter), Śuddhavidyā which we saw are a sort of mixture of matter and spirit. (III.3d) By means of these tattvas the Śakti of Śiva is present and active in souls, relaxing somewhat the shackle of Āṇavamala, and setting those three faculties of the soul to work:

The first five tattva form the field for animation (*where the soul's faculties are set in motion*). *The seven tattva* (*aśuddhamāyā, Niyati down to Rāga, and purusha*) *form the field for enjoying those faculties* (*directing them to the relevant objects*). *The other fourteen tattva form the field for objects of enjoyment, where the soul is active.* (*Siddhiār* II.70)

This means that in order that the soul may arrive at an understanding of any particular thing, Śiva, who is present in the soul from eternity, must let his principle of action, the Śakti, come forth and enter into śuddhamāyā. The five śuddhatattva which come from this union are then used by Śiva to animate the otherwise inactive faculties of the soul. By the five tattvas from Niyati to Rāga he then gets the soul to deploy those faculties on the external objects which are presented to it by Buddhi and the other organs developing out of Mūlaprakṛiti.

For knowledge to occur, all the tattva from bhūta up to the śuddhatattva are needed, as this comment shows:

The soul knows an object if one of the five jñānendriya, one of the five bhūta, one of the four Antaḥkaraṇa, Kalā etc. (*which never leave the soul*) *and the five śuddhatattva all act together. Without this package* (*of tattva*) *the soul cannot be active.* (*Prak* V.I)

This quotation also resolves our earlier question, what part Śiva plays in the achievement of knowledge. The soul knows through the help of Śiva, just as the senses perceive objects through the help of the soul: but this comparison does not hold in every

respect. It does not mean that, as it is really the soul that knows what the senses grasp, so it is really Śiva that knows what the soul understands. The comparison really turns on the impossibility of activating oneself without help. As the senses are incapable of performing any kind of work if the soul does not spur them on, so is the soul unable to become active without Śiva's instigation, by getting it to deploy its faculties, setting it in a world full of objects, enticing its faculties onto those objects and providing organs by which it can take control of them.

A further point must be made, regarding Śiva's part in human knowledge. Our account could suggest that his participation in the work of the lower organs (from Buddhi downwards) is merely indirect; that these organs act by aid of the soul which in turn acts by the aid of Śiva. No, Siva's participation is direct. By his Śakti he dwells within all that exists, and he sees to it that effects go out from external objects. Then he is thought to reside in one of his forms in each individual organ, animating them. Thus each event which helps towards the soul's knowing is traced back to Śiva. Of all the powers that go towards knowledge, his is the highest.

In addition to the powers mentioned, which help the soul to act, the four Vāc are also said to contribute to knowledge. As we saw in III. 3b, in conjunction with the objective universe the four Vāc evolve letters words and sentences, which make up the so-called intellectual universe. This shows that these four Vāc are those same powers which enable souls to conceptualise external objects. The account in Siddhiār also shows that the four Vāc enable the soul to tell others what it has discovered and to learn what they have. The four Vāc with their derivative śabda-adhvan are thus powers which enable intercourse between individual souls. The relevant passage in the Siddhiār reads as follows:

Vaikārika-Vāc takes the sounds coming out of the body by the udāṇavāyu, assembles them correctly and, to avoid any doubt, has them brought into the open by prāṇavāyu, so they can be heard by the ear, convey a concept and thus act as conveyor of understanding. (20)

Madhyamā-Vāc differs (from vaikārika), has no support from prāṇavāyu, is not committed to making comprehensible sounds. It is a sound understood within but not heard by the ear, and rises gently upward. (21)

As the liquid in a peacock's egg conceals (the shape and colour of a peacock) so within Paisanti-Vāc is there that whereby different sounds

come out sounding different. It causes immediate knowledge (non-sensual), is extremely small, and found in the inner parts. (22)

Sūkshma-Vāc is a sound in paraśarīra. It is non-transitory and causes the failure of the breath that is dependent upon it. If the soul attains Sūkshmavāc it achieves immortal knowledge, immortal joy, immortal authority, is everlasting, free from death and rebirth, from fatigue and change. (23) (*Siddhiār* I. 20-23)

Śiva takes an active part at each stage by which knowledge is acquired, yet it is the soul that seems to be the real subject of knowledge. Does this imply that the soul's knowledge, acquired with the help of Śiva, the perfect intelligence, must, therefore, be completely adequate; and that all souls must have the same knowledge, as Śiva is active and present in all souls? Aruḷnanti considers this point and rejects the inference:

If the Supreme instructs, must the knowledge be the same and in all cases alike? The 'more or less' arises from karma. Then there is no necessity for God. As ordinary work requires land (to work on), and as a lotus-flower has need of the sun, so is there need for the Supreme, who gives karma as per the person named. (*Siddhiār* V.2)

Śiva is responsible for knowledge occurring, but not for its degree, which depends on the stage the soul has reached in the gradual process of eliminating Āṇavamala, the fount of ignorance. Śiva's contribution, then, is not so much directive as mechanical. He provides what the soul needs to deploy its native powers, ensures that what he provides is put to work, but does not influence the result of all the work undertaken.

Does Śiva's involvement in the soul's activity prejudice his absolute state? On this see II. 9. Does it encroach too much on the soul's own native intelligence? On this, see the last chapter of the book.

6. What the Soul does in Sakala Avasthā?

Having explained how the soul exists during sakala avasthā, and studied the organs of activity available to it in this period, we can now consider the range and value of the soul's activity. As to the range, the soul's activity is not limited to the area dominated by a gross body, nor to that time, as it can withdraw from a gross body into a subtle one. The soul is active, even if the gross body lies inactive, for example in sleep. It is also active, either in heaven or hell, in the interim period between death and birth. However,

while the soul's activity during the sakala period is very extensive, it also has limitations. It depends on the tattva (products of Māyā) for all its activity; and as all products of Māyā are restricted more or less by the confines of time and place, the soul also must be restricted, to varying degrees, in activities dependent on those tattva.

The restrictions in time and space are clearly recognised when memories of event in earlier lives are said to be lost, when dream-experiences are quite vaguely remembered, and when the soul is said to rely on a whole range of organs in its knowledge and activity, as the help they give is related only to the objects in question, and these have to be taken seriatim. The most serious limitation is this: as the soul can act only via its organs, it can only act on things to which those organs relate. The soul does indeed have as organ the Śakti of Śiva, which is intelligence; but during sakala avasthā it does not act directly, but only through the organs of Māyā. All the organs which act directly are products of Māyā and are Asat, without intelligence. Thanks to their close union with the soul and with the Śakti of Śiva, the bodily organs can, in spite of being themselves without intelligence, serve to mediate knowledge to the soul; though only of things like in nature to themselves. Thus they can help the soul to know Asat only, not Sat.

This means that while it is dependent for its knowledge upon the mediation of the organs (as is the case during sakala avasthā), the soul can know only the products of Māyā, active and present there; not Śiva, not his Śakti, not itself. This is clear from these texts:

Is Śiva an object of knowledge, or not? Objects which can be recognised are Asat and acit. Unknowable things are nothing. The omnipresent Śiva is neither (not a nothing, and not something known through an organ). He is cit and Sat. In the presence of Sat, which Śivajñāna gives, no Asat is there. (1)

As the knowledge conveyed by organs arises and disappears, comes and goes; since it relates to the world, to objects of pleasure, to the body, the organs etc.; as it is mixed with Mala, is distinct from the soul, and perishes, so all objects of knowledge are Asat. (2)

Everything known to us through Manas is Asat. (5) (*Siddhiār* VI.1, 2, 5)

The senses, organs etc. perceive through the soul, but they do not know the soul. In the same way souls perceive through Śiva, who is present in all places, but they do not know him. (*Siddhiār* V.1)

The soul cannot know anything without an organ to point the way. Through the named tattva knowledge of God (Śiva's jñānaśakti or more simply the true knowledge, i.e. God's) cannot be achieved. (*Prak:* VI)

Though the five senses know by the aid of the soul, they don't know (themselves, or the soul). In the same way the soul, though it knows through the Aruḷ of the Supreme (who is lord of the soul's faculties of knowledge), yet it does not know (itself or the Aruḷ). Its knowing is like the pull of a magnet. (*Bodha* V. *cf: 'Śiva as Subject and Object of knowledge',* II.9, III.3 *above; Bodha* VI.1)

The knowledge to be acquired during the sakala avasthā is thus knowledge of the world, and of no great value as the world does not have much. In Siddhiār VI the world is described as the object for the soul's knowledge during sakala avasthā, and its slight value is emphasised, to avoid overrating sensory knowledge.

Life in this world, sovereign power in the world of the gods, the life of Brahma and Vishṇu, all the innumerable kinds of living existence are like castles in the air, like a dream or an illusion. The world is as good as non-existent, that is why it is called asat. (VI.3)

The knowledge to be acquired during sakala avasthā is pretty worthless, as it is incomplete and inaccurate. Aided by Māyā's organs the soul gets to know the world not as it really is, but in a rather superficial way; which is not taken as true knowledge, but a confused knowledge called Maruḷ. The soul sees the world not as it is in itself, but only as it appears to the senses. And to them, as they are Asat like the world, that world appears the sole Being, and so as the highest Good; for the senses do not perceive the other entities, God and the soul, so cannot convey them to the soul.

The most important entities thus remain far removed from the soul. It does not know them, and what it does know it knows only vaguely, without reckoning its true worth, and so is led into error. (cf. Bodha VI.1, Thesis and Reason)

That the senses lead the soul astray while it depends on them in the sakala avasthā is quite clear from what is said about its activity. Activity like knowledge requires tattvas as intermediaries, so they both can relate only to the world. Now the world is pāsa,

a fetter, and what the soul undertakes in that connection will not turn out well. It does no doubt bring certain joys, but not real joys and anyway they end in pain, entangling the soul still further with the world and prolonging its transmigrations. Thus although worldly activity is sure to bring pain in the end, yet the soul is always hurrying back to the world, which the senses always represent as the final reality and the highest good. The emptiness of the soul's existence during sakala avasthā is movingly described in the following verses taken from Neñcuviḍu:

While the Eternal was there, so was I, but not always living in the same condition, but as one born from a bud, from sweat, from an egg, from a mother's womb, and dying too, reaping the tortures of deeds good and bad, fool that I was! With my limited knowledge I tend to follow the materialists (for whom this world is the sole reality), my mind being largely uneducated. I find myself in the power of Manas, that flies off more cruelly than an arrow, destroys a house, wanders around the world committing murder, theft, adultery; that does not know the clarity (Śiva's Aruḷ-Śakti), and finding no true satisfaction returns back fatigued. Buddhi also has me in charge as it searches along the way Manas went, made bold by pride, by the allpowerful (Ahaṃkāra) which combines with Buddhi. I cannot name the agonies that the soul endures as the body gradually pines away and perishes.

Alas that a lecher has me in his power, a tyrant, a libertine most envious. I am captive to ten strong indriya, ten tanmātra, the eternal five Bhūta; and to the good and bad deeds, which with the three evils which control Manas (envy, anger, error) direct the three Guṇa, the three Mala and the three avasthā. Ten invisible Vāyu also lord it over me, as do harsh and mighty caste-rules, and much-coveted wealth. Equipped with Icchā, Jñāna, Kriyā, which in their turn are in that one's power, I endure innumerable fears and cruelties. My way does not lie along the saving path of girdled kings. I am fallen into a sea of different senses tormenting me, and stray around like a madman. I must say that those who achieve Pasujñāna and Patijñāna (to gain which no aid can come except from you) are surely the perfect sannyasin, while the rest are captives wandering in doubt.

O heart that yearns not for the truths that trickle from the godly poet of the eternal Tamil lands — of Tiruvaḷḷuvar (who wrote the famous wisdom poem Kuṛaḷ), but does things matching the senses while not straying in their ways (i.e. does not obey them in all respects). O heart, that founders in the wild seas of sin; that is imprisoned in the captivating eyes of women;

that is experienced in the science of desire, that does not study the true science which gives true knowledge, that with its tongue gossips all sorts of cruel words, that here is daily set about by death and birth — think, O heart, what sort of life is led by this soul!

A similar evaluation of the soul's activity is given in Bodha VIII and Siddhiār VIII where its mode of existence in the sakala avasthā is likened to that of a king's son abducted by the gipsies, and growing up among them. The gipsies get him into their power, drag him down to their lower station, and make him carry on business unworthy of a prince. The senses also overpower the soul, drag it down into the realm of Asat and force it to follow pursuits unworthy of it; for it is of divine origin 'with a claim to possess and enjoy all divine blessedness, as like God it ranks as cit' (Bodha VIII, comment). The pursuits into which the senses seduce the soul, besides being unworthy of it, also cause it great sorrow, as they increase its karma and thus bring about new birth.

As we have seen, activity of every sort can be traced back to Śiva. The organs can become active only if Śiva, through his Śakti, is behind them. The soul in turn can set them to work for knowledge or action only when the Śakti moves it so to do. Śiva's Śakti is thus present and active within the soul, as its animating principle. This being the case, the question arises why Śiva's Śakti not merely permits, but itself enables the soul to engage in activities that lead to such serious consequences. Surely the indwelling Śakti, pure intelligence that it is, would lead the soul to better knowledge and so to more beneficent activities; as its presence within makes it seem possible that besides knowing Asat the soul should also know Śiva himself, or if that may not be, at least his Śakti, and thus be led away from knowledge of Asat and towards Sat. The answer to these questions can be found in the doctrine of Śiva's fourth work (veiling).

As we saw in V.2, Śiva brings the soul into contact with the world so that Āṇavamala may be removed. As soiled articles of clothing must come into close vigorous contact with soap if they are to be cleansed, so must the soul come into intimate contact with the world, which has the same effect upon it as soap has on clothes. To bring about this contact, Śiva commits the soul to the care of the senses. But to prevent the soul realizing too soon the real situation and taking fright at the suffering that connection with the world must bring, and so retreating from the world and

thus making its cleansing impossible: to avoid all this, Śiva shrouds his Śakti in the soul, so the soul's faculties of knowledge cannot recognize it, and he also prevents the soul from understanding more, through its organs of knowledge, than is needed for satisfaction of the law of karma.

In Payaṇ, Umāpati remarks expressly that the soul does not recognise the Śakti of Śiva that is found within it as life-principle, and in spite of the presence of that indwelling power, still pursues after the worthless things of this world. He emphasises the tragedy in this. The relevant verses follow here, with a few explanatory comments.

As fish stray to and fro, in a sea of milk, so do souls who belong to Aruḷ stray about in a sea of desire. (IV.4)

This saying is in reply to the objection, that souls admittedly do pursue things of this world, which cause them pain, making it hard to accept that the enlightening intelligence of the Śakti of Śiva is present in them and guiding them. You would have thought this intelligence would assist souls to keep away from the things of this world, and to seek their satisfaction in fellowship with this enlightening intelligence; and surely find it there.

Umāpati refuted this objection by an analogy intended to clarify the point at issue. If fish found themselves in a sea of milk they would pursue small creatures, with great labour, rather than satisfy their hunger with the milk quite easily. The reason for that is their instinctive urge to consume flesh. This instinct prevents their realising how foolish it is to satisfy hunger with a food that is hard work to get, and how much wiser it would be to take food available nearby and easily had and tasting better too. So it is with souls in sakala avasthā. They are very close to Śiva's Śakti. The Highest Good, that can banish all longing and all hunger of the soul, holds them, so to speak, in its hand. But they pass it by unheeded and unenjoyed and concentrate instead on sensible things much harder to reach and of far less worth, and wear themselves out pursuing these, all because of the Āṇavamala still present in the soul. This enshrouds its faculty of knowledge so it does not see Śiva's Śakti and so never troubles with it, and it arouses in the soul a yearning for those less worthy things and for the dubious joys of this world. Śiva allows Āṇavamala to work on souls like this, as it is not yet mature enough to fall away; and hides himself from souls, in a way, behind Āṇavamala. The Śakti

is there and at work in the souls, without their noticing, being shrouded from them by Āṇavamala. Only when Āṇavamala is removed will they recognise and turn, away from the things of this world to the indwelling Śakti of Śiva, and seek and find its satisfaction there. Thus the fact that souls pursue goods which cause pain does not prove that the Śakti is not present in them. It only shows how low the soul has sunk in its bondage to Āṇavamala.

As the five senses do not recognise the help that stands by them, so souls do not recognise wisdom. (*Payan* IV.5)

This quotation contains a further analogy to clarify the idea that although Śiva's Śakti is present in souls as their central and leading principle, yet they do not recognise it. The relation of souls to the Śakti is likened to the relation of the five senses to the soul. The senses stand in closest relation to the soul, without which they can do nothing. The senses need the soul's help in all that they do; it is the real subject of their actions, and not they themselves, as they blindly suppose. Souls in their turn can act only by Śiva's Śakti's help. Without it they can do nothing at all. The Śakti has to help them reach sakala avasthā from kevala avasthā (total bondage by Āṇavamala), by equipping them with Tanu Karaṇa Bhuvana Bhoga: yet these cannot be deployed in practice without the help of the Śakti of Śiva. The Śakti dwells within souls, enabling them to act, to will, and to know, yet the souls know it not, as Āṇavamala conceals it from them. The Śakti is present within souls as a living principle, but unrecognised by them.

We come rambling onto the earth, but never give a thought to it; and likewise the world (*i.e. the souls in it*) *does not know* (*the Aruḷ*). (IV.6)

A further analogy explains how souls can be ignorant of the Śakti within, which sets them going. What is closest and most obvious, we forget most easily.

People do not see the mountain they are standing on, or the earth either, they who do not see the air, although they move in it, and they do not recognise Knowledge, the Supreme — or themselves either. (IV.7)

This saying brings out the tragic aspect of the soul's ignorance of its indwelling Aruḷ-Śakti. They have it already, yet fuss about not having it.

They (*i.e. souls*) *are like people who wrongly think they're in charge; who stand in the water yet suffer thirst, who can see nothing even in bright daylight.* (IV.8)

It is no fault of the Śakti that souls do not recognise its presence within them and permeating them. That is the fault of souls who, misled by Āṇavamala, think themselves their true lord who need no other; as it is not the fault of the water, if a man stood in it suffers thirst; or of the sun if a man gropes about as in darkness, after the sun has risen.

Stop that fuss and listen! It's like a cat sitting on a pot of milk but desperate to eat a cockroach.

Comment. Suppress all that fuss due to desires and learn with longing the nature of the Aruḷ. Human limitations stop you seeking the Aruḷ and send you hunting for the world's pleasures; like a cat sitting on a pot of sweet milk hanging down from the rafters, but trying to catch one of the cockroaches running along the wall, to grab it and kill it.

A cat on a pot of milk hanging from the rafters does not drink the milk but with a quick jump tries to catch a cockroach. And if it succeeds (which is doubtful), it gets sparse nourishment with great effort. Its pain is worse if the cockroach escapes; all that effort, and the milk-pot broken too!. Now souls are linked from ever to Śiva's Śakti, yet do not attain bliss, but strive after the small joys of this world. They likewise suffer great pains in thoughts, words and deeds in order, perhaps, to achieve a minor joy. And if they fail, then they lose not only the joys of this world, as well as the next, but also suffer even greater pain. (*Payan* IV.4-9)

The only way for souls to recognise the Aruḷ-Śakti and attain the true salvation which it offers, is to suppress the yearnings incited by Āṇavamala for the worthless joys of this world, which usually end in pain. True salvation cannot be obtained while these desires are allowed to lead the soul into error.

In the verses quoted above, Umāpati blames the soul for its trivial knowledge and profane deeds. We feel obliged to state that the soul is guilty only in a rather special sense. The soul has a beginingless link with Āṇavamala, so it can hardly be blamed for its lack of true knowledge. It does have Śiva's Śakti inside, a sun beaming true knowledge around; but this sun does not come out during sakala avasthā, and it lights up the objects then available only so far as the soul's development at that time makes possible. This is what the doctrine of enshrouding is about. Here the soul can be blamed only for not learning fast enough from its experience. For the soul's doings, however profane, during sakala avasthā, and the knowledge it does achieve, however limited and

imperfect, were brought about by Śiva in the interests of the soul. Through the experiences it has gained, the soul is supposed to learn to despise the joys that Asat can provide, and to suppress the yearnings that Āṇavamala ever and again engenders there. So those doings during sakala avasthā, and the knowledge then acquired do serve, indirectly at least, to free souls of their fetters. That is their true value. So Umāpati in Kroḍai can also praise Śiva for enabling the soul to become involved with the world.

When the soul is keen to quench the great fire (hunger) which blazes on a while seeking fuel, and that soul does what it can, then stands the Supreme at hand, with his karma-record: of the āgāmyakarma, just then acquired unhindered, and of the old karma (saṃcita and prārabdha karma). Praised be this work of the Supreme. (8)

How Śiva achieves the aim he seeks, will be seen in the next section.

7. Stages on the Way to Salvation

Śiva has the universe evolve, puts souls in there, and brings the two entities together, in readiness for freeing the soul from Āṇavamala. This release comes about through the soul's link with solid matter (as distinct from Āṇavamala and karmamala, which are also material). In kevala avasthā souls were totally inactive; no desires, no knowledge, no action, just there. But in sakala avasthā they acquire desires, through Āṇavamala. But just having desires is not enough; what about fulfilling them? As a child longs for its mother's milk, so longs the soul for activity, once Āṇavamala has become active. As a mother pays heed to her child's desires, and, in her pity, lays it at her breast, so does Śiva notice the longings of the soul that have become active through Āṇavamala. He feels pity for the soul's longings, and, by setting them with bodies and objects in a world created from Māyā, he enables them to accomplish the deeds they desire. In this way, Śiva's first act of assistance to the soul is that he enables it to have wishes and to satisfy those urgent desires.

But Śiva does more. He is concerned that souls not only perform deeds, but also are freed from Āṇavamala, to which their low state is due. The desire to act serves to eliminate Āṇavamala, so Śiva enables souls to perform them. For the deeds to lead to the desired result, he not only puts them in the world, but also observes their conduct, and allows them to consume the fruits of

their deeds. It is as if he collects these fruits, and sees to it that each soul does consume the results of their deeds, both good and bad. 'The Aruḷ, like the sun, is a great light over everything, to gather deeds and make sure they are consumed.' (Payan IV. 2) Siva does not do this for the purpose of tormenting souls, but so they gradually acquire a repugnance towards everything that Āṇavamala makes them desire. Thus Śiva's second aid to souls is to make them consume the fruits of their deeds.

This creative and judicial act of Śiva is not an end in itself, but a means to an end. It continues throughout sakala avasthā, and is very diverse, for Āṇavamala does not arouse the same desires in all bodies; and different desires are fulfilled in different ways. So Śiva creates a whole series of worlds, bodies and objects (see III. 3 above). Souls are provided with a world and bodies, as the deeds require. They don't immediately get a body equipped with all the tattvas, but start with plant and animal bodies, which have fewer organs (see the teaching about transmigration, V. 3 above). As it is in the human body that the soul is first equipped with all its organs, the preceding time could be called one of unfolding or evolution. During this time, souls have to earn their organs, so to speak. Now it is Śiva who gives them more adequate bodies, when deserved, thus making higher knowledge and better actions possible for them. This progressively better equipment of souls with more perfect bodies could be called Śiva's third aid to them.

Acquiring all the tattvas does not, however, complete the soul's development. It needs to use them aright; which requires experience. To begin with the soul will mainly make use of the lower tattvas, and the humbler organs will determine the soul's actions and so its destiny. As souls then manage to hold the lower tattvas in check and make use of the higher ones, so they move higher up the ladder towards release. For a soul in a human body, a lower stage would be one where the main activity is by the lower tattva from Ahaṃkāra down, under the control and direction of Ahaṃkāra. This stage is chracterized by self-seeking and sensual life. Lōkāyatikas, Materialists and atheistic Epicureans are souls of this sort.

If souls are dissatisfied, because of bad experiences, with Ahaṃkāra's guidance, then the next tattva up takes over, the Buddhi, leading to a life that is moral; and respectable. The world-view corresponding to this stage is Buddhism.

When souls realise that Buddhi also is flawed as a leader, as they being acit are not strong enough to suppress and repress the bad desires entirely, they take the next tattva up as leader, namely the soul itself, the purusha, which is to some extent imprisoned in the body. The soul, as distinct from the organs, now takes on the leadership. The philosophy of life corresponding to this stage is that of Māyāvāda, i.e. of idealists, Vedāntins like Śaṃkara, who realising how harmful matter is shove it aside and think themselves the pinnacle of creation.

At the ensuing stage souls become dissatisfied with the Vedāntic solution, wondering why they are landed with a body and subject to transmigration. Aided by the next higher tattvas, Rāga, Vidyā, Kalā, Niyati, and Kāla, souls understand karma as responsible for transmigration, and see why time, and Kāla-tattva, are needed to do justice to the law of karma. The philosophy of this stage is Mimāmsa; for which karma is the highest principle.

The next stage is that of Pañcarātra of the Vaishṇavites, so called because its chief text is supposed to have been written in five nights. Now souls have fully understood that karma cannot be the ultimate principle, that there must still be something more behind karma. But they consider Māyā rather than God as lord of karma, and regard Vishṇu (also called Māya) as the one who brings release.

The soul has to pass through these several stages, to be fit for birth as a Śaivite. Of course further stages could easily be distinguished, as the stages below Ahaṃkāra have the most influence, and two or three tattvas can be said to share the leadership, and different tattvas may have more or less influence. Actually there are as many stages as there are non-Śaivite religions and philosophies, which are usually grouped together as puṛasamaya, i.e. outer, non-Śaivite religions. These do not help souls towards salvation directly, but prepare them for it, by leading to a higher rung on the salvation ladder. Souls which have fully observed the demands of the religion into which they were born, and have experienced its version of blessedness (though not the true blessedness), will be born into a higher religion. Each religion is a necessary stage on the way to salvation; thus each, although not the complete truth, can still be seen as leading truthwards. This allows each and every religion to be traced back to Śiva. It was for the needs of souls of very different stages of development that Śiva called up

religions of very different stages of development, which can all help to advance souls ever nearer to their goal; though those religions do not take you to the goal. So they should all be called good, though in comparison with the one perfect religion of Śaiva-Siddhānta they are imperfect. As Śiva has founded different religions to suit all sorts of differently developed souls, to help his aim of bringing up souls born human, we can see this as the fourth aid Śiva provides to souls in sakala-avasthā.

The purpose of all non-Śaivite religions is to lead the soul on until it can be born as a member of the Śaivite religion; they are like the entrance hall of a shrine. Not that birth as a Śaivite takes it straight into the inner sanctum, but only into the holy place. There are yet more rungs to be climbed within the Śaivite religion before the actual process of release can go forward (which happens only within Śaivism). The lower rungs consist of the Śaivite sects which differ from Śaiva Siddhānta; there are several of these, called agasamaya (inner religions) as opposed to Puṛasamaya (non-Śaivite religions). When eventually born into Śaiva Siddhānta one is still not yet entitled to the teaching that brings release, having three further stages to work through first, called Caryā, Kriyā, and Yoga: also named Dāsamārga (servant's way), Putramārga (child's way) and Sahamarga (friend's way). After these the soul enters the inner sanctum, the jñāna-stage or Sanmārga (good way), where salvation actually takes place. This is treated in more detail in the next chapter.

If the soul fulfils the requirements of non-Śaivite religions, and walks in them, upholds the requirements of the books of law, carries out the duties of station set down in the Vedas (i.e. duties obligatory for a student, a father, a recluse, and for a sannyāsin who has fulfilled all his duties to the world); and does harsh penances; if it learns various difficult scientific texts, studies Vedas, Purāṇas, and Upanishads, then it achieves Śaiva Siddhānta. Having completed the Caryā, Kriyā and Yoga stages it will through knowledge reach Śiva's feet. (*Siddhiar* VIII.11)

As the three stages of Caryā, Kriyā, and Yoga immediately precede the actual process of sanctification, they are called preparatory in a very special sense; and will be more fully discussed in Chapter VI. Here we may give just a brief account of their characteristics.

The lowest stage within Śaiva Siddhānta is Caryā. This is described in Siddhiār VIII.19 as follows:

To sweep and wash the floor of the temple of the Gracious One (Śiva), so that it shines; to pluck flowers to bind them into different garlands for the god; to praise him and sing to him; to set up lights that do not go out; to lay down flower-gardens, to honour him whenever one sees his holy garments, and to ask 'Say, what can I do, dog that I am?', and to carry out his commands — this is a servant's way, and those who do this Caryā will attain to Śivaloka.

At this stage one is to serve Śiva, as a faithful servant serves his lord. The services rendered are external ones. Loyal service is repaid by being taken to Śiva's heaven after death. After enjoying the blessedness due, the soul is born again as a Śaivite, with different duties to fulfil. The duties of the second or Kriyā stage, according to Siddhiār VIII.20 are as follows:

The way of a child is to take fresh and sweet-smelling flowers, lights that burn with a fragrant smell, oil etc. and ambrosia; to do the five purifications; to set up an altar and picture; to meditate upon the intellect of the god in the picture and thus to consecrate the picture, rendering homage to it with pure devotion, making petitions to it and praising it, and out of love to make burnt offerings. Those who daily perform this Kriyā will attain the presence of the One without Mala (Sāmīpya).

The service of God here called for is more inward than the previous stage, and corresponds to the duty which a son offers to his father. Loyal fulfilment of duties is rewarded by the soul coming near to Śiva, after death, and there consuming its karma. After Kriyā comes the Yoga stage.

On the friends's way the five senses must be repressed; the two breaths (i.e. both nostrils) suppressed; attention directed to a single object; the inner progress (secrets) of three-cornered ādhāra known and its significance bethought; then holding on to these you swing up, enjoy ambrosia in the place of the shining heaven of the moon, so the body is replete; then meditate upon the perfect light, perform the eight yogas correctly, so that actions cease. Such will attain to the form of Śiva. (*Siddhiār* VIII.21)

This deals with the inmost service of God. A religious person serves God as a man serves his friend. As a friend understands his friend even better than a son understands his father, and much better than a servant does his lord, so does the religious person at this stage understand the nature of God better than at the former stages; so is he now better placed to render service worthy of the nature of God as intelligence. So he worships God at this stage with his intellect, as he did in the Caryā stage with his body,

and in the Kriyā stage with his senses. Loyal service is rewarded at the yoga stage by Sārūpya, conformity to Śiva and similarity in appearance.

But yoga is still not the highest stage. Knowledge and service of God come step by step, as at the Caryā and Kriyā stages, for in each case the organs of thought are material in character. But knowledge and service of God cannot be fully conveyed by matter; so the last word must be yet to come. At the yoga stage, then, the soul is not yet at its final destination, but is high up on the ladder that reaches salvationwards. The soul has a sense, at this stage, that God is not to be found in matter, so it strives in its yearning for God to cut free from material things, and to restrain its organs from involving it further with them and ensnaring it again in matter. When the soul has got free of matter it then enters a quite new stage, called śuddha avasthā. Here the soul is progresively assimilated to God, the pure intelligence.

Souls in the upper stages, which comprise sakala avasthā, first get control of matter as tattvas, and through these of other matter; and then have to get free of matter again. They must enter matter and then leave it again, going-out from self and then drawing-back into self again; explicatio then implicatio, evolutio then involutio; not forgetting that the exit from matter, the drawing-back into self, implicatio, involutio is completed only in śuddha-avasthā, the moves made in sakala avasthā being merely preparatory. Stages 1 through 7 could be compared with a someone's arrival and growth up to school age, 8 through 12 with primary school, 13 with a transitional class, and then 14 — 16 with secondary school. Śuddha-avasthā could then be compared with University.

8-12 are stages of regress. Religions are non-Śaivite. 8 represents the life of the senses, 9-12 lives devoted to religion and philosophy; led in 8 by Ahaṃkāra; in 9 by Buddhi; in 10 by purusha; in 11 by Rāga-Kāla; and in 12 by Māyā.

13-16 are stages where souls have gradually to get free again of the tattva. Religion is Śaivite, and lives are devoted to the service of God; at 14 with the body, with the senses at 15, and at 16 by meditation.

Table III: STAGES ON THE WAY TO SALVATION

Through which the soul must pass, before being worthy to enter into the actual school of salvation.

Stage	1.	Plant world
Stage	2.	Water Creatures
Stage	3.	Creeping Creatures
Stage	4.	World of Birds.
Stage	5.	4- footed Creatures
Stage	6.	Mankind
Stage	7.	Gods and demons.
Stage	8.	Lokāyatika
Stage	9.	Buddhists
Stage	10.	Vedāntists
Stage	11.	Mīmāṃsāka
Stage	12.	Vaishnavites
Stage	13.	Śaivite sects
Stage	14.	Caryā
Stage	15.	Kriyā
Stage	16.	Yoga

1-7 are stages in the evolution of the soul. Souls are equipped to loosen the fetter of Āṇavamala; and have faculties, first gross and then gradually subtler ones; in stage 7 the Gods have subtle tattvas.

CHAPTER SIX

Saving the Soul from Matter

1. From Sakala to Śuddha Avasthā

As we saw in the last chapter, while the soul is in bondage to three-fold mala its experiences do go some way towards loosening those fetters. Their ancient evil was their inability to engage in knowing choosing and doing, owing to Āṇavamala. But as Śiva by his Śakti sets the three-fold mala to work on them, souls do get the use of their faculties, but unfortunately use them incorrectly; not a happy state of affairs.

Their position at this stage has three defects:

1. Their faculties are aimed wrong, being trained on Asat rather than on Sat;
2. They use the wrong means, relying on the tattvas handily provided by Asat (which naturally cannot grasp Sat), when they should rely on Śiva's three-fold Śakti (Jñāna-, Kriyā- and Icchā-Śakti);
3. Their attitude is wrong, for they act either as slaves of Asat or as their own masters; which hinders their becoming Sat, as they really ought. By acting as Asat's slaves they get like it; and as they can't really act independently, 'being their own masters' is really another form of slavery to Asat.

Only when these three evils are eliminated can the soul achieve the next higher stage, śuddha āvasthā. So a definite programme for eliminating them would form the transition to that stage.

Our sources describe some preparatory steps, and then the transition itself. Preparation involves Caryā Kriyā and yoga; completion requires Iruvineioppu, Malaparipāka and Śaktinipāta. We have already come across Caryā Kriyā and yoga as forming the conclusion of sakala āvasthā; and return to them now to show how they prepare for the transition to śuddha avasthā.

The statements in our sources on this point give an insight into Śaiva siddhānta as a practical religion, so I quote them here, though as referring to Caryā, Kriyā, and yoga (in sakala avasthā) they properly belong in Chapter Five. In any case they are dealt with in our sources along with the special processes of release to which they lead, and to which the present chapter is devoted.

First let us hear what is said in Bodha about these three stages as a means for achieving bliss.:

When as a result of tapas the Supreme appears as guru and points out that souls enslaved by the five senses (gipsies) and thus forgetting who they were have now grown up, then they will forsake the senses and unite with the feet of the Supreme, because they are indeed, not different from him.

Comment. This Sūtra explains how souls achieve Jñāna.

When guided by Asat and connected with Asat what the soul knows is Asat; and when enlightened by Sat and connected with Sat what the soul knows is Sat. To explain this, the Sūtra shows the benefit when Sādhana (means to achieve release) is performed by duly qualified souls (see Sūtra VII), *what they get by doing Sādhana; which Sādhana is best for this; and how one attains to it.*

The Supreme, who was previously hidden in the soul though present and guiding it, now comes as guru, because of good works already done, and offers advice. 'You are a king's son taken prisoner, fallen into the hands of the five senses (gipsies) and so growing up ignorant of your own worth and suffering pain'. When the soul thus discovers its true status it will leave the gipsies forthwith, and cling to the feet of the Supreme, from whom it does not differ essentially.

Thesis. The soul attains to Jñāna through tapas previously performed.

Comment. Different schools teach different theories of the Sādhana that souls need to perform and how to get to it. So this thesis is put forward in the resolution of the first part of the Sūtra.

To show it can be achieved only gradually and not by tapas done in just one life-time, it says 'through tapas previously performed.'

Jñāna here means Sādhana knowledge, achieved by using Śivajñāna as an eye, if the guru so directs.

Reason. If in former births one has performed Caryā Kriyā and yoga one achieves Jñāna, the good path, but not Release.

Comment. Some say tapas is enough as Sādhana, why Jñāna as well? The Reason explains why.

'But how did Tirujñānasambhandar and others attain Jñāna with-

out doing tapas?' This objection is met by saying 'in former births'. Here the negative is used to make quite clear that without Jñāna release cannot take place.

Example 1. *Those who perform the tapas achieve tapaloka. In order that when born they may disregard desires, they are born into a good family who perform tapas and achieve Jñāna. This is what scholars in their wisdom say.*

Comment. A query: How does the practice in a former birth of Caryā Kriyā yoga ensure Jñāna? He explains, so confirming the Reason. Those who did Caryā etc. (*thus surely attaining Sālokya, etc.*), *and who show the fruits of tapas and enjoy the pleasures of that place, in order that when born again on earth they may dismiss desires* (*which owing to destiny decreeing later deeds do arise after the death of the former body*), *will be born into a higher caste which does tapas, and thus will get rid of desires* (*so desires may not flourish due to a shortage of tapas*); *and in this way they will achieve tattva-jñāna* (*i.e. the Jñāna which knows tattvas*).

The statement that they must be born again so desires may be eliminated shows that if desire is eliminated, they can achieve Jñāna in that world.

The statement that they must be born again into a good caste and achieve Jñāna shows that the lower castes cannot achieve tattva-jñāna.

Example 2. *The blessings mentioned* (*in books on ethics*) *as outcome of deeds are like the happiness of one driven by hunger, who eats but then is hungry again. If through complete tapas* (*Caryā etc.*) *what the scriptures call Iruvineioppu is attained the soul by drawing close to the guru will achieve Jñāna.*

Comment. Some object: How can you be sure Caryā etc., will guarantee tattva-jñāna? You should say the sacrifices etc., mentioned in scripture bring about tattvajñāna. In reply, the reason is re-affirmed.

The happiness due to sacrifices and other deeds of duty, mentioned along with those pleasures men yearn to get by beginning on good works and studying ethical texts is like the happiness food confers on a hungry man, who promptly gets hungry again. Good deeds and bad ones are very much the same (*like gold chains and iron ones*): *for both hinder and shackle knowledge; and by Caryā and the other tapas* (*which unlike those are not destroyed by experience, but always keep on growing*) *they become quite equivalent; so the soul through a programme of tapas will seek the Jñāna-guru* (*yet unnamed*) *and attain to Jñāna.*

You can see from the ethical texts themselves that the joys which sacrifices bring are only temporary (*unlike Tattva Jñāna*); *that is why it*

says 'mentioned in books on ethics'. To show that virtues must be set aside for Jñāna to arise, as they not only fail to bring Jñāna, but like evil deeds actually hinder its arrival, it says that what is called Iruvineioppu (in the scriptures) must arrive.

It says the blessedness deriving from good deeds is like an eater getting hungry again, which suggests that the Tattva Jñāna attained by tapas is like the ambrosia of the gods, who after enjoying it do not get hungry again. Ambrosia not only prevents ageing but also removes hunger, and tapas not only ensures Tattva Jñāna, but is a step towards salvation too. (*Bodha* VIII.1)

The first example shows that Caryā Kriyā and yoga concern stages preparatory to Jñāna, leading souls to suppress their desires. The second example distinguishes them from virtues commended in books of ethics, and their benefits from those at which the life of virtue aims; and declares the former as a higher stage. Moral life is the precondition for the Caryā Kriyā and yoga stages, as these are for the Jñāna stage.

Caryā Kriyā and yoga prepare souls to enter on the Jñāna stage (i.e. Śuddha Avasthā); just how, is made clearer in Padiār:

Śiva-dharma (Caryā and Kriyā) consists of some tasks that are easy and others that are difficult. If you start on one of these then you must finish it, to avoid rebirth. (16)

All the various arrangements for worshipping the Supreme are called good works, and as they are easy to do they are called easy works. (17)

To cook flesh with one's own hands for the beautiful Supreme who bestows favours (as met in one of his saints), killing without mercy; this we call a difficult work. (18) *(This refers to a tale from one of the Purāṇas, about a father who killed and cooked his only son so he could suitably honour a Śaivite saint.)*

When Śiva saw how Sandeśar without fear of crime or punishment, cut off both feet of his father, who was a Brahmin, for this deed he made him as Śiva (19; *see above* III.2). *And verse twenty refers to Tāyanār, who took his own life when the sacrificial offerings fell in the dust.*

Those who do such 'Śiva-deeds' and resign themselves to Śiva, destroy the highhandedness of the deed. If you have field, plough and oxen, all you require, then what can go wrong? (21)

The author of Padiār here seems to suggest that such services to Śiva raise one straight to the top (the Jñāna stage), bypassing the yoga stage as not absolutely necessary. This interpretation is possible, but not compulsory. Souls who have reached a higher

stage should still fulfil duties of lower stages. So we may suppose the holy people mentioned to illustrate the benefits of the Caryā and Kriyā stages are actually in the yoga stage and would take very seriously what is prescribed for lower stages. The author is unlikely to have meant that one can pass immediately from the Kriyā to the Jñāna stage, as the very next verses mention yoga as preliminary to the Jñāna stage, and with more emphasis than for the Caryā and Kriyā stages.

There are two ways to attain the Aruḷ of Śiva, ādhāra (gradual) yoga and nirādhāra (immediate). Ādhāra yoga is meditation on divine forms derived by knowing souls in the Ādhāra (soul-centres in the five-fold body). Nirādhāra yoga is meditation on the unknowable (Śiva). (22)

The soul sets up an object in one of the ādhāras, meditates on it, transfers it within and meditates on it so hard that it ceases to be different from the meditator. If the soul thus meditates it ceases to be itself and becomes one with the object of meditation. To become one in this way is ādhāra yoga. (23)

If you shrink the object of meditation to a millionth, the meditator also will become infinitely small. Then the two will no longer be two objects, but only one, which no longer says, 'This is that'. (24)

As the five letters show the nature of Ammaiappa (Śiva), you must learn the five letters through the guru and be able to understand and recite them and thereby enter into the Aruḷ. If Paśu-Jñāna perishes the king of the Śakti will appear to remove all Pāśa and to bestow universal salvation. (25)

The following passages go on to describe nirādhāra yoga. But ādhāra-mantra yoga (25) following ādhārasūkshma yoga (24) and ādhāra-sthūla yoga lead to Jñāna yoga; and nirādhāra yoga is the process by which true knowledge becomes actual; so clearly nirādhāra yoga is not part of the 'Yoga-stage' of yoga, but is to be considered identical with Jñāna, the stage at which true knowledge is realised. So we omit the sayings about nirādhāra yoga at this point.

In what ways do the preparatory stages of Caryā Kriyā and yoga make the soul ready to enter on the Supreme stage, where salvation is realised? In the Caryā and Kriyā stages, clearly, the soul is brought to see Śiva, rather than the sensible world, as the highest good, directing the attention by prescribed worshipful acts away from the world to Śiva; and in the yoga stage the soul realises that the knowledge to be had through the outer and

inner sense organs is not knowledge, as there is another knowledge, higher than the senses, to attain which some better access to knowledge is required.

At the Caryā-Kriyā stage the soul has to learn, not by theoretical instruction but through practical demonstration that matter cannot satisfy its yearning; and at the yoga stage that the organs of knowledge provided by matter are also inadequate. At the Caryā-Kriyā stage the soul is taught that the good it has so far striven for is not the highest good; and at the yoga stage, that the means adopted so far for achieving the goods then desired will not achieve the true and only highest good. In this way, the yoga stage follows quite naturally upon the Caryā and Kriyā stages.

This sequence of stages must not however be taken to suggest that on entering the yoga stage we say goodbye to the Caryā and Kriyā stages. You have got to keep your destination clearly and constantly in view, to make out which path does *not* lead to it. Now the job of Caryā and Kriyā is, to direct souls away from the world and towards Śiva; so only on reaching that goal can they be put aside. That is why Siddhiār XII.5 remarks that one at the Kriyā stage is obliged also to observe the precepts of the Caryā stage, and at the yoga stage to observe those of Kriyā and Caryā; adding that even one at the Jñāna stage himself is still bound to observe the instruction of all the other three stages.

Knowledge about the highest Good and how to obtain it by the three stages mentioned should not be overvalued. The knowledge itself is negative rather than positive. We learn what not to look for, and dimly guess what we should seek, and that is Śiva, but without really realising what the highest Good is like.

We know that the natural senses are not adequate for knowing God, and suppose there must be knowledge which is superior to that of the natural senses; but do not know what that knowledge is like, but feel around for it, repressing the means previously used to acquire knowledge. This is not a matter of definite knowledge open to logical support, but of something at the back of our minds, though by no means inactive, for it shows itself in more or less strong feelings pressing forward into consciousness and finally producing the state our sources call Iruvineioppu. If this state is reached, then the purpose of the preparatory stages is fulfilled, and the ripened soul enters the Jñāna stage, in which it then comes to clear and positive knowledge.

Before describing the Jñāna stage we should explain what is meant by Iruvineioppu. Translated literally, it means 'two sorts of actions being equal'. The precise significance of this must be gathered from statements in our sources. In the recently cited second example from Bodha Sūtra VIII.1 it says that Iruvineioppu results from the Caryā Kriyā and yoga stages, but not what it consists of. The commentator says that the soul will achieve Jñāna if virtues and sins are removed; for these both hinder and fetter knowledge, having like effects as do gold and iron chains. But this does not quite indicate just what Iruvineioppu means.

The Comment continues: *Jñāna can arise only if virtuous acts are put aside; they don't lead to Jñāna, and they hinder its arrival just as much as bad deeds do. That is why it says Iruvineioppu has to take a part.* This suggests that Iruvineioppu is to remove deeds both good and bad, i.e. Karma. But we can't take this 'removal of both sorts' literally, as that has to happen at a later stage.

Example 1 in the same Sūtra shows how to take this phrase about 'putting both sorts of deed aside'. *So that when born they put desires aside, they are born into a good family that performs tapas, and they attain Jñāna.* Here Iruvineioppu is not about putting deeds of both sorts aside, but about desires, whether of inclination or aversion.

Prak: indicates that the two sorts of deed said here to be equal come from all three kinds of karma:

When the unremoved twin fruits accumulated in earlier births (Saṃcita), and the deeds whose fruits were gained in the earlier birth to be consumed in the next one, are put aside (prārabdha); and the coming deeds (Āgāmya) have by Śivapuṇya (Caryā Kriyā and yoga), which helps to set that karma aside, been brought into a balance with them, then Tirōdhāna Śakti, previously angry, becomes gracious, like the Aruḷ, and the good Śakti takes possession of the soul. (*Prak* II.30)

From all these indications we can say that Iruvineioppu is about giving up the desire to consume the karma-fruits stored away, and those now ready for consumption (which may include some joys); and giving up the desire so to act as to get future joys (and pains). This of course relates deeds and fruits of both sorts, good and bad, not just to one.

Payan IV.9 makes it quite clear that Iruvineioppu is about giving up the desire for action and the resulting fruits. To the question *How is ignorance removed, and how does the soul know?'* the

answer is *Stop that fuss and listen! Its like a cat sitting on a pot of milk, desperate to eat a cockroach.* It is remarkable that the giving up of desires for actions and fruits came to be called Iruvineioppu, likeness of twin deeds. So the commentators try to explain the word, without much success. Thus on Payan VI.1 we find:

When the many good and bad deeds become equal, Śiva's Śakti will take possession of the soul.

Comment. Good and evil deeds when opposed become a monster, but when equated then Śiva's Śakti takes possession of the soul. 'Equated' means one good deed to match each evil one. Others say the sum of good deeds done in thought, word and deed is to balance the sum of bad deeds, as gold and iron balance in the scales....if one outweighs the other they will be hostile and opposed, and draw the soul away.

Here we see two of the various notions about Iruvineioppu, noted earlier: a. each evil deed cancels a good one, each sorrow matches a corresponding joy; b. good must equal evil deeds in total, and so must joys and sorrows, as in weighed: If they balance, Iruvineioppu has been reached.

The commentator prefers b., but though it doesn't fit the line about the cat (just above), so he tries patching, saying *if one outweighs the other they will be hostile, etc.* (i.e. the desires will draw the soul into the whirlpool of worldly life).

It is clear from another work of his that Umāpati in writing Payan VI.1 was not thinking of a balancing in weight alone. For in his refutation of the Śaivavāda, in *Saṅkalpanirākaraṇa,* he says:

You may say (wise men) replace it (malaparipāka) when the two different sorts of deed are equal. But I tell you, if Āgamya deeds are weighed up and removed, they are no longer on the balance. And a deed when done does not become two. (A good deed is not half sin, nor is a sin a half good deed. A good deed comes out good, and a bad deed bad.) So tell me how equality is reached.

This shows the commentator is wrong; but does not explain why desirelessness should be called Iruvineioppu, any more than Bodha did. It just rejects the two explanations offered by the commentator on Umāpati, and says that Iruvineioppu is reached *when in his mind deeds of both sorts appear equal, as he desires nothing and shuns nothing, but has an equal dislike for deeds both good and bad and for their fruits.* This says that Iruvineioppu is not two sorts of deeds being somehow equal to each other, but both having the

same effect on the soul. The soul is the subject, not the two sorts of act. The soul behaves in the same way to all acts, to all sorrows and all joys, viz., it is indifferent, inwardly undisturbed, with no craving for activity or reward. All activity and all events are alike for the soul, with no difference of good or bad, better or worse. Everything is as good or bad as everything else, so no one thing is preferable to another, there is no basis of desire due to one thing being thought better than another, and no grounds for aversion either by supposing one thing is worse. This understanding of Iruvineioppu matches the one we first put forward, and does not conflict with sayings like Payan VI.1, which (unlike the comment) can be taken to mean 'The many good and evil deeds are equivalent for the soul, i.e. exert same attraction on it, viz. none.'

The arousing of desires through the influence of the Tirōdhāna Śakti upon Āṇavamala marks the beginning of the sorrowful path of transmigration, so it is only logical that the taming of desires should mark the beginning of the process of salvation which will remove all suffering. It marks an epoch in the history of the soul, which had from ever fallen between Sat and Asat, but now turns from Asat and towards Sat; and finds that Iruvineioppu leads straight on to Malaparipāka (ripeness of mala) and to Śaktinipāta.

If, during transmigration, desires have ceased to rage and the soul has realised desire and activity and possessions are all an evil, then Mala has lost its power over the soul. Malaparipāka does not mean that Āṇavamala has been finally eliminated, nor even that it has lost all influence upon the soul, but only that it is now up for elimination (if that is the right word), that its hold on the soul is broken, that their link is now a loose one, like ripe fruit still on the tree; that the soul no longer takes it as norm for its activity.

Śaktinipāta is an essential counterpart to Malaparipāka, and means Śakti falling away or settling down. This is explained in various ways, in commentaries; usually as Śiva's Śakti settling down on the soul (taking it over); or as the Śakti of Āṇavamala falling away, being ripe; or as the 'I-consciousness' of the soul (which keeps the soul separate from Śiva, owing to Āṇavamala) coming to an end under Śaktinipāta. As we shall see, these last two explanations must be wrong, as they conflict with the soul's salvation being accomplished gradually; and anyway our texts clearly show that Śakti means Śiva's Sakti. Thus in Payan VI.1 it says: *When the*

many good and bad deeds are equal, the Supreme takes possession through his Śakti; and in Kroḍai 10 *Śiva has his Śakti descend as soon as the twin results of both kinds of yearned-for former deeds are equal.*

The overall situation requires that 'Śakti' refer to the Śakti of Śiva. The soul is by nature dependent, latching on to something else, under external influence; up till now that of Āṇavamala, but its influence has gone as Iruvineioppu and Malaparipāka arrive. Some other power must now take its place and influence the soul, and this can only be the Śakti of Śiva, who is present from ever in souls. Logical necessity thus requires that Iruvineioppu and Malaparipāka are followed by Śaktinipāta, i.e. by Śiva's Śakti taking over the soul.

Just what does this mean? As we have seen, the Śakti is present from ever in the soul. During kevala avasthā it is inactive; in sakala avasthā it is Tirōdhāna Śakti, arouser of desires (as it sets Āṇavamala going), and transmits inadequate and ultimately incorrect knowledge. The Śakti takes Tirōdhāna form because Āṇavamala still holds the soul in its power. But now Iruvineioppu and Malaparipāka have ended the dominion of Āṇavamala, so the Śakti need no longer act with a view to destroying its dominion. Hence the remark in Prak II.30 that as soon as the soul attains Iruvineioppu *the previously angry Tirōdhāna Śakti becomes gracious (Aruḷ-Śakti) and Iruvineioppu appears.* Thus Śaktinipāta is not a new and unfamiliar Śakti coming to the soul, but the same Śakti which was there all the time, but is now behaving differently; though this may give the impression that the former hostile Śakti has gone away, and a new and kindly disposed Śakti has taken its place.

The Śakti's behaviour is now completely different. Previously it was busy in the soul with Task Four (obscuration); now it starts on Task Five (salvation, grace, enlightenment). Previously it did not convey correct knowledge to the soul, not being in touch directly but only indirectly through organs belonging to Asat. But from now on the knowledge given will be correct, and not given through organs.

Śaktinipāta then is not concerned so much with actually imparting true wisdom, but with the means to acquiring it, with equipping the soul with an infallible eye to suit Śiva, the real object of knowledge.

The altered behaviour of the Śakti is at once evident by its awakening of yearning in the soul; as at the beginning of sakala avasthā it evoked a quite different yearning, which made it subject to karma, but now the yearning is to free it from karma, a yearning for Sat not Asat, for truth, for union with Śiva. And the Śakti not only arouses this yearning, but also enables the soul to satisfy it, as we shall see in the following paragraphs.

The bitter experiences during transmigration paved the way for Iruvineioppu, Śaktinipāta and Malaparipāka. Siddhānta therefore describes Malaparipāka and Śaktinipāta as fourfold, e.g. in Prak: II.31. These four varieties are spelt out in the fuller commentary on Bodha Sūtra VI:

As tapas is four-fold (Caryā Kriyā yoga and Jñāna), and as these four differ from one another, so also is Śaktinipāta. The Tirōdhāna Śakti is active in support of mala to bring about ripening, before the contrary action of grace (enlightenment) changes it into 'grace'. The Śakti now becomes Paraśakti, and descends on the soul in four stages, manda(slow), mandatara (the comparative, but here taken as 'less slow'). Now and then we also find mandatara mentioned first, then tīvra (intensive) and tīvratara (more so, but here also the contrast is the same). Malaparipāka causes Śaktinipāta, and is also diverse.

The four kinds of Malaparipāka and Śaktinipāta occur at the four stages (Carya etc.). At each stage the dominion of Āṇavamala is driven further back, and the Śakti of Śiva comes more to the fore, until Āṇavamala is entirely without influence and the Śakti takes over complete possession of the soul. In all four stages Malaparipāka and Śaktinipāta create a desire for the Highest Good. At the three lower stages this was still combined with more or less powerful desires for goods belonging to Asat, but at the highest stage there is no such mixture. This induces the soul to perform the acts of divine service, prescribed for each stage.

2. What Śuddha Āvasthā is like?

The soul that has experienced Iruvineioppu, Malaparipāka and Śaktinipāta is in Śuddha Avasthā. This name suggests a state of purity, but it really means a state of being purified. Purity is what Śuddha Āvasthā aims at and leads to, and is properly called Mukti or Moksha. The present chapter is concerned with the process of purification. The state of purity, to which it leads, is discussed in Chapter VII.

Bodha VIII.1 and Siddhiār VIII.1 compare the state of the soul on entering Śuddha Āvasthā through Iruvineioppu etc., to that of a king's son set free from captivity among the gipsies. Captured as a child, he grew up among them as a gipsy, with no thought of his true rank. Once set free he is taken back to his father. Now his royal bearing and kingly worth, so long suppressed, need to be manifested once again, unsullied by all the unkingly habits.etc. that come of living as a gipsy among gipsies. But this cannot be achieved simply by taking him back to his father's castle. He will need training, both to cure the old habits and to bring on kingly ones. The soul likewise, when newly raised up by Iruvineioppu and Malaparipāka, will still need training, both to eradicate the old and confer the new.

What must be taken away, and what newly given, is clear from our earlier discussion. Iruvineioppu and Malaparipāka have ensured that the soul breaks free from Asat in all its forms; this must become a finally settled fact, and the soul which through Śaktinipāta now has Śiva's Śakti must follow its working without hindrance or limit.

In the present chapter the course of this two-fold training will be described. Śuddha Āvasthā involves a process of purification; as is clear from it being said to have five stages. The first is called Nirmalajāgara, a wakeful and mala-free state. This followed on the Yoga-turīyātīta Āvasthā, a state where yoga-practices suppress the organs so completely that for some time they cease to function. But this suppression is forced, external, and temporary; it lasts only while those yoga-practices are continued. In Nirmalajāgara Avasthā the soul, guided by the guru, realises that it has really nothing to do with the organs (as Asat-objects); and it turns away in inner revulsion from those things which in the Yoga Āvasthā had to be forcibly kept away from.

In Nirmalasvapna Āvasthā this inner revulsion from all Asat is confirmed by overcoming the evil of habit; so in Nirmalasushupti Āvasthā the soul stands totally free from mala; a high but not the highest state for the soul. Next comes Nirmalaturīya Āvasthā (total surrender to the Śakti). Finally there is Nirmalaturyatīta Āvasthā, a state of complete and final devotion to Śiva, of total release. This is described in more detail in Chapter VII.

The material presented in Chapter VI appears in different

order in different sources, and is presented from different points of view. Usually it is set out as Ātmandārśana, Ātmanśuddhi and Ātmanlābha (enlightenment; purification; soul's reward). Ātmandārśana coincides more or less with Nirmalajāgara Āvasthā; Ātmanśuddhi with Nirmalasvapna and Nirmalasushupti; and Ātmanlābha with Nirmalaturīya and Nirmalaturīyātīta.

A more detailed survey of the development in Śuddha Āvasthā is given in Uṇmaineṛiviḷakka:

Knowing the forms taken by tattvas from Earth to Śiva (tattva), is Tattvarūpa. Knowing that tattvas from Earth to Śiva (tattva) are matter and mala, is Tattvadarśana. Not remaining in tattvas from Earth to Śiva (tattva), in all their variety, but breaking free of tattvas by the Aruḷ of Śiva, is Tattvaśuddhi. (1)

Ātmanrūpa is getting away from enveloping darkness and knowing one's own self, through Jñāna. Ātmandarśana is not doing anything at all oneself. When your own knowledge is put aside, and you enter Jñēya (Śiva as the real thing known), and your self is not around at all, that is Ātmanśuddhi. So the revealed scriptures teach. (2)

Knowing fully that One is there, who is all This Here, who looks like the beautiful Śakti and in mercy considers souls held fast by mala; who creates and brings to an end; who protects souls by abolishing rebirth: knowing all that is Śivarūpa. (3)

The 'foot of Siva' is reached when the Śakti is present in the soul, which no longer speaks of 'I' and 'mine'. The 'face of Siva' is reached when someone sees everything as Śiva. His crown is to be speechless, healthily. To know all this, and to want nothing else, not to enter tattvas, not to revert to the original state (kevala Āvasthā), not to be submersed in the false delusion of oneself being Brahman, but to identify oneself with the marvellous One and achieve that complete bliss which is so hardly come by, now that is Śivadarśana. (4)

To realise the true nature and value of anything that bothers you, and to know the nature of the soul being bothered, to realise the incomparable grace, higher than the soul, and the nature of Śiva, and to deal through his grace with whatever you come across, to realise that things move nothing (do not act); that it is Śiva who thinks, who errs, who is generous intelligence; and that the things you experience are also Śiva; and so to unite yourself with the real object, all that is Śivayoga. (5)

If a mukta (perfected one) commits a crime, or takes to murder,

larceny, drunkenness; or even strays in unrighteous ways, even breaking caste — and such mistakes may well occur — provided he does nothing off his own bat, but identifies with the Aruḷ, then will the Lord identify with his body and his soul, will eat, sleep move and make choice of various pleasures (i.e. experience joy and sorrow and provide what is needed for them to occur and be enjoyed). He will be inseparably one with that mukta, and make him over into Himself. That then is exalted Śivabhoga, as the scriptures say. (6)

Śuddha Āvasthā here consists of several stages:

1. Tattvarūpa, getting to know the tattvas.
2. Tattvadarśana, and that we differ from them.
3. Tattvaśuddhi, getting free of them.
4. Ātmanrūpa, getting to know what the soul is.
5. Ātmandarśana, giving up self-sufficiency.
6. Ātmanśuddhi, surrendering to Śiva's Śakti.
7. Śivarūpa, getting to know the god within (immanent).
8. Śivadarśana, and the god beyond (Śiva transcendent).
9. Śivayoga, seeing everything as Śiva.
10. Śivabhoga, and uniting with him, renouncing our initiative and individuality.

The following discussion employs a slightly different division of the stages. After distinguishing Ātmandarśana, Ātmanśuddhi and Ātmanlabha it then indicates who guides and instructs the soul as it enters Śuddha Āvasthā, and how this is done. Then we portray how the soul's three faculties are purified and healed, being completely freed of mala and equipped with Śiva's Śakti for knowledge, action, and desire. Then comes a section explaining how the soul is released from mala; and how the evil of habit can be removed. In conclusion we indicate the means for purification and for getting rid of the evil of habit. That will conclude Chapter VI.

It is now obvious how Śuddha āvasthā differs from other āvasthā. During kevala āvasthā the soul is completely under the dominion of Āṇavamala. In sakala āvasthā it is governed both by three-fold mala and by Śiva. During Śuddha āvasthā it is totally under Śiva's influence. Śuddha āvasthā is a very considerable advance, being as bright day to the dark night of kevala āvasthā, and to the dawning day of sakala āvasthā.

Śuddha āvasthā is also called the jñāna stage or Sanmarga (good way); it recalls the entire development, leading by Caryā, Kriyā and Yoga stages to culminate in jñāna; hence 'Sanmarga'.

EVOLUTION OF SOUL IN ŚUDDHA ĀVAṢTHĀ

Iruvineioppu

|

Malaparipāka

|

Gurudarśana

|

Soul realises true nature of eternal substances

|

Purify soul's faculties of

Knowledge: reject wrong means, objects; use proper means
Action: free from karma, enable correct action Desire

This results in

|

overcoming the evil of habit

|

Surrender to Śiva's Śakti
(no more self-sufficiency)

|

Surrender to Śiva
(mystical union)

(Which may all take several lives)

In Śuddha avasthā everything that happens to the soul happens through Śiva. He, it is who makes the soul pure, in his Work of Enlightenment (no. 5) called Aruḷal (grace evident, in contrast to Work no. 4, of Shrouding). This work is performed by Śiva's Śakti, here called Aruḷśakti to constrast with the Tirōdhānaśakti of fourth Work. And Śuddha āvasthā is called a state of grace as opposed to a state of darkness (kevala āvasthā) or of marul, confusion (sakala āvasthā). This makes it quite clear that Śaiva siddhānta takes Aruḷ in the sense of enlightenment. Śiva in his grace enlightens the soul by granting it true knowledge and removing everything opposed thereto. Dr. Pope in his book on Tiruvācaka takes Aruḷ as grace in the Christian sense, but that is misleading.

3. Release made Complete by the Sadguru

Iruvineioppu Malaparipāka and Śaktinipāta complete the soul's transition to the Jñāna stage. It is now entitled to achieve true knowledge, as required for salvation; provided it has broken free of the merely deceptive knowledge of everyday, and has acquired the one and only right means to knowledge, the Śakti. At this stage the soul resembles a man long blind but now made to see. For him to benefit from his now-seeing eye it must be turned upon objects. Just having a good eye does not ensure that he sees anything; he also needs something to see, and the eye must look at this object. Thus even providing a soul with Śiva's Śakti, an infallible eye, does not guarantee it true knowledge, not unless it actually uses this eye in learning by the Sakti of that indwelling and now unhindered Supreme Good; and provided that object can be reached by the Śakti-eye in a way the soul can understand. Now Śiva, the Supreme Good is no doubt present in his Śakti and therefore also in the soul, a fact which the soul has yet to realise. First it must be led to seek within itself that Supreme Good which down the ages it has sought outside itself. Śiva is well aware of this need, and so approaches the soul initially as a distinct person to get acquainted with, and a light to reveal the true relation of soul to Śiva and to show Śiva as that Supreme Good in non-dual relation to the soul. All this transpires in Śiva's appearance as Satguru, the Guru-darśana.

The easiest way to present this wide-ranging topic will be to consider first Śiva's appearing as Satguru, then the need for this, then its results, and finally the mode of instruction he adopts.

(a) *Śiva appears as Sadguru*

Satguru means good teacher, but our sources make it quite clear that it does not refer to ordinary religious teachers, but to a personification of Śiva himself, as hinted at earlier and still to be described in detail. Some remarks of Meykaṇḍadeva and his commentators give sufficient evidence on this point:

For these (ripe) souls the Supreme himself comes as guru to instruct.

Comment. (Objection by Sāmkhya, Nyāya, and others) Those who by these means lead others to Jñāna are people like ourselves, as are science teachers. In reply Meykaṇḍa makes the above assertion, in the course of resolving Part Two of the Sūtra.

To those souls which have as explained completed Caryā Kriyā and Yoga and so achieved Malaparipāka and Śaktinipāta, and who long for Tattva-Jñāna, to them does the Supreme (who had been in them all along, piloting) knowing the time, appear as Guru and ensure Jñāna. (*Bodha* VIII.2, *thesis*)

Further statements indicate that the Śiva who appears as Guru is the same Śiva already present in the soul and linked to it non-dually:

Śiva, the clever dancer, who is there in souls as their intelligence, comes in disguise to those who have made it to the jñāna path which none can describe. (*Prak* II.31)

The king who takes on visible form without leaving souls is that Aruḷ who was there in souls while yet ignorant, and supports them. (*Payan* VI.1)

The Satguru, then, is a personification of Śiva, who has always been present in souls. From all time he was most closely linked to souls, though they saw him not and knew him not. And now he comes to them visibly as Satguru, appearing as some sort of distinct and external entity confronting them, though actually the Śiva within. As the soul's intelligence, indissolubly advaita-linked to it, he is so to speak in an I-relation to the soul, but for the purpose of revelation he appears as a distinct person; not as a Thou in one of the forms described in II. 7, but in a form which will not reveal him as Śiva but conceals his true form in a disguise, as a 'third person'.

This does not apply to souls of all classes, but only to sakalar (including humans). To souls of Vijñānakalar he appears in the first person, and to Pralayākalar souls in the second.

To souls afflicted only with Āṇavamala (Vijñānakalar) the Supreme himself grants jñāna directly. To Pralayākalar souls (fettered with both Āṇavamala and karmamala) he appears (in his true form) as guru, and instructs them directly. To sakalar souls (afflicted with all three mala) he appears as a guru in human form and teaches them, hidden in this form.

Comment. He instructs Vijñānakalar souls in the first person, Pralayākalar in the second and Sakalar souls in the third person. The first two methods of instruction are direct, the last indirect. (*Bodha* VIII.2 *Example* 1)

To Vijñānakalar souls, journeying along the way to Mukti, the Supreme appears within, as himself, and clears away one mala. To the Pralayākalar who practise love he appears as God, and eliminates two malas. To Sakalar

souls, living in this world, he appears as one of them, meets them, clears away three malas, and makes them his servants. It is his nature so to do. Not that in so doing he shows his dance, his black leg, his green half (Śakti), the Ganges flowing down from his head, the crescent moon, his snake form, the eye of fire in his forehead, his drum, his banner of fire, his girdle of snakes, his tiger-skin, his foot at rest (which submerges the pious in total bliss), his swinging foot (by which he gives knowledge to the holy ones), his ankle bracelet, his toe-ring, his hero's medals for defeating deceptive karma and doing away with rebirth; no, he hides all these things. Keen to transport us to imperishable bliss the never-born Supreme took human birth, the nameless one answered to Saṃbandhanātha, eats as men do, sleeps as they, fears and rejoices like a man. Praised be his name! (*Kroḍai* II)

Śiva thus appears to souls on earth, not as Creator, Preserver, Destroyer, nor as worshipful, but as a human guru, without no signs of divinity clear to the eyes. How should this appearance of Śiva as guru be understood? Should we think of Śiva being incarnate, as Vishṇu had incarnations in Indian mythology?. Or is it like God's incarnation in Christ? The passage just quoted from Kroḍai II suggests a real incarnation, for it says the *never-born Supreme took human birth, the nameless one answers to Saṃbandhanātha, eats as man do, sleeps as they, fears and rejoices like a man. Praised be his name!* But in another passage Umāpati, the author of Kroḍai, rejected the thought of Śiva being (in the ordinary sense) incarnate. This passage comes in Saṅkalpa-nirākaraṇa, where the Śaivavāda is being refuted:

You may be wondering about that saying, that the guru is the incarnation of the Aruḷ. But I tell you that the immortal Supreme does not take on any form of Māyā. (You may say he does, to help souls to salvation, but I tell you) that anyone taking on that form is one of us.

Again, in the Siddhiār-Parapaksha the ten incarnations of Vishṇu are criticized one by one and made fun of; which is another reason against supposing Siddhānta could have Śiva born as a guru. Sat and Asat are too far apart for a direct link between them to be conceivable.

There is another way that Śiva's appearance as Satguru might be explained. When circumstances so require, and some soul is ripe for higher instruction, then Śiva by his almighty will makes himself — as he surely can — for a set period a special body which humans take to be human; and as such he appears.

The story of Māṇikkavācaka's conversion favours this view. He composed the poem Tiruvācaka some centuries earlier than the sources we are studying. For Siddhāntists he is one of their most revered members and orthodox saints. This story is not a legend for them, but historical fact, and much used in what we might call their practical theology. So we retail it here, as showing how Siva's appearance as Satguru could be thought to have occurred.

Māṇikkavācaka, 'whose words are as precious stones', was minister at the court of the king of Madura. One day the king heard that many ships carrying valuable horses had reached the harbour of Tiruperunturai (a great harbour and sacred place, 27 English miles from Tondiman's Puthukottha, now called Avudaiyar-Kōyil; though recent scholars locate it on the western coast of Travancore). The king sent Māṇikkavācaka there with a great treasure to buy the horses. While he was on his way, Śiva announced to the surrounding gods that he was going to visit the earth, in the form of a guru, to instruct a disciple who could make truth triumph once again in Tamil land. (Māṇikkavācaka lived at the time of the struggle between Saivism and Jainism). Śiva came down to earth, the gods accompanying him as disciples, and sat down dressed as a guru under a trichilia thorn tree in a small copse in the neighbourhood of Tiruperunturai. Māṇikkavācaka had meanwhile reached Tiruperunturai with his retinue. Hearing an unusual sound, due to Śiva's 999 companions reciting sacred Śiva-scriptures, he sent a messenger to investigate, and learnt that a holy and venerable guru was sitting under a trichilia thorn-tree surrounded by countless devotees. Now Māṇikkavācaka had for years been longing for a guru. Hastening to the tree he found a holy man marked with dazzling white ash, with a third, fiery eye in the middle of his forehead, and a book in his hand[19].

What's that book? he dared to ask.

Śivajñānabodha.

What is Śiva? He ventured further, What is Jñāna? What is Bodha?

Śiva, the god-guru replies, is the everlasting incomparable Divine Being. Jñāna is knowing what He Is. Bodha is setting forth that knowledge correctly.

No sooner had the minister heard this these words than he fell at the feet of the guru, crying 'From now on I renounce all inclination for worldly

---

19. For Śaivites it is a most important religious duty to smear the forehead and other body parts with white ash. The third eye is usual, in representations of Śiva. Mythology tells how in loveplay his partner covered his eyes, so Śiva had a third eye come out of his forehead so the world should not lose its light.

riches and glory! I your servant am worse than a dog, O free me from bondage to matter. Take me as your slave, O king of my soul.' One of Śiva's retinue now puts in a word for him, asking Śiva to teach him the secret of emancipating grace. Śiva agrees and tells his companions to get everything ready. In the copse a grand cell is constructed with costly silken curtains decorated with fragrant blossoms and inummerable precious stones, and a seat made in the midst thereof for the divine guru. The novice is bathed with Ganges water, sprinkled with scent and by further ritual made ready to receive saving instruction. He then offers the guru a dish of expensive fruits, and the instruction begins. First he learns the mantra and the sacred scriptures (Vedas). Then he worships the sacred feet of the god-guru and reverentially sets them on his head, as a sign of complete devotion. Finally all the secrets of Śaiva siddhāntin philosophy are divulsed, thus freeing Māṇikkavācaka from all the fetters of three-fold mala.

In this conversion-story, as in the Purāṇas and the more edifying scriptures, the prevailing assumption is that Śiva appears in a form constructed especially for that occasion. But in the philosophical writings we use as sources, this is not asserted directly — or denied either. But they do indicate fairly consistently that Śiva uses existing bodies, viz. bodies of people who have already attained salvation (Jīvanmukta). Thus in later writings we often find Meykaṇḍadeva and other Siddhāntin teachers, who are said to have attained Release, addressed as divine gurus and so identified with Śiva and described with all the Śiva-guru's epithets.

He has made me his own, he has made me like Him, his Śakti knows how. He is defender of the saints. He appeared to me as the Śivayogi living in Tiruviyalūr, and halted the driving wheel of rebirth. (*Paḍiār* 96)

He who appeared to Meykaṇḍa in Veṇṇeynallūr, he who in appearing hides his forehead-eye and his black throat, and in ready souls dispels mala here on earth; him if you have met and known, then realise that intelligence, the Śiva within, is not separate from souls. (*Irupā* 1)

Again in Viñāveṇba the author identifies his teacher with Śiva appearing as guru.

Presumably the view of the guru taken in these sayings originated in a docetic appearance of Śiva in human form; which (whatever the original intention) could be regarded as miraculous. Payan and Bodha (but not their commentaries) clearly start from here. Later writings show a contrary tendency, playing down the miraculous. For them the jīvanmukta is inseparably and

indestructibly united to Śiva, almost identical with him; and so can himself act as Satguru.

We must not exaggerate this difference, or imagine that the idea of a docetic incarnation is here being displaced by that of apotheosis. In both cases Śiva really does appear. In both cases he is presented as concealing himself behind a human form. The difference between them is only this, that Śiva was earlier shown as constructing a human form, but later is said to use one he already has, for as we shall see a jīvanmukta is simply a body of Śiva for him to live and work in just as he likes. (If we had already studied the theory of jīvanmukta we would see why the Satguru, the hidden Śiva, should be sought and found in the jīvanmukta.) Taking note of both views we could say that according to Śaiva siddhānta Śiva appears to ripe souls as guru, taking the form of a jīvanmukta if one is available but otherwise taking a form specially prepared and looking like the human body of a jīvanmukta.

How exactly does Śiva use a human body for instructing ripe souls? Bodha answers this question:

Thesis. The Supreme himself comes as guru for these souls and instructs them.

Reason. He is present inseparably in a spiritual form.

Comment. Some take his 'presence' in the general sense of inspiration: 'the immortal never takes on mortality, else would he be as one of us (a soul). So he indwells a guru, to instruct.' No, his indwelling is special, as the Reason indicates. The Supreme is not hidden as butter is in unchurned milk, but is actually visible like the butter in buttermilk; for he takes pure souls to his body.

You may think the Supreme comes to us in a guru in the general way in which he is there in everything but hidden like butter in unchurned milk, but this idea is not appropriate, for then he could have just as well have appeared as the guru of another religion. (*Bodha* VII.2)

To explain how Śiva could appear as guru, and just how he does it, the notion of Advaita is required; that Śiva while different from other substances is linked to them inseparably and everywhere. But some care is needed in applying this idea. The 'original' advaita discussed earlier (II.8) would lead us to think of Śiva functioning as guru through any soul and any object you like, being indeed non-different from these also (though not quite, owing to mala). Taken in this way the notion of advaita would lead us away from what we were trying to explain.

Instead we should think of a final, perfected Advaita in full and free operation, unhindered by any mala (as we shall see when considering the nature of Release). We shall now see Śiva as present in the jīvanmukta (who comes as guru), present specially and active specially (as indeed the more general presence has made possible). He is not there as butter in milk but as in buttermilk (not inseparably mixed with Mala, but as a distinguishable entity).

It is said 'I knew it was Śiva (who appeared to me and taught me)'. Must we then say just how he comes to earth? I tell you that here on earth we see salt taking solid form (which in the sea is fluid in form); and Śiva's coming to earth must be thought of in that way. (*Paḍiār* 91)

Not that every jīvanmukta is automatically a Satguru. But Śiva may use any one of them, to function as Satguru as from a hide; may, but need not. A special and deliberate decision from Śiva is required, for a jīvanmukta to become a Satguru, by which Śiva seeing him ready for the most advanced instruction, comes to possess him. What the guru does is not just inspired by Śiva, but is his direct doing. The man Śiva decides to appear as is just a mask, with Śiva hiding behind; like a hunter who covers himself with a deerskin so as not to scare off the deer he is stalking.

Bodha VIII.2 example 3 explains how Śiva could appear in this special way:

Milk and tears (of joy), my pupil, arise in a mother though never there before. Now he, present though formless, is invisible as a shadow on water; who is going to recognise him, unless he takes some visible form?

Comment. Some take the statement, that he comes as guru to Sakalar souls only, as metaphorical. By this example he shows it is to be taken literally.

In a mother, my wise pupil, come milk and tears, the visible signs of love, so that anyone can see the invisible love for the child, although they were not there before the mother saw the child. Who is going to recognise the Supreme who is like a shadow on water, formless and invisible, yet present in souls, unless he makes himself visible in the form of a guru and gives teaching?

These are both embodiments of love, as they appear only when required.

As fish live in water, the water must have air in it, so there must be shadows too; but as these are indistinguishable from the water they are in, they like it are invisible. That is how the Śivacaitanya (intelligence) exists invisibly along with the Ātmancaitanya, which we know as object for the I-consciousness.

Just as mother-love appears in a visible form in milk and tears, so also Śiva's love for souls who yearn for him can take visible form, as guru; for the new-born child the mother's milk is such a token of love, and souls need some such visible token just as much.

(b) *Why Śiva has to appear as Sadguru?*

Iruvineioppu and Malaparipāka make it possible for the soul to break free from mala; and by Śaktinipāta it can then be linked to Śiva alone. Still these two changes need to actually take place; which can only happen if the soul has fully grasped the true nature of mala and of the Highest Good. Cārya, Kriyā and Yoga will have given some inklings of the true nature of all that is; the soul's entry into Iruvineioppu is evidence for this. But inklings are not actual true knowledge. The soul yearns to leave the world for Śiva: yearns, but does not leave. Knowing that Śiva, and not the world, is the Highest Good, still it does not possess that Good. Śiva provides through Śaktinipāta his own Śakti, the only effective help for achieving that Good. But the soul does not know how to use that help, or where to search for Śiva, or how to recognise him. What a hopeless search! So Śiva must take the soul on further, helping it to find him and recognise him. He is of course there in the soul, but that presence and company is no help, for the soul can no more recognise him than we can see the shadows which must be there in water, as air is there. (cf. Bodha VIII.2, ex. 3) Śiva must reveal himself to souls in a form they can recognise, as he does when he appears to them in the form of a guru.

But why does he appear as a Guru, i.e. in disguise? Three reasons are given. First, an appearance *incognito* accords with his nature, with his whole way of doing things.

Who in the world will recognise him if to confirm grace to us he comes in a manner suggesting that he does not grant it?

Comment. The world cannot know, that the guru-form really is the Supreme Being, which the human form cloaks like a mantle, so that just as his four works of creation, maintenance, destruction and cloaking are done without revealing himself, so he may also work enlightenment as if he were not doing it. (*Payan* V.3)

By nature, Śiva is invisible. He accordingly works in secret, not appearing himself. Appearing in the visible form of a guru is a complete novelty, unlike his usual way of doing things, though not

actually contradicting it. For in that visible form he performs an invisible work, since souls not yet ripe enough to see him may look on him physically but still do not recognise him as Śiva. For the world Śiva even in the visible form of a guru remains the invisible god, performing an invisible task.

Secondly, Śiva appears in disguise for the sake of the souls he has come to help. Were he to appear in his undisguised sovereignty, they would be flee from him in terror. This does not apply to Vijñānakalar souls, so he appears to them without disguise. More can also be expected of Pralayākalar souls, who take up the place of gods in the universe, so he does not appear to them in human form, but as God. But to Sakalar souls he appears as a man, so as not scare them. In this case the guru-form serves as a sort of bait.

The world does not realise that the disguise is to capture men and get them in his power, it is like a bait.

Comment. The human guru-form is adopted out of kindness (by aruḷ) to get hold of men, not scared off by seeing a higher, divine form, just as people hunting a beast or bird set up an appropriate decoy. So people need not take it as disguise. (*Payan* V.5)

In the form of a man he can easily approach worthy souls and carry on the work of enlightenment. A bird deceived by a decoy and caught will soon realise what the decoy really was. And ripe souls who at first take the god-guru for a man soon spot the deception and recognise God in the guru.

Finally, for unripe souls Śiva appears in disguise so that they do not see him, for at their present stage that could only harm them.

Souls darkened by lies (Āṇavamala) are without knowledge. The two embodiments of truth, which form the principle of knowledge (for souls), are quite beyond their grasp.

Comment. Those given over to a transitory worldly life, and whose understanding is shrouded by Āṇavamala, cannot know the value of wisdom, or recognise the two great personifications of truth, the principles of knowledge, Aruḷ and the guru-form which comes into appearance through the Aruḷ. (*Payan* V.4)

Souls not yet in Iruvineioppu will not recognise Śiva in his disguise as a guru, even if their eyes see him, for their eyes are not fit to make out the divine. Nor will they understand his teaching, even though their ears do hear it, for their reason is not capable of grasping the divine. What they see is only the body. They do

not see the aruḷ-śakti hidden in the body. What they hear are mere words, without grasping the truth they contain. They have eyes and see not, ears and they do not hear. For them the form of the god-guru is an ordinary human form, and his words the words of an ordinary man.

Why is Śiva disguised as a guru, and not as anything else? The answer given is that this disguise suits the work which at this stage must be done on the soul, and because at this stage the soul will surrender to Śiva only when encountered as a guru. The spiritual state of the soul at this stage is like that of a thirsty man searching for water; the soul thirsting for true knowledge yearns to find a teacher who can instruct it. If Śiva were to appear in any other form than that of a guru, people might ignore him; but if he takes the form of a guru they will feel drawn to him, hoping to learn the truth from him. The guru-form is thus the most appropriate.

But why does Śiva himself need to give the instruction? Why can't people acquire the knowledge they long for and need via teachers and books, in the ordinary way, or through the senses? Must we expect Śiva to make such a miraculous appearance? In Payan V.2 the question, does he have to appear as guru? Aren't learned people good enough? Receives this answer: 'A secret sickness is known to intimates. And to bystanders?' Since ever Śiva has dwelt in the soul, and he alone knows its true state and what it needs. That is why he needs to appear in person and give instruction.

Then again, Śiva has to appear so the soul will believe the news of its high worthiness and turn it to good effect.

The son of a king, detained in the company of gipsies, grows up among them and lives among them unaware of who he really is. Later the king says to him, 'You are my son!', separates him from the gipsies and with insignia of honour shows him equal to himself, cherishes and fosters him. The soul likewise, having come into the power of those oppressive gipsies, the five senses, does not recognise its helper (Śiva). He then appears as a gracious guru, separates the eternal soul in its misery from those gipsies, removes mala, makes the soul equal to himself, and sets it under his blossom-feet. (*Siddhiar* VIII.1)

If a king's son who from earliest youth grew up among the gipsies and knew nothing of his true origin were told that he was after all the son of a king, this news would seem incredible to him, especially if it came from just anyone. Even if the news was

believed, that would still not restore the recipient to his birthright. Coming from some ordinary person that news, far from improving his position, would actually worsen it, for in addition to his previous suffering he would now also bewail his unlucky fate and distrust those who kidnapped him. But if the king comes to him in person, and says 'You are my son', confirming that with tokens of love and insignia of honour, then the son's position is entirely different. That shows why Śiva has to give instruction to souls in person, to achieve the result he desires.

The state of the soul before instruction provides for Siddhānta a further reason why that instruction must be given by Śiva himself; as indicated in Payan V.7:

You may bring a mongoose to someone with snakebite, but even so the poison will disappear only by the efforts of a genuine hypnotist. In whom then will darkness be destroyed?

Comment. The poison does not disappear, even if a mongoose is brought near. But it does disappear by someone taking on that form (of a mongoose); and the darkness of Āṇavamala will also be dispelled by the holy glance of the guru. The Supreme is from ever one with the soul, but Pāśa does not disappear unless he appears as guru. This is said in reference to Sakalar souls.

Between snake and mongoose there is implacable enmity. If the mongoose can get hold of the snake, it kills it. Now someone with snakebite in a sense has the snake inside, i.e. as poison. But just bringing a mongoose into external contact with the man's body will not kill or render harmless the snake which is in his body as poison. For that, it must get into the man's body, as the snake did. That is what the hypnotist achieves. Taking on the role of the mongoose, he hypnotises the man, who then sees him as a mongoose and eventually sees himself as one too, and that does the trick. The poison disappears. To achieve this the hypnotist must first become that which he is getting someone else to become. Unless he first plays the part of an mongoose he cannot cast someone else in that part.

The poison in souls is called Āṇavamala. This can be eliminated only by knowledge (mongoose). The man bitten (soul afflicted by Āṇavamala) cannot find healing in any external power. Knowledge (mongoose) has to be forced into the soul so it can fight it out there with Āṇavamala (poison). How then does that knowledge find its way into the soul? It is in the soul already,

unrecognised, just as the idea of a mongoose is there already in the bitten man. But knowledge which though present is not recognised cannot expel the mala, any more than the mere thought of an mongoose can get rid of the poison of snakebite. First the soul must identify itself with knowledge, as the man bitten identified himself with the mongoose.

How does this come about? In the case of snakebite it comes about through hypnotism, the actions of the hypnotist working on the idea the man already has of the mongoose. And the soul likewise can be hypnotised into identifying with knowledge, as knowledge in the form of Śakti is there already to provide a starting-point for the hypnotism. But not everyone can hypnotise. Anyone wanting to get someone to identify with an mongoose must first be able to do so himself. Similarly someone anxious to get a soul sick with Āṇavamala-poison to identify with knowledge and so find healing must first be himself identified with knowledge. But where is such a personification of knowledge to be found? Only in Śiva, whose nature is pure, complete intelligence. Only by one who is knowledge absolute can the soul be brought to identify with knowledge and so break free of mala.

The nature of blessedness provides a further reason why Śiva needs to appear.

The Great Knower stands surety for that blessedness which is beyond everything material. But unless he comes, who will know?

Comment. O Lord, you who possess perfect wisdom, you who open the way of release, you who surpass the six adhvan from Mantra to Kalā, who will find the way, if you do not appear as guru? (*Payaṇ* V.9)

The total blessedness to which the soul is led is not achievable in any of the many worlds, not even in the world of the highest gods. It surpasses the six adhvan, i.e. is totally non-material, so can be achieved only in something non-material, i.e. God. If total blessedness had some relation to matter, souls might perhaps achieve it without Śiva's direct enlightenment. But the fact is that total blessedness is right outside the material sphere, and no man or even god who is in some other, lower material sphere can possibly provide information about such blessedness or arrive at it. That can be done only by Śiva, who alone is not subject to matter. So instruction by Śiva in person is absolutely necessary, for achieving blessedness.

Payan V.10 emphasises by an analogy the need for Śiva to

appear as guru. 'Knowledge can arise without him only if fire can flash from crystal without the sun'. If the sun's rays play through crystal on combustible material, it catches fire. The crystal has an innate power to light up, but it will not without the sun's rays manage to set something else on fire.

In this analogy fire is compared to saving knowledge, sunbeams to a guru, and crystal to the soul. The soul does have some knowledge, thanks to Śiva's Śakti indwelling it from ever, but not enough to confer complete knowledge and make it worthy of total blessedness. So this partly-knowing soul (crystal and its native gleam) still needs a guru (sunbeam) as well. The soul's existing capacity for knowledge must be much further developed, by the guru, than the material means of knowledge Māyā provided could achieve. For it has to acquire greatly superior knowledge, which Māyā-organs cannot deal with.

In Bodha VIII.3 Meykaṇḍa explicitly draws attention to this fact, that the natural organs of understanding by which souls recognise the material things of the world do not make instruction by Śiva himself superfluous.

Thesis. Souls are confused by the five senses and do not know themselves.

Comment. Here the Śivasaṃkrāntavāda-Śaiva object: The five senses which transmit knowledge of objects are adequate to transmit tattva-jñāna: There is no need for the Supreme to appear as guru. In reply the thesis is re-stated and the third part of the sūtra explained.

Reason. The senses display only what is there to show (impressions), like colours in a crystal.

Comment. This backs up the thesis, as against those who ask how organs which transmit knowledge can cause confusion. As various colours brought near a crystal show themselves, suppressing its native gleam, so do the five senses suppress the soul's nature, and reveal to it only those objects they are now displaying.

Example. We take the nature of the five senses as our own nature, just as crystal displays a variety of colours that lie near it; but if someone were able on reflection to realise he is distinct from those deceptive senses, as the colours are distinct from the crystal, then he seeing that lie as a lie would become a servant of Śiva, the true reality.

Comment. Some say, If the senses thus display their perceptions, surely this is a sort of knowledge, even if the Supreme is there instructing as a guru (provided the senses are still present)? In reply, the means to

knowledge is specified, and previous statements reasserted. Crystal has the general property of presenting as its own the nature of various colours in its vicinity. And the soul regularly tends by a law of assimilation to present the nature of its senses as its own. When the soul recognises this tendency, it will realise that the several senses which work on it are different from it, as the colours are different from the crystal that reflects them. Which convinces it that its own true nature is that of Śivasat, since the general quality it derived from the senses was now seen as deceptive, their nature being Asat, unlike its own. Which realisation caused the soul to belong to Śivasat.

At this point some object that knowing is not possible while organs are present as they only reflect impressions. Remove the organs and the soul is back in the kevala state. So how can the soul recognise its nature? In reply he indicates how the soul comes to understand its nature, even if the senses are present; and this proof establishes the Reason as correct.

The soul is able by its organs to recognise certain objects, but it still needs a divine guru. The knowledge transmitted through the organs is unreliable, for the senses do not show things as they really are, but only as they appear to those organs. For the soul to form an accurate opinion of things as they really are, it must stop looking at them through the spectacles of the senses, which tend to make them look different. Instead, it must give up using the senses to discover things with. Not that this is a relapse into the kevala state, for the power of mala over that particular soul is broken and it now has a much better and reliable organ of understanding, Śiva's Śakti. The objects being studied must evade the five senses, in reaching this new organ; though this does not require those senses to be destroyed. Śiva is now the only means of knowledge, as all else is Asat or is influenced by it. So for the soul to come to a perfect and unclouded knowledge, it is absolutely necessary that Śiva appear.

(c) *Instruction by the Guru*

The instruction given by Śiva as guru to mature souls is graphically depicted in Payan VI:

Question. What will the Lord teach if he appears in the form of a guru?

Answer. The One, the Many, the darkness, karma, the two Māyā. These six are beginningless.

Comment. Six realities are without beginning. God, who is One; souls,

which are many; Āṇavamala, which takes the form of darkness, karmamala, the two sorts of Māyā (pure and impure).

Summary. This states briefly what the six eternal realities are. (VI.2)

Question. If these are all beginningless, which do we need to know?

Answer. That you may live (achieve blessedness) know there is a doer, and deeds done, and their fruits, and one executor.

Comment. My pupil, you must know that you have a soul, which accomplishes deeds both good and bad; that those deeds are yours, which were done by you, the soul; as are their fruits of joy and pain; that there is one lord who collects the deeds and makes souls consume (their fruits). This you must know, to achieve blessedness.

Ignorance of these things leads to arrogance, saying 'I' and 'mine' and to the evil of transmigration. (VI.3)

What Śiva does in the soul is contrary to what Āṇavamala does; as indeed his nature is opposed to that of Āṇavamala, which works ignorance in the soul, while Śiva (as guru), helps souls to true knowledge. He teaches first about the eternal substances, Pati, Paśu, Paśa; though it is not much good just knowing that they exist. Then he teaches the pupil how these entities relate to the soul. Once this is realised, the soul knows its history and its fate. Knowing its history precisely, the soul sees that progress is possible, that a better fate can be had by avoiding the lapses and errors previously committed and now seen for what they are. Śiva has the pupil confront his own history by explaining the law of karma, and how it operates. This knowledge restrains the soul from committing deeds fateful by their consequences. Āṇavamala made souls ignorant of the karmic law and thus brought them under its sway; so true knowledge of this law is the only thing that will get them to abstain from action altogether.

What is it that souls need to know about the law of karma? They should realize that thinking one needs to do things is going beyond their station and trespassing on God's domain, for busybodying is not what souls are there for. Nay more: that all their deeds are crimes calling for punishment; that no-one can avoid the consequences of their deeds; that God sees to it that souls consume the fruits of their deeds, and that this is all for their own good, to free them from the domination of the law of karma.

Question. Can't one realize this for oneself, to achieve blessedness?

Answer. As the body lives through the soul, so the soul which is in the body lives through its link with pure knowledge.

Comment. The body is linked with the soul, acting jointly and inseparably with it. And the souls in those bodies are linked with omnipresent Jñāna (Śiva's Śakti), forming one inseparable entity. As the soul is in the body, so is Jñāna in the soul. (VI.4)

The commentator regards this as an answer to the question asked; which seems implausible. Both context and content suggest that this speech contains further teaching given by the guru. The previous comment said doing karma is a sin (VI.3); mere bald assertion, unless supported in some way. As to karma, the instruction was don't do it; to fulfil this, it should first be shown possible to abstain altogether from action. The present comment (VI.4) provides these extras of which the previous one (VI.3) stood in need, by defining more closely the relation of the soul to Śiva or to his Śakti.

The relation of the Śakti of Śiva to the soul is here likened to the relation of the soul to the body, which in all its activity is dependent upon the soul. First, the soul should animate its body, giving it a mechanical capacity for activity. The soul also needs to take all the decisions about this activity. If the body used the soul just as power but shook free of its direction, i.e. of its superior, intelligence, some revolutionary act would result, which would not go unavenged. The well-being of the body is only then assured if it subjects itself completely and entirely to the authority and guidance of the soul, its proper lord. As the body cannot act at all without the soul, so also the soul can do nothing without the Śakti of Śiva; which provides the mechanical force to switch on the soul's capacities, thus making activity physically possible. But the Śakti is not there just as a mechanistic power-house for the soul's activity, but also and mainly as pure intelligence to guide and direct the soul in all its activity. Śiva's Śakti is not there in souls from ever just to provide physical force, but rather to influence the quality of the soul's activities. But the soul, deceived by Āṇavamala, makes use of the Śakti just as mechanical power, overlooking what the Śakti has done and should do as leader and guide, and sets itself up as lord and principle of its own actions. Which it isn't, really, for it is Āṇavamala that in fact directs all the soul's actions and governs their quality, pretending meanwhile that the soul is Lord, so as to hold undisturbed sway over it.

All actions of the soul which do not bring in Śiva's Śakti as governor and leader are really crimes against the Śakti, the lawful

mistress of the soul. That is why the soul needs to acknowledge the Śakti as sovereign, and from now on act only in harmony with it. It is to this that the guru means to move his pupil, by the teaching given in these various sayings: to acknowledge its treasons past and to give place in future for Śiva's Śakti, the place that is hers by right.

Question. How is this done through the Aruḷ?

Answer. Sunlight enables a crystal to display its native brilliance and the colours of other things; and Śiva's light shines like that.

Comment. The sun brings about the two-fold property of the crystal — that of absorbing into itself the different colours that fall upon it and reflecting them, while still retaining and displaying its own brilliance. And that is how the Jñānaśakti, the Lord's light, relates to the world. (VI.5)

He is the cause of everything, for the state of bondage as well as for the state of release.

Summary. These and the two previous sayings describe how God directs the world. (VI.5)

The previous saying (VI.4) indicated that Śiva's Śakti has to be the mechanical and decisive power for the soul in its activities. In the present one (VI.5) the guru teaches his pupil how it is that the Śakti's authority is not recognised in the time of bondage, not until release occurs; so the pupil can take care not to offend further against the Śiva's majesty, and may learn to respect his authority.

The soul is like a crystal, which has a double property. Its inner brilliance can shine forth; and it can absorb the colours of other objects nearby letting them shine out again as its own; but only if sunlight falls upon it. During the night, or if the crystal is shut away by an impenetrable object, it has no radiance at all. If something transparent comes between sun and crystal, so the sunlight comes through it to reach the crystal, then the crystal absorbs its colours and beams them out as if they were its own. If the sun shines directly on the crystal, without hindrance, then the native brilliance of the crystal shines forth almost like sunshine. Without the sun, the brilliance of the crystal cannot be seen. And if the sunlight comes only indirectly, the crystal's brilliance is only partly seen.

If we take the analogy like this we understand crystal as soul, and the crystal's native brilliance as the soul's threefold capacity

to know, to will and to act. The obstructions whose colours the crystal reflects are Māyā, and the products of Māyā; and the sun is Śiva and his Śakti. In the night the crystal is dark and does not shine; as in kevala state, where Āṇavamala is in complete control, and quite excludes any influence of the Śakti, the soul is totally ignorant, and incapable. At sunrise, the sun is usually hidden by clouds which the sunbeams must penetrate before they can reach the crystal, so the crystal does not shine as much as it might, but transmits a reflection of the clouds in their various colours. This is the state of souls in the sakala state, when these souls are afflicted with Māyā. This leaves room for the Śakti of Śiva to have an influence upon the soul, as the clouds do allow the sunbeams to affect the crystal. Souls do act and do know something, just so far as their subjection to Māyā may allow.

At midday, if the clouds have disappeared and brilliant sunshine comes, then the crystal is entirely under the sun's control, and shines marvellously. That is how the soul is in Śuddha-state. Māyā has disappeared, and Śiva can work unhindered upon the soul, and bring all its skills to their full development. Now the soul becomes filled with divine knowledge and blessedness, and is hardly distinguishable from God himself.

Why is the Śakti's authority not always recognised? This is not the fault of the Śakti, who is always the same, and in the same relation to the soul. It is because of the mala, which excludes the Śakti's influence from working on the soul. In kevela-state Mala envelopes the soul like a thick impenetratable husk, preventing the Śakti from guiding the soul as it ought, or even from animating it mechanically. In the sakala state, where this veil or sheath of Āṇavamala is a little lighter, this mechanical power of the Śakti does come into play, but not its authority for decision. In the Śuddha state when mala is completely removed, the Śakti can work unhindered upon the soul and bring pure knowledge, etc., to its full development within it. The guru teaches the scholar all this so that never again will he allow Mala, whose power over him was broken by iruvineioppu and malaparipāka, to become so powerful that it can force itself between Śiva and the soul, but will give himself up completely to the guidance and teaching of Śiva, and forswear self-willed activity.

Question. Why do I need to see through the Aruḷ? I can see by myself.

Answer. Between eye and object some light is required. And if there is

a light between, the soul can soon know the thing (illuminated), which it can't otherwise.

Comment. If the light of Jñāna has not its proper place in the centre of the thinking soul, then you won't know objects precisely, however precisely your external senses are brought to bear on them.

Summary. You can't learn just through words, without a guru. (VI.6)

If we do not allow the Śakti its due authority, we cut the soul off from knowledge and so from full blessedness. Having an eye and an object does not guarantee seeing; you need light as well, as a link between the two. No light, no sight, no matter how near the object and how sharp the eye. And the soul needs such mediating light, to recognise what is required in order to achieve complete blessedness. Śiva's Śakti is that light. If that light is not there, or if we shroud ourselves against it, we shall never know the truth, even though souls have that capacity, even though we hear it taught, or read of it in books.

Question. 'The soul knows through the Aruḷ'. What is that like?

Answer. It takes very little effort (by the soul) to set your senses to work. Thus you must realize that your action is that of the king.

Comment. The senses act without error, though set in motion by so slight an effort of the soul. And you, my pupil, must regard your deeds as done through the Kriyā-Śakti of the Supreme. If you look at it in this way your deeds will remain without consequence and rebirth will cease.

Summary. We live by means of the actions of the Supreme. (VI.7)

This shows that guidance by the Śakti of Śiva is needed, in relation to the law of karma. The soul falls foul of this disastrous law because it dares claim a sovereignty that is the Śakti's alone. Once the soul fully recognises the sovereignty of Śiva's Śakti, and gives up entirely its own initiative and activity, content to be a mere tool in the hand of Śiva, then it is no longer responsible for its actions, and so cannot be called to account for them. For now it is not an action of the soul, but of Śiva, who provides the mechanical power, and also induces souls to perform the deed, and determines the quality of the activity; just as the activity of the senses is ascribed to the soul.

If a Siddhāntist says 'My action is God's' his meaning differs from what a Śankaran Vedāntist would mean by the same words. The Vedāntist says it because he holds that he is identical with God. The Siddhāntist says it because he believes that God gave

him his soul, and guides and inspires him. The soul stands as agent, so long as it is dominated by Āṇavamala. Only after Āṇavamala is removed is the action ascribed to Śiva, as by the practices of Iruvineioppu, Malaparipāka and Śaktinipāta the soul's activity is, so to speak, ascribed to a new subject, a soul no longer governed by Āṇavamala, but by the Śakti of Śiva. The deeds that the soul enacts under the dominance of Āṇavamala it claims as its own deeds, so it is condemned to take their consequences. After Āṇavamala is deposed the soul still acts, but these deeds are not regarded as its own; now the curse is removed from them; they no longer bring the soul under the curse of karma. The proverb 'The curse of an evil deed is that it begets more and more evil' applies to all deeds, good and bad, done under the direction of Āṇavamala, but does not apply to deeds done under Śiva's lordship. And as actions inspired and directed by the Śakti of Śiva fall outside the law of karma, the need for rebirth also and naturally disappears.

Question. How does knowledge occur, under the influence of Aruḷ?

Answer. Do not attempt to know by the senses, nor by thinking about objects, nor by thinking you can take the lead. Just watch the Seer!

Comment. Do not enquire what variety Jñāna belongs to, don't imagine you can grasp it through symbols, as you do objects; and don't try to comprehend it by yourself coming forward to get hold of him. Just watch the Jñāna that looks on you.

Summary. If you just stand there, quite still, perfect Wisdom will come of itself. (VI.8)

Here the guru shows how to go about abandoning self-activity and letting Śiva's Śakti work unhindered. He first says how not to get there. It is futile to seek true knowledge and right dealing by knowledge which came through organs and senses, for they are products of Māyā, and therefore material in character. If you cling to them, the Śakti cannot come into her own, being unable fully to influence a soul thus obscured; as in the case of crystal when clouds obscure the sun.

It is equally futile to seek by reflection on nature and her laws to gain the heights required for total bliss. Nature is material, and can offer a knowledge of sorts to the scholarly soul, but not a true knowledge, and certainly not an experience of God. Anyone studying nature with a view to achieving pure knowledge by that very action shuts out the Śakti (who can never endure another by her side) and so gains neither true knowledge nor blameless conduct.

Another futile approach is thinking about yourself in the hope of discovering true knowledge or proper action. The self is not the Supreme. It is not autonomous, but heteronomous; not autodynamic but heterodynamic. It has no knowledge of its own, but only at second-hand. Putting yourself forward means claiming authority for yourself, elbowing aside the true authority which alone can lead to total bliss.

Here the guru is rejecting, one after another, the methods which the logicians, the materialists and the idealists (i.e. Śaṃkara) recommend for achieving true knowledge and experiencing total bliss.

One can also combine the first two of these rejections, as showing Paśajñāna is not enough; and take the third as proving the inadequacy of Paśujñāna. Only Patijñāna leads to the goal. Pati alone is pure knowledge, and he alone can convey it to another. Pati alone is autonomous, entitled to do whatever he wants, not subject to any law such as the law of karma. That is why he and he alone can so shape and grade the soul's activity that it does not fall under karmic control. So all attention should focus on Pati alone. Surrender to Śiva and to Śiva alone is the only way to achieve right knowledge, right action, and true blessedness.

Question. Will it be joy to face holy Aruḷ, and look on her?

Answer. Look on the exalted thing (Aruḷ) as joy. Shroud yourself so Jñāna's light is the only light for you.

Comment. The joy brought by thinking about Jñāna is a great good. To make that your only light, enter it and hide inside.

Hiding means being irrevocably linked to it. (VI.9)

Question. When will they cease for ever (Paśajñāna and Paśujñāna), and when will this arrive (Patijñāna)?

Answer. As you see by the Aruḷ, so regard it. To keep ignorance at bay, stay where the Aruḷ put you.

Comment. Think of Jñāna as it appears to you. Stop ignorance coming back, by getting absorbed by the Aruḷ-Śakti, as the Aruḷ-Śakti absorbs you'. (VI.10)

Summary. These three sayings (8, 9, 10) *teach how to recognise Jñāna; how then to be one with it; and how to come completely under its influence.*

The first of these passages (8) demanded that we give up working through the senses, abjure visible objects, stop coming forward as director. Does that mean renouncing everything that

makes men happy? People think there is no other activity, no other knowledge, no other feel-good factor except that conveyed through the senses, directed to visible things and self-motivated activity, but they are wrong. There is a motivation, a knowledge and a satisfaction not conveyed through the senses, not dependent on Matter, and in which the self is not the main agent. Most people think of a life divorced from the senses, from Matter and from the self as an evil, a living death, but in fact this is true life. Once this is grasped the slave can break free from senses, from Matter and from Self and surrender completely to Aruḷ, to Śiva's Śakti, through whom the new life comes.

The feel-good guaranteed by a life free of the senses, of matter and of the personal 'I' will not be felt at first; but do not be misled. The more the senses are repressed, the world and all its goods despised, and I-thoughts given up, the more complete the surrender to the new bringer of action, knowledge and satisfaction, so much the wider will be the experience of good fortune and of blessedness.

To bring the soul into full possession of this new life, in this entirely novel sphere, the guru counsels total submersion, so to speak, in the Śakti, so that nothing else exists any longer for the soul. The soul should admit influence only from the Śakti, and keep everything else at arm's length.

The soul is like a photographic plate. To get a clear picture, only those rays of light coming from the object photographed should fall on it. Everything else must be excluded. If other light gets into the camera, the plate shows a complete muddle, unrecognisable, impossible to sort out. So it is with the soul. If anything and everything is allowed to work on it, no clear knowledge can result, no blameless dealing, no undisturbed satisfaction. But if the soul is shut away carefully from all external things, and directed only on the Aruḷ of Śiva, then Śiva becomes both subject and object of knowledge, of action, and of the satisfaction that the soul will feel.

(d) *The Guru's Way of Teaching*

As we saw, Śiva does not appear to all souls in the same manner. To the vijñānakalar he appears in the first person; to the pralayākalar, in the second person; and to sakalar souls in the third. Śiva considers the special needs of individual souls, as we can see in his way of teaching them right knowledge.

The guru has many ways to eliminate Paśa. They are nayana-dīkshā, sparśa-dīkshā, vācaka-dīkshā, mānasa-dīkshā, śāstra-dīkshā, yoga-dīkshā, hotṛi-dīkshā and others. Hotṛi-dīkshā is a two branched study — including Jñānavati and Kriyāvati. Jñānavati directs sacrificial actions performed in thought, Kriyāvati those that are actually visible. Hotṛi-dīkshā appears as nirpīsa and sapīsa. (*Siddhiār* VIII.3)

Seven modes of teaching are mentioned here, for use as the special needs of each soul may require. All are equally good; they do not form a ladder of ascent. It may be that in some cases several methods are combined.

Let us review these seven methods. Nayana-dīkshā is eye-teaching. The guru gazes on his pupil, and his glance destroys the last traces of Āṇavamala, and so enlightens him. Sparśa-dīkshā is teaching by touch. The guru touches five important places on his pupil's body, thus conveying to him the right understanding of the five letters, the holy symbolic formula (discussed later). Vācaka, dīkshā means teaching by word of mouth; by mantras, sacred formulae, mystic songs.

In the fourth mode of teaching, mānasa-dīkshā, the guru uses hypnosis to work on his pupil. In the fifth, śāstra-dīkshā, he is instructed in philosophy. Yoga-dīkshā seeks to impart true knowledge by aid of the ascetic practices laid down in yoga-science. Finally hotṛi-dīkshā uses symbols, mainly those on which divine service is based. Jñāna-hotṛi deals with mental and verbal symbols, Kriyā-hotṛi with practical, external ones.

Hotṛi-dīkshā is also divided into nirpīsa and sapīsa, as set out in Siddhiār VIII.4 & 5:

Nirpīsa-dīkshā can be done by children, the ignorant, the old, by women, by the worldly, by the sick. It frees novices from religious obligations, and authorises them to perform ordinary duties, as far as they can. It is niradhikāra-dīkshā (*without authority*), *and leads to mukti either after death or at once.* (4)

This excellent pīsa (*sapīsa*) *is for the exalted, who learn and reflect and do not stray from the path prescribed. On this path they undertake the daily duties in due order, and naimittika* (*special rites regarding vows*), *and kāmya* (*religious ceremonies for realising particular wishes*). *Sapīsa divides into lokadharmini and Śivadharmini, which ensure blessedness. That is why it is called adhikāra-dīkshā* (*authoritative, powerful*). *Nirpīsa and sapīsa include samaya-dīkshā* (*ceremonies of introduction*), *viśesha-dīkshā* (*ceremony qualifying for entry into the mysteries*), *nirvāṇa-dīkshā*

(*ceremonies entitling a pupil to perform temple services*) *and finally abhisheka-dīkshā* (*ceremony of installation as guru*). (5).

These passages show that the guru's teaching is not a mere flash of enlightenment, but a gradual, progressive development. Siddhiār mentions four stages of taking in what the guru taught, hearing, thinking about it, understanding it, and samādhi. These were referred to earlier as stages of application.

Just as a crystal gleams when the sun shines on it, so will the first Jñāna (*hearing*) *be when the divine guru comes, appearing to the pupil, full of grace. When that happens* (*when the pupil gives ear to instruction*) *then will Śiva appear to him visibly* (*he will recognize Śiva in the guru*); *then will his own Self be revealed to him, and the whole world, and he will realise the entire nature of Śiva, the Finest, the Greatest, Soul of all souls and present everywhere.* (28)

If ripening is enough and Śaktinipāta sets in, then does Jñāna grow; then will pupils penetrate by the guru's grace (*into the object*), *will ponder over it and long for samādhi. They will be in the world as jīvanmukta, free of desire and aversion, viewing gold and rubbish with like equanimity, and advaita-linked with Śaṃkara* (*Śiva*) *so closely that they never forsake God nor God them, for they see Śiva only and naught else beside.* (29)

Setting aside both ignorance and (*sense*)*-knowledge, yet with inner wisdom by the guru's grace without ever learning it; thinking thoughtlessly, suffering though with no Antaḥkaraṇa* (*to suffer*) *and no Avasthā* (*to suffer in*) *— if you melt down your desires like that then will the inseparable Śiva come, appearing to you as the Universe; and at last, at the Jñāna stage of understanding, he will seem neither different nor non-different, but eternal, transcendent, present everywhere.* (*Siddhiār* VIII.28-30)

After Understanding comes Samādhi, the stage of completion (more detail below, see VII.2).

4. Purifying the Soul's Knowledge

We have seen how the soul is prepared for instruction by the guru, and how that instruction is carried out. We must now see how the soul takes in this instruction, thus moving from ignorance to knowledge.

Who has real knowledge? Only he who knows Śiva. But Śiva cannot be known as other objects are, through organs or by meditation. So clearly the soul cannot get to know Śiva the way it gets to know objects (as described in Chapter V). That was getting to know Asat, but now we have to get to know Sat. That knowl-

edge was false knowledge, really, for it was obtained via non-intelligent organs, and passed on to a soul whose faculty of knowledge was weakened by Āṇavamala. But this knowledge comes from the pure intelligence of the Śakti of Śiva, and comes to a soul over whom Āṇavamala now has no power. This new and real knowledge is not a further instalment of knowledge already enjoyed, but is something entirely fresh both in content and in the way it is acquired. Far from developing previous knowledge, it replaces it with a new and contrary knowledge.

As this new knowledge is contrary to the old, our way of getting it is naturally negative as well as positive. If the soul is to acquire this new knowledge taught by the guru it must not only set itself towards the new but also turn away from the old. Accepting the new, it must cast away the old. Thus the guru has not only to impart new learning, but must also clear out the old, to make room for it. So before describing how the soul gets to know Śiva (acquires true knowledge), we should first describe how it breaks free from the old knowledge got by organs or by reflection. For that is an essential preliminary.

(a) *Getting rid of Wrong Means to Knowledge*

In the sakala state, the soul learns things by means of organs provided by Māyā. The objects thus known are mere products of Māyā; for the lower cannot know the Higher. Knowledge about products of Māyā, gained via organs in this way, is called Pāśajñāna.

Pāśajñāna consists of the understanding of the Vedas, the systems of philosophy, Smṛiti, Puranas, sciences and mantras deriving from Vaikārika-Vāc etc., and from knowledge of objects arising from tattvas down as far as Nāda. (*Siddhiar* IX.2)

Vast as this territory is, it covers only Asat. Pāśajñāna cannot reach up to knowing God. The passage just cited reemphasises what we already knew: 'The Supreme cannot be known via Pāśajñāna' (cp. above II.9 & V.6). Not that even Asat is known aright, through Pāśajñāna:

The knowledge acquired by the soul through Pāśa is called Pāśajñāna only by courtesy. It is foolishness to take this as real knowledge of Pāśa; an idea due to lazy thinking. (*Bodha* VII.2, *Comment*)

Pāśajñāna not only fails to reach true knowledge, but is actually harmful to it. That is why it has to be eliminated.

Jāgarātīta is (achieved) when the soul is the Absolute: which comes about when no dazzling tattvas still approach the soul, when ignorant

Atīta keeps away, and when the soul's do-it-yourself activity is abolished as the higher Jñāna makes its appearance. (*Prak* X.1)

Abolishing Pāśajñāna is not just a matter of ruling out tattvas externally. If it were, then any souls lacking tattvas would be reckoned ready to achieve true knowledge.

You may say that mukti is not having organs. But there are souls in eggs, in fish, in birds, in the uterus and in semen; so then being dead would be mukti, sleeping would be mukti, and so would passing out, holding your breath, or getting bitten by a snake. (*Siddhiar* IX.3)

Abolishing Pāśajñāna involves an inner revulsion against tattva-gained knowledge. This revulsion comes when, led by the guru, you realize what tattvas really are, and the objects they inform us of. Bodha VIII makes this clear, comparing the five senses (tattvas) with gipsies, from whose power the king's son (the souls) must be freed.

When the Supreme appears as guru and teaches by tapas that the soul being in the power of the senses (gipsies) grew up ignorant of its own nature, then will that soul unite with the feet of the Supreme, from whom indeed it is not different.

Part three of this sūtra shows that the soul, misled by the five senses, does not know itself; and part four then indicates in what sense the soul is said to forsake the senses:

Thesis. When the soul realises it is different from the senses, it reaches the holy feet of the Supreme.

Comment: Bhedavādaśaiva and others object: This will suffice for those who recognise the lying senses as different from themselves, and who see this lie as a lie. But as action is impossible once the organs are eliminated, the soul cannot then subject itself to the Supreme. In reply to this objection he expounds Part Four of the Sūtra, asserting the thesis just given.

The soul is separated from the senses in the kevala state also. However he does not say 'when the soul is freed from the senses', but 'when it realises it is distinct from the senses'. This 'realising' is enough to rule out the kevala state.

Reason. The feet of Śiva may may be likened to the ground, when the rope of a swing breaks.

Comment. This is in reply to the query, how such realisation can get you to the feet of the Supreme.

Someone swinging relies on the rope. If that breaks, then he has only the ground to rely on — his bad luck stops there! This comparison confirms the thesis stated.

Example 1. The soul is like flood-water held back by a dam. Once released from the sense-purveyed knowledge which held it back, it reaches the feet of the faultless Supreme, and never comes back, just as flood-water released from the dam plunges into the sea.

Another group make this suggestion: If the soul once separated from the senses cannot stand alone, but has to combine with Śiva, then it will return again, as it did when by separation from the senses it reached kevala state. Refuting this suggestion, the previous thesis is reemphasised: If someone puts up a dam then the floodwater comes to a halt and builds up against it; as the soul does when hemmed in all around and made smaller by Pāśajñāna, acting through the organs. But when it attains the holy feet of Śiva, having burst free of the dam of Pāśajñāna, then is it merged in him and never comes back; as flood-water bursting the dam flows unhindered to the sea, mingles its waters therein and never again comes back.

As the power (Śakti) of Mala is limited, souls which in the kevala state attained Mala might re-unite with the senses. But as the Śakti of Śiva is unlimited, souls which have once attained the Śakti can never again return to the senses. To lead up to this it was here emphasised that Śiva is flawless.

Example 2. If every form is Śiva, none of them needs to reach the feet of Śiva. But if he is different from every form, then he is not the Supreme. The other bodily members do not see as the eye sees; and that also applies to different forms. The eye is superior, as is evident when blind men achieve the power of sight.

Comment. This refers to Śivādvaitaśaiva, who say they need not be said to have 'no return', since it makes no odds, for those who have come to know everything as Śiva, whether they return or not. In reply he emphasises that they do not return.

If not only the soul's knowledge (Paśujñāna) but also sense-knowledge (Pāśajñāna) becomes Śiva (Patijñāna), then there is no need for the soul to forsake the sakala-state in which the senses made it stray, and to reach the holy feet; for in such a case there would be no real difference. From which it follows that no-one has to reach Śiva's holy feet; and it is meaningless for the Āgamas to state that the soul which leaves Pāśa and attains Pati is in mukti. From which you might infer that the Supreme is quite unrelated to sense-knowledge and separate from the senses. But I assure you that if sense-knowledge has no reference to him then he is not Lord there, and his sovereignty is damaged thereby. You may then wonder

what other relation Śiva can have to Paśajñāna. But I tell you that even if sense-knowledge became one with Śiva just by admixture with soul-knowledge, that would not make them identical. The five senses all exist and operate: so far they are alike. But they all operate differently. The knowledge you gain through the body is unlike that had by the tongue, as that is unlike what the nose tells you, or the ear. The eye is different again. Helped by the light, and working with the soul's faculty of knowledge it can see even distant objects quite clearly, whereas the other senses only know things which come to where they are. This superiority of visual perception can be noticed when blind people get their sight back.

The Supreme is equally present in both forms of knowledge, but while soul-knowledge is like a light shining everywhere, sense-knowledge illuminates only that place where those senses are. This distinction is not evident in the case of those afflicted with Mala, who have lost that universal knowledge. But it can be seen clearly in those who have banished Mala and reached Śiva.

Here he says that even when the soul becomes Śiva sense-knowledge does still illuminate something (though not, like soul-knowledge, everything); which shows that souls cannot return (to the senses).

Example 3. You, my pupil, have realised you are not the five senses; but the sakala who has abandoned the five senses as prescribed, and has reached Śiva, is not separated from him by the five senses. If Mala and karma, set far off as moss is from water, should come back, then he will repel them by meditating on the One who is never separate from him.

Comment. Now some say that the river water naturally goes into the sea, when the dam breaks, and is submerged there; and that water which flowed by the river into the sea also returns by the same river; so you could say that the soul which has reached Śiva's feet also returns, after a while. So you can't say no return takes place.[20] *In reply he explains why return takes place and how to prevent it, reasserting the above thesis: You my pupil have learnt Siddhānta, which has taught you that your knowledge is not limited like that of the senses. But I tell you that the sakala who in the way just described gives up sense-knowledge and attains the feet of Śiva will never be separated from Śiva by the five senses, just as river water goes into the sea and mingles with it after the dam has been removed. When Mala karma and Māyā have been set aside by attaining Śiva, they may make a come-back, as moss moved away by a stone thrown in the water will return again, and Mala etc. do turn up again like this by the ill*

20. Here the German has *that there is a Return.* (*Ed.*)

effects of habit, but the soul will push them away (so as not to fall prey to the senses once again) by meditating on the Supreme, who will never abandon it.

These three examples show (1) *that the soul which has achieved Patijñāna does not go back again to sense-knowledge (Paśajñāna);* (2) *that it is a mistake to go back; and* (3) *that if by habit it does occasionally revert, it is capable of stopping this.* (*Bodha* VIII.4)

To achieve true knowledge it is first required, that the soul realise its previous mode of knowing as erroneous, and that sense-knowing, which it now gives up, is not the only sort. Through the guru it learns how thoroughly and widely ineffective that old knowing was; which frightens it at first, as it is scaring if your swing's rope should break suddenly. But you soon pull yourself together, on reaching firm ground; and so does the soul when the guru points out a mode of knowledge superior to the senses. And once it has tried that better way it will never go back to the old inferior mode. Switching off the senses does not mean death, as you might suppose from the fact that in ordinary life, no sort of activity takes place without the senses; but in this case a replacement mode of knowledge is available, in place of the senses: the Śakti of Śiva, there from ever in the soul. The availability of this replacement makes it quite clear that disuse of sense-knowledge does not necessarily presuppose an external separation of the senses from the soul, as such discuse is conceivable even while the senses remain externally intact. There is of course some danger here, as the soul may be tempted to surrender to the senses once again. But that danger is not great, as the soul is well equipped to deal with it. It does however imply certain duties for the soul, which we shall look into later. (VI.9) First we must attend to another requirement, if true knowledge is to be attained; that Paśujñāna be given up.

A soul which has realised that by Pāśajñāna it acquires only false knowledge, and that a different set-up is needed to attain true knowledge, might well try to achieve this through Paśujñāna, as this saying explains:

When a soul linked (to the worlds of thought and of objects, as just described III.3b) *realises its command of them and proudly claims 'I am Brahma', its knowledge is then Paśujñāna. As such a soul is still shackled to the body, and has much to learn, and can learn them only one at a*

time, it is called Paśu. Śiva knows everything intuitively, from within. (*Siddhiar* IX.2)

Paśujñāna, then, is a form of knowledge in which the soul still plans to employ the senses (though Asat-like and far beneath it) to achieve true knowledge, even though it recognises that everything perceptible is far below and no help in reaching true knowledge. Such a soul has yet to see that help from a total knower is absolutely essential, for knowledge to occur; and consequently thinks itself the absolute intelligence or Brahma, taking on a role which Śiva alone can play, who is not the same as that soul.

This Paśujñāna is superior to Pāśajñāna, for it does bring a more accurate picture of Asat, which the soul confronts; but it does not offer genuine knowledge even of the soul, though this, rather than Śiva, is its main concern. Pāśajñāna offers a wrong view of its object, Māyeya, as Paśujñāna does for its object, the soul. Pāśajñāna may get rid of Māyāmala, if you are lucky, by bringing the soul to see the products of Māyā as they really are, but Āṇavamala cannot be eliminated in this way.

Some say that Samādhi (yoga-Samādhi, not Jñāna-Samādhi) suppresses the organs just as at midday shadows disappear underfoot, so he then achieves mukti by his own efforts (as by Pāśajñāna Māyeya is reached); but Āṇavamala has not really disappeared. This knowledge also is Paśujñāna. (*Siddhiar* IX.3)

Pasujñāna is in no position to destroy Āṇavamala, as the only means to knowledge it admits, the soul's native intelligence, is in a way naturally exposed to Āṇavamala; as a crystal swathed in darkness is in no position to dispel the surrounding darkness by its own lucidity and without the help of any light. The inability of Paśujñāna to destroy Āṇavamala explains why it cannot convey true knowledge. Not that Āṇavamala can still deceive the soul about the nature of Māyeya, once it has struggled up to Pāśajñāna, but it does still enshroud the soul's capacity to know Śiva. The soul ensnared in Paśujñāna does not recognise Śiva, but wrongly regards itself as the highest nature. Pāśajñāna made the soul confuse itself with Asat, and now Paśujñāna makes it think itself is Sat.

By its own intelligence the soul really knows nothing, yet as a Mind (which considers itself independent) it enjoys everything as there just for itself (regarding them all as its own work). Such is the knowing of the

soul's intelligence. But if by God's grace that soul knows God it will also know itself, for then it will be as Aruḷ, in a way. (*Prak:* VIII.2)

Since Śiva is still hidden from the soul, it imagines it is knowing without his help, by its own native powers; whereas in fact the soul is of a nature to act only by some mediating entity. Our sources lay great emphasis here on the soul's Satasat nature and its consequent inability; and on the need to give up Paśujñāna. For someone still involved with Paśujñāna, and ascribing all knowledge to himself rather than Śiva, will also disregard his royal position.

My pupil, some men are ascetics who realise that knowledge is diverse (confusing), if their intelligence is the only one there; so they replace their own intelligence by the pure complete intelligence of Śiva, achieve true knowledge and attain to full salvation, like the tongue of an immovable bell that is standing rigid on the ground.

If the organs of the body are destroyed, the Atmanbodha will rise up by the sound (Paranāda) of noisy foot ornaments (Paravindu) to unite itself with Śivabodha and be merged in it. And when that happens the Supreme who stands at the end of the sound will appear, in jñāna community with his Śakti, and loving you in this manner will make you one with himself.

As it says in Kuṛaḷ, one who knows the true situation proceeds on that basis, putting aside false reports. Here knowledge of the true situation is (really) meditation; proceeding by putting aside false reports, is Samādhi. By suffering pain, the hankering after karma will not recur. (*Paḍiār* 32-34)

To believe that we can stand on our own is a delusion which must be put aside, for it prevents the soul from uniting with Śiva, who is the pure intelligence.

If a light shines in the darkness, one can see. But how to banish the vain illusion that you see all by yourself? (*Payan* VII.3)

This doctrine is already familiar, from the discussion about the soul being Satasat. (above IV.3) It is characteristic of Siddhānta that the soul's inability to know things directly should here be repeated with special emphasis; showing that Siddhānta is unlike Sāṃkhya and Vedānta in spirit, though it does borrow a certain amount from them.

Sāṃkhya denies the existence of a God, and therefore teaches that the soul must look after itself and acquire knowledge by its own efforts. Even the Vedānta of Śaṃkara claims that the soul can

and must know things directly. This claim results from his theory of identity. If the individual soul is identical with the universal soul, called Brahma, then whatever can be said about the universal soul can also be said about the individual soul. Now Brahma knows things immediately, indeed there is apart from him nothing to be known or by which it could be known. The ignorance of the individual soul, which we accept empirically, is due to the delusion that one is different from Brahma. So long as one thinks one is different from Brahma, and needs some other thing (object, or light) to make knowledge possible, so long one has no knowledge. But once you abandon these illusions, then you know.

The assumptions which led Sāṃkhya and the Vedānta of Śaṃkara to claim that the soul knows directly and by its own efforts are not shared by Siddhānta. It rejects the atheism which forced Sāṃkhya to admit direct knowing by the soul. It rejects the theory of identity which led Vedānta to grant the soul a faculty of direct knowledge. Now while Siddhānta could not follow its rivals down these paths, there was still a strong temptation to claim such knowledge (though on different grounds) at least for the time when Āṇavamala has been made harmless. Indians have an extremely high regard for knowledge, which Siddhāntins shared, so they would naturally prefer direct knowledge to one merely indirect. To say that even at the highest level knowledge was only indirect would, in a country like India where knowledge itself was so highly regarded, be a bad recommendation for the system as a whole. It would have been quite natural for Siddhānta to deny direct knowledge to the soul during bondage but grant it when perfection came. But it denies such knowledge even then, as it was logically bound to do. Siddhānta conceives the soul as existing alongside God from ever, while granting that it is dependent upon God, the Lord of all beings. Short of dropping that assumption (that the soul is an existent in addition to God) the Siddhāntin is now bound to grant to the soul an essence different from that of God. This it does; God is pure knowledge, it says, but the soul has only a little knowledge; God knows directly, the soul only indirectly; God is Cit, the soul is Citacit. Again, unless the Siddhāntin assertion that God is the Lord of the soul is to turn out an empty phrase, or else lead to a pluralism fatal to the unity of all that is, the soul's dependence on God must be seen as fundamental to its nature. If there were some stage at which the

soul has no need of God, then clearly the soul would be its own master and its dependence on God merely apparent.

The whole system of Siddhānta is based on the independent existence of the soul and its dependence upon God. Short of unsettling these basic principles, it must take the soul's inability to know directly as part of its nature for all time, and stick to it, resisting the temptation to ascribe direct knowledge at least to the released soul. Certain of its own position and consistency Siddhānta goes on to claim that the idea of direct knowledge actually hinders souls from achieving true knowledge, by discouraging them from surrender to the Śakti of Śiva, which alone bestows true knowledge. This temptation, it says, also leads to soul-migration, as the idea of knowing directly makes the soul proud and leads it to act in its own power, thus subjecting it to the law of karma.

We now have some idea how Siddhānta defends its view that the soul cannot know directly, even at the highest stage, but can and must be helped. This point is more fully presented in remarks from Bodha Sūtra IX and X. Some passages from Sūtra IX are given here; those from X have been cited already, in relation to Patijñāna. (see III.3f)

When the soul has by the eye of Jñāna recognised the Supreme (which it could not by either Pāśajñāna or Paśujñāna), it abandons Pāśa as a rapid but driverless mirage-bus. Śiva is then like a cool shade for the soul; which must now recite Sri Pañcākshara, as the law requires.

Part 1. *Thesis. Know the Supreme by the jñāna-eye.*

Comment. The Śivasamavādaśaivar object: The previous sūtra said the Supreme cannot be known through Pāśajñāna, but maybe he can by Paśujñāna. Taking up this point the author asserts the above thesis in his exposition of Part I of the sūtra.

Reason. He is beyond the reach of either Pāśajñāna or Paśujñāna.

Example 1. *If someone tries to know himself through nerves, bones, veins, blood, etc., and fails, he will realise that some other approach is required. If with God's help he knows neither God nor himself, how will he know his own self in some other way?*

Comment. Some ask how you can know that Śiva can not be known in any other way? After Mala is banished the soul's knowing faculty operates directly, like Patijñāna, so maybe Śiva is knowable. To refute this he describes how that knowledge takes place.

Example 2. *The eye points things out without itself knowing them. It does not even know the soul which enables it to see; nor does the soul which*

points things out know itself. The thief who enables the soul to know things is the Supreme. Let your soul know him.

Comment. Some make this point: The eye which perceives something in front can also perceive one behind, if you turn round. And a soul which knows things experimentally can also know them thoroughly. In reply he denies the soul has that capability, emphasising that it can only know by God's aid.

The eye knows an object, if so required by the soul, but even so does not know its own nature. Nor does it know the soul which indicated that object and set it to work. And although it is by God's instruction that the soul knows something experimentally, and although God is present in it in concealment, yet it still does not know its own nature, nor the Supreme who instructed it. He it is that is present and hidden like a thief even in experimental knowledge, and whom we must seek and recognise in that knowledge.

He is called a thief because he is present invisibly. But his concealment ceases in those who achieve knowledge; so they know themselves and the Supreme.

The soul cannot achieve true knowledge by its own efforts. This it must accept, and therefore look for a connection to the proper source. That is the real purpose of Paśujñāna: not to destroy the soul's natural faculty of knowledge (this will become clear when we see in detail how true knowledge is acquired) but to convince it that the soul on its own can do nothing, and that in regard of knowledge Śiva is lord and the soul is servant.

(b) *Getting rid of False Objects of Knowledge*

Śiva alone is Sat (genuine Reality) and is the only object of true knowledge, and the soul that would come to know him must, we saw, break free of lower modes of knowledge. It must also take a further step. As an object can be correctly perceived only if nothing else comes between it and the observer, as his whole attention has to be concentrated on it alone; so also the soul, if it is to recognise Śiva correctly, must let nothing else come between, so it can concentrate entirely on him. But it is still in the world, at this stage, and the world keeps demanding attention. Of course the soul did realise, in Iruvineioppu, that the world as perceived is of dubious value; even so, the soul is not yet entirely free of it. Conceivably the soul could just retreat from the sensible world to a world of ideas behind it — call it what you will — and regard

a world as real and as the proper object of knowledge. But the soul has to make a more conclusive break from the present world than is achieved in Iruvineioppu. It is not enough to suspect that world as of inferior quality; it must be firmly convinced that the world is Asat, unworthy of the highest mode of knowledge: and it must act on this conviction. It is only when the soul has realised the true nature of this world which demands its immediate attention, being all around and taking concrete form, only then will the soul be in a position to disregard it and turn its full attention on Śiva.

If all lesser modes of knowledge are to be set aside, their worthless objects will also have to be eliminated. Let us see what our sources have to say about eliminating the world as an object of knowledge:

Thesis. If you recognise differences in colour which are Asat (unreal) as Asat, then you are in a position to recognise what is really there as an embodiment of jñāna.

Comment. When shown that the Supreme can be known only by an eye of jñāna, you naturally ask how to get such an eye. The thesis just mentioned was put forward, in the course of resolving Part II *of the Sūtra, in order to deal with that question.*

He says 'which are unreal' to show that in the saying 'When Pāśa is eliminated, Pati becomes as a cool shade', Pāśa means the world of action. And he says 'differences in colour' rather than 'the world' for brevity's sake, indicating the Reason too. And he says 'recognise as Asat', rather than 'put aside as Asat', to show that with the removal of Pāśa the soul's knowledge attains its highest point. And he says 'what is really there' to show that being there as a shadow is not anything new. By saying 'an embodiment of jñāna' he indicates that Śiva stands for Patijñāna in the sūtra. Finally the remark 'in a position to know' shows that this can be learnt only through experience, and not by words.

The Reason contained in this thesis can be stated separately like this:

Reason. When you realise all the various colours are distinct from the crystal, and put them aside, then what is left is the crystal.

Comment. In this example you first realise that the various colours by which the crystal is concealed are not real colours, in which case the remaining substance is the crystal itself; which shows that when you realise the unreality of the world which conceals the true form and is unreal, then what is left over is the true nature of Jñāna.

Example 1. *Once the soul is free from ether and the other tattvas, surely the incomparable Supreme, the Nirguṇa, the Nirmala, the eternal*

Blessed One, the Absolute, appears as an unimaginable miracle and inseverable intelligence.

Comment. Now some say, Surely when Asat is put aside, what still appears as Asat is a nonentity. In reply he describes the nature of jñāna, and re-asserts what he said:

The incomparable Supreme is not fitted out with three guṇas like the unclean world, he is not to be grasped by measuring, nor as a product of Mala and Karma like the compound world underlying the three guṇas, nor as an embodiment of temporary blessedness, like the pure world which underlies Mala and Karma. The soul can be known from its general nature as something linked to those three; but Śiva can't, for he is higher than the soul, and so not knowable in any wise. So when the soul has recognised and set aside as Asat both ether and the other Asat-products, will the Supreme then appear as a nonentity, he who by nature ranks far above all knowledge gained by practice? Surely he will appear brilliant, as the light of lights, present inseparably in transmitted knowledge. ('unclean world' means the sakalar world arising from prakṛiti; compound world' is the world of pralayākalar souls, put together from Śuddhāśuddha tattvas; 'pure world' is the world of vijñānakalar souls, made up from the five Śuddha-tattvas.)

In the example he says 'Supreme' instead of Patijñāna.

Example 2. If you observe the world which can be known by observation, and observe it to be Asat, then I tell you that what is left is Sat. You the observer are not Sat. But if you unite with Sat, and surrender to him as his slave, then Asat will pass away.

Comment. Some say that what is left behind after the destruction of the tattva is something else; so why regard it as an embodiment of jñāna? In reply he re-affirms his earlier statement: Take the world which one of limited knowledge can get to know by observation. Now if you get to know it in the manner prescribed, observing it a bit at a time, and realise it is Asat, and set it aside, then I assure you that what still remains as your proper object of knowledge is different from Asat and is in fact Sat. Now you may suppose that Sat, which thus appears distinct from Asat, is the soul, but let me explain that you who in conjunction with Asat were gaining knowledge by observation cannot be the Sat which now appears. And if you imagine that this observational knowledge will not pass away, let me point out that you, so far the Asat-linked observer and knower, if you now thrust Asat aside, and put yourself in the power of the Sat which then appears, and unite with him, then your old restricted-knowledge character will desert you at that point.

Example 3. *When the soul recognises that what it has seen is not Sat, and gives it up as Asat, and meditates inwardly on the Supreme and comes to know Him, then by his aid he will drive out Pāśa, as poison is driven out by the vulture-meditation.*

Comment. Some ask how you can recognise Asat as such, and thrust it aside, and how you can then take your place in Sat's service and unite with him; and how this gets rid of Asat-knowledge. In reply he re-affirms: if the soul recognises the world that is known by observation as non-Sat, and gives it up as Asat, and meditates inwardly on God, who is present in the soul though not known by observation, and knows him, then by God's aid (who is present inseparably) and by that meditation he will be rid of his old accustomed nature by which he was shackled from ever; just as the hypnotist gets rid of the poison by the vulture which through this meditation appears above him. (*Bodha* IX.2; *for more on the vulture-meditation see below* VI.9)

The soul's task is to recognise Śiva. To achieve this, everything else must be recognised as such and dismissed, to guard against muddle and confusion. Not-Śiva includes everything known by the senses, outer and inner. But when you have dismissed everything that you normally perceive outside yourself, by the eye etc, or by reflection etc., can you still be said to know? Only with difficulty, for we usually associate knowledge with those items we just dismissed; but for Śaiva Siddhānta it remains a logical possibility.

Whatever external object is known by inner or outer organs of knowledge is all Asat. Apart from Asat there remain only Śiva and the soul, as independent substances (Śiva is two-in-one). But that gives us all we need, for knowledge to occur: a knower (soul), something to know (Śiva), and some means of knowing it (Śiva's Śakti). So the dismissal of everything ordinarily knowable need not imply that no further knowledge can occur.

Meykaṇḍa discusses another objection. Once Asat is dismissed why must we concede that two substances remain, the soul, and the two-in-one Śiva? It would be simpler to assume just one, the soul. The objector does not deny that something remains, for to dismiss something you need something else to dismiss it from. The objection is that what is left is just the soul. That the soul is there, is evident, for it dismissed Asat with which it was previously linked; but for that, the dismissal would not and could not occur. Having been linked to Asat, the soul itself is clearly non-Sat, for Sat by its nature can have no connection with Asat. So the soul

not being pure Sat can have a connection with Asat. The soul must therefore by nature be a hanger-on to some other thing. Now things do not change their nature, they always remain identical. So even after dismissing Asat the soul is still a hanger-on. Which is feasible only if after the dismissal of Asat, Śiva the real Sat is also considered to be there: which also makes knowledge possible.

Asat is not the only wrong object of knowledge. The soul may be one too. After dismissing Māyā as means to knowledge the soul was still in danger of thinking itself an immediate intelligence (knowing things directly), and of not recognizing any Mind higher than itself. And after dismissing Māyā as object of knowledge the soul is still in danger of thinking itself the Be-all and End-all, the proper object of higher knowledge, and of turning all its attention on itself. Now supposing the highest knowledge to be all about oneself is just as inimical to the search for true knowledge. One's Self has to be repressed just as vigorously as Asat. A soul that still pays attention to its Self is by that very act stuck far back in the road to true knowledge. For Siddhānta, then, the highest knowledge can no more be about the self than about Asat. But we need not go into detail on this just now, as the call to disregard the Self is closely linked with the call to see Śiva as the only thing to be known. These two topics cannot be treated separately, and to launch into one of them now would inevitably lead to repetition.

Siddhānta's insistence that Asat and the Self be dismissed from consideration by those who seek the highest knowledge does not however imply that at the highest level no knowledge about Self or Asat can occur. For we must know about them, in order to dismiss them. You need to know Asat and the self as non-Sat, to graduate to a total loss of interest in them, and to turn your whole attention on Śiva, who is greater than both Asat and the self.

(c) *How Knowledge brings Light to the Soul?*

Having set out the negative preconditions for the attainment of true knowledge we now turn to study the positive ones.

'Like an eye, the soul is not light, and not darkness.' (Prak: III 6); a comparison suggesting that the process of visual perception should help us understand how the soul acquires true knowledge. The process of visual perception is described next:

You might think light gives the eye the power to see. No; for in that case it must have lacked that power, previously. The eye's visual capacity

combines with the light of a lamp in seeing distant objects. It has no other way to achieve this. The visual capacity and the brightness of the light need to combine, each making its own contribution. (*Prak:* III.7)

The eye needs a light, to connect eye with object, putting them in touch. The light enters the eye, awakening its native visual capacity and bringing it to bear on the object, at the same time forming an image of the object for the visual faculty, and then conveying both back to the eye. If the eye declines such united action then no perception takes place even if the eye is healthy and the object is present.

To perceive Sat, the soul has need of light, which Pāśajñāna and Pasujñāna (as we saw) certainly cannot provide. What light, then, is sufficient for this task?

You may rely on your five senses, cutting youself off thereby (from the Aruḷ-Śakti). But what are the senses without the Śakti? What is the soul compared with the Object of its quest? (*Payan* VII.9)

This question is for those people who think they can manage without any special or extra light, as people do know some things through the senses, while others are self-evident. The question is put to get them to consider how different from God are the things people know unaided; which is why a special extra light is thought to be required. The knowledge natural to humans is of earthly objects. The fact that the soul can know earthly things does not mean it can also know the Supreme Being, without more ado. Sat and Asat are totally different, so knowing Sat is quite another thing from knowing Asat, and makes much greater demands on the knower. Now the soul requires help even to know Asat; which suggests that some help will also be needed, in knowing One higher than himself. For Asat-knowledge the help of the tattvas is adequate, as they also are Asat in nature. But the help the soul needs for knowing Sat must itself be Sat in character, for a communicator has to be like in character to his message. Now Śiva is the message, and only his Śakti is of like nature to him, being actually one with him. Which means that the soul cannot possibly know Śiva unless it relies on his Śakti as a light.

The eye's visual faculty needs to be brought to bear, by a light, on the object to be perceived, and the soul likewise needs the Śakti to point it towards Śiva. The soul which is so far below needs lifting up to Śiva's level, so to speak, by the Śakti, and for this it must surrender to the Śakti, as a committed follower. The

soul naturally conforms to whatever it is attached to, so by its commitment to the Śakti it does in a way become Śakti (i.e. it shares in the Śakti's nature). But the Śakti is essentially similar to Śiva. So the soul by joining up with the Śakti is moved into Śiva's sphere, we may say, and brought to him as the eye is brought to the object by the light.

The eye needs to be brought to bear on an object, in order to perceive it; and, further, that object needs to be brought to the eye. Both functions are performed by the light. For the soul to know Śiva it likewise must be lifted up to his sphere, and, further, he must come down to its level. How does this take place?

When someone gives of his own free will, surely we can't suppose he was forced to give by us? Does this thought bear comparison with him?

Comment. When someone is in a position to decide by himself to give some thing, out of affection, it is not right to think we made him give it. Someone who thinks like that is worlds away from the blessedness which Aruḷ can confer. (*Payan* VII.10)

Śiva is the Supreme, the sovereign who towers above all things, and who has no higher power on whom to depend in any action or transaction. If he allows a soul to know him, that is his own free act. Nobody can pull him down or draw him near or compel him in any way. If the soul knew Śiva by its native powers, that would make it more powerful than he. If anyone does know him, that is because he made himself available, voluntarily. So the soul must wait on Śiva's gift. For a gift, some hand is needed, for bestowing it; which in this case is surely the Śakti, the one point where soul and Śiva meet, and the only light by which Śiva can be known.

The soul lit by the Śakti alone is ready to know Śiva. This follows from its being Satasat.

A column of crystal, which the light has occupied, has no shade of its own. And there is no darkness any more, once the Aruḷ has occupied the soul. (*Payan* VII.9)

If light reaches the crystal through many impediments (clouds etc.), the crystal's innate brightness will be only partly switched on, and it will give an imperfect light, not clear and uniform but tinted (colours being lower grades of brightness), and varied (showing the different shades of the impediments). But if the sunlight falls on the crystal directly and in full strength it will give off a clear brilliance, bright and sparkling as the sun itself, as if it had totally absorbed the sunshine and almost become another sun.

Nothing clouds its shining, not even its own shadow. Its native power is fully displayed, the crystal is pure light. And if the soul puts off baser things and poorer ways of knowing them and surrenders to the Śakti of Śiva, it will be totally taken up thereby, and have room for nothing else. Ignorance will be no more, for that soul, just as for the column of crystal in direct sunlight there is no darkness left. When it is with the Śakti the soul has no place left for ignorance, but becomes intelligence, as the Śakti is intelligence.

The complete enlightenment of the soul by the Śakti of Śiva begins as soon as Asat has been put aside; no special move by the Śakti is required. Not that the Śakti begins enlightening only now, or does it specially much. It has of course been there in the soul from ever, and has been at work as enlightening intelligence since the day of creation. It is not that the Śakti starts doing something different, but rather that the soul has a different attitude to what the Śakti does, and to its results. While the soul lay under Asat's governance, it knew nothing of the Śakti and lived as if there were none such; as a blind man knows nothing of the sun and consequently lives as if there were no sun. But once Asat has been put aside the soul notices the Śakti and serves it. Asat moreover while still in control of the soul prevents its full enlightenment, as a cataract reduces the sunlight that can come into the eye. This results in unclear knowledge, wrong evaluation, mistaken activity, and endless rebirth. But once Asat is put aside, the Śakti can work unhindered upon the soul, to enlighten it completely, just as the sun can fully light up a healthy eye. Now we do not blame the sun for the blind man not seeing or praise it for someone else seeing properly, we put this down to the presence or absence of visual defects; and the soul's enlightenment or otherwise is likewise not to be put down to different actions by the Śakti, but simply to the presence or absence of Mala in the soul. The only thing required, then, for enlightenment to be possible, is that Mala cease to have any influence. And for enlightenment to succeed (i.e. for true knowledge to occur) it is necessary only that the soul dedicate itself to the Śakti, and accept its guidance.

Souls filled with Aruḷ (Śakti) must stand behind the light of truth, like someone holding a lighted stick in a bejewelled hand.

Comment. People holding lighted sticks in bejewelled hands hold it out far in front and stand behind, until they find what they were looking for.

Like that you must hold Aruḷ in front and take your place behind it until Jñeya is revealed (Śiva, whom you sought to know). That is how it is with souls who stay linked to the Aruḷ. (*Payan* VII.8)

When in bondage, the soul was completely under Mala's influence, and now it must be totally under the Śakti's. While in bondage it identified more or less with Mala, almost taking its place, and so now it has to identify with the Śakti of Śiva, immerse itself in it totally, almost forming a single entity with it.

This explains how it is that the Śakti which is always and identically present in all souls at all times does not affect them all the same way. Souls not surrendered completely (to the Śakti) lack what is subjectively needful for enlightenment, for they fail to realise how the Śakti can help them. The Śakti is still there within them, the same as ever, but unnoticed or undervalued, while the soul is not seen for what it truly is.

To some even sweet milk tastes bitter. But if the sickness responsible for this is cured the soul will regain its normal taste.

Comment. When the tongue is healed the milk which tasted bitter before will now taste sweet, as the illness responsible for the bitter taste has been healed.

Once the darkness of Mala is removed the Maruḷ which was responsible (*Śakti as tirōdhāna-Śakti*) *is seen to be the Aruḷ; as souls realise. The comparison with the tongue which got better was to show that what is found after abolishing Mala is the soul* (*as it truly is*).

Summary. This says that the time of Aruḷ's appearing is the time when the recovered soul knows the Aruḷ. (*Payan* VII.2)

The soul's enlightenment depends objectively on the Śakti being present and at work in the soul; as he always is. It also depends, subjectively, on the soul surrendering completely to the Śakti, which can only happen once the power of Mala has been broken. Both these conditions must be met before enlightenment can actually occur; though of course fulfilling the subjective condition does not make any objective and visible difference to what is going on. The actual fact of enlightenment is not an objective event, but consists in the soul feeling differently owing to the Śakti's presence and consequent on discarding the three malas. In kevala Āvasthā the soul is not conscious at all of the presence and activity of the Śakti. In sakala Āvasthā the soul knowns nothing definite of the Śakti's presence, but is vaguely conscious of it.

The soul is not aware of any activity of Śakti within, as this is prevented by Āsat, so it experiences it not as Aruḷ (its true nature) but as Maruḷ, as the unlovely tirōdhāna-Śakti. This consciousness brings no great happiness, just as milk tastes (bitter) when you already have an even more bitter taste in the mouth. In Śuddha avasthā however the Śakti appears to the soul as it truly is, and its presence is felt as a blessing, vaguely perhaps at first but then quite definitely, as something to seek and not avoid.

Bodha X part 1 argues quite specifically that you have to unite with the Śakti, to achieve enlightenment; though the actual wording may suggest it is Śiva himself we are to unite with, as it mentions the Supreme but not Śakti or Aruḷ. But in Sūtra IX.2 example 1 the commentator expressly takes Supreme to refer to the Śakti; and he uses the simile of eye-light and lamplight, in explaining that passage (X, part 1); moreover the soul's union with Śiva is never mentioned until Sutra XI, though preparations for this are discussed in Sūtra X. These points justify our taking Sūtra X part 1 to refer to the union of the soul with the Śakti.[21] The text of X follows:

If the soul is one with the Supreme just as he is with it, and is serving him, then Mala and Māyā will disappear, and mighty Karma as well.

Comment. This sūtra deals with the way to destroy Pāśa.

The three previous Sūtras considered who it is that performs Sādhana (the soul), the benefit thus won (the Satguru), and how they should be performed. He now explains what they achieve for us: they eliminate Pāśa, and bring us to Śiva. The cleansing of the soul described in Sūtra IX *led to the elimination of Pāśa, once the limits on the soul's knowledge had been demolished by recital of the Five Letters (cp.* VI.9). *Sūtra* X *is to explain just how all this takes place.*

The Supreme (who is known by the jñāna eye) came to stay in the soul and identify with it though it was still in bonds; and the soul then imagined it knew (though actually he did, residing there) as he was not evidently distinct. But the soul (as its state in bondage would suggest) though now knowing through its link to him (not being evidently distinct from him) will identify with him and stand as his unerring servant; and then not only Mala and Māyā but even mighty Karmamala shall cease.

Part One. Thesis. The Supreme exists as soul, and in that way you also must exist united in him.

21. Sūtra IX.2 and the reference in Prak: III.7 to eye-light and lamplight are cited above VI.4b & c. (*Ed.*)

Comment. The Śivasamavādaśaiva object that knowing the highest Good, by enlightenment through jñāna, suffices for attaining salvation. In answer to this he sets forward the above thesis while resolving Part One of the Sūtra.

Reason. When a man is so placed the pride which says 'I' and 'mine' falls away and he attains the holy foot of the Supreme.

Comment. Otherwise Mala will not disappear, and the holy foot is unattainable. Here 'I' means jñātri, the knowing man, 'mine' means jñāna (knowledge) and jñeya (what is known).

Example 1. Those who still distinguish 'I' from 'He' have a desirous Paśujñāna, so the Supreme appears not as Lord, but as soul. But those who confess that they are nothing and he is all, will be united by the Supreme with his foot and will exist as if there were no soul.

Comment. This is emphasised for those who ask how such specially knowing knowledge can be called confused.

In those who still distinguish 'I' from 'he', (jñātri from jñeya), as in those who still say 'I', Paśujñāna is evident, so Śiva appears in them only as Paśujñāna and not as Lord. But those who so know Śiva that 'I' is no longer lord, and who identify themselves completely with Śiva, thus submerging in his All-fullness, of them he will make Lords.

You may ask how it can be that if Pasujñāna still exists the Supreme is as if non-existent, but if Pasujñāna is not there then He is. And I will tell you.

Even careful observers fail to note how the eye-light and lamplight are inextricably combined, because they observe them separately. Thus someone mainly interested in the power of sight will concentrate on the eyes and disregard the lamplight, though it is there; and someone more concerned about the lamplight will emphasise how it brings things to our attention, and neglect the eye's contribution. Even if they are both considered, but separately, the power of vision will be at centre stage, and the lamplight only partly recognized. And thinking about Śiva and the soul separately will likewise lead you to overlook how inextricably they are united. So you must study them in the way set out above.

You may ask what the difference is between full and partial knowledge. Perhaps this example will help. When lamplight etc. combines with eye-light, we have full knowledge of it as lamplight, sunlight or moonlight. But the eye-light which combines with these does not shine in a distinct beam as they do, so we get to know it in another way, and our knowledge of it is only partial.

You may make this suggestion: eye-light is dim compared with lamplight

so is not something we can perceive, as lamplight is. Not so, for in that case the lamplight could not be perceived either, but only known from the object it illuminates.

You may enquire what proof there is that an eye has light, as by itself it lights up less than a glow-worm does. That's a silly question. Nobody argues that as sound (a property of ether) never occurs without some occasion, therefore an echo is not a property of ether. And it takes a fool to say that as the light which is there in the eye is observable if and only if some occasion for it occurs, therefore it is not in the eye's nature, to illuminate. Let me tell you something else: the eye-light naturally shines less when the object is limited, but shines all over when the object is everywhere.

You may ask what proof there is that the light of the eye combines with that of the lamp? We don't suggest any connection between two eyes inspecting the same object, so why make one between the eyelight and the lamplight? That is silly talk. Eyes looking at the same thing can't see each other, nor does one's looking reveal that another does so too, so there is no reason to suggest these two eyes combine. There is a connection between the eye seeing light and the light indicating the eye; but the eye which overlooks this is not to the point here. The Āgamas all say that in sense-knowledge the senses do not just confront but actually unite with their objects. So the claim that eye-light and lamplight do not combine is at variance with experience. Thus we find that all the features of this illustrative simile are true also of the thing it was intended to illuminate.

Eyes do not see each other, you may still say, so souls do not know each other. That's silly. The fact that the eyes cannot see each other only means they are not known as independent entities, as light or objects are. That is why the eye on seeing lamplight identifies with it, becoming able to see, and thus sees itself in the form of the light. And one eye can make out another in this way. These evident facts make it reasonable to suggest that souls, though not independent entities, do when bound to Śiva know both themselves and other souls. (*Bodha* X, & *part* 1)

As the commentator plainly says, Sūtra X is about removing Pāśa or Mala, and Sūtra XI about getting to Śiva. Now as the soul is Satasat, it needs to link up with some other entity (Sat) if Mala is to be banished. It is therefore no surprise that this is discussed in Sūtra X. Sat is Śiva. Śiva is a binity, Śiva-cum-Śakti; Śiva as transcendent with Śakti as immanent. Whatever Śiva does he does as the Śakti. Now Mala-removal is a factual occurrence, which can only be brought about by an action of the Śakti. The Śakti must shove Mala aside, to take its place. Once Mala is totally eliminated

and the soul possessed completely by the Śakti, Śiva will have no occasion to do anything more for that soul, so the Śakti need not appear again: that soul is ready to unite with Śiva transcendent. But it needs to unite with Śiva immanent first (the Śakti), as it now can, as Mala has actually been eliminated. Now Sūtra X is about the elimination of Mala. So Part One of that Sūtra, quoted above, must relate to the soul's unifying with immanent Śiva (the Śakti) and not with transcendent Śiva.

There is a further indication that this passage refers to union with the Śakti. The Supreme is here compared to a light in front of the eye (the soul). This light not only makes seeing possible, but can itself be seen. The eye, itself a limited light, must perceive that light. But how? While eye and light confront each other as separate entities, no perception will occur. Eye and light need to merge in some way. The light needs to combine with the eye by entering and influencing it. And that limited intelligence, the soul, will not get through to Śiva, the pure intelligence, so long as they confront each other as two distinct entities. Śiva's intelligence needs to combine with the soul's and be used by it. For this to occur Śiva must act to influence the soul. And Siva-in-action is the Śakti.

The Śakti has of cource been influencing the soul's intelligence ever since creation, but this influence was impeded by Mala. For such influence to have its full effect every last bit of Mala needs to be removed and the soul surrendered completely to this influence, with no more havering. Such sole control is possible only if all other influences are excluded, that is when they share a single life and seem to form a single entity. So long as anything else can come between the soul and Śakti, the soul's intelligence is reduced, making it less adept at recognising the Supreme. It is by union with the Śakti and the resulting total demolition of Mala that the soul acquires the knack of uniting with transcendent Śiva. But if its union with the Śakti is even slightly incomplete it cannot go on to merge with transcendent Śiva, as even the smallest defect would require Śiva to act (by his Śakti). Now totally perfect union with the Śakti is not easy to arrange, as Mala is not readily expelled and put out of action, having been so closely linked from ever to the soul. This difficulty will be considered in more detail later on.

If the soul is completely and entirely one with Śiva, it is in

possession of true knowledge, knowing as fully as in kevala avasthā it was ignorant.

Diversity appears in the dark as similarity, and in the light as well; which also applies to the doings of soul both enlightened and unenlightened.

Comment. A varied object not seen as such appears uniform; whether in darkness or in light this is due to being enlightened or confused.

Summary. Union with the Aruḷ is a bit like union with darkness, i.e. nothing else appears. (*Payan* VII.4)

For the soul that has become one with the Śakti, ignorance has disappeared; it has all become knowledge. A blind man sees nothing at all, everything is darkness for him, even the brightest light has no existence for him. The soul fully enlightened by the Śakti is equally thorougho-going: for as the blind man sees nothing, it sees everything. Light as well as darkness is darkness for the blind man; darkness and light are both light to the enlightened soul. Light has no existence for the blind man, and ignorance is just not there for the enlightened one. Dark night becomes bright daylight when the sun shines, and the soul's ignorance is entirely done away by the Śakti and replaced by knowledge.

The Vedāntist will however object that this knowledge is indirect and therefore limited. Siddhānta rejects this objection, saying the knowledge Śakti conveys is a simple whole. Here we might develop our earlier simile with a photographic plate, comparing the Śakti to the picture (knowledge) projected on the plate (soul) by the lens. Whatever is imaged in the lens comes out as picture on the plate. Now the Śakti is pure intelligence, present in and pervading everything, from which nothing at all can be hidden. It is the lens, imaging everything automatically and clearly. Everything gets concentrated by the lens (Śakti) into a unitary whole and passed on like that to the soul (the photographic plate) which by the elimination of Mala is made ready to receive it. So the knowledge conveyed to the soul by the Śakti is not limited to any area small or big, but covers everything including Matter and the soul, which thus reveal their true inmost nature as seen in their relation to Sat. Moreover this all-embracing knowledge will not confuse by its variety (as embracing everything) but is concentrated by Śakti, the lens, into a single field easy to survey. This knowledge is complete and unsurpassable both in unity and extent. And the soul, knowing everything and knowing it aright can then use

those powers aright. That, however, takes place in mukti, so will be considered later on. Here we are just describing the preparation needful thereto. For only when the soul has been equipped with the right means of knowledge, and has been granted true knowledge of the eternal substances and their interrelations, only then can it experience Śiva in blessedness.

5. The Purification of Action

The soul is equipped to know, to act and to decide; but in kevala avasthā these faculties are quite out of use, and in sakala avasthā they are not used fully or correctly. This is due in the end to Āṇavamala; for a more immediate cause we may again look to Āṇavamala, in the case of knowledge, and to karmamala as regards action, and māyāmala for decision. We have just seen how the faculty of knowledge is to be set free. Now we shall enquire how the faculty of action can be set free. For the faculty of knowledge to reach full development the soul had to set aside the false knowledge acquired through faulty means, and surrender itself completely to the Śakti, who is pure intelligence. The faculty of action also, if it is to attain its full powers, requires that wrong actions are set aside and the soul given up to the Śakti, which acts as Jñānaśakti and also as Kriyāśakti.

(a) *Getting rid of Karmamala*

Wrong action comes under karma. In Śaiva Siddhānta karma is not any and every action (else the soul could not be said to act) but only wrong actions and their consequences. Any act in which Śiva's lordship is not acknowledged is wrong action, any action undertaken self-sufficiently, whether good or bad. The soul falls prey to karma because of the ignorance for which Āṇavamala is responsible, and right action becomes possible only when ignorance has been eliminated. So cleansing the soul's activity depends on first cleansing its knowledge.

Something else is also needed, before karma can be done away. Karma is not just wrong actions, but also their results; both actions and results need eliminating, for both are Mala, and the pleasure to which those results are bound to lead brings about new karma. So Prārabdhakarma and Saṃcitakarma need removing as well as Āgāmyakarma.

We here translate what Meykaṇḍadeva and his commentator

say about the eliminating the three-fold karma; and then treat each of these on its own.

Thesis. Stand thou blameless in the service of the Supreme.

Comment. This thesis expounds Part Two of the Sūtra and provides a reply to the objection put by Śuddhaśaiva; that products of karma and the efforts which help one to consume those fruits can never be abolished as long as the body is there, so there is no way to stop them opposing union with God.

Reason. If you do nothing except by his Aruḷ, ignorance and karma will find no way in.

Comment. Some say it is enough, to be one with the Supreme! So where does serving him come in? In reply he gives a reason for the thesis.

When a soul decides to act only if the Supreme so acts, and performs every action in concert with the Aruḷ, then Māyeya and Karma cannot get in the way of this their unity, so they give up pestering the soul. Hence the above statement.

As Mala has already been eliminated, 'ignorance' must here refer to the confusion brought about by the products of Māyā. Now these always survive as long as the body does, so the Sūtra does not refer to ignorance etc., being destroyed, but to their finding no way in.

Example 1. If we realise we are not the senses, and they do not act by our instructions, and we are not their objects, but belong to the Supreme — then, I tell you, the servants of the Supreme will have no more karma, whatever bodies they may occupy. Their earlier deeds also vanish before the Supreme.

Comment. This re-affirms the reason, in response to the objection that it seems hardly right to say they can find no way in for those who are serving the Supreme; for Prārabdha karma is certainly there, and those still lumbered with bodies would like to get rid of if; and this leads to Āgāmya karma, so that is there as well.

The senses (owing to which deeds are desired and performed) are not ourselves, but are part of Māyeya. We did not set them to work, the Supreme did. And the things on which karma has to work also are not ourselves, but Māyeya, and are set going by the Supreme, and not by us. We are linked to them, as subjects who get and then consume karma, but we can only act when He empowers our capacities for knowing and doing, and not otherwise; so we are not our own masters, but are in the power of the Supreme.

Once we see aright what Paśu and Pāsā really are, and consider all our actions as undertaken through the Aruḷ of Siva, then we shall not be

shackled by them, whatever deeds we do and whatever body we may do them in. Prārabdha karma does strictly follow Āgāmya karma (as God requires) but disappears in God's presence when the body dies.

Now Saṃcita karma perishes once instruction is obtained, just as a seed perishes if touched by fire; so by 'earlier karma' he must mean Prārabdha karma.

Example 2. Great persons have a duty to protect those who so request; so it is not partiality if the Supreme protects his own. Those who take refuge in him he takes to himself, and leaves the others to consume their deeds; and deals likewise with karma brought forward from before.

Comment. Some say that if Prārabdha karma is not imposed upon the servants of the Supreme, as it is on others, but disappears in his presence, surely that makes God partisan. This he denies, and re-affirms what went before.

As great folk who offer protection to those who seek it are doing their duty, not being partisan, so God is not partisan if he defends only those who take his part. He arranges that Āgāmya karma should not touch his followers and servants, any more than it touches Him, but requires others to deal with their Āgāmya karma. And Prārabdha karma, which affects both groups, is also dealt with differently, according to the service given.

People say Śiva is partisan, because different groups are treated differently. Yes they are treated differently, is the reply, but no he isn't partisan, as the saying about great folk shows.

For further emphasis he gives the instance of Śiva's differential treatment as regards Āgāmya karma. And this instance is appropriate, seeing that other schools agree that God identifies with his servants, leaving others to bear the results of their own actions; so this is not arbitrary or partisan.

Example 3. Prārabdha karma and Māyā do still bother the wise, as when 'asa' foetida is removed from a vessel the smell still lingers on; even so Āgāmya perishes along with Māyā, since the wise man has become as Śiva, and depends on him.

Comment. Here some quote Tiruvāśakar: 'I may yet have to bear no little pain and body-shackling' to show that Prārabdha karma still troubles those who serve Śiva. In which case the statement that it ceases according to the measure of their service cannot be correct, so Āgāmya karma, its consequence, must also remain as seed on another birth.

To deal with this point he explains why it is that Prārabdha karma still bothers, showing that it is not wrong to say they cease according to the measure of their service:

In a pot which previously contained asa foetida the smell does linger, but gradually lessens, though a little still remains; and so it is with a wise man who serves the Supreme. From sheer force of habit hankering now and then returns for Prārabdha karma and its instruments (body and other products of Māyā), and bothers him from time to time owing to the habit. But Āgāmya karma which always and unavoidably follows it does not in this instance come to fruition but is destroyed along with Māyeya. For when by habit he is like to err, he looks up to Śiva, who will not allow him to, as being among Śiva's following he is one with Him. As light drives off darkness so that glance at Śiva drives away Āgāmya karma.

Example 4. *Those who knowing the truth glance at the feet of the Supreme will not lose their skill, even though they are still involved with the five senses. In this they are like ascetics who are not burnt with fire, or a horseman riding by at speed.*

Comment. This example is to help those who ask how they can fail to stumble, if Prārabdhakarma and Māyā still pester them, and how then can they glance up to Śiva. Those clever enough to stand in the fire without getting burnt do not lose that skill, even if they lie on the fire; and those who have learnt to ride do not lose their skill even if the horse goes very fast; and those who found a way to get free of the five senses, and who glance up to the feet of the Supreme, even if Prārabdhakarma and Māyā still bother them and involve them again with the five-fold objects, still their skill will not desert them nor will they be shackled once again.

Example 5. *If anyone has understood his true nature to be Satasat; and observes only through Śivajñana, he has no more desire for Pāśa. Darkness can do nothing when a fire is burning brightly nearby, and those who have achieved Sat will not come under the power of powerless Asat.*

Comment. Here the reason is further supported by explaining the Law of Assimilation, in response to the comment that the soul being Satasat naturally turns into whatever it is bound up with, so will come under its power and adopt its mode of operation when it gets involved with the five-fold objects, even if by then it has already reached the feet of Śiva.

If someone realises what he really is, namely Satasat (by assimilation), and sees only through the Aruḷ of Śiva, then he has no more desire for Pāśa, i.e. Asat. So those who have merged with the Supreme do not get involved with Asat-objects, which cannot exercise their power in the presence of Sat, just as darkness is powerless in presence of bright light.

Sat and Asat are dissimilar; so when those who have attained the feet of Śiva do get involved with the five senses they need not lose their skill. (*Bodha* X.2)

Other sources amplify and sometimes clarify this teaching; some of these will be cited in the following pages, which consider how the soul is set free (i) from Āgāmyakarma, (ii) from Saṃcitakarma and (iii) from Prārabdhakarma.

(i) *Getting rid of Āgāmya Karma*

The soul aims to become free from Mala, and to be united with Śiva. By Iruvineioppu and Malaparipāka together with Śaktinipāta the soul has, in intention at least, achieved that aim. Āṇavamala has now lost its hold upon the soul, and the Śakti of Śiva has taken possession of it. But Āṇavamala's loss of control will not automatically cancel its consequences; and the Śakti does not, just by seizing possession, ensure that the soul will deliberately surrender to it in every last respect. Though all things needful for perfection are there, available, still they need to be set to work. The soul which Āṇavamala had rendered imperfect must now, by totally destroying those effects, be made perfect again, and brought by the Śakti into total and absolute surrender. So the Śakti first goes to work as Jñanaśakti and, banishing the ignorance due to Āṇavamala, enables the soul to acquire real knowledge. Knowledge however needs to be completed by action, if it is not to be useless. So the soul also needs to be empowered for genuine action.

The knowledge achieved by the soul through the Jñānaśakti, enabling its faculty of knowledge to function correctly, is basically this: that Śiva alone is Sat; that he is the Lord; that whatever happens is to be attributed in the end to him; that beside him, Matter is nothing; and that the soul must surrender to him completely and be fused with him into a single entity. Which can only happen if the individual I is first abandoned, self-will and independence quite given up. The I should not set itself up above Śiva, nor even as his equal, but subordinate itself to him. That is why it was said earlier, when discussing the soul's faculty of knowledge, that the soul must set aside all means and objects of knowledge which it can command, forswearing any independent application of that faculty and conceding to Śiva's active Śakti sole right to make use of it.

The same applies to actions. We should do nothing on our own initiative, but put ourselves completely and entirely at Śiva's disposal, to act only when he says we should. The simplest way to

ensure this is not to act at all, to be never a subject but always an object. Inaction, which includes non-speech, desirelessness and thoughtlessness, is therefore demanded of us, so as to achieve correct activity.

Do not bother about matching up the different tattvas of the various schools. Get rid of the citta that engages in this enquiry, and honour the controlling Śakti by incomparable Patijñāna. (38)

If all desire is eliminated during life, leaving us as if dead, then death is no pain at all, but a great help towards inactivity, and in following the indescribable holy path. (39)

Kuṛaḷ says, If you wish, wish for birthlessness; indicating that there is something we should wish for. He goes on, if it is birthlessness you wish for, this will come about by wishing not to have any wish; meaning that from the one who grants prayers we should ask to have nothing to pray for. (40)

If, through Śivajñāna, you labour to get rid of atmanbodha (Paśujñāna), then organs, breath etc., will still be engaged. That way you will not achieve perfection. But while imperfection rules the body also will be everlasting. (41)

Then will the non-religious good and bad deeds, accompany him where he is going. If he then falls on ill fortune, will the Lord Śiva abandon him? Śiva, after all, is one-half Aruḷ. (*Paḍiar* 38-42)

Those who have reached Aruḷ and those who have achieved Saṃādhi will be inseparable (from the Supreme) and free of rebirth. Those who have no desires barring speech are just free from rebirth.

Comment. Those blessed with freedom and those who have reached Samādhi, its immediate cause, will never be separated from real Goodness. Those whose have yet to achieve that grasp of the highest Good where even speech dies away, are free of rebirth.

The phrase 'no desires barring speech' refers to those still in a state where they must hear and reflect and (so) put doubt aside. To be 'free of rebirth' is to have reached the lower stage of salvation. (*Payan* VIII.6)

It is not easy for souls at this stage of development not to engage in any activity of their own. They still have bodies, equipped with organs for action; they are still in the world, surrounded by objects for their activity. And (most importantly) their earlier karma is still with them, yet to be consumed. Consuming it involves activity, which is guaranteed to produce fresh karma in its turn. So the generation of new Āgāmya-karma seems unavoidable.

Śaiva Siddhānta takes note of this difficulty. It admits that a

soul still on earth cannot possibly be totally inactive. Which is a problem, for every action will bind the soul to Matter, being performed by material organs and on material objects, and therefore counting as karma and shackling the soul firmly to Matter.

In this difficulty the soul is advised to seek Śiva's help (Paḍiār 42, cited just above), as he 'destroys the acts which the soul still does' (Siddhiār VIII.10). Does this contradict the alleged impossibility of escaping karma's law? Śaiva Siddhānta meets this objection by saying Śiva does prevent such action occasioning bad results, but only for those who serve him and who act solely through his Śakti, not for any and every soul. Inactivity is the ideal, but Siddhānta is realistic enough to see it is impossible for anyone still in a material environment. Logically this should exclude complete release, but Siddhānta thinks it need not draw this logical conclusion, referring instead to its doctrine that every action must ultimately derive from Śiva, for without his help no movement or action can occur. The unenlightened soul does not realise this, but thinks it is in charge and in total control of its own actions; and thus acquires for itself all their consequences. The enlightened soul by contrast knows that Śiva is its Lord and He alone acts independently. Acknowledging this liaison with Śiva, the soul sees itself not as doer but merely as tool. So any action it gets involved in is not ascribed to that soul but to the Śiva within.

Although the senses exist only as a part of you, do not imagine that they acknowledge your authority. I tell you they will lead you hither and thither, as they want, in obedience to the Supreme, who gave them to you; so worship at his feet who is Lord over the both senses and you, and burn up their strength through the Aruḷ. Once free of that weakness (of the senses) decide that any deeds which occur belong to the Supreme, and treat them accordingly. You will not again be subjugated to the senses. (*Siddhiār* X.3)

Externally it makes no difference whether a deed is done by an enlightened or unenlightened soul; internally, it makes all the difference. The unenlightened soul is inevitably brought by its action under the law of karma; but for an enlightened soul it does not have that effect, for Śiva as guardian and executor of the law of karma knows that the enlightened soul acted on different assumptions and so must be judged quite differently. Not that Śiva as judge can entirely overlook its deeds, for that would go against the principle that whatever exists cannot entirely disappear. This

principle requires that even the deeds of an enlightened soul must bear fruit. But as the soul was not doing deeds of its own, but of Śiva's, He as guardian of karma does not put them to that soul's account; and this prevents their becoming Āgāmya karma and Prārabdha karma, and so protects the soul against its own deeds.

What happens, then, to these deeds of an enlightened soul? Bodha X.2 Ex.3 suggests that Śiva somehow transfers these deeds (which should properly come under the law of karma) to Māyā, to perish there, just as a grain of corn (the deeds) whose germ (self-sufficience due to Āṇavamala) has died will rot in the earth (Māyā) and disappear into it without springing up and bringing forth new corn (joy and sorrow, fresh deeds).

Payan and Siddhiār give a different answer.

It can't be right to say that only those who love him greatly will now find their way to him who takes and bears their burdens.

Comment. Can a dear friend readily find someone to bear every burden laid upon him?

Summary. This says that those who have the love which becomes Aruḷ (who identify with the Aruḷ) can easily understand how the Jñeya (Knower, Śiva) can turn deeds of those who have reached him into his deeds, so they are not pursued by them. (*Payan* VII.5)

Śiva exists as a sort of soul (being invisible during bondage) so the soul needs to unite with him and serve him. That eliminates the error. Śiva will treat its deeds as his own, and everything that opposes it as opposing him. Out of love he unites with the soul, to spare it rebirth. If one does sin he turns that into service to God. (*Siddhiār* X.1)

This says that Śiva prevents the law of karma from applying to actions of the enlightened soul, by relieving it of them and taking them on himself. Declaring himself the real doer, he puts the deeds down to his own account instead. This theory involves substitution, though without displacing the subject of the actions. Once Āṇavamala has lost control, Śiva provides decision as well as movement for the soul's actions, and the soul now executes none of them, though regarding itself as autonomous, but as there is still some Prārabdha karma to be consumed (which Śiva as karma-controller had imposed on it), so Śiva and not the soul is the real agent.

Siddhiār offers a third explanation:

The good and bad deeds an enlightened one performs while still in the world revert to people who do good or ill to him. (*Siddhiār* X.1)

This says that the good and bad deeds of enlightened ones are offloaded onto their benefactors and enemies. We find the same thought repeated in X.4:

The Supreme unites with those who have attained to him through Jñāna, and with good intention makes others consume their deeds, thus setting them aside and cherishing and protecting those souls by keeping karma far away; and in doing this he is not partisan. All action is abolished for those who confess thus: All my actions in the world are yours, you dwell within me and do it all, you are the real agent. I have no action of my own, for it is yours.

On this view Śiva turns the Āgāmya karma of the enlightened into Prārabdha karma of the unenlightened. Nobody bothered whether this would conflict with the statement that karma is not transferable between souls. The present passage says Āgāmya karma cannot harm the enlightened. But later we find Siddhiār praising a good deed done to such:

Someone who gives just a little to those who have attained Sivajñāna will reap a benefit growing like the earth or a mountain. The gift will prevent the giver from falling back into the ocean of rebirth and make it enjoy the highest bliss in the heavens; and to destroy Pāśa will have it reborn into a life devoted to tapas which after brief sojourn with Caryā, Kriyā and yoga will bestow supreme knowledge and ensure it reaches the lotus feet of Śiva. (*Siddhiar* VIII.26)

If this passage is taken with the last one it says you benefit from the good deeds of an enlightened one you do good to, consuming them as Prārabdha karma.

This much is certain. Śiva preserves the enlightened from the fate of having to consume the fruits of deeds they did after being enlightened. He thus puts them, in a way, outside the realm of karma, withdraws them from the sphere of causality, and prevents the developed Māyā from bringing the seeds of those actions to germination. All this he can do because his aim in subjecting the soul to Māyā's causality (as aid to karma) has now been fulfilled. Śiva put the soul within developing Māyā so that Āṇavamala might be destroyed; and obedience to the law of karma was to help in achieving this. Māyeya (body, organs, worlds, objects) are thus good things entrusted to the soul for a special purpose. Śiva, their lawful owner, can claim them back, cutting the causal link between souls and Māyeya, and allowing them to destroy the fruits of their deeds. He could destroy the link he made between Māyeya and

soul any time he likes, but he does not do so while Aṇavamala still holds the soul in bondage, as that would deprive souls of any chance of getting free of Āṇavamala. Once Āṇavamala is destroyed he can safely break the causal link with Māyeya; as indeed he must, if the soul is to have any chance of full perfection. But the link is not broken suddenly, but loosened gradually. First it is cleansed of false knowledge and fitted out with the Jñānaśakti. Then he re-directs the deeds of the soul, which previously were passed on to developed Māyā (Tanu, Karaṇa-Bhuvana-Bhoga), but now either disappear straight into undeveloped Māyā (Matter), or are taken over by Śiva or transferred to other souls. There is here no injustice, or arbitrary act, for he is quite within his rights, and no more open to criticism that a man who reclaims something of his that someone had embezzled.

If someone tricks you out of some valuable object you lent him, say, will you lie down to sleep, or go out?

Comment. If someone steals something which he borrowed, is the lender going to take a nap or go out for a walk? Come on, my pupil, what do you say?

Summary. This says it is difficult to attain to Śiva by cheating the Jñānaśakti, who is present in full strength in everything, and is needed before Jñeya (Śiva) can be attained. (*Payan* VII.6)

It would be unjust not to let the soul out of Māyeya but keep it tied down to deed-doing and joy-enjoying, even now that its link to Māyeya has served its purpose and Śiva is working for its release. This would be a betrayal of trust. It is not the soul that possesses and controls Māyeya, nor does it (as Vedāntists suppose) acquire that right by denying Matter or identifying with God. Śiva is, and remains the Lord. Souls are his servants, and remain so, and cannot gain control. Pretending to it would be like robbing Śiva of his own. A wise man will lay claim only to that position which he really occupies, for nothing else can lead him to his goal. The enlightened soul, recognising this, will not seek to use Māyeya for his own interests. He makes no claim on the outcome of any actions he still in a way performs. If he still makes use of Māyeya he is happy to disclaim any benefits there from.

Śiva is not only authorised but required to render harmless the deeds of the enlightened soul. As Lord he has a duty to protect the soul which joins his ranks. This is not partiality on his

part, any more than it is for an important man who favours his followers rather than others.

There is no other way to avoid new Āgāmya karma accruing. Asceticism, emphatically, will not do the trick:

Wandering about the country, living in forests, dwelling on mountain peaks, going without water or food, though you should live deathless for ever these will never bring you mala-free Jñāna; and you will be born again.

But the path prescribed will lead you there:

Though thou were the object of yearning and satisfaction of desires for beautiful women, yet wouldst thou, on attaining Patıjñāna, achieve that release which is so hard to get, and continue adoring Śiva's lovely feet. (*Siddhiār* X.5)

(ii) *Escaping the Consequences of Karma*

What about earlier deeds, not yet expiated? These, we know, get put away in Saṃcita and Prārabdha karma. Saṃcita karma contains the results of earlier deeds not yet brought to fruition. As each birth adds more of these, the backlog is tremendous, and seems impossible to destroy completely, a task which would in any case hold back the soul from final release, although no longer guilty of new Āgāmya karma, as it would be indefinitely captive in the world.

Siddhānta, so as not to call into question the final salvation of the soul, including its escape from Māyā, teaches that the enlightened soul is let off consuming its Saṃcita karma. But how is the soul to be let off something stored up over several births for ultimate consumption? Surely saying Saṃcita karma is not entirely consumed will destroy the law of karma and undermine karma-teaching. Not much thought was given to this difficulty. Karma appears suddenly, and as suddenly disappears again. It is briefly stated that Śiva as Satguru by his enlightening glance 'puts away deeds done earlier (Saṃcita) so the soul need no longer consume them'. (Siddhiār VIII.10) and that 'the twin-type deeds due to numberless births (Saṃcita) suddenly vanish like seed thrown in the fire'. (Prak: X.10)

The soul does not fare quite so favourably with respect to Prārabdha karma i.e. deeds now ripened and due for consumption in the current life. It is not let off this karma, but has to get rid of it by actually consuming it.

Śiva destroys by experience the karma there in the body. (*Siddhiār* VIII.10)

The deeds found in the current body are destroyed.

While the soul is yet in the body, Prārabdha karma does not cease to oppress the soul, even though the fetters are destroyed, just like asa foetida (*whose smell lingers on in a pot after it is taken out*). (*Prak:* X.10 & 11)

The impossibility of escaping from Prārabdha karma is the reason why the soul is still held back on the earth, and cannot immediately enter completely into salvation. The soul does not feel much torment through Prārabdhakarma. No feeling accompanies this experience, and bliss will not be spoilt thereby. It has no evil consequence.

(b) *Enabling the Soul to act Alright*

Self-sufficiency, due to not recognising Śiva as Lord, and all that happens as derived from him, turns our actions into sins, thus sentencing the soul to transmigration. To get free of this the soul must abstain from all independent activity. For this purpose total inactivity is recommended; not as goal but as transition to an even higher stage of right activity, which in turn leads on to full and perfect bliss, when the soul rests in transcendent Śiva. The only right action is what Śiva does, and nothing else. Now the soul has an eternal and inherent power for action; and the inactivation of this constitutes its lowest stage, kevala avasthā. So a soul on the verge of the highest stage cannot correctly be said to have no occasion for action. It should have occasion, indeed it must; but that occasion should not come from Asat or from the soul itself, which must be a mere tool in the hand of the Śakti (Śiva-in-action). Acting aright means leaving it to Śiva to initiate it, putting oneself entirely at his disposal, and doing only what and when he tells us to. This can be achieved only by suppressing one's I and surrendering completely to Śiva's Kriyāśakti. How this possession by Kriyāśakti comes about, starting from Śaktinipāta, is closely parallel to the way (just described) by which Jñānaśakti takes possession; so we need not go into detail here. We explained above (VI.4c) how the soul is kitted out with suitable means of knowledge; and much the same applies to equipping it with means of action (Kriyāśakti) and means of desire (Icchāśakti). This last question is briefly dealt with in the next section.

6. Purifying the Soul's Desires

All action is based on desires. To avoid wrong conduct we must eliminate wrong desire; and to ensure right action, right desire must lead the way. All those desires are wrong which are evoked by the organs of the body, and concerned with Asat. All those desires are right which Śiva's Icchāśakti has called forth, and have Śiva as their object. For genuine Release all false desires must be given up: the soul should have no longings for things of this world, there should be no traffic between the soul's faculties and organs and things of this world, and the soul should no longer even want to make use of the organs Māyā has provided. Its desiring faculty must be related only to Śiva, by recognising his Icchāśakti as the only norm and directive, and the only suitable object for desire.

Wrong desire originates in Āṇavamala. Māyeya nourishes and re-awakens it, offering it objects to desire and equipping it with organs by which to gain control of them. As long as the soul remains in contact with Māyeya, it is liable to misuse its faculty of desire. Wrong desire will be ruled out only when the soul is free of Māyeya's shackles; which can happen, externally, only when release is followed by death. Not that it had a fetter to bear right up to that death, making any pre-mortem Release incomplete. For the soul can even while in Māyeya break free of the objects and means of knowledge which Māyeya provides; it can during life refrain from self-sufficient action though Māyeya entices it thereto; so also it can even before death fend off Māyeya so it can no longer work on its faculty of desire. By putting this faculty entirely at the disposal of Śiva's Icchāśakti, (and not by asceticism) it can take its stand within Māyeya as if that were no longer where it stood.

This discussion relates only to purifying the soul's faculties and making them healthy. How it acts, when healthy, is described later (VII, on mukti).

7. Freeing the Soul from Three-fold Mala

The previous sections have shown how the soul is purified of forces which pervert its efforts. Now as the soul is eternally linked with these forces, we are bound to ask how the soul could possibly be set free of Asat-powers; and if so, free in what way.

It is a basic principle of Śaiva Siddhānta that what exists can-

not completely disappear. Aṇavamala, karma and Māya are realities, so on this view they cannot disappear. The soul's connection with three-fold Mala is also real, so we might infer that also cannot disappear. Śaiva Siddhānta does draw both these conclusions. Does that make Release problematic, then?

The principle that what really exists, exists eternally does not say it always exists in the same form. For example, the world is a reality, so it must exist eternally; but that is not to say it must exist always in the same visible and developed form. Its form and condition can change without affecting its reality in any way. It is just as real in its invisible undeveloped state as in the visible and developed one. Now just as the eternally existing world does not always exist in the same way, so also Āṇavamala and the other Mala need not always exist in the same way. We already know they don't, and don't always affect the soul in the same way. In kevala avasthā they exist as inactive entities, but are active in sakala avasthā. In both their presence threatens disaster for the soul, even in the kevala avasthā where they are inactive, as Śiva is inactive in that period. Nor do the Mala cease to exist in Śuddha avasthā, nor break their connection with the soul, but they exist in such a way as no longer to bother the soul.

If you say Pāśa perishes, then the Vedas should not call it eternal. If you say it does not perish, you have no hope of attaining knowledge. The Śakti (of Pāśa) perishes, but not its eternal character. When light banishes darkness the darkness is still there, but is no longer able to obscure. (*Prak:* X.9)

The three-fold Mala is not destroyed; but its power to influence individual souls is nullified and becomes irrelevant for the enlightened; a change this saying compares to the sun banishing darkness (for the enlightened: for the others there is no change). Sunlight does not destroy darkness, or it could not come back after sundown; but the sunlight pushes it aside, making it inactive by action of an opposing principle. Not that the comparison implies a later return of the disengaged threefold Mala, for the soul's union with the Śakti, which disengages Mala, is upgraded to a permanent union with transcendent Śiva. (see below)

As we saw, the connection between soul and Mala is compared to that between corn-grain (soul) and germ (Āṇavamala), between inner and outer husk (karma and Māyā), and between copper and verdigris (see above III.1). Siddhiār's account of the

putting aside of Mala includes these two examples. A translation follows:

(*A comment*) *The body has always been. It leaves one soul, and promptly acquires another. Arising, perishing, again arising, by karma's law it is endless. Souls which have gained the Aruḷ of the Supreme will later receive an eternal body. This is mukti. True enough, this mukti is progressive, an unbearable situation, for if the body is still there then karma, Māyā, and the other Mala will arise. The body created out of the Sūkshma body has a beginning, being a product. It is like a medicine for the elimination of beginningless Mala. Once Mala is eliminated, the body will disappear as well.* (3)

When the soul comes to the unreachable true Jñāna, Śiva enlightens it, and it becomes a Jivanmukta. Like snake-posion held in check by medicine, or darkness banished by the glare of a bright light, or impurity in water removed with the strychnos nut,[22] *so also indwelling Mala does not entirely disappear. But its strength is gone. Mala will still be there, as long as the body is. Later the mala will also gets rubbed off, so it does not accompany a body.* (4)

You may say that as Āṇavamala has no beginning it can have no end, or souls would perish alsong with it. But I tell you that verdigris disappears when scraped with an alchemist's stone, but the copper remains. That is how Mala is removed when the soul reaches the feet of the Supreme. You may say that mukti is the pure state reached after the removal of Mala, so there is no need to reach the feet of the Supreme; but I tell you that the darkness disappears when the sun rises; and Mala disappears when the soul is united to Śiva's foot. (5)

Inner and outer husk have always been there with the grain of corn. So tell me how they get separated, and are there on their own. In clean rice they cannot be found. You may object that husked rice does contain them; if so, please explain why husked rice does not produce any further rice-grain. They perish gradually; and so do Mala and karma, which have always been there to bother the soul, yet leave it in Śiva-mukti. But to souls in bondage they are bound, so it is quite in order to call Mala imperishable. (*Siddhiār* XI.3-6)

These quotations appear to conflict with what was said earlier. Items (3) and (4) make it quite clear that Siddhiār does not contemplate the complete destruction of three-fold Mala, in this life anyway, but its being inactivated. As snake-poison is not

22. The nut of *strychnos potatorium* is used in India to purify drinking water, as it draws dirt to itself leaving the water clear.

destroyed by medicine but only made harmless; and as darkness is not destroyed by light, but only suppressed; and as pollution is not destroyed by the *strychnos potatorium* nut, which only clears the water; so Mala also is not destroyed for those enlightened during their lifetime, but only rendered harmless to them. Items (5) and (6) however suggest that when they do die the three Mala are indeed (as affecting those souls) destroyed; i.e. that the link between them and the soul is completely severed. This is not and cannot be a genuine Siddhāntin view, as it violates the principle that whatever exists can never become nothing. The link between soul and Mala does really exist so cannot become nothing; it is there and always will be.

In Sūtra XI of Bodha, where complete bliss is described, there is nothing about soul and Mala being separated, though it is said that in mukti Mala is set aside. According to the comment there, this just means that Mala's power to obscure is destroyed. (XI.2, Example 4)

As the examples of copper and verdigris, and of rice-grain and husk, were used in describing the relation between soul and Mala, the writer of Siddhiār clearly felt obliged to use the same examples when saying how the soul gets free of Mala. These examples show that the soul can get free of the evil of habit; but he also uses them to describe how that liberation takes place. But these examples, used in this way, have implications contrary to the spirit of the system, and these we must reject.

We shall therefore need some other explanation of how the soul is freed from Mala, in which the link between them is not destroyed, but is made harmless. As our sources are silent on this matter we shall have to try our hand at reconstruction.

During world-sleep, as we saw, karmamala has its base in Māyā, and the souls not yet released also repose in Māyā like a bed. Āṇavamala (which totally shrouds the soul) is also located there. Now Māyā is in turn based in Śiva, i.e. rests in Śiva but without Śiva being affected by it, for where Śiva is, Asat is as good as nonexistent. The released soul has its form of existence in Śiva.

Now, in view of what was said about the period of world-sleep, we should take Āṇavamala, karmamala and Māyeyamala, which hold the soul in bondage, to be resolved into Māyā (as regards that soul) at the time of its release, just as everything is at the time of general world-destruction. As this Māyā rests in Śiva, with whom

the soul forms a single unit, we can suppose that in mukti also there is a link between the soul and Māyā (plus karma and Āṇavamala which are based in it). Which also implies that this link has no further effect upon the soul, as it now forms more or less a single unit with Śiva, for whom all Mala is as if non-existent.

On this approach the relation between soul and Mala is different after the death of the body from what it was before. The released soul is unharmed by Mala both before death and afterwards; but while before death a fully developed Mala confronts the soul, after death that Mala has been re-absorbed. This distinction has its importance, as distinguishing Jīvanmukti from Paramukti; and providing a basis for the theory of the evil of habit. This we shall deal with in the next section. The teaching about Jīvanmukti and Paramukti is given in Chapter VII, where we describe the nature of Release.

8. The Evil of Habit

The negative aspect of Release is the cleansing of the three faculties of knowledge, action and desire, not in sequence but simultaneously. It occurs when Śiva as Satguru brings about enlightenment, in the seven-fold manner described above (VI. 3d). Enlightenment comes in a sudden flash, though it may follow on a process of gradual preparation. The same is true of the purification which enlightenment brings. Thus although purification and enlightenment by the Guru must both be considered factually complete, they may appear to take some time. This is due to the evil of habit.

Once enlightenment has occurred the soul still remains for some time in the realm of Māyeya, confronting it externally although internally now freed from it; for the purified soul has some prarabdha karma still unconsumed. Thus the link with Mala which was firmly established up till death still affects the soul, even though it is no longer under Mala's power.

The position of the soul is now quite different, and it has different aspirations too. What is used to seek after and value it must now look upon as nothing, although those things are all still there. There must be no more expressions of individuality, no more spontaneous actions; for now it is a mere tool in Śiva's hand.

Is this, perhaps, too radical a conversion for the soul to undertake? Can the soul of its own motion abandon all its independence and enslave itself to an external Power? Or is some compulsion required? Here is the reply:

Nobody need tell you to find a cool shade. You do that on your own. And that is how the soul becomes one with the Śakti of Śiva.

Comment. A traveller done in by the heat can find cool shade without anyone telling him to. He will do it by himself, fast enough! And someone getting baked by the sympathies and antipathies which Māyā evokes will by himself seek Aruḷ and become one with it. (*Payan* VII.1)

The soul became independent long ago, which brought it various problems. So it tries to feel and find its way, unconsciously at first, out of that independence (iruvineioppu). Then comes the guru and explains how all that unpleasantness was due to independence, and how to get free by itself, by surrendering to Śiva's Śakti. That does the trick. Once the soul sees the disadvantages of independence, and has been shown a way of escape, it will want to give up independence and surrender to Śiva's Śakti. No compulsion is required, any more than a weary traveller needs compelling to take advantage of cool shade he may spot, in the heat of the day.

The soul, then is attracted by the new relationships, but is still hindered by inertia. For an inconceivably long time it regarded Matter as Lord; a sort of soul-sickness to be healed by abandoning that idea and surrendering to Śiva's Śakti. The enlightened soul, then, could be considered healed but not yet quite better: some convalescence is required. A blind man who gets his sight back must first grow used to the light. At first, not being fully accustomed to the light, he will often shut his eyes, escaping back into the darkness from which he was so keen to get free. And he will still grope for his stick, that was his support and guide for so long, although he now has no need of it. It is not that he wants his old blindness back, it is just force of habit.

Other examples are used to explain why habit should have this effect: the potter's wheel goes on turning after he has stopped turning it, asa foetida leaves its smell behind in a vessel (Bodha X.2 Ex:3); and the caterpillar long fed on margosa leaves and pining for them even in preference to sugar-cane (Bodha IX.3, 3rd reason).

At first the evil of habit will often lead an enlightened soul back to its previous character and involvement with Asat. So the state of being enlightened is not a fixity, at first. That is why Irupā (allowing for the evil of habit) describes the initial stages of salvation like this:

How comes it, Meykaṇḍadeva, that my mind which is in you should run after Mala? If my mind combines with yours, it should not go after Mala. If Mala still plagues me, I am falling between two stools. Why is it one thing and then the other, father, for me? (*Irupā* 11)

The relation between soul and Matter even after enlightenment is bound by continuity to appear much the same as it did before. The enlightened man, still influenced by habit, will for some time continue to perform both good and bad deeds, though not so often and not by design. He will still yearn for various earthly pleasures, instinctively but not so passionately. He will still fear pain, involuntarily and less strongly. For a while he will go on using his old organs of knowledge, not that he really expects to discover things thereby, but just because he is used to using them.

Such activities due to the evil of habit are wrong, as they are not based directly on Śiva, but they are quite different from pre-enlightenment activities which were rooted in self-sufficiency due to Āṇavamala. The new activity is not autonomous; but then it is not theonomous either. Not being autonomous, it need not condemn the soul to rebirth. But not being theonomous it is detrimental to the soul. If the evil of habit is not rapidly overcome, the resulting activities will at the least postpone final Release. If habit prevails too long the soul might theoretically revert to Mala-bondage. This is indicated by comparing the initial removal of Mala to the removal of scum by a stone thrown in a pond.

If one throws a stone on to a pond covered with scum, it disappears for a moment, but the pond is soon covered over again. So do Māyā, Mala, and karma leave souls which recognise the feet of Arans (*Śiva*)*, but re-possess them later. Those who, filled with love, submit themselves to the holy feet of Śiva without separating themselves from him, and achieve Samādhi, will always remain in that state. To those who filled with desires turn this way and that, we will explain how to get the help of the Aruḷ-śakti, so that Pāśa is abolished.* (*Siddhiār* VIII.39)

While a relapse into bondage appears theoretically possible, it seems to be considered impossible in practice. Śiva's Śakti provides a principle by which the enlightened soul can always take its bearings. Habit may drag it hither and thither in the whirlpool of worldly life, but the experience of enlightenment soon brings it to its senses, and it can find Śiva once more. Should it for a moment forget itself, Śiva will come to its aid. As we saw, he sees to it that acts the soul does from habit, or to expiate Prārabdhakarma, do

not occasion evil consequences. And he prevents the soul's faculties of understanding and desiring from becoming a prey to Asat, by taking the place of the Asat-object, through which put the soul was liable to forget itself, so that a yearning for Asat became a yearning for what was actually Sat.

He removes Pāśa, makes me his very own, subjects me to him and comes into my meditation. If I meditate aright, he comes as Lord. If from habit I look upon anything else, he is there as that object. (*Paḍiār* 95)

While it seems practically impossible to fall back into bondage, the evil of habit still sets the soul a task: not to entertain any false security, and to go on fighting until this mongrel state is quite overcome. The evil of habit must be overcome and set aside, as the name Mala would suggest. An enlightened one who dies before this is finished does not need to be born again, though he cannot enter immediately into full bliss but has to make do at first with a higher mukti-state, from which he can pass directly into total bliss.

This shows how important it is to overcome the evil of habit. Many counsels are offered, to the same effect. But as these are not easily distinguished from counsels on how to get cleansed and how to unite with the Śakti, we propose to deal with both together, in the next section.

9. Removing the Evil of Habit

As in sakala avasthā, so also in Śuddha avasthā there are several necessary stages of development, beginning with Iruvineioppu. People would naturally like to reach their goal as soon as possible, so it is no surprise to find suggestions for speeding up the process of development. We need not go through all these in detail. Many of these resemble the advice given to bring about Iruvineioppu, e.g. external and spiritual worship of Śiva (Siddhiār IX.10 & 11). Others follow naturally from what was said above, e.g. the advice to treat the world as a mirage (Siddhiār IX.1), and to spurn everything that is not Śiva, even the mightiest powers, the heaven of Brahma and the other heavens (Siddhiār IX.6); advice on giving up the I (Paḍiār 15) and self-pride (Siddhiār X.2), about indifference to the world (Paḍiār 29 & 93), about single-minded desire for Śiva (Paḍiār 30), and about giving up self-willed knowledge and action (Paḍiār 31-35 & 41).

Special emphasis is laid upon meditation and, in the later writings, on love. This is not mentioned in Bodha. Perhaps the

idea that love helps in achieving bliss came in later, not being found in the older devotional writings.

If you get rid of Paśujñāna from your atmanbodha both internally and externally, then the Supreme with his spouse, the Śakti, will appear in you. Achieving full knowledge in this way you will get rid of the evil of habit. Or, by acquiring Śivajñāna through love, you can be freed from the evil of habit. Do one or the other. (*Paḍiār* 51)

The claim that evil habits can be avoided and full bliss attained through love of Śiva can be confirmed by several examples from the holy writings:

It is said there is no love like Kannappen's love; so only Kannappen or Śiva can understand such love. Who else will understand such love? (52)[23]

From love he undid the big cloth full of rice, and so became sweet ambrosia for Śiva-with-the-let-down-hair. This is something Sentenar did in true love. (53)[24]

When it was told that the child (Tirujñānasaṃbandha) had drunk pure Śivajñāna at the goddess's breast, milk flowed from the breast of the Queen of Madura. So did this meek lady show her love. (54)[25]

The love that removes atmanbodha, if in love one weeping cries O Love, my Love! and adopts love as his form, is the ripe fruit mentioned, but pilgrimages and meditation, and external Śiva worship are not. (55)

I have investigated all the statements of other schools, as far as I could; and of all the ways by which the evil of habit is said to be destroyed, only that described by Siddhānta have I found fault-free. (56)

Śiva and jñāna are like seed and germ, correctly understood. Some people lose the germ because they do not see it in the seed. Wise men forfeit their gains if they show no love. (*Paḍiār* 52-57)

Through loving surrender to Śiva comes true knowledge and thereby complete salvation, for true knowledge is in Śiva as the germ is in the seed.

---

23. The Periapurāṇa tells how Kannappen, out hunting, comes across an abandoned statue of Śiva. From love for Śiva he forgets himself and the world, undertakes full-time service to the Śiva-statue and even sacrifices his eyes in this work.
24. This legend also is in Periapurāṇa.
25. The goddess Umādevi laid Tirujñānasaṃbandha, then a child, on her breast and comforted him, at the temple-tank in Shiyali. Along with the goddess's milk he sucked in the supreme liberating wisdom. The Queen of Madura must have been an enthusiastic adherent and patron of the Acārya. (Periapurāṇa)

Payan VIII.10 argues from the nature of blessedness to love as the means to attain it. Translated literally it reads:

Total-bliss is the highest of all, and means that bliss really is there. Love is its nature.

All the commentaries I could consult take the middle part to mean 'If Love is there, so is bliss', i.e. they read *anbu* (love) in place of *inbu* (bliss). The commentator whom I have been citing all along offers this paraphrase: 'If anyone now has love, he will gain that total-bliss which surpasses all others, for the nature of Śiva is Love'; and infers that for those who love, total-bliss is easy to attain.

Much more emphasis is however laid on meditation, or rather on mystical submersion. This differs from what is called the 'yoga-stage' at the end of sakala-avasthā, as Paḍiār explains by distinguishing between Ādhārayoga (indirect meditaiton) and Nirādhārayoga (direct). Where the soul tries with the means it already has to lay hold of Śiva, the soul as subject acting on Śiva as object, this meditation is indirect, and does not achieve its aim, though if rightly done it will achieve Iruvineioppu. But where the soul by a direct approach through the Śiva within lays hold upon Śiva, there Śiva is both subject and object, and the soul plays no active part. Paḍiār describes this meditation:

To become one with Śiva, who is linked to his Śakti which in turn is linked to the soul, and is present in all things unrecognisably, yet undisturbed, and gets rid of bondage: that is Nirādhārayoga. (26). *It is not by observation that yogis know the Supreme (who knows everything), knowing the knower through knowledge, not distinguishing subject from object.* (27) *The Supreme will render speechless those who have found the way to speechlessness, and speechless knew him. The Supreme is inseparably present in yogis who are speechless and whose own knowledge plays no part.* (*Paḍiār* 26-28)

Nirādhārayoga is thus a meditation by which the soul realises its unity with Śiva, and the bliss of that unity; it might be better to call it 'Mystical submersion' rather than 'meditation'. If this yoga is developed to a permanent state, it is called Samādhi, or Release during life. This yoga involves union with Śiva without remainder, and so automatically eliminates Mala, for which there is now no room; so it is also called 'vulture meditation'.

If a man rejects everything visible as not-I; if he recognises that he is not one with the invisible God; and if, full of melting love he unites with

him inwardly meditating 'I am Śiva', then will Śiva be seen as not different from us, and all Mala will be destroyed, as poison is destroyed in the vulture meditation, and the soul will be pure. This is what the old Vedas mean by meditation when they prescribe for reflection the thought 'I am He'. (*Siddhiār* IX.7)

The commentary on Bodha gives more detail:

If you ask what the vulture meditation is, we will tell you. There are three vultures, Ādhibhautika, Ādhidaivika, Ādhyātmika. These distinctions are found in everything. Ādhibhautika is present in the world as the visible vulture; the mantra which this one reveres as divine is Ādhidaivika; the Śakti of Śiva, who is present in the mantra and ensures a hearing for the one who prays, is Ādhyātmika. The vulture here called Ādhidaivika takes the form of a mantra which the one praying recites and meditates on inwardly. This mantra when personified and recited daily will eventually make the meditator one with the object of his meditation, so that knowledge of the object actually takes possession of the meditator. If one sees with such a mantra-eye then the poison is prevented from worsening. As this clearly does occur, this meditation serves as an example here. Observe in the Sarvajñānottra etc., that in all herbs beasts trees etc., there is a holy mantra, and that whoever recites that mantra becomes like a crystal for its personification.

This shows that those who consider the vulture meditation false are not justified. And how could it achieve results, if it were mere show? (*Bodha* IX.2, Ex.3)

In the mystical absorption of the soul into Śiva (which is compared to the Vulture Meditation), the soul identifies itself so completely with Śiva that it has no further separate existence. By this identification the soul takes on Śiva's nature, for the soul takes on the nature of whatever leader it is following. As it is here totally devoted to Śiva, it participates completely in his nature. But it is Śiva's nature to be entirely Mala-free.

This Nirādhārayoga, or Jñānayoga (Jñāna-stage yoga), also called Śivayoga, must be regarded as the chief means of attaining that bliss which leads on at once to perfect bliss. Without this meditation there is no complete bliss. By practice one can rise to this supreme yoga, for example by meditating on the five sacred letters. This gradually raises the soul into the supreme meditation. Jñānayoga can often be interrupted, through the evil of habit, but meditation on the five letters excludes this and keeps it firm. For this reason meditation on the five letters is considered extremely important.

The idea is not that purely mechanical repetition of the five letters will by itself lead to full bliss. The desired effect is due to the truth they contain, which the soul realises by recitation and meditation. The five letters are symbols for five important concepts. By going through them in order one acquires important information about the soul's true history. When a well-informed worshipper recites the five letters, the whole history of the soul passes before his spiritual vision, inciting him to surrender the soul unrestrainedly to Sat, for that alone is true blessing, and disaster awaits one who turns from it.

How do the five letters reveal the story of the soul? And how is reciting them supposed to help us towards total-bliss? The clearest account of this is given in Bodha and Payan IX. Our translation of the latter follows, first, with the relevant commentary and some further comments where necessary. The recitation of the five letters plays a great part in Śaivism, and this justifies a detailed treatment here:

Question 1. *What should be done if the bliss of the speechless state (samādhi) fails to materialise?*

Answer. The Āgamas and Vedas and all other books are concerned with explaining the meaning of the five letters.

Comment. If scholars who understand the content and meaning of the Śaivāgamas, Vedas, and all the other books look into it carefully, they will agree that all these books deal with Pati, Paśu, Pāśa, which is what the five letters are about.

Summary. This says that the contents of all books is contained in the five letters.

Question 2. *What is the meaning of these five letters?*

Answer: The Supreme, the Śakti, Pāśa enlightening Māyā and the soul are included in Om.

Comment. Śiva, Śakti, Āṇavamala, good Māyā and the soul, these five are contained in Praṇava, the one letter which contains all five of them.

Summary. This describes the nature of the five small letters called Praṇava.

By understanding the five letters correctly you can achieve samādhi sooner, for whoever understands them properly has the complete knowledge which is needed for experiencing God. All scriptures are there to lead to that knowledge, about the nature of Pati, Pāśa, Paśu, and their inter-relationships. The five letters

are Śi, Vā, Ma, Na, Ya, and stand for Śiva, Śakti, Āṇavamala, Māyā (or the tirōdhāna Śakti which works through it), and the soul. The following sayings will indicate the content they are to convey; and after that we shall consider how this five-letter formula relates to the formula Om, mentioned just above.

Question 3. *In what order do these five letters stand?*

Answer. The dance of concealment is on one side and that of revelation on the other and the soul, I tell you, is in the middle.

Comment. On one side are Na and Ma, which give rise to rebirth; on the other side are Śi and Vā, which bring about release. And I tell you that Ya, the soul, stands in between these two groups. Dancing indicates how the soul is steered through the time of bondage and release.

Summary. This explains what the five letters really are.

You can recite the five letters in a different order, yielding a different truth. In the next passage the order is Na Ma Ya Śi Vā, which tells us that the soul is not self-sufficient, but is affected by two different powers.

Question 4. *Why does the soul not reach its Jñeya (object of knowledge) even though the Pañcākshara (was recited)?*

Answer. Ma and Na spread themselves out, take possession of Ya, preventing its release. When their great task is complete Ya and Śi will succeed.

Comment. Ma and Na (Mala and Tirōdhāna) are very closely linked to Ya, the soul, and do not allow it to turn back. The soul will reach Śi, (Śiva) when its serious illness (being darkened by Mala) is removed.

Summary. This says that the soul's shackling and release both occur through the five letters.

All the soul's troubles are due to Mala's control:

Question 5. *Why does Āṇavamala not disappear now that Pañcākshara is recited?*

Answer. How can a change take place while confusing Tirōdhāna and Mala are in charge? It cannot get a foot in, until the prevailing Āṇavamala gives way.

Comment. If Na and Ma (Tirōdhāna and Mala, which cause confusion) are pronounced first, will they disappear? Not unless you put them last. You have to say it differently, so that Śi (Śiva) comes first.

Summary. This says that people keen to achieve release should not say Ma and Na first.

Question 6. *Does Mala disappear for those who pray the Pañcākshara?*

Answer: You must respect the point of origin! O dear, this wretched habit of disregarding this and saying (Na and Ma) at the beginning.

Comment. Śiva is the point of origin. But clearly people disregard this, as their order in reciting shows, and do not even notice their mistake. Alas for this tendency to recite Na and Ma first.

Summary. He shows sympathy for those who say the five letters in the wrong order, and suffer for it helplessly.

Souls do not instinctively understand that they must allow themselves to be led by Śiva and his Śakti, but willingly allow themselves to be led astray by Mala and Māyā. To get free of Mala's influence, the soul must worship Śiva. But if you keep recollecting that Śiva should be providing motive power as well as authority, you will realise that surrender to the Asat is wrong, and turn away from it. Worship of the Supreme includes Caryā, Kriyā and Yoga (meditation) which bring about Iruvineioppu.

Question 7. How should you pray the Pañcākshara?

Answer. If Śi and Vā come first, rebirth will cease. Pray it in that order.

Comment. If you say it so that Śi and Vā come first, then the mishap of rebirth will cease, my pupil. You who seek release must speak the five letters in that order.

Summary. This says how the saint (mukta) should speak it.

The order Śi Vā Ya Na Ma describes the state of the soul after entering Iruvineioppu. Śiva and the Śakti exercise the greatest influence upon the soul, and relieve it of Māyā and Mala.

Question 8. How does speaking it like this benefit souls?

Answer. Vā reveals Śi, and confers total-bliss on the soul. She (Aruḷ) is there, a body without flaw.

Comment. If you speak it like that then Vā (Aruḷ) will reveal Śi, (Śiva) and transport it to total-bliss. Also the Aruḷ is a flawless body for Śiva.

Summary. This describes the nature of the Aruḷ as Vā, one of the five letters.

It is the Śakti of Śiva that bestows total-bliss, being naturally fitted for that task, as the last part of the saying indicates. Being an incarnation, a visible form of Śiva, it is fitted to bring about the union of the soul with Śiva.

Another commentator takes this saying to convey that in mukti the Śakti builds for the soul a faultless body. As the Śakti replaces the body created from Māyā, and is available to the soul as an

intelligent and self-directing organ, it can bring souls securely into union with Śiva, being itself already in such union. The souls which the Śakti controls are transformed by assimilation into its own likeness, and so into Śiva's, whose nature is alike.

Question 9. *What is the manner of the soul's existence in mukti?*

Answer. The order is for souls not to come between faultless Na and Vā, but by enlightenment to come between Vā and Śi.

Comment. The order is for souls (Ya) to come between Śakti (Vā) and Śiva (Śi), not between Tirōdhāna (Na) and Śakti (Vā). Learn from the guru how to rearrange the letters and speak them. He says 'flawless' because the Tirōdhāna Śakti does not itself shroud the soul, but only sets going the fetters which do so.

Summary. This describes the position of those who speak the sacred letters in the order mentioned.

The order na-ma-ya-śi-vā describes the nature of the soul's existence during the time of bondage, and the order śi-vā-ya-na-ma that in the jñāna stage. The formula śi-vā expresses completion. (see Question 7 above. Ed) For those who have reached perfection, as for Śiva himself, na and ma no longer exist, so they can be omitted. The soul has completely relinquished its individuality, and identified with Śiva, so in a formula describing mukti the letter ya (soul) is superfluous. You might say śi-ya-vā but that would suggest feeling distinct from Śiva; i.e. that the highest stage of devotion to him had yet to be achieved.

In Question 2 (above) it was claimed that the five-letter symbol is the same as the symbol Ōm. The authors of Bodha and Siddhiār take Ōm to be made up of A U M together with Vindu and Nāda. A stands for Ahaṃkāra, U for Buddhi, M for Manas, Vindu for Citta and Nāda for Uḷḷam (soul). Vindu symbolised by O and Nāda by — combine to form the Piḷḷaiyar symbol ∩__which every Śaivite puts at the head of every written document.

This symbol is further interpreted to mean that behind A (Ahamkāra) stands Brahma, the divinity which sets all things in motion, behind U (Buddhi) stands Vishṇu, behind M (Manas) stands Rudra, behind Vindu (O) stands Sadāśiva, and behind Nāda (—) stands Īśvara. Brahma is the god of creation, Vishṇu the God of preservation, Rudra the god of destruction, Sadāśiva the personification of the Śakti, and Īśvara is Śiva himself; whereby Ōm comes to mean that Śiva by his Śakti arranges through gods Brahma, Visnu and Rudra the three works of creation, preservation and destruction.

Ōm can also be taken to indicate the process of evolution and involution, i.e. just what the five letters Śi Vā Ya Ma Na were in their own way supposed to express. This explanation of the syllable is hardly orthodox, though it is orthodox to say that the sound Ōm combines the three different sounds A U M into one single sound, conveying thereby the idea of one universal godhead combining everything in himself.

It is not surprising that Siddhāntin teachers explain the five letters Śi Vā Ya Ma Na as identical with Ōm. The old and revered symbol Ōm could not simply be replaced by another, without incurring the charge of heresy. But by explaining that Śi Vā Ya Ma Na meant the same as Ōm they sought still to appear orthodox.

The five letters convey items of knowledge for different stages, depending on the order in which they are pronounced; so they can be beneficial to recite, at all stages of development. For souls in the sakala stage the appropriate order is na-ma-ya-śi-vā, reminding us that the soul is not self-sufficient, but under the dominion of Mala. Once the soul has in Iruvineioppu realised what this means, it will pray Śi-vā-ya-ma-na, thus recalling that lordship belongs to Śiva. This prayer will enable it to overcome the evil of habit. In order to reach Samādhi, the highest stage, Śivā is prayed, showing all links with Mala are severed and no individuality is claimed.

Payan means to show how everything worth knowing is contained in the five letters, Bodha how the soul by meditating on the five letters comes into possession of that knowledge and brings about its absorption into Śiva. Here are the statements of Bodha:

Thesis. Now meditate on the five letters in order.

Comment. This thesis resolves Part three of the Sūtra and provides a reply to those who say that Jñāna alone will purify the soul, shining as a cool shade after Pāśa is abolished; so nothing then remains to be done.

The soul which through the jñāna eye (which shines like a cool shade after Pāśa is abolished) has recognised Pati must still recite the five sacred letters in due order.

Pañcākshara here means the Pañcākshara of mukti.

Some people, not understanding why the author says 'in due order', claim that the order serving Sādhana (help towards salvation) differs from that for praying. This goes against Siddhānta. If the order serving Sādhana does not coincide with the order for recitation, how can it serve Sādhana?

A prayer can be said silently, or in a whisper, or out loud. He says 'meditate', not 'say', to show that inner prayer is here meant.

Reason: Souls which have attained jñāna will still glance back to the old observational and limited knowledge, as a caterpillar fed for a long time on neem leaves (margosa) will still yearn for them, even though they are very bitter. To prevent such recursion one must pray the Pañcākshara.

Comment. This is stated in response to an objection: Here an internal service of God is in question. So how can praying the Pañcākshara as Sādhana be necessary (useful though it is as part of external worship which seeks to show the unknowable god as knowable). In reply he says: A caterpillar which has been feeding on neem leaves will leave them aside if it can find sugar cane and enjoy its sweetness, but through habit it still hankers after neem leaves. The soul does likewise. Colour differences it saw to be Asat, thus attaining Patijñāna and realising Jneya, but from force of habit it still hankers after the old accustomed knowledge by observation. To get free of this dependency it must pray Pañcākshara in due order.

Example 1. *When the soul by the five letters realises that it belongs to Śiva, and worships him through the five letters in the heart, and in the navel offers sacrifice by the five letters and meditates on him between the eyebrows, then will the Supreme appear to him there, and the soul will become his servant.*

Comment. Some ask how this helps get rid of the evil of habit. In reply he re-affirms the Reason, in more detail.

When the soul by the five letters realises that it belongs to Śiva, and in the heart, the navel and between the eyebrows respectively offers him worship, sacrifice and meditation, honouring him in the heart just as in external worship, in the holy form that arises by meditation on the five letters, by the eight blossoms of non-death, by the suppression of the senses, adorned by patience, by goodness, by knowledge, by sincerity, penance and love, and when through this mantra a jñāna fire is kindled in the navel, spooning out the melted butter of ambrosia by the organ of respiration, and the soul does Śiva-yoga meditation between the eyebrows, taking Si, Ya, Vā in that order as Śiva, Soul, and unifying principle (Śakti), then due to that meditation the Supreme will appear visibly and the soul become his servant.

Sacrifice and meditation, I tell you, are part of worship. Praying Pañcākshara receives special mention, for this reason: even when Patijñāna has been achieved, our knowledge is still limited by the evil of habit, and yearns for outer things; but all this activity is suppressed (by Pañcākshara) so it concentrates on what is within (where Śiva is) and on a single object

(Śiva). Moreover to give the soul steadfastness it attends to the order in which it says the five letters, and by repeated reflection it destroys that hankering and sets the jñāna eye to work and so enables the soul to reach perfection.

Example 2. If the soul sees the Supreme within, as during an eclipse people see the planets Ketu and Rahu in the sun and the moon[26]*, then will he appear as eye of the soul, just as fire appears on rubbing firesticks. Then the soul becomes Śiva's servant, as iron becomes fire when fire touches it. Meditate on Pañcākshara!*

Comment. These examples show that the Supreme can only be known if the entire attention is concentrated on one point; how the Supreme appears in the soul and can be known; and, when he has appeared, how the soul becomes his slave: confirming what was said earlier.

Pāśa and Paśu, which can be known by observation, are objects of which you can say 'I know this' or 'I don't know that'. But the third (eternal) Reality, the Supreme, cannot be known in that way, but inwardly, by meditating on the five letters. The cosmic planets Rahu and Ketu are not visible like the others, though during an eclipse they are seen in the sun and the moon, so also the Supreme appears as the intelligence of intelligence, and as fire which flashes forth from firesticks when rubbed. Then just as iron touched by fire gives up its independent strength so the soul will also, and become a slave of the Supreme. That is why you must recite the five letters in the proper way.

Example 3. On examining the heart's lotus bloom we find in the stalk the 24 tattvas from the earth on, in the petals the Vidya tattvas (Śuddhāśuddha tattva), and Śuddha Vidya, in the stamens Īśvara and Sadāśiva (Śuddhatattva 3 & 4), in the fruit bud, Śakti (Śuddhatattva 2, Vindu), and in the seed Nāda (Śuddhatattva 1). The Śakti of Śiva rests in this lotus-bloom. Learn this. (Bodha IX.3)

The soul shuts itself away from everything for this required meditation, letting nothing else but the mystical letters work on it. On its surrender to the letters, what stands behind them takes (spiritual) shape in the soul. For behind those letters stand the three eternal substances, Pati Paśu and Pāśa, and the powers by which they interact, Śakti and Māyā (which does the work of Tirōdhāna Śakti). Thus by this meditation on the five letters all things come within the soul, as a microcosm matching the macrocosm. And within the self the soul has to come to terms

26. Ketu and Rahu are two of the nine planets. They appear as monstrous snakes or dragons, thought to cause eclipses by swallowing sun or moon.

with that microcosm, just as it had to with the macrocosm outside. For lordship over the macrocosm the soul must worship the Supreme through Caryā, Kriyā and yoga, leading to Iruvineioppu with Malaparipāka and Śaktinipata, i.e. it deserts the macrocosm and (by the Śakti) relieves Mala of authority over the soul. This process is repeated spiritually in the meditation on the five letters. Caryā, Kriyā and yoga occur once more, in a purely spiritual way; and this spiritual worship results in a more spiritual Iruvineioppu, so the attacks of habit now glance aside and finally cease altogether. Mala is then completely eliminated and Malaparipāka is brought to its highest conclusion; so the Śakti of Śiva now rules unrestrictedly, as complete Śaktinipāta takes place. The process begun in principle by Caryā Kriyā and yoga is now triumphantly concluded by meditation on the five letters.

CHAPTER SEVEN

Perfection

Earlier chapters have shown how the soul comes under the Śakti's influence, and how under that leadership bondage leaves off harassing the soul. That completes the process of release, but does not indicate the pleasure thereby gained. Getting free of various fetters is only the negative side of salvation, its prerequisite. But the bliss to which Śiva wishes to lead souls is not just the removal of fetters, but something positive. Nor does salvation consist solely of purifying and healing the soul's faculties, but also of using them aright, once healed; of enjoying health. The present chapter is to describe this positive aspect of salvation; which consists in the soul's union with Śiva himself, and not just with his Śakti.

1. Release perfected by Union with Śiva

The development of the soul up to its surrender to the Śakti has already been described. It used to identify with Mala but now identifies with the Śakti. Is Release thereby completed and bliss made perfect? No. Union with the Śakti is not the final goal, but intermediate, serving to eliminate Mala and set the soul's faculties to work, and also helping towards a union with Śiva (beyond that with the Śakti) and towards deploying the restored powers of the soul. Our sources explain why union with the Śakti needs to be followed by union with Śiva himself.

The Śakti's relation to Śiva requires us to go beyond claiming union with the Śakti.

You may ask what reasons there are for claiming a further Jñeya beyond the Jñāna mentioned. Because that Jñāna is Śiva's Aruḷ (Śakti). And anyway without the sun there is no light. The Mala-free Supreme is the Jñeya. His shining Aruḷ is the Śakti.

The pure Śakti is the light of wisdom. Without Śiva that Śakti cannot exist. It removes the useless Mala and gladly reveals the Supreme,

just as the sunlight shining everywhere destroys darkness and shows the sun which must be there. (*Prak* VIII.4 & 5)

The Śakti is not an end in itself. Though similar in nature to Śiva, it does not exist independently, but as an emanation of Śiva, just as light is an emanation of the sun. Śiva allows the Śakti to go out from him for a special purpose, to free the soul from Mala. Once this is done the Śakti withdraws. Moreover Siva's two-in-one relation to his Śakti means that Śiva shares in what the Śakti has, and anything linked in communion with the Śakti is linked likewise to Śiva; they both exist in and with each other, as if they were one.

The soul must be said to unite with Śiva, not just with the Śakti. The cosmic arrangement shows clearly that this is how it has to be; for Śiva has an advaita relation to everything that is. (cp. Siddhiār XI.7) This advaita-connection admittedly takes place through the Śakti, but the final word always rests with Śiva, with the Śakti only as agent. Were you to stop at the soul's surrender to the Śakti (who does mediate between Śiva and the soul, but is not the supreme power) then the final world-order would in mukti be imperfectly realised. The advaita relation which has always existed between Śiva and soul requires logically that in mukti the soul is completely dedicated to Śiva himself.

Payan VIII.2 considers these questions: Is the Aruḷ not sufficient? What do you need a higher Jñeya for?

What kind of pleasure do two women have? Pleasure is found if man and woman unite.

Comment. What kind of pleasure have two women by their intercourse? If man and woman engage in intercourse, pleasure does occur.

Jñeya is higher than Aruḷ or the soul, and no salvation is complete unless Jñeya is revealed. Man and woman are mentioned to indicate the greater importance and higher nature.

Summary. This sets out the boundaries within which total-bliss has to be attained.

This saying refutes the suggestion that the bliss gained by union with the Śakti ought to be enough, using a comparison drawn from Śaivite mythology. In the Purāna Śiva's Śakti is presented as his spouse, and so as feminine. Souls also are thought of as feminine, but Śiva as a man. Now a man ranks higher than his wife; which is why she gets more pleasure from intercourse with him than with a woman. She may also derive pleasure from

intercourse with her own kind, but without full satisfaction, and it leaves her yearning for a greater pleasure, which inevitably lessens her well-being.

Stripped of its mythological details this saying offers evidence to show that the soul needs to unite with Śiva himself, and not just with his Śakti. The Śakti is not supreme over everything, something else is yet higher, namely Śiva. The Śakti is of course of like nature with Śiva, but he is greater, for she emerged from him. Only union with Śiva, the Supreme, can guarantee total bliss undiminished by yearning. Union with the Śakti (inferior to Śiva) does make one happy, but still leaves room for one desire more, for something higher, for Śiva.

That the bliss gained by union with the Śakti is not the highest bliss can also be seen from this comment on Sūtra XI of Bodha:

The Aruḷ-state (*in Turīya*) *consists of union with the Supreme and serving him* (*cp. Sūtra* X). *So the removal of Mala is followed only by a foretaste of health, not by full health, i.e. the appearing of Śiva-nature* (*in Atīta*). *This is not gained through the Śakti, by just doing nothing; so clearly some further action is required, to achieve perfection.*

What then is still missing, when the soul unites with the Śakti; for matters cannot just rest there? Śiva sends his Śakti out to do something, to Mala, viz. free the soul from it. Once this is done the Śakti need do no more (for that soul); task fulfilled, it can stop work. That is why complete idleness and total inactivity of the soul are regarded as characteristic of the stage of full and total union with the Śakti.

Can that be the final end and aim of soul-development? Not for the soul as we know it to be. It has three essential properties, of knowing, willing and being able to act; and inability to use these powers correctly or at all spells evil for the soul. Now whatever leads to their wrong use, or non-use, is swept aside by the Śakti, leaving all the soul's faculties in proper shape. But what good is that, if the Śakti promptly abandons the soul and does nothing more for it? Healing its faculties has a satisfactory outcome only if those faculties then have some opportunity for right activity; which requires, first, that the Śakti remain at the soul's disposal as its driving force, as even a healthy soul can do nothing by itself. Second, the soul restored to health needs a fitting object for its activity, which the Śakti should provide. Were the Śakti no

longer to serve the soul in these two ways, its state on Release would be like the Kevala state, as regards these three faculties; and they would hardly seem to belong to the soul at all.

Can the Śakti still provide this double service to the soul? The Sakti has done with Mala, and can now return into Śiva, from whom it issued to make Mala innocuous. But by returning to Śiva the Śakti links itself with him into a higher unity, uniting Śiva with soul, as it is one with the soul. Moreover as the Śakti is one with the soul it can set in motion the restored faculties of the soul and (as it is also one with Śiva) can provide to the soul the one suitable object of activity. The commentary on Bodha Sūtra XI emphasises this reason, based on the soul's nature, for claiming that the soul unites with Śiva as well as with his Śakti.

A further reason is mentioned in Payan:

The form of him who confers blessedness on those who achieve it is full and total blessedness. That is why he experiences none.

Comment. The Supreme takes the form 'total-bliss' when bestowing blessedness on those who come to him, so he himself derives no delight.

The Supreme has ever been free of Mala, so he does not feel it as souls do, who have always been locked into Āṇavamala, and when it is eliminated the soul feels that freedom as something quite new.

Summary. This raises the question whether the Supreme himself experiences salvation. He only bestows it on souls. (*Payan* VIII.3)

While the soul's union with the Śakti has yet to be made perfect by union with Śiva himself, we must regard the Śakti as Śiva's energy, directed externally, active and activating present faculties. As energy it will still, even at this highest stage, require something of the soul: to know Śiva, to do nothing, to have no desires. Thus the soul still has duties to recognise, though these are mainly negative; so its bliss is not yet complete, not being wholly undisturbed. Nor can the Śakti give up entirely its work upon the soul, for then the state of release would be like the kevala Avasthā: no activity, no experience or enjoyment of bliss. So we cannot exclude the idea of Śakti working on the released soul. Which Śakti, though? Not the one who came forth from Śiva to set Asat in motion; for its influence could well have undesirable effects. So it must be a Śakti which has reverted to Śiva, its task with Asat now discharged, a Śakti which has become one with the soul and which therefore can have no more dealings with Asat.

The faculties of a released soul, roused into activity by the Śakti's influence, should be directed only to Śat, i.e. have Śiva as object, for any other object would drag the soul down, whereas activity can safely be directed to Śiva, as his nature is complete bliss. He has need of nothing; he demands nothing; he remains in absolute peace, unchangeable from all eternity to all eternity, ever the same.

Here alone, in the lap of peace and bliss, can the soul wait quite undisturbed until it can enjoy bliss supreme. There is no risk of any obstacle that could interfere with its enjoyment of the pleasure that comes from union with Śiva. It is He that confers such enjoyment, and He is not going to disturb it; and no other now exists, for that soul. Nothing bothers it, now, just as nothing can bother Him. Were Śiva not total-bliss, unkindled, non-maintained, unincreasable, then indeed he might conceivably make demands on the soul which would disturb its peaceful enjoyment of that bliss; but as His bliss does not depend on any need so his companion-soul also is guaranteed enjoyment undisturbed. Union with the Śakti offers no such guarantee, as it is energy in action, and no object other than Śiva can ensure its bliss. But the soul cannot possibly enjoy the bliss which only Siva can provide, unless in union with him.

In the word tāḍalai the letters l and t are joined and do not appear separately; and you should conceive the blessed union of fundamentally different things (God & soul) along those lines, as becoming One.

Comment. The two words tāl (foot) and talai (head) combine so as not to appear separately; and that is how you my pupil should understand that mingling which preserves the difference (though in union this is never evident), and ensures total bliss by union with the Supreme.

Summary. This says that a soul submerging in Jñeya becomes one with him. (*Payan* VIII.4)

As the word tāl when joined with talai loses its distinctive l and has to take on a new letter ḍ, of which it is not sole possessor as it has to share it with talai; so the soul likewise to achieve total bliss must give up that special something which it seems to have, and take on something else, shared with Śiva, and be so to speak grafted into him. I-thoughts, individuality, wanting one's own way; these are what the soul must give up. Total bliss, the speciality of transcendent Śiva, is what it must receive. The soul which is to get total bliss must unite completely with Śiva (bliss) as object, but in

such a way that it, the subject, is as though no more and as though only Śiva, the object, still remains.

If the passage just cited is taken as describing the union with Śiva, this would imply that Śiva changes by that union, just as the word talai is changed by combining with tāl. But it is a basic principle of Siddhānta that Śiva cannot suffer change. Only the soul will change, though not essentially, as its nature is eternal and unchangeable, but only in its mode of life. So this passage must be taken to demonstrate that the soul's union with Śiva himself is essential if total bliss is to be attained.

(a) *How the Soul unites with Śiva, in Mukti?*

The soul is to unite with Śiva; but what does this 'uniting' mean? There are different varieties of unity. A comment in Bodha lists a whole string of them:

What sort of unity is here meant? Is it that between the air in a pot and the atmosphere, when someone breaks the pot? Or the unity involved in a mistake, when someone takes a tree-stump for his son? Or that which bridges a change in form (clay and pot)? Or that which unites a quality (Guṇa) to its substance (Guṇi), as whiteness to lotus-flower? Or the union of combination (iron and fire), or the inseparable mixing of water and milk? Or that due to hypnotism (vulture and praying mantis)? Or where one engulfs another (water and hot iron)? Or indwelling (demon and the one possessed)? Or invisible quality (fire in kindling)? Or overpowering (lamp in sunlight)? Or sexual union, or love between friends, or racial identity (wild and domestic cows)? (x, comment)

Which of these provides a fitting analogy for the soul's union with Śiva? In the commentator's view not one of them is entirely appropriate, for with the words 'in order to reject all these various views of unity as held in the different schools' he introduces another one, which he finds more suitable.

Although the commentator rejects these types of unity as inappropriate analogies, several of them are used in our sources to explain the union between Śiva and the soul in mukti. Does this bring him into conflict with his own authorities? (Not necessarily), for such analogies are not meant as a complete description of that unity, but only to illuminate particular aspects or effects. So we should not apply them to every aspect of the matter, but only to that which the context indicates.

It would take us too far afield if we tried to explain in detail which analogies are and which are not suitable, and why. At most we can present the more important indications, negative and positive, of the nature of that union with Śiva which they are intended to explain.

The identity theory of Śaṃkara's Vedanta is rejected, decisively, with the remark that if Śiva and the soul were identical entities they could not be united; to start uniting you need two distinct things, to unite. Siddhānta will not admit even in Release a throughgoing, distinctionless identity of God and the soul. Such an identity cannot result from Śiva's uniting with the soul, for two distinct things can unite into an identity only if (a) one of them ceases to exist, or (b) they both do, and something different from both of then appears. This latter alternative would be in conflict with the principle that God cannot undergo change; and the former alternative, i.e. the annihilation of the soul in mukti, would contradict the principle that something existent cannot completely disappear, though it may be resolved into its elements. In any case if the soul were to perish, bliss could not occur, being short of a subject to be enjoying it. Our sources emphasise frequently that the soul cannot possibly perish, in mukti. Here is one such saying:

You may wonder if it is by perishing that, that soul achieves union with Śiva. But I tell you that what has been destroyed is unable to unite. But if it is still there, then there was no perishing. If you say the soul perishes after attaining Śiva, then tell me who achieves mukti when soul-death occurs? If you say that mukti means perishing, then the soul is not eternal. (*Siddhiar* XI.9)

Nor is this a union between two substances of like nature, existing separately; as this remark indicates:

You may think the soul unites with him, as water does with water. But then they would be just the same. But I tell you that the soul is not similar to the Supreme. (*Siddhiar* XI.9)

Could we save the identity theory by suggesting that in mukti the soul is transformed into Śiva? This also is rejected:

Copper freed by the alchemist's stone of verdigris becomes as gold, and unites with gold. So, you may say, the soul freed from Mala will become one with God. But I tell you that God is compared to stone, not to gold; he it is that gets rid of the tarnishing Mala, and sets the soul under his

golden foot. The stone that with difficulty removes the verdigris does not itself turn into gold. (*Siddhiar* XI.10)

Copper encrusted with verdigris is a favourite image for the soul afflicted with Mala, suggesting that copper freed from verdigris could illustrate the soul freed from Mala. And copper free of verdigris is commonly regarded as gold; which could lead us to suppose that the soul is transformed into God, as copper is transformed into gold by the alchemist's stone. The passage quoted rejects this view, calling the comparison inappropriate, for if we decipher it God comes out as the alchemist's stone which changed the copper and not as the gold into which it was transformed. Copper after cleaning is still copper, even if it looks like gold, and the released soul is still a soul. In a special sense it can be called intelligence, but not as implying a like nature to Siva's or transformation into his nature; for he really is Intelligence.

You may say that Śiva and the soul are both Cit, but I tell you that Śiva is Aruḷ Cit, while the soul is a Cit on the way to Aruḷ. He is the Cit responsible for creation and destruction, for both earthly and higher joys; but the soul is a Cit found therein (and subject to them). The soul is a Cit needing guidance, but He knows things by his own efforts. So these two, although connected, are not the same, though not strangers either. Soul and Buddhi are both Cit. Is Buddhi then a soul? Buddhi is Acit. So one should also say that the soul, compared to Śiva, is Acit. (*Siddhiār* XI.11)

In mukti the soul appears as pure Cit, though essentially Citacit, just as Buddhi through its connection with the soul appears as intelligence, though really Acit. The soul is not transformed; it does not become Śiva.

The soul's link with Śiva does not make it disappear by perishing or by transformation; nor is something new created, a compound of both and different from each, with quite new qualities; as can happen when chemicals combine to form a new material, so that its components do not survive pure and unchanged, neither substance nor qualities. Śiva is still Śiva after the union, as he was before; and the soul also is still the soul, with its essential nature undisturbed.

If then soul and Śiva preserve their own proper and different natures, when uniting, will this not lead to a Dualism in which that union is denied? Can two things be said to become one, if they remain different? Here is the answer:

If they become one, uniting is impossible. If they remain two, no harmony is achieved. So they are neither one nor two.

Comment. Were we to say the Supreme and the soul become one, they would have no need to unite. If we say they are two then no sound (harmony) occurs to unite them. So they are not one thing, nor two.

Summary. This confutes those who say soul and Supreme are one unity, and those who say that they are two; and claims they have a non-dual (advaita) relationship.

Advaita means that by mingling with each other they are strangers no longer. (*Payan* VIII.5)

This saying rejects monism as basis for the unity mukti requires; but also seeks to avoid the resulting danger of a dualistic world-view, arguing that one can be different without being separated. Saying something is different in character is a statement about its inner nature only, not about its mode of existence. Two entities can preserve their essential difference, even in mukti, without implying that they live apart from each other, quite independently. Soul and Śiva should not be thought of, in mukti, as strangers, nor yet as two friends who may be together or apart, as they choose. For being together in this way is no guarantee of bliss; it does not even guarantee harmony, which is prerequisite for bliss, as disharmony brings discontent. Saying tāḷ and talai separately does not improve the euphony, and no harmonious total bliss can be had while soul and Śiva, the subject and object of salvation, remain strangers. So they neither become one in essence nor remain two in mode of existence, but enter on an inner link whereby in nature they remain what they already were, yet present not as two independent entities but as a single unity, existing in and with each other. There is no dualism in their way of existence, nor any monism in natures, but a life in and with each other, an advaita relationship; both being so combined as to be inseparable, there for us as if one entity, though they are really two. (On advaita see above II.8)

This advaita link between Śiva and the soul in mukti is not a purely external companionship (as the denial of any change of nature might suggest), but allows both to develop to their full personal potential; a development which was always bound to lead to such a link, as being appropriate both to Śiva's nature and the soul's. Śiva is present everywhere, being above all spatial distinctions, immensely great yet incredibly minute, pervading

everything, comprehending all, fulfilling all; so it is only natural that He is in each soul and also there alongside of it, as he must have been from all eternity.

When Mala ruled, Śiva's presence was far from evident, but now in mukti it becomes quite obvious. What used to be hidden is now revealed. Thus the union of Śiva with the soul in mukti is just what his nature requires, in its most complete development. When the clouds withdraw the sun shines forth in total majesty, as does Śiva's nature now — though in essence it was always so.

The union in mukti sees the soul's nature also most fully displayed. The soul is by nature not independent, always needing something to hang on to; so it needs to drop all other supports and cling only to Śiva, who alone is Sat and Lord of all. By joining with Śiva and living in him, then, the soul is not giving anything up, but developing its own personality to the full. Now a soul naturally takes on the look of whatever it is dependent on; which is quite in keeping with an advaita alliance in mukti.

How far the released soul participates in the nature of Śiva will be considered later (VII.1c). Our point here is just that the soul's nature as Citacit and Satasat enables it to take part in his nature, as in kevala and sakala Avasthā it took part in the nature of the Mala which beset it.

The precise character of the soul's life with and in Śiva is set out in more detail by a series of analogies. Some of these (but not all), rejected earlier as inadequate, are yet employed to bring out some aspects of the relation between Śiva and the soul to each other.

Siddhiār XI.12 refers to a magnet attracting iron, to indicate that Śiva is the active member of the relationship, and the soul passive; and adduces the combination of fire with iron, in red-hot iron, to show how the soul by the linkup with Śiva comes to look like him, as iron when red-hot comes to look like fire; which also suggests that the soul is by this union freed from Mala, as the fire destroys anything combustible or polluting in the iron. Prak: X.8 points out that this comparison does not turn on the iron becoming combustible, as the soul would then be in a position to perform the five works of Śiva. It is also said that Śiva unites like salt with water to show that the union is complete and pervasive. A comparison with friendly intercourse shows it is a happy union. Lastly a reference to the rubbing of copper with the alchemist's

stone is to show that the union does make a difference to the soul.

These are only partial analogies. A fuller account of the union between Śiva and the soul in mukti is given by the following analogy, or rather contrast:

The soul's union with Āṇavamala is an image for the nature of union and knowledge. (*Prak:* X.8)

Kevala Avasthā is the reverse of mukti, as night is of day, darkness of light, ignorance of knowledge. Āṇavamala rules over the soul in kevala Avasthā, so that here the soul appears as its clone. And Śiva rules over the soul in mukti, so that the soul now appears as his clone. Here mukti and the kevala Avasthā are as thesis and antithesis. For each statement about the one condition there is a corresponding but opposed statement about the other one; so that each condition is like a denial (or assertion) of the other.

(b) *The Benefit of Union with Śiva*

What does a soul gain by union with Śiva in mukti? Let us recall (i) that the soul has three faculties, of knowing, deciding, and being able (to act); (ii) that it needs something to lean on, which it then imitates and assimilates; (iii) that its faculties need to be set in motion by some impulse from outside. By itself the soul is something entirely neutral, with no distinguishing feature, almost dead. That it has a history is entirely due to other substances. Without them the soul would be a nothing. First the three-fold Mala takes charge, has it born and gets it to enjoy the joys and sorrows of this and other worlds, by supplying it with objects and organs for action (Māyā), getting it involved with these (Āṇavamala), and keeping it enslaved to them (karma). But the power of Āṇavamala gradually diminishes, in the course of this development, and eventually disappears altogether; though this is hardly a cause for congratulation, for if nothing replaces Mala at this point, the soul will sink into nonentity again, an inert somewhat having hidden faculties but making no use of them. From the threat of this nirvāṇa the soul is saved by union with Śiva, who now does for it what Mala did before.

The soul was of course indebteded to Śiva for its earlier activity, etc., though not directly, as Mala stood between. Whatever Śiva then did for the soul he did through Mala. But now the soul is

united to Śiva directly, so he can in person act on its behalf. As Mala previously served it ill, so Śiva can render the same service, but now for its benefit; Mala used to set the three faculties going, which Śiva can now do much better without distraction or hindrance: in proof whereof we may cite the complete and undisputed possession of the soul by Śiva's Śakti, from whom all movement comes even during mukti-unity with Śiva, as Śiva is never without his Śakti.

From Chapter VI we can see how the soul (being dependent on organs) is compensated for the Mala organs; for the Śakti served it as organ of knowledge (and activity) so it could come to knowledge of truth, thus making mukti-union with Śiva possible. For the union with Śiva, the two in one (being never without the Śakti), ensures that the Śakti will still provide this service even after the soul reaches its ultimate aim. But the objects which the soul obtained from Māyā are replaced by Śiva himself. Thus when the soul by knowing him achieves mukti (complete advaita linkage with Śiva), he is still an object for the soul to contemplate; so union with Śiva in mukti does not make the soul a nonentity, but enables it to have a lively life.

Bodha emphasises how union with Śiva in mukti brings the three faculties to life and correct activity; and we cite this first, with its particular reference to the effects on those faculties. More detailed description and assessment of that life will be given later.

Sūtra. As the soul empowers the seeing eye to see, and thus does itself see, so also does the Supreme empower the soul to knowledge, and itself knows. That is how the soul by inextinguishable love attains the feet of the Supreme.

Comment. Some people make this objection: Those thus united to Śiva and serving him have no link to ensure that their faculties of knowledge decision and activity can operate, which suggests there is nothing for the soul to work on. He replies: If there is nothing to do mukti will be a nothing, like the 'total ignorance' of the Buddhists. If the Guṇa (attribute) is a nothing, then so is the Guṇi (bearer of attributes). But that can't be right. So in Sūtra XI *he describes the further result (of release), Samādhi, the union with Śiva, to show how those faculties do act, as a result of that union. (The first result is the soul's surrender to the Śakti, which purifies the soul.)*

You may persevere with this query: For those united with God and serving him, nothing remains to be done. Now when darkness is banished

daylight then and there appears, so when Paśu-nature is eliminated Śiva-nature takes over forthwith, so no special account of it is required; and as the Sanskrit text describes in Sūtra X *the attaining of Śiva* (*viz. his self-experience*) *along with the elimination of Pāśa, therefore there is no need to describe it here on its own.*

Now this query is extremely ignorant:

(1) *To be united with the Supreme, with a place in his service, is the Aruḷ state, in Turīya. At that stage, once Mala is eliminated, there is just a foretaste of health to come, not the complete good health* (*emergence of Śiva-nature*) *found in Atīta. This good health is to be had through the Śakti, and not by mere inactivity; so clearly there is something yet to be done, to achieve perfection.*

(2) *Daylight comes in as darkness is removed; and Aruḷ enters as Pāśa is removed, though total bliss is yet to come.*

(3) *The arrival of Aruḷ is different from achieving total bliss* (*as explained later*).

(4) *The author of the Sanskrit text describes the elimination of Pāśa in Sūtra* X *in order to contradict those who say that the removal of Pāśa is mukti. This is done to prepare the way for Sūtra* XI, *which says that anyone who succeeds in removing Pāśa will also achieve a personal experience of bliss. Now we find the purification of the soul mentioned in Sūtra* IX *and then described more fully in Sūtra* X. *The same goes for personal experience* (*of bliss*); *it is mentioned in Sūtra* X, *and described in more detail in Sūtra* XI. *To avoid any confusion the author* (*Meykaṇḍadeva*) *has inserted into Sūtra* XI *the statement that one achieves personal experience* (*of the bliss of the mukti experience*), *when he says 'attains the feet of the Highest'. There is no deviation here.*

(5) *The translator* (*from the Sanskrit*) *is not responsible for any deviation at this point.*

For these five reasons your query is absurd.

An eye can see something, when pointed out; and the soul can then recognise that object and unite with it and point it out and so see the object itself; and that is how the Supreme unites with the soul, allowing that soul to know an object (*which it can, if directed*), *and instructing it and knowing. That is why the soul will from love attain an experience of Śiva's bliss, as it does not forget the great mercy of God, as shown by his standing in advaita relation with the soul and helping it and holding it close to him.*

The faculties of knowledge, will and ability are responsible for

not-forgetting, loving, and going (holding close) respectively; the faculty causes the act, in each case.

When the eye (which the soul definitely needs) sees an object, then the soul's faculty of knowledge is intimately linked to the eye, not regarding itself as different; so that what the eye sees by the soul's aid is just what the soul indwelling that eye will see, the impression or perception of each appearing insparably and simultaneously, advaita-style. So is it also in the relation of soul and Supreme. When the soul (which definitely needs the Supreme) knows an object, then the Citśakti of the Supreme is intimately linked to the soul, so that what the soul knew by aid of the Supreme is just what the Supreme indwelling it knew, these two intelligences being inseparably related, advaita-style.

When the soul identifies with the Supreme and serves him, as the help provided by the Supreme is the same during bondage as in Release, the soul will recognize this privilege (of being helped by the Supreme to which it is inseparably linked), and after that whenever it remembers and desires this help, that will not be forgotten but will blaze up even more. The faculty of desire thus experiences the total bliss which appears by itself.

That is how he describes the mode and manner of activity of the three faculties of knowing, desiring and being capable; i.e. the Atīta state.

An advaita-link is one where two different things become essentially non-different.

Fire takes hold only in conjunction with some other thing; and the Supreme carries out all his works within souls. Now the knowledge which the soul may have does not result solely from his instruction, without his being there within and knowing, as is clear from these remarks about mukti:

As I consider myself your servant, so do you consider yourself mine.
As I wish, so do you also wish.
I am a disciple, you should be one too.
I am enjoying life, please enjoy it too.
On this matter Kārikkālammaiār (a Saivite saint) sings:
He is a knower and one who instructs.

And she also says:
All the soul knows, he knows.

The first knowledge occurs for the purpose of instruction, and the second knowledge is to immerse the soul within the object. This is said to explain the nature of advaita.

Some say this Sūtra is to describe the help given by showing. But this is not the author's aim, for in the first section he emphasises only the help

due to seeing, mentioning also the showing-help but only to indicate that it precedes seeing-help. This passage can't be about showing-help, for then it would merely repeat matters already stated in Sūtra V.

But the Sanskrit text of Sūtra XI, *you may say, relates to Śiva who shows, not Śiva who sees. What a stupid remark! It does say he is also a show-er, i.e. as well as a see-er. Overlook the 'also' and you will get this Sūtra entirely wrong.*

Part 1. *Thesis. The things which the soul knows the Supreme knows too.*

Comment. Some say the Supreme helps souls only by giving instruction. The above thesis serves to correct this view, while helping to resolve Part 1 *of the Sūtra on the nature of Advaita.*

The advaita relation was described in general terms in Sūtras II *and* V, *and is here described in connection with the seeing-help.*

Reason. These souls also can do nothing without him.

Comment. The eye is material; and it is the soul that benefits from seeing; so, when the eye sees, the accompanying soul sees. The soul, however, is not material like the eye, and it is the soul itself that benefits from knowledge; hence we cannot rightly infer by this analogy that the Supreme also knows the soul's objects.

The Reason just stated was in reference to this mistaken inference.

In order for the eye to see something, the lamplight must combine with the eye-light, and both then combine with the object. And for the soul to know something by instruction, the Supreme's own knowing must unite with the soul's, and both with the object. The soul by itself has no knowledge nor can it know anything on its own, unless the Supreme is there both to enlighten its knowledge and to gain control of its objects.

Some object that there is nothing left for the soul to know, in mukti. In reply he says that in mukti one perceives the experience of Śiva's bliss; which could not happen without the Supreme; so the saint does have that experience.

Example 1. *The soul knows what it knows, by the five senses uniting with the five objects; these, then, are not known simultaneously, but one after another. But the One sees and recognises all the worlds at once.*

Comment. Some make this objection: If God has to combine with the soul, in knowing its objects, then soul and God are indistinguishable, as regards knowledge. Here he takes up that point, shows there is a difference between them, and confirms the Reason just given.

It is the soul's nature to know what it does know by the five senses uniting with their five objects; hence that knowledge is not simultaneous,

but in sequence. But Śiva in himself is always the same (not being made to vary, by Assimilation); and he knows all the objects of all the souls in general, but in union with souls he knows them in particular.

Example 2. When the soul is one with the Supreme and feels the uniting presence, the Supreme appearing as bliss is permanently united with it. Surely then he will know those things that the soul knows, through the soul's own faculty of knowledge?

Comment. An objection: When the soul in mukti knows the Supreme (as previously it knew the five sense objects), then the Supreme being united with that soul will know himself. But that involves the 'fallacy of pride' (self-reference.). So it can't be right to say that he has experience of the soul's objects.

Reply: that's exactly what he does do. When the soul after union with the Supreme has by assimilation become firm and settled, enjoys the closest connection with him and senses his presence, then the Supreme, who at that time appears to it as total bliss, will identify himself with its faculty of knowledge. Surely when he is thus inseparably united with the soul he can know himself, as he is what the knowing soul then knows.

When the soul knows the Supreme, as it is He that is then known, he will be known by himself.

It is quite in order to say that the Supreme recognises himself in the soul as the eye does in a mirror, so there is no question here of any fallacy of self-reference. The Śaivagamas say that all such reflection is like a mirror-image, just a picture, nothing else.

That the Supreme is aware of (the soul's) objects is here stated in regard of knowledge, but is also true of the other faculties, for Siddhiār I. 62 has the faculties of willing and capacity running parallel to that of knowledge. This clearly shows that things perceived by the soul during bondage or in release are also perceived by the Supreme through its union with the soul. During bondage they are objects to the soul, not to Śiva, but he perceives them by his union with the soul. In release they are all (himself excluded) objects to Śiva, not to the soul, and the soul perceives them through union with Him. (Śiva is like an eye for the soul, during bondage, but in release the soul serves as eye.)

Part 2. Thesis. If one lays hold of him in a love that does not forget, one has attained his holy feet.

Comment. Some enquire how the faculties of knowledge, willing and capacity can function in those who are united with the Supreme? The reply explains the nature of Samādhi and affirms this thesis in resolution of the first part of the Sūtra.

Many confusedly assert that in final bliss there can be no love, as love, bhakti, desire etc. denote appetite, and explain that bhakti is a sadhāna for the state of a jīvanmukta. This explanation is wrong. Siva's bliss can only be enjoyed if one has the faculty of desire, in the state of total bliss. In any case this point could more properly be made in relation to Sūtra XII, *if it is only about the Jīvanmukti.*

Reason: The Supreme is bound inseparably with souls, and ensures their deeds have fruit for the doer.

Comment. This reason is given for those who say that even someone in his Aruḷ in unforgetting love can attain to his holy feet only in paramukti.

The Supreme stands in inseverable binding with souls, knows all the deeds of souls, and allows the fruits of deeds to appear either immediately, or at a later time. (The advaita link, whose reality is proven by the faultless operation of the law of karma, shows that complete union with Śiva is possible during life)

Example 1. *Though the sun may shine on the blind, to them it is dark as night. And the Supreme is like darkness to those afflicted with Pāśa. But for those who by love have come to know him, the Supreme will by his Aruḷ-eye banish Pāśa, as the sun brings a lotus-flower into bloom.*

Comment. Some question whether the feet of the Supreme can be attained during life (and not only after the soul is freed from the body), as for those nearby he would be an object of knowledge, like sunlight. In reply this is denied, and the example given to show in what way he is an object of knowledge, thus confirming the Reason.

Although the sun shines in the same way on everything, his shining on the blind (unless equipped with power of vision) is as darkness, like night. The Supreme also shines in the same way on all, yet to those beset by Mala it is like Ignorance (except for the mukta who is Mala-free). You may say that as Jīvanmukti have bodies like other people, they also are afflicted with Pāśa, so there is no difference between them. But I tell you that the sun causes only the mature lotus flowers to open and bloom, though all lotus flowers are equally alive; and the Supreme by his gracious glance removes Mala and instils knowledge only in those who are ripe and know him in love although they, like everyone else, have a body to put up with. They are not under Pāśa's control, even though they are still in the body.

Example 2. *As the moon drives out the darkness, so the Supreme, eternally bound to souls in love, drives out Mala. His action is like a*

magnet attracting iron, and taking charge of it; never wearying, never changeable.

Comment. Some opponents say that the elimination of Pāśa and the blossoming of knowledge in the Jivanmukta who knows the Supreme in love will occur only in paramukti. In reply he shows how Pāśa is eliminated and knowledge conferred.

The Supreme, by whose love he seeks to make souls his own, and who from eternity is linked to them, will from ripe souls gradually remove the Mala's Śakti established there, as the waxing moon gradually removes each day a little more darkness, and finally banishes all of it. That done he sends down his Śakti to sink into the soul and draw it along and take control of it, as a magnet attracts iron and takes control of it; yet not suffering fatigue nor change thereby. Like the magnet, it acts just by being there.

Example 3. If the soul unites with Śiva by perishing, there would be no unity as the soul has perished. And if the soul does not perish, no uniting can occur. Mala perishes like salt dissolved in water, and then the soul attains the feet of the Supreme, and becomes his possession. Duality ends there.

Comment. This is aimed at those who say that the innate Mala that is present from eternity like a guṇa in the soul cannot possibly be separated and driven away from the soul; so you can't really speak of Mala being banished.

People ask whether the soul that has attained the feet of the Supreme will unite with him by perishing, or by not perishing. If you reply, By perishing, then the union cannot take place as the soul has disappeared. If you say, By not perishing, then no union can occur as there are two objects. That is why once the inherent Mala is dissolved the soul unites with the feet of the Supreme, and becomes his property, as salt loses its solidity and unites with the water. For such a soul separation is no more.

If one thing A is there 'for' another thing, B, and is not independently defined, then A belongs to B. The other souls and Pāśa belong to the Supreme in general, but released souls are his property in a special sense.

Example 4. As the sun gives less light when veiled by clouds, but shines over everything once the clouds disappear, so is the intelligence of the soul shrouded by Mala, yet it enjoys the world and attains the mukti that frees it from Mala.

Comment. The soul endures the three states, Kevala, Sakala and Śuddha, described in Sūtra IV, without any harm to its nature. This is shown by an example, to confirm what was said above.

The sun is veiled by clouds, first thing in the morning, and when they clear a bit it shines slightly, then when the band of clouds is completely dispersed by a strong wind, the sun shines everywhere. The soul likewise first of all endures kevala Avasthā in which its intelligence is veiled from eternity by Mala: then acquiring organs and a modicum of intelligence it experiences objects, and eventually attains the feet of the Supreme and is made pure, with its intelligence fully developed and Mala completely banished by the Aruḷ of the Supreme.

This example shows that the removal of Mala means the removal of something which shrouds or obscures; that is all. (*Bodha* XI)

These explanations show clearly that Siddhānta seeks to avoid a mukti like the Buddhist nirvāṇa. It claims that the faculties of knowing, willing and doing are essential to the soul, which is thus (it supposes) guaranteed a mukti also which is full of life. But how will those faculties be set to work, in mukti; and how can they get hold of Śiva (the only object they can have) without damage to his superiority? These explanations in Bodha make it fairly clear how Siddhānta conceives the soul's activity in mukti, and how it tries to reconcile this with Śiva's being absolute.

It is assumed at the outset that in mukti the soul must experience its oneness with Śiva, else it would be as good as dead. How can such an experience come about? The soul is not the only agent in this. The released soul resembles an eye which cannot see anything all by itself. For the eye to see, the soul must identify with it, point out objects, and recognise them for it. Whatever the eye does is really done by the soul. The eye is merely an instrument. And the soul likewise can know things only if a higher intelligence (Śiva's) unites with it, shows it things to know, and recognises and experiences them on its behalf: as is already familiar in the teachings that Śiva instructs the soul, and that everything that is done by him. To be precise, whatever happens is a copy, a real reproduction, of what Siva experiences.

This however does not quite explain how the experiences Śiva has for the soul are actually experienced by the soul; for Śiva's experiencing them does not by itself ensure that the soul does too. We also need to discover how Śiva can be said to experience, without damage to his absolute position. It is solely to meet this point that the analogy with the soul helping the eye to see is given. There is indeed a similarity between eye and soul; but there is also a difference. The eye is entirely Asat. When it is said that

the soul sees for the eye, this does not mean that the eye is conscious that the soul is seeing on its behalf, of what it sees. Now the soul (like Śiva) is Cit. When Śiva is said to have experiences for the soul, that need not mean that the soul is not conscious of Śiva experiencing for it, or of what he experiences. The experiences and sensations are indeed indirect (mediated), but they are still real experiences and real sensations. An experience had through another is still a real experience, if there is a subject capable of feeling, as there is in this case, as the soul also is Cit.

Turning now to the sakala state, here also the soul has no direct experience, but it does have an indirect one, and this is felt by the soul; incorrectly, no doubt, as it has no knowledge of the experience occurring, but even so it is still a real feeling.

In mukti also the soul has impressions indirectly, though not in the same way as in the sakala state, for the Asat organs are no longer involved, and the intelligence of Śiva serves as mediator instead. Which ensures that the object makes an adequate impression on the soul, of which the soul is fully conscious. And the soul surrenders completely to Śiva, as an eye. In the sakala state it appears that the soul is the intelligence which experiences and Śiva just an intermediary (just the opposite of the real situation, where Śiva is always ultimately the active party, even in the sakala-state, where he appears as organ of the soul). That is, the soul in mukti does (from the point of view of the soul) conform to the realities of the situation. It is quite passive, leaving it entirely to Śiva to direct affairs, and contenting itself with the subordinate position of an eye.

If Śiva does use it for any purpose as an eye, the soul will realise this, and be conscious of it (it does have feeling); and Śiva's use of the soul will prove his presence therein, and that the soul's own faculties really are becoming active. It was Śiva that made an impression on the soul, and had experience of that impression. Now as he experiences the impression made on the soul, with which he has the closest of links, and which he uses like a mediator of his own experience, so the soul (whose faculties, by Śiva's presence, are alert) realizes by their aid what Śiva experienced, and itself takes part in that experience.

What sort of impressions does Śiva cause in the soul, in mukti, and have experienced? i.e. what does he use the soul for, in mukti? We have seen how Śiva makes use of souls such as Brahma

and Vishṇu for the work of creation and maintenance. We have also seen how he dwells within vijñānakalar and pralayakalar souls, doing various works through them. Moreover from his point of view everything the soul does in sakala Avasthā is done by Śiva, performed through their agency, to banish Mala. In mukti such uses of souls by Śiva do not arise; and the notion that they are used in mukti to carry out Śiva's Five Works is specifically rejected.

Since the Aruḷ of the all-knower (Śiva) has taken possession of the soul (as a demon overpowers the powerless), the soul must therefore know everything, and unchanged perform the Five Works of the Supreme. No, this can't be right.

If a demon who can speak, see and walk, enters dumb, blind and lame men, what will happen? (they remain blind, etc.). And when Jñāna enters the soul it governs and directs what is already there. Śiva carries out his proper Works in his own proper shape. (*Prak* IX.1, 2)

They won't be yearning for the Five Works (of Śiva) at all, nor for those that follow these, nor even for those cruel ones which are the reason for consuming joys. (*Prak* X.2)

In mukti the soul has no contact with matter, and is never used to govern it. The only thing Śiva uses the soul for in mukti is to experience Śiva as bliss. Souls in Release meet him only as total bliss, not as Lord over other substances. He calls on the soul's faculties solely for experiencing this total bliss, which he is. So the soul may experience and feel this, he identifies with it and enjoys bliss through it, just as through Brahma and Vishṇu and the other souls he carries out the works of creation and maintenance etc. By his presence he enables the soul's faculties actively to experience and feel the bliss which Śiva is enjoying through that soul; just as Brahma and Visṇu and the other souls acquire impressions of what he is doing through them. As the soul thus consciously enjoys Śiva's bliss it holds on to Śiva and will never let him go (for that would indicate independent activity by the soul).

Matter is a hindrance to the soul, and an object for its activity, and an organ. These are all banished in mukti, but no other change is made in the soul's activity or in its relation to Śiva; for that activity remains indirect, and channelled through Śiva. But what the soul feels is new. Of course the soul's activities are now somewhat limited, in the nature of the case. As long as the soul is still concerned with Matter, its faculties must be trained thereon, by Śiva, as fits its stage of development. Full cleansing from

this is inevitably painful, even for Brahma and Vishṇu. Now once matter loses its power over the soul, independent action in that regard is no longer necessary or even desirable; nor need the soul take part in Śiva's Five Works (for removing Mala), for it can feel its bliss without doing so. Śiva does nothing superfluous, so he limits himself to allowing souls to share his bliss, and his nature, just as it is on its own apart from the presence of other substances.

But — you might object — surely it is in the soul's nature to assimilate to its 'leader', which suggests it should at least appear to share Śiva's entire nature, including his immanence and his works? In his innermost nature, Śiva is Cit-Sat-Ānanda, Intelligence-Reality-Bliss, and the released soul shares this nature by experiencing bliss (Ānanda) truly (Sat) felt (Cit). Śiva also performs works, being immanent in that there are other substances beside himself. In this immanence the soul can only share as far as its nature allows. While the soul is combined with the third substance it takes part in that immanence of Śiva which extends to it, so far as the soul's linkage with matter and with Śiva will permit. The soul's sharing in Śiva's immanence is apparent from the soul's presence in the universe, and in its experience of joy and sorrow therein. Had the soul no remaining link with matter it could have no part in an immanence of Śiva directed at a third substance now remote and for the soul virtually non-existent. If it did take a part that would bring it into contact with the third substance once again. The soul does however have a full part in Śiva's immanence, as extended to itself as an individual.

Here a further objection may arise. Are we not endangering Śiva's unity and producing a dualistic division into Śiva immanent and Śiva transcendent? Śiva is immanent, we are told, as if he were not immanent; and in Śiva's presence the third substance exists as if it did not exist. It is this nature of his, which more or less condemns the third substance to non-existence, that the soul shares in; his real nature, not the nature which appears when Asat is present.

This brings us close to the Siddhāntin's line of thought, in allowing the soul to experience Śiva's bliss, without disturbing his absolute character. Although everything done in the world comes back to Śiva in the end, it does not disturb him, being due to his presence only and not to any exertion on his part. Even the action

required of him as regards the released soul in mukti occurs only by his presence. That soul's faculties move into action because he is there; and as there is no other object for them, he serves as object for these faculties he now directs. And as he is present in the soul, for whose faculties he by his presence provides an object, he as Lord of the soul accepts what those faculties acquire; and as he is present in the soul, and accepts what its faculties acquire, the soul also has a share in it.

Śiva does not exert himself, in this. Everything takes place of its own motion, merely occasioned by his presence. A sort of special knowledge is indeed involved, not for his own sake but for that of the soul he is present in; and does not exclude total knowledge (which for this special knowledge is not required). He is complete bliss, though without needing to feel it by any particular act. If in certain cases he does feel it, that happens for the soul's sake, not his, as he is present in it and it in him. He is total bliss even apart from this presence.

The soul's union with Śiva in mukti thus results in a conscious experience by the soul of Śiva's bliss. The soul identifies completely with Śiva, intentionally surrendering to him, and thus seems not to exist any longer, but to be welded into one entity with him, as though it resembled Śiva in every respect. Yes they do form one entity, by combining, but their natures remain distinct. In appearance they are exactly similar, indistinguishable; but in reality they are, and remain different.

The commentary on Bodha gives an account of the essential differences between Śiva and the released soul, to resist attempts to exaggerate the effect of union with Śiva.

Why should we not assume (you ask) that souls become like the high gods (like Śiva)? The Vedas and Āgamas say that souls subjected to the three stages of development, if they achieve release, are like Śiva and have unlimited knowledge. But I tell you that the world of souls which is non-decaying and eternal, like the Supreme, is even in mukti subservient to the Supreme in another way.

'In another way': as the eye cannot see in daylight, without the sun; and the soul in mukti though Mala-free does not attain knowledge without the Supreme, its foundation, its fellow-worker and its teacher.

Unlike the Supreme, the soul has no independent position, but like eye, crystal, and air depends on something else. God, unlike the soul, has the power to perform the Five Works; what the soul can do is experience Śiva.

It is present everywhere, but only by being present in God, just as the power of sight is effective only as far as the light reaches; for the soul's intelligence is only human, unlike God's. (*Comment on Bodha,* I, *example* 3)

The released soul is always subordinate to Śiva. It does share in his nature, but only in a derivative way.

Although they are at peace, free from limitations, and filled with a total knowledge they can never lose, they are entitled to enjoy the total bliss of the Supreme, and that alone.

Although they have attained all knowledge, outside the One they know nothing at all.

Comment. Although the Jñāna that by its nature knows everything is inseparably combined, when it appears, with the Holy One, yet apart from this Jñāna they know nothing else. (*Payan* X.2 & 3)

It is impossible to describe the magnitude of the bliss that mukti brings:

Who can describe the bliss due to the three things (*soul as knower, knowledge, object*) *uniting in him and never appearing again?*

Comment. What words can we find to describe the total bliss due to the trinity of knowledge, knower and known, and the duality of Śiva and the soul not appearing, owing to their very close combination? (*Payan* VIII.9)

Total bliss is so special that no-one can say just how big it is. In full salvation all differences disappear i.e. are no longer apparent. The soul, which has the bliss, unites so closely with Śiva, who confers the bliss and is its object, that they no longer appear as distinct substances; so visible interaction between them is no longer conceivable.

The soul, which is to experience, is united so closely with Śiva, the object to be experienced, that the soul need not now do anything, to experience Śiva. During bondage the knower, the knowledge and the known are mutually opposed like the three sides of a triangle, but in release these move together until they seem a single point. While subject and object are sufficiently opposed for interaction between them to be discernible, their natures can be separately described and their form of interaction classified. But if subject and object grow so completely together as to appear as one, not two, and if interaction between them can no longer be detected, then they cannot be described individually or have their interaction specified.

Regarding the soul's life in mukti one can say only that it is

very closely linked to Śiva and shares his bliss. What form that soul takes, how it enjoys bliss, how much it enjoys it ... these are unanswerable questions. You would need to enjoy bliss, to get an idea what it is like.

Those who have seen the Supreme linked with his all-blessed Śakti in total bliss, they really do experience total bliss. Those who have tasted sweet ambrosia-food rising up out of the sea know how sweet it is. (*Paḍiār* 77)

The unreleased cannot possibly conceive the bliss of mukti:

A little girl does not know the sweetness of love. It is impossible to describe to her the sweetness that is born out of the union of a man with a woman. Only lovers know it. It is not by the body that the soul knows the body. If those who have not known Śiva say that they have known him by means of everyday knowledge, this is an illusion. If they have attained to the Aruḷ they will know both (Śiva and themselves) without any special act. Had they not attained, rebirth would not cease, nor could Mala be eliminated. (*Siddhiār* VIII.36)

Only one who has reached mukti can say whether someone else has. No-one else has any criterion for deciding the point:

Though you manage to swim across the sea, that doesn't mean you can measure it. And the way Śiva possesses those holy ones who love him here on earth is not to be grasped by any everyday knowledge. (*Paḍiār* 90)

2. Jīvanmukti: Release during Earthly Life

It might seem that Mukti as just described could be full and complete only after death. Not so. There is a specific claim that full mukti is attainable during life:

Good deeds bring about higher births, evil deeds lower births. But by the virtue of worshipping the Supreme and by the Jñāna thus achieved a soul may prevent both sorts of rebirth, never more to enter this world or the underworld or the world above; but achieve mukti here and now. (*Siddhiār* VIII.31)

While this released soul tarries here below it is called jīvanmukti i.e. living but released. One leaving the earth by death is then called Paramukta i.e. higher and released; though without implying the bliss is of higher grade after death than before.

Some have complete knowledge, and their deeds no longer have those threefold results; for such, Beyond and Our-side are alike:

Comment. Deeds bring rewards in three ways: in this life, in heaven or hell, or in the next life. For those whose deeds bring no such rewards,

and who have attained to higher knowledge, bliss after death is the same as bliss before. (*Payan* X.9)

Bliss is the same, whether the released soul is still in the body, or not. But there is some difference between Jīvanmukta and Paramukta, though one of appearance rather than nature, due to the Jīvanmukta being in different circumstances, here in the world. We shall need to explore how he comes to terms with those circumstances, and what impression he there gives.

But first we must ask why the released soul, being already Mala-free, is not promptly removed from this world, which is still Mala. This is because of unconsumed Prārabdhakarma. Whatever is ordained for that soul in that life, because of earlier karma, must work itself out. It cannot leave the world until it has consumed all that was allocated to it before birth. If at the time of release much of the Prārabdhakarma remains unconsumed, the soul must stay behind to finish it. Only then can it become Paramukta.

This means that a Jīvanmukta must be active in the world, otherwise the prārabdhakarma cannot be consumed. But won't that return him to unhappiness, or at least affect his bliss? Seemingly so, but actually not. Whatever the Law of Karma requires does take place, but without affecting him. He is in the body as if not so: in the world as if elsewhere: he suffers pain painlessly, as it were: rejoices as though there were nothing to rejoice about: he acts like one inactive. Whenever prārabdhakarma faces him with something he withdraws like a tortoise.

They retract their organs, creeping off to their inmost (*highest*), *and never come out again; like a crawling tortoise.*

Comment. When faced with something they take fright, get rid of sensations due to it, and crawl off into Jñeya, their lord, and never return; like a tortoise, which takes fright when someone confronts it, draws back its head, and stays there motionless.

The tortoise sticks its head out again after that person has gone off, and quickly goes back to where it was before. Not so the Jīvanmukta. That is why he says, 'and never return'.

Summary. This explains how they fear the impressions of the senses, and keep away from their influence. (*Payan* X.4)

While in the body he enjoys the happiness of communion with the Śiva within. If something comes from outside, he recedes to the furthest corner of the body, and stays there enjoying bliss

until the danger is past, until the problem due to prārabdhakarma is resolved. Thus he experiences nothing of what is happening around him or because of him.

He will no longer ask where the sun rises. He will feel no want.

For those who, in this world, achieve the steadfastness of Jñāna, there is neither good nor evil; there is no more desire, no compliance with prescribed ritual, no penances, no self-mortification, no asceticism, no meditation, no inner impurity, no sectarian symbol, no physical nor inner sense. They have no Guṇa (i.e. tamas, rajas, sattva), no distinguishing features, no caste. They are like children, and those possessed. All they do (if anything) is sing and dance.

They get things done unawares, as if land, place, time, direction and position had no contribution to make. Their manas does not behave like a swing. In walking, sitting, sleeping, waking, eating, going without, standing, lying, in purity and impurity, in poverty and wealth, in pain and pleasure, in sexual union and in anger, in affection and aversion, wise men though they do all these and more besides will never be separated from the presence of Aran (Śiva). (*Siddhiār* VIII.31-33)

Sin no longer comes into it. If they do something that appears sinful, it is only because Prārabdhakarma required that precise action. They are not personally involved in it.

Those who reach Jāgara Atīta are the truly wise who have achieved total extermination of the tattva. To what is their happiness due? To their eliminating in this life all the soul's desires, to their having reached Śiva and being walking Sivas. Though they may wear a crown, and rule, or enjoy feminine company, yet have they no desires, within. Those not so far advanced are yet born again, although now free from external desires, as their deeds are still unconsumed. (*Siddhiār* VIII.35)

The reward due for works completed is this world. But the real reward is for there being none such.

Comment. For deeds one is proud of, feeling 'I did it. It is mine' the reward is life on earth. For deeds done in self-disdain, without pride, the reward is total bliss which can never pass away.

Summary. This says that even if they do something, it is not desire that moves them to. (*Payan* X.9)

A non-doer doing a non-doing deed. That's him. (*Paḍiār* 60)

The Śivajñāni enjoy total bliss while the tattva are displayed (before death) as well as when they are heaped up. Even if they do experience something they don't really do so if they have reached the Supreme, who

is in eternal and unbreakable union with the Śakti which experiences nothing while experiencing everything. (*Paḍiār* 66)

For him nothing exists any more except Śiva, and everything becomes as Śiva. If anything surprises him, his all-engrossing mystical union with Śiva (which clears all else away) makes it into Śiva. If he experiences anything, that becomes an experience of Śiva's bliss.

Those who have achieved the knowledge that is the same within and without pay attention to nothing.

Summary. This says that for them everything appears as Jñāna.

To the world, that cannot understand such a concentration upon Śiva, a Jīvanmukta appears as a lunatic.

Until you get like someone possessed by demons, do nothing at all.

Comment. The deeds of one possessed are all devils' deeds; so this means: until all your deeds are God's deeds. After that no Sādhana is required. The point is made in this context to show that whatever needed doing previously is all done with, and in this final state (*one's*) *doing has to be restrained.* (*Payan* VIII.7, *cp. Siddhiār* VIII.32 *just above*)

One possessed has lost control of himself to a demon; and a Jīvanmukta likewise is not in command of himself, but given over to Śiva. Everything else no longer exists for him. Śiva is his one and all. In everything he sees only Śiva. He seems like one possessed by a fixed idea.

There cannot still be duties for a Jīvanmukta to fulfil. Yet Bodha XII unexpectedly lists several commands for the Jīvanmukta. Does he require instructions, suited to a much lower stage of development? Before drawing any inferences from this surprising fact, let us first translate this concluding Sūtra:

Once the Jīvanmukta has washed off the Mala which hindered him from reaching the strong lotus-foot of the Supreme, and has united with the holy ones; and once ignorance is removed, then shall he worship the symbol of those who overflow with love (*to Śiva*), *and honour the temple as God.*

Comment. This Sūtra shows how one can know the unknowable Supreme as knowable, and worship him.

In mukti the faculties of knowledge desire and action are inactive outwardly. What are they applied to, then? In reply, Sūtra XII *shows how the Supreme, who is attainable through bhakti though unreachable by Vāc* (*sound*) *and manas can yet be reached by manas and Vāc, and worshipped.*

It says he must wash off the Mala, indicating where the faculty of knowledge is to come into play. It says he must keep company with the holy ones, indicating in what area the faculty of desire is to act. It says he must worship, indicating where the faculty of activity is to play its part. This shows that these three faculties are not now concerned with anything else. You must realise that for him one object is no longer different from another. All the three faculties are simultaneously and continuously trained on one solitary object.

Part 1. *Thesis. Eliminate the three Mala.*

Comment. This is what the Jivanmukta must do first.

Reason. The three Mala do not bring forth Jñāna but only ignorance.

Comment. Some query how Pāśa which was eliminated in Sūtra X *can still be there to be removed, after Truth has been recognised and Samādhi achieved. In reply the significance of this Sūtra is explained and the thesis confirmed.*

The three Mala must be eliminated: this is so the soul does not again come under their power, for these three will somehow gain entry even if he has recognised Truth and achieved Samādhi, and they will subjugate true knowledge and revive the old limited knowledge, the seed of rebirth.

Example. Karma, which occurs with both good and evil deeds; Māyā, which consists of the tattvas from Earth to Aśuddha Māyā, and Āṇavamala that causes confusion of knowledge; these three are unsuited to someone genuinely wise. Leave them be!

Comment. This shows how they worm their way in and cause ignorance, and slip in; and that they ill befit someone truly wise; which reinforces the Reason.

While the body lasts Prārabdhakarma will still be linked to it and by sheer force of habit will somehow bother the Jivanmukta, even though he has eliminated Māyā completely and achieved Truth and entered Samādhi.

Siddhiār II.11 *says Karma is not consumed without activity, so attraction and aversion must also be present. In which case limited objects like the earth, etc., will for those who have seen God be something they can recognise. Consequently this restricted and observational knowledge will grow and grow until true knowledge is subverted and there is cause for rebirth. To indicate how the three Mala seek out an opportunity to creep in again, he makes use of the sequence Karma Māyā Āṇavamala, and describes how they come about.*

They can lose you the full bliss of union with Śiva; so he says they

'ill befit' the wise. Unless you root them out at once they will grow and grow, with results aptly put in that Kuṛaḷ verse:—

Life as a body-lodger? That's no home, now, is it?

That is why he says emphatically 'Leave them be!' What does this involve? First, realising that if they arise as indicated, false knowledge will be due to limited knowledge, which is due to inclination and aversion, which is due to the personal knowledge that comes by Prārabdhakarma Karma; and (second) getting rid of them so personal knowledge does not recur; and (third) escaping to Śivajñāna and taking one's stand therein so that the experience of Śiva (of the bliss he has) becomes a personal experience.

Part 2. Thesis. Keep company with Śiva's holy ones.

Comment. In the resolution of the second part of the Sūtra this assertion is made in order to show that when people have washed away Mala there are still things to be done, to keep clean.

One should not keep company with any others.

Reason. Others bring about false knowledge.

Comment. Some say that the really wise, having put aside aversion and attraction, should not show any love or hate. In reply he gives a reason for the thesis.

The three Mala induce false knowledge when they get a chance. Those who are not Śiva's holy ones do more; they cleverly engineer an opportunity even when none presents itself. That makes them more cruel than Mala, to be more feared and avoided.

Example: To avoid the company of lower folk who make you forget yourself and fall foul of Mala's snares, join yourself eagerly to the holy ones and have knowledge via the intelligence of the Supreme. No karma comes near to those who are so truly holy.

Comment. Some say it is sufficient to avoid those who bring about false knowledge. Why need one go about with the holy ones of Śiva? In reply the statement is reemphasised. The company of loveless folk we previously kept would make one forget the advaita relationship by which God helps by instruction and sight, and would lose us the Supreme's wisdom-eye just now firmly grasped, and lead us into evil ways and the hell of Mala-caused rebirth. To prevent this we must join the company of Śiva's holy ones. They will hinder that forgetting and give the Jñāna and free us from the hell of rebirth and set us on the right way. Then as lovers we can know by the eye of Śivajñāna; and as holy ones be free of Prārabdhakarma, which leads one to seek the company of unloving people.

Those who, full of love to Śiva's holy ones, with heart, mouth and

hands keep their company find that worldly knowledge passes away and is replaced by knowledge of the Śiva-experience, and then Prārabdhakarma as a bodily problem can bother them no longer, as among them no further consuming takes place. Then will the cause of Prārabdhakarma, namely the desire to keep company with the loveless, disappear completely. To make this point he says that those who full of love keep company with the holy ones, and have the genuine tapas that comes from knowing the Supreme, they never find karma coming near them. By this remark he indicates how necessary that service is, as the desire to keep the long-accustomed company with the loveless, which causes deeds, can only be removed by fellowship with Śiva's holy ones, by which the knowledge of salvation is confirmed.

Part 3. Thesis. Consider the attire of the holy ones and Śiva's temple as the Supreme, and worship them.

Comment. This thesis serves to resolve the third part of the Sūtra, explaining what those who have joined the company of the holy ones still have to do to confirm this fellowship.

As clothes, sandals, jewwllery etc., on a girl's body charm the lover and ensure his desire, so do the clothing of the Supreme and the temple of Śiva charm the wise man just on seeing them, and guarantee joy.

Reason. The Supreme is visibly present in these objects, but is not knowable in other objects.

Comment. Some make this objection: those that have true knowledge can rightly be said to see the Supreme in everything indifferently, as is taught in various books, while Tirurudra names all living and inanimate objects without distinction, and says one must honour them. So why give preference just to these two?

The Supreme is indeed present in all things, but he is visibly present, as butter is in butter-milk, only in these two, while in the rest he is invisibly present, like butter in milk. The statement in the Tirurudra refers to the general presence of God in all objects.

Example 1. The Supreme wishes all to know him, gives his form to the saints, ensures that they know him and feel at home in him. Thus in pious people who know him he is apparent as butter is in buttermilk; but for souls possesssed by Pāśa he does not so appear.

Comment. Some query how the Supreme is there and visible in the clothing. The answer is that as he wishes all dwellers on earth to know him, he gives his holy form (holy ash, rosary etc.) to the pious, and gets them to recognise him by the Śiva-meditation and transports those pious

ones who know him through these insignia into his universal presence. Thus for those who know him by a symbol he is visible as butter is in butter-milk. But for those subject to Pāśa he is invisibly present, as butter is in milk.

Example 2. Fire looks different from firewood; and the Supreme, who is the same as visible pictures, and different from them, is visibly present in the pictures by a mantra known (to the pious). When they recognise that form as God himself, will he not appear to them like that?

Comment. Some say the Supreme is visible in holy pictures only when a mantra is recited, as those pictures are not in nature like the holy ones. He is emphatic in replying that the Supreme is visibly present in holy Śiva-pictures.

When firewood is rubbed the fire appears, and looks different; but is not visible if the wood is not rubbed. Similarly the Supreme is naturally one with sacred pictures by combination, but different in essence; and to those who know him not he is invisibly present in the picture when the mantra they know is not available, but visible when it is. But surely God will appear visibly to the truly pious, who regard those pictures as God himself.

Part 4. Worship the Supreme in these places.

Comment. Some say that a Jivanmukta automatically acquires the three things mentioned, so what had to be stated there should not here be turned into a commandment. In reply the above thesis is set forth, to emphasise that it still needed stating as a command.

Reason. A man is made up of muscles, bones, nerves etc., and appears as such, but is not identical with them. So is it also with the Supreme.

Comment. As some remark that there is no point in commanding what has already been achieved, he gives a Reason for the thesis.

The soul is there non-separably with the muscles, bones, nerves, etc., as if identical with them, but on precise enquiry as to whether it is muscle or bone or nerve turns out different from them; and the Supreme, present in combination in all lifeless and living natures as if identical with them is yet by nature different from them. Now they (religious pictures) are revered on the principle that he is identical with them, so provision is needed whereby in those places he will be revered. That is why it says these are the places to worship in.

Example 1. As the wise realise, God is neither different from other things nor identical with them, nor both identical and different. He is in advaita linkage with all things: so everything is his form. You must worship what engages your love, you disciples of advaita.

Comment. Some ask why it commands worship only at these places, when the Supreme is by nature related to all objects. His reply reinforces his point.

Those who have known the Supreme's presence in all living and lifeless things will realise that he is not different as are eye and sun (allowing you to say Here is Śiva, There is the world); and that he is not identical with it as body and soul are (allowing you to say The world is Siva); and further that he is not both different and identical as are Guṇa and Guṇi (allowing you to say He exists as the world). He stands in advaita relation overall, like sunlight and the power of vision; so all obejcts are his form. You who know advaita Siddhānta worship what you love.

Example 2. As karma promotes Asat, Jñāna can occur only if karma is got rid of. If one seeks out and venerates wise men, so that karma may cease, then Jñāna will arise. That is why you should love and revere them.

Comment. Some say that once the Manifold is seen to be Asat, and abandoned, full knowledge is at hand and advaita understood. So why command further worship here? Again he re-iterates his case, with emphasis.

The habit of Prārabdhakarma is based in the body, and while it continues bothering the soul there will be attraction and aversion, and objects of manas and Māyā, and in consequence knowledge will be limited; and all this will prevail even though those Asat-objects were banished. The Prārabdhakarma-habit is the basic cause for all this; only when that cause is completely removed will Asat be suppressed and true knowledge arise. To achieve the complete removal of that habit one is to seek the company of those who have achieved true knowledge, and honour them: then that karma will be destroyed and true knowledge will arise. So you should love and honour them.

You may say that for this purpose it is enough to pronounce the five letters in due order. True enough; but without that veneration this prayer is not possible.

Example 3. The Supreme instructs one and makes another into himself: and to forget this afterwards is an inexcusable crime. He does transform someone into himself, but that person still continues an underling. So worship of the Supreme still has force (is a duty).

Comment. Some ask: Can worship, here commanded as beneficial, be postponed; as sacrifice and other sorts of divine service sometimes are, because those benefits are not needed, or because he thinks he can do it later

on? In reply, it is shown why non-worship is blameworthy, and why worship is a duty; and the command is re-emphasised.

The Supreme gave the soul immense help, for when it knew not its own nature and lay there like a blind man, he instructed it in different ways; and though it stood so low and he so high yet he transformed it into himself. To forget all this is not like forgetting through ignorance, during bondage, a sin which can be wiped out. The Supreme does identify with the soul, which till then had no freedom and depended as an underling on the help of the Supreme; and it is still an underling. That is why the soul has a duty to venerate the Supreme, who identifies with it.

Three duties are here laid down for the Jīvanmukta:—1. to avoid Mala; 2. to keep company only with like souls; 3. to worship Śiva among his saints, and sacred pictures.

The second piece of advice is obvious enough, as it is implied in what was said about the nature of mukti. The first and third items seem strange at first. Jīvanmukti is a state of being quite free of Mala, and entirely one with Śiva, in whose presence Mala cannot abide. But it is quite superfluous to tell someone to avoid a thing that for him no longer exists; and humiliating to tell someone who is so closely related to God and knows him, that he should worship God indirectly through holy men or sacred pictures. Surely this advice will bring the Jīvanmukta tumbling from the height of equality with God down to the depths of ordinary humanity!

The wise men of Śaiva Siddhānta evidently do not regard these three pieces of advice as a disparagement of the Jīvanmukta state, otherwise they would not have offered such advice. There must be reasons in the structure of their system for giving such advice to Jīvanmuktas. It is only right that we should seek out those reasons.

The advice to avoid Mala assumes that it is possible even for a Jīvanmukta to be ensnared in Mala yet again. Can such an assumption be justified, in view of what was said about the elimination of Mala and the nature of mukti? We cannot give a negative answer straight away. Removing Mala does not mean destroying it, but just that it ceases its activities, being paralysed by the Śakti within. What does exist cannot be completely destroyed; so the paralysis of Mala by the Śakti must not be put down to its being destroyed; which theoretically leaves open the possibility of its reviving and starting up again. Consequently a certain activity of Mala is supposed even during Jīvanmukti time, as it is claimed

that Prārabdhakarma still has effect in this period. Now this activity of Mala in Prārabdha can, unless great care is taken, serve as a spark which re-ignites the extinguished Śakti. Now Prārabdhakarma is not possible without activity, and some relation to matter. But for this, there would be no need for the redeemed soul to go on existing in the body and in the world, to consume Prārabdhakarma.

The activity needed in destroying Prārabdhakarma takes place through the senses. They are excited by objects which they then lay hold of to bring them to the soul. This capture and conveyance to the soul is essential, as otherwise Prārabdhakarma could not be destroyed. But the soul had better not receive them directly from the senses, and in material form, as it would then be in contact with Mala and defiled anew. Such a misguided consumption of Prārabdhakarma would lead to a revival of the powers of Mala, previously paralysed; and Śaiva Siddhānta is clearly warning the Jīvanmukta against this, when it says 'Avoid Mala'. Taken in this way that advice seems entirely justified.

The question now arises how Prārabdhakarma in the Jīvanmukta can be destroyed without the soul coming into contact with Mala. Clearly it is the soul that has to take hold of the object captured by the senses, as it is the soul which is to consume Prārabdhakarma. We have seen how the Jīvanmukta draws back like a tortoise as soon as its senses bring it an object. It won't let its senses anywhere near, but hides itself away in Śiva. What then happens to the objects which the senses are trying to hand over to the soul? The answer lies in the statement that to the Jīvanmukta, everything appears as Śiva. In the presence of Śiva, Mala does not, so to speak, exist at all. To the soul hidden in Śiva the things passed on by the senses do not appear as matter at all; for the soul sees right through matter with its Jñāna eye, discards that matter completely and recognises Śiva omnipresent there, seizes him and thus consumes the Prārabdhakarma as the bliss of his presence.

The second and third items of advice are obviously meant to bring to mind how this consumption of Prārabdhakarma is achieved, and could be made easier. Owing to Prārabdhakarma the Jīvanmukta will still come into contact with matter, and it will be harder for him to disregard it and recognise the Śiva present therein, when he keeps company with unreleased souls who know only matter and hold it before him on display.

It will be easier in the company of released souls who love Śiva

alone and talk only of him, and by their garments draw him to the attention of those around. And one's concentration on Śiva (to render Prārabdhakarma harmless), becomes even easier if the things which assail one are related as nearly as may be to Śiva. It would therefore be a good move for a Jīvanmukta to try to ensure that his Prārabdhakarma is worked out on things which remind him of Śiva.

Śiva himself is present in all objects, and released souls can recognise him in everything. But those things in which he is present invisibly and only in a general way, as butter is in milk, if they should come on the soul suddenly and unexpectedly, as they surely will (for the Jīvanmukta does not notice worldly things, bumping into them before realising they are there), he may let them influence him as matter, not noticing the Śiva in them.

This danger however is pratically nil if the objects through which the Prārabdhakarma has to be worked out are in a special sense bearers of Śiva. Such special bearers of Śiva are holy people, the Jīvanmukta (as is obvious from what was said about mukti), the temple of Śiva and images of him. In these latter he is visibly present in a special sense, like butter in churned milk, because of the mantras connected with them.

The Jīvanmukta by performing services to other Jīvanmukti and fulfilling all that is required for holy images in the Caryā Kriyā and yoga stages should seek to consume his Prārabdhakarma. What he does and experiences in service to holy persons and images will always remind him of Śiva; it will be for him action and experience relating to Śiva, and not to Matter, because thoughts about Śiva keep his service awake, so that whatever comes along he can see the Śiva within.

Worship through images is thus seen as a help against the possible harmful workings of Prārabdhakarma, to which the released soul is subject until death; and is a form of worship not only acceptable to God, but also beneficial. Not that philosophical Hinduism regards worship through images as a form of service to God suitable only at the lower stages up to Caryā-Kriyā; for it considers such service proper and beneficial and indeed essential at the very highest stage. Hindu philosophy's assessment of image-worship is thus not at all out of step with that of religious practice and the purāṇas, where it plays an important and well-known role.

The command to worship images is thus an outgrowth of the system itself. But it is closely connected with two major defects, previously mentioned, in that system. The Siddhāntin does not seriously regard God as a person. For him, God is transcendent, does not come into direct touch with other substances, and may not reveal himself directly. It is indeed said that the soul in release takes direct hold of God, with only God's own Śakti coming between; though before death it is said, more modestly, that it knows and enjoys God in special forms which he takes on for just that purpose, as he does for the special tasks of creation, maintenance, destruction, obscuration and release.

Might such mediation of knowledge and bliss in mukti be justified by God's being everywhere? That suggestion seems inappropriate, for it leads directly to the claim that there is a special presence in images. Such a special presence is however only asserted, not argued for; that reference to mantras at this point is at best superstitious, and not something that any reasonable man could count as evidence.

The advice addressed to released souls raises the question why none of Śaiva Siddhānta's commands lead to benefit or progress. Is it completely non-social? The last stanza of TiruaruḍPayan does indeed mention sympathy felt by the released for the non-realeased; but this is an isolated comment. Were a released soul to act like this it would be in total conflict with its own nature and duty. We cannot seriously take this remark to show the Siddhantin as concerned for the demands of society, arising from there being more souls, not just that one. Siddhānta does of course accept that there are many souls; but the consequences of this, or of the existence of God, or of the three-fold Mala; the consequences of all these facts for the individual soul it completely overlooks. It has no inkling of relations between souls. Each one is considered as if entirely independent of the others. As a result, Siddhānta never comes up with any genuine ethics, and has nothing to say of the benefit a released soul could confer on the unreleased. It considers every soul as a completely independent entity. Nowhere does it venture into ethics, or indicate what help released souls might be to those unreleased.

As we saw earlier (VI.3), a Jīvanmukta does indeed play the part of a Satguru; even so, the description of the Jīvanmukta shows how unsocial Siddhānta is. For it is not really the Jīvanmukta,

but Śiva, who is the Satguru; with the Jīvanmukta coming in merely as an agent with no will of his own. For this reason our sources in their description of the Jīvanmukta rightly pay no further attention to the fact that he is occasionally used as a guru, and build no ethic on that. The only inference drawn from the Jīvanmukta being used by Śiva as a medium for his activity as guru, is that as an embodiment of Śiva he should receive divine honours, just as images do.

3. Śaiva Siddhānta and the Last Things

Every soul is called to gain release. That is the only goal towards which the soul's development was directed. A soul may take indefinitely long to reach that goal, and there may be indefinitely many souls, but even so a day might come when they are all released. Now everything that happens in the world is for the sake of release; so the release of souls could affect the world; and a time might come when the world, or rather transmigration, is superfluous.

We might therefore have expected that from the release of individual souls Siddhānta would move on to discuss the End, and explain whether and how transmigration might itself terminate once all souls are freed and the world has no further use. No such teaching is provided. Our sources never even raise the question whether all souls will reach their goal, leave alone the question what should happen to the world when they have all entered into Śiva.

Transmigration never began, and our sources take it as practically unthinkable that it should ever end, in view of the infinite number of souls and the endlessly long processes they need to go through, before their need of the world disappears. Perhaps this feeling that an end to transmigration is practically unthinkable suppressed any logical inclination to work out a theory of the final End. Perhaps there were other reasons for not theorising on this point.

If someone had claimed on logical grounds that transmigration had an end, he would have met the weighty objection that (for Śaiva Siddhānta) what had no beginning cannot have an end. But if, respecting that principle, one said the world had no end, this would conflict with the claim that transmigration takes place

in order that the soul may attain its release; and then one would have to find some special inner purpose in transmigration.

All these difficulties are avoided by concentrating entirely on individual souls, one by one, and disregarding the fate of all of them, as a collectivity. One might overlook this if some attempt had been made to justify this neglect of the plurality of souls which Siddhānta itself asserts. But no such attempt is to be found.

CHAPTER EIGHT

Conclusion

When dealing with the nature of God and of Matter we often had occasion to consider the relation of these two entities to each other. Śaiva Siddhānta, we saw, takes its stand on a pluralism of substances, and then tries to safeguard God's absoluteness and the unity of all Being by asserting a monism of events. In our assessment of this we were driven to doubt wether this solution was satisfactory as regards God's absolute position; as Śiva was quite significantly limited, in his dealings with Matter, by its teleology, which was quite independent of him.

This same question, which confronted us in the relation between God and Matter, also arises as between God and the soul; and we can now take this up, having reviewed the whole evolutionary process that Śaiva Siddhānta has the soul pass through.

Śaiva Siddhānta has more difficulty in ensuring that God is absolute, and all Being one, when it comes to souls, as unlike Matter they are intelligent. It chose the only practicable solution, that the soul's intelligence is limited (see above. IV.3 & 4). It is, in fact, just may-be intelligent; and the soul cannot on its own turn that May-be into Is. It is, for Śaiva Siddhānta, entirely up to God whether the soul is intelligent in fact as well as theory. This move makes it possible to assert a monism of events, for souls as for Matter, and thus to safeguard God's absolute character and the unity of all Being.

Simple though this explanation appears, it involves considerable difficulties. A certain sense of reality stopped them attributing to Śiva each and every event connected with the soul, and they were specially nervous, in practice, of putting directly onto his account actions which were, perhaps, unworthy of the supreme and perfect Being.

Śaiva Siddhānta did seek to deflect from God responsibility for the 'how' of events concerned with Matter, saying this was and always had been due to tendencies and aims innate to Matter. This solution would not work for souls, being intelligent: it would set souls in conscious opposition to God, endangering further what it was intended to protect, but would also put in question a consummation established as an everlasting right which nothing could undermine; for the intelligence souls are supposed to have would condition the re-appearance after suppression of natural tendencies, since if these were actually destroyed the soul would also perish, at least as an intelligent entity. In the case of unintelligent Matter we might be able to explain and put up with its continued existence after destruction of its innate and anti-God tendency; but not with intelligent souls, since Śaiva Siddhānta regards a change of nature as a new creation which it will not or cannot accept. Feeling, therefore, compelled (and preferring) to make God responsible only for the fact (the That) of soul-related events, and not for their 'How', this school had to take a different line in relation to souls than it had with Matter.

The responsibility for the 'how' of all actions relating to Matter is shifted, by this school, from God to Matter, by endowing it with various anti-God tendencies. A similar move is not made for all actions related to souls, but just for those unfitting for God; here souls are not admitted to have any tendencies which account for the 'how' of their actions. Souls are active if God permits, but they are not responsible for the 'how' of what they do, as they are not free agents acting on their own peculiar principles. The standard determining the action God has permitted comes to them from outside. Where from? For an anti-God action, from Matter. For one conformant to his will, from God.

To summarize: Souls have the ability to know, to will and to act; and these abilities can come into action if God provides an occasion. The outcome and value of such activity depends, however, not upon norms inherent in those abilities, but on one of the two substances that have from ever been advaita-combined with souls.

Of these, it is Matter that mainly regulates the soul's activity. So long as powers inherent in Matter continue to influence the soul's abilities, its actions while as mechanical fact due to God (who needs to activate the powers of both Matter and the soul), are actually anti-God in character; and for this neither God nor

the soul is held responsible, but Matter. The soul for its part is subject to the law of karma, i.e. to the evil of transmigration. But once the powers of Matter cease to influence souls, i.e. when they are no longer impressed by Matter-guided action and no longer lend their powers to Matter; then indeed Śiva appears as the guiding principle, setting norms and thus becoming responsible for the 'How' as well as the 'That' of their activities.

Śaiva Siddhānta needs a monism of events so as to preserve God's absolute character and the unity of all Being while adhering to their metaphysical first principle that there are several substances. Now, is that monism compatible with the assertion of eternally existing intelligent beings other than God? Siddhānta tries to make it so. Does it succeed? Claiming that the soul's powers in themselves are norm-free admittedly does not increase the difficulty Siddhānta here faces, in regard to souls. As souls do not carry their own norms for action, but get these from Matter or from God, it follows logically that the question whether a pluralism of substances endangers God's absolute position of the Unity of all Being is limited to two substances only (God and Matter) and does not concern souls at all. They may carry out an action, or suffer one done to them, but it was not theirs to decide on it or to take moral responsibility for it.

But in assessing a doctrine we should not only ask whether it avoids increasing difficulties, but also whether it lessens them. It can hardly be claimed that the norm-free character of the soul's powers solves our problem. It is alright in mukti, for the powers of Matter are then no longer active, so a monism of events is actually supported by the soul's powers being norm-free, and this without putting God's absoluteness at risk. But this doctrine makes no difference to the limits placed on God's absoluteness during bondage by the aims and objectives of Matter. Indeed that norm-free character could even be said to make God's absoluteness dependent, in a way, on Matter. For what brings God to interfere with Matter is just the fact that the soul, being without its own norms, borrows them from Matter; and it is to remove this dependence that God moves in. If souls were not thus dependent on Matter, God would not take any notice of it. Matter would then be a Nothing, for him.

In assessing this theory of normlessness we have duly considered its value as resolving the metaphysical problem due to

that metaphysical first principle; but we must also consider what other advantages or disadvantages this theory brings with it. Does the theory render illusory the soul's alleged intelligence? How can an entity dependent on other entities for the 'that' and also for the 'how' be called an 'intelligence'? According to Śaiva Siddhānta this is no problem, for the soul's activity while dependent in both these ways still leaves impressions which the soul in some way experiences. Not that anything in the system would prevent souls having such perceptions; and Siddhānta undeniably regards this sort of merely passive and completely formal intelligence as adequate for souls. This is shown by the discussion of the showing-and-seeing help Śiva gives in mukti (above VII.1c), which is presented as supreme perfection for the soul. Whether to rest content with such an intelligence for souls is clearly a matter of taste, but no offence could be taken at someone who considered it inadequate.

This theory of the soul's capacities being norm-free devalues its intelligence and also takes away its honourable status as an ethical personality. It is true that all souls can act in various contexts, that self-consciousness accompanies their every action, and that the results thereof are all put down to their account, and born by them; but an ethical personality requires more than that. By these statements Śaiva Siddhānta does not raise the soul above the ethical life of lower beings, which also are active, and in consequence receive impressions, and bear the consequences. A person is not considered fine and ethical just for putting up with whatever comes along, but if he takes full responsibility for his actions, by reference to standards of his own, whether of knowledge or decision; not he who is just pushed, but who proceeds of his own motion; not he who just accepts the labels 'good' and 'bad' which others stick on his deeds, but who himself imports those values into what he does.

It is claimed that every event relating to souls leaves an impression behind, whose consequences they experience either as three-fold karma or as Śiva's total bliss. This claim does not make the soul an ethical personality.

The doctrine of the soul's faculties being norm-free is itself a threat to the individuality of souls. Whatever detailed definition we may give to the concept of a person, it must include existing for-oneself. But this is precisely what the theory of norm-free faculties would destroy.

Two other doctrines have however often been overlooked. Souls are said always to tack on to something else; which would allow of their existing for-themselves. Souls are also said to assimilate to whatever they have tacked on to; which makes them a sort of pale reflection of their current exemplar, so they are there 'for-themselves', but only as a nonentity. They depend entirely on other substances, for any full and real life, and even then they have no say in the 'how', the character of this lively existence. This situation is clearly and suitably expressed by Śaiva Siddhānta's preferred name for souls in the sakala state, 'prisoners of the five senses' (i.e. of Matter), while those in śuddha-state are called 'Śiva's slaves'. Prisoners and slaves they are, always have been, always will be; but never free individuals. It is not easy to respect such creatures, or even to have sympathy for them.

Śaiva Siddhānta can thus reckon up the metaphysical costs and benefits of this doctrine that the soul's faculties are normless, as follows: (a) it means that the existence of souls does not resolve the problem about God being absolute and all Being unitary, but (b) it does not make that problem any worse. However (c) it also involves surrendering the worth attributed to souls, e.g. in the Christian scheme. That cost is surely high.

It is because of this personal worth that souls are usually thought higher than Matter; so robbing them of this is a particularly dangerous move for Śaiva Siddhānta as a religion. It is, of course, also responsible for the evolutionary theory, by which souls must accept lower ethics and lower religions as truth and as norms, blurring the boundaries between truth and lie, between good and evil. Here we will comment only on the value attached to the state of perfection; a value more evident when the end is reached than it was on the way there.

The religious ideal, for Śaiva Siddhānta, is the soul's complete surrender to God, a mystical and direct unity of souls with God. This ideal has impressed all the Eurpoeans who have studied the matter, deservedly. But a certain caution is required here.

Classifying mystics in general is difficult, and not our business here, but we may perhaps distinguish two main types. One type, found in such Christian mystics as Paul, John and Luther, starts by recognising a basic difference between God and the soul, which it then hopes to bridge, sweeping aside the line of division, by a process of righteous-making which takes the soul's responsibility for granted.

The second type of mysticism is found mainly in India, but also within Christianity (of a pantheistic slant). It regards God and soul as belonging together, by a likeness of natures. A third power has fractured this relation, or perhaps the soul never noticed it; and the real original situation is restored either by destroying that third power, or by enlightening the soul through instruction.

Śaiva Siddhānta clearly belongs to this second type. God and souls belong naturally together, in virtue of the advaita-relation. Not that they are equivalent; but not separate either, not different. Their belonging together is not evident, it is not experienced by souls, due to the three-fold Matter from which souls have always suffered through no fault of their own. The shackles which bind them to Matter have to be broken, so the link with God (which is real, for all that Matter could do) may enjoy its full rights, i.e. be felt and experienced by souls also.

How are souls to be set free from the shackles of Matter? By unleashing Matter on the soul, which has to be brought into very close contact with Matter and so profoundly touched by it as to turn away in revulsion. Various moral-sounding admonitions are no doubt given to encourage this process, but such ethical activity is valued only as hastening the entirely natural process of discarding Matter. Souls are not asked to change, or improve, they can stay as they are, provided they sunder connections with Matter; connections due to an unfortunate relation of nature, and for which no-one and nothing is responsible. Once Matter is put aside the union of the soul with God, which had always been there, is realised as a fact of experience, or will be when the needful instruction has been given to the soul.

God and souls do really and as a matter of natural fact belong together, a belonging which then needs to be realised and fully worked out, again by a process of development that is entirely natural. It is not as two ethical entities that God and the soul are inter-related. The soul does not indeed disappear, or get changed into God, but it has to give up all individuality, indeed all activity; so completely that it is not to experience final bliss for itself, but allow God to have that experience for it. Release is thus a state of total passivity. God and the soul become one, on the basis that the soul is a mere vessel. Now this total passivity makes it quite impossible to take that union as ethical in character.

Śaiva Siddhānta, then, has not achieved a genuine ethic. Moral

advice is found here and there, not however for ethical purposes, but to promote a natural process. The Siddhāntin scriptures glow with religious fervour, and the goal of union with God, to which they offer to guide us, is a religious one. For all this, Śaiva Siddhānta is not a living religion but only a natural philosophy which transposes all religious categories into metaphysical relationships. The reasons for this are to be found in the norm-free character of the soul's faculties; in the pluralism of substances from which the metaphysic began; and in those pantheistic tendencies from which it tried and failed to break free. The notion that the soul's faculties have no norms of their own will prevent the system from playing an independent role as a religion; while the basic principle of plurality of substances imposes a like limitation on it as a philosophy. Yet it deserves attention, for it will certainly influence the religious and philosophical future of India. It may even become as important for India as Neoplatonism was for the lands of the Mediterranean at the time of Gnosticism; with which quite fruitful comparisons could be made.

Tables

Table IV

HOW THE THREE-FOLD EVIL SHACKLES SOULS

EVILS	*shackling*	*SOULS*	*who live among (products of)*
Āṇava-mala		Vijñāna-kalar	Śuddha-Māyā
Āṇava-mala Karma-mala		Pralayā-kalar	Śuddha-Māyā Aśuddha-Māyā
Āṇava-mala Karma-mala Māyā-mala		Sakalar	Śuddha-Māya Aśuddha-Māyā Mūla-Prakṛiti[27]


These souls commit Āgāmya-karma (good and bad deeds); of which some get consumed (Prārabdha-Karma), and the rest remain for consumption later (Saṃcita-Karma): thus necessitating endless rebirths, as each consuming of Prārabdha-karma generates new Āgāmya-karma.

27. Mūla-prakṛiti itself derives from Aśuddha-Māyā.

Table V

THE THREE SUBSTANCES
AND THE TATTVAS

I. PATI
(God Śiva)



his ŚAKTI


icchā- \
kriyā- ....
jñāna- /

Śiva's FORMS

Śiva-Nāda
Śakti-Vindu
Sadāśiva
Māheśvara


Brahma
Vishṇu
Rudra

II. PAŚU
(souls)



Vijñāna-kalar
Pralayā-kalar
Sakalar

see next page


III. PAŚA
(Fetters, Evil)
Āṇava-mala
Karma-mala
Āgāmya-, Prārabdha-, Saṃcita-
Māyā-mala
Śuddha-Māyā
1. Nāda
2. Vindu
3. Sādākshya
4. Māheśvara
5. Śuddhavidyā
6. Aśuddha-Māyā
7. Kāla
8. Niyati
9. Kalā
10. Vidyā
11. Rāga
13. Citta .... 12. purusha
sattva-)
rajas-
tamas-)
Guṇas .... Mūla-prakṛiti
14. Buddhi
15. Ahaṃkāra
Taijasa
Vaikārika
Bhūtādika
16. manas
jnanendriya
(senses)
17. hearing
18. touch
19. sight
20. taste
21. smell
karmendriya
(organs)
22. mouth
23. foot
24. hand
25. anus
26. sexual
Tanmātra
(objects)
27. sound
28. feeling
29. form
30. taste
31. hearing
Bhūta
(elements)
32. ether
33. air
34. fire
35. water
36. earth

Scriptural Passages

(of three lines or more)

TRANSLATED IN THE TEXT

this book	*Bodha + comments*	*Siddhiār*	*others*[28]
ONE			
1.		Par(apaksha)	
		1-9, 15-18	
2.		Par 1-5	
3.	IV 2	II 79, 81, 84	
TWO			
1.	I	I 1-18	P-I 4
		Par 8, 9	Py IV 2-3
2.	I 3	I 34	
3.	VII 1	VII 1, 4	Py VIII 3
4.	I 2, 3	II 1	Py I 1, 6, 9
	X2	I 47	Pr I 5
6.	II 4	I 63	
7.		I 44-59	Pr 13

28. Ir(upā), Kr(Kroḍai), Pḍ (Paḍiār), Pr(ak:), Py(Payan), Ko(ḍikkavi), Ne (ñcuviḍutūtu), Uṇ (maineṛiviḷakka).

8.	II 1-3		Py I 8
9.	VI-VII	VI 5, 8	Pr 7
	V 2	167-70, II 1	Pḍ 87
THREE			
1.	IV 2, II 2	II 80, 84-5	Pr II 2, III 3-9
	V 1-2	II 87	Ir 4, Ko I
2.	II 2	II 4, 9-35, 40	Py IV 2, Kr 8-9
			Pr II 7, 11-13
3.	I 2, II 3	II 36, 53	Py II 71, Pr I 6
	VI, VII 2	I 1-29, 47	Pr 4-5, 7, 23
FOUR			
1.	III 1-7, IV 1		
2.			Py II 1
3.		IV 6-14, 18-20, 31	Ir 6
		V 3	Py II 7
4.	VII 4		Ir 3
FIVE			
1.		IV 37-8	
2.		IV 39	Pr I 6, II 2, 30
	IV 2	II 79-87	Kr 3
		II 51-2	
3.		II 36-7, 41-50	Kr 4-6
		II 89-96, IV 10	
4.	IV 3	IV 16-24, 32-6	Kr 7
5.	V9	I 20-3, II 54-70	
		V 2-8	Pr II 21-3, V1-3

6.		VI 1-5	Kr 8, Py IV 4-9
			Ne
7.		VIII 11, 19-21	

SIX

1.	VIII 1		Pḍ 16-25, Pr II 30
			Py VI 1
2.			Un 1-6
3.	VII 2	VIII 1	Kr 11, Pḍ 91, 96
	VIII 2-5, 28-30		Py V 3-9, VI 1-10
			Pr II 31, Ir 1
4.	VII 2, VIII 4	IX 2-3	Pḍ 32-4, Pr X 1
	IX 1-2, X 1		Py VII 2-4, 8-10
			Pr III 7, VIII 2
5.	X 2	VIII 10, 26	Pḍ 38-42
			Py VII 5-6, VIII 6
7.		XI 3-6	Pr X 9
8.		VIII 39	Ir 11, Pḍ 95
			Py VII 1
9.	IX 2-3	IX 7	Pḍ 26-8, 51-7
			Py VIII 10, IX 1-9

SEVEN

1.	X, XI	XI 9-11	Pr VIII 4-5,
			Pr IX 1-2, X2
	I 3	VIII 36	Py VIII 2-5, 9
2.	XII	VIII 31-35	Pḍ 66
			Py VIII 7, X 4, 9

Glossary

Abheda *not separate, non-different* 71
Abhisheka Dīkshā *ceremony for installing a guru* 285
Acit *non-spirit, matter* 46+ 93. 120+ 141
Adhikāra Dīkshā *authoritative instruction* 284
Adhikaraṇa *section, paragraph* 22
Adhvan *way; group* (6) *of Māyā-products* 122
Adhvan-mūrti *Śiva's 'body', i.e. everything* 65
Adṛishṭa *unseen power, due to earlier deeds; fate* 152
Advaita *non-dual, unity* 14 29 70 85
Agasamaya *inner* (*Śaivite*) *religion* 243
Ahaṃkāra *self-consciousness* (*tt* 15) 125 153 170 228. 335
Amūlamūla *rootless root* 153
Anbu (T) *love* 55 330
Aneka *more than one, many* 72
Anga *member* 49
A-nirvacana *not expressible in words* 82.
Angi *what anga belongs to* 48
Anna-maya-kośa *food-type cover, sheath* 127 213
Antar-yāga *inner sacrifice, offering* 16
Antaḥkaraṇa *inner organ* (*tt* 13-16) 125 170. 213. 227.
Artha-Adhvan *objective Adhvan* 122
Aruḷ (T) *grace* 18 55. 261+
Aruḷ-śakti *kindly śakti* 61 138
Asat *not-being; not-being-sat* 45 78. 140+ 297
Aśuddha-Māyā *impure Māyā* (*tt* 6) 121 129 135

---

tt tattva
. and on the next few pages
+ and on many other pages
T Tamil (most are Sanskrit)

Bhūtādika-Ahaṃkāra *'I' as origin of elements* 125
Buddhi *concept-faculty* (*tt* 14) 46 125 170 228 334

Caitanya *spirituality* 268
Caryā *pious service* (*bottom step*) 243. 339+
Caryā-Kāṇḍa *liturgical part of Ágama* 13
Cit *intellect, spirit* 46+ 120 140+
Cit-Śakti 183
Citacit *cit-and-not, divine-cum-material* 197 348
Citta *attender, noticer* (*tt* 13) 125 169 227 335+

Dāsa-mārga *way of a servant* 243
Dharma *rule, duty* 250
Dīkshā *consecration, preparation* 284
Dvaita *duality, dualism* 72

Eka *one* 72.
Ekamevādvityam *one thing only, no second* 155

Guru *worthy person, esp. teacher* 22 248 263.
Guru-darśana *guru appearing, teaching* 261.
Guṇa *property, attribute* 49. 81 153 297
Guṇa-śarīra *one of soul's five bodies* 127 210
Guṇi *what a guṇa belongs to* 82 90 98

Icchā *wish, desire; soul's faculty of* 135 221
Icchā-Śakti *Śiva's desiring power* 61+ 134 247 320
Inbu (T) *bliss, happiness* 330
Indriya *organ* 235
Irupā = Irupā-virupathu
Iruvineioppu (T) *deeds 'all same'* 203 247. 328 339
Īśa *lord, master* (*Śiva*) 86 139

Jāgara-atītā-Avasthā *desire-free state* 367
Jāgara-Avasthā *being awake* 214
Jīva *life, individual soul* 46
Jīvan-mukta *one set free in this life* 21 266 357 365.
Jñān-endriya *sense-organs* (*tt* 71-21) 125 153 214 227
Jñāna *knowing* 79 252+
Jñāna *soul's faculty of knowledge* 79 221 317 369

Māheśvara (*tt* 4) 67 122 135
Mānasa-Dīkshā *instruction grasped from senses* 284
Mānasa-pūjā *worship in-the-mind* 16
Māyā *skill, magic; cause of world* 34. 93 192 320+
Māyeya *product of Māyā* 121 164 202 317 325+
Mohini *Vishṇu as woman* (*i.e. Aśuddha-Māyā*) 210
Moksha *getting free, freeing* 19 24 257
Mukta *one set free* 334
Mukti *freeing, release* 64 257 287 345+
Mūla-dhāra *top base, a seat of soul in body* 214
Mūla-mala *chief evil* 93
Mūla-prakṛiti *matter, chaotically* 119. 136+

Nāda *loud sound* (*tt* 1) 66 122 135 230 334
Naimittika *caused, occasioned* 284
Nayana-Dīkshā *guided by the eye* 284
Nir-guṇa Sa-Suṇa *without with qualities, attribute-free* 54. 296
Nir-vacana *needing explanation* 31 79
Nirādhikāra-Dīkshā *instruction without authority* 284
Nirādhāra-yoga *yoga unbased, direct* 251 330
Nirpīsa-Dīkshā *incomplete instruction* 284
Nirvāṇa *emptiness, release* 351
Niyati *fixed order of things* (*tt* 8) 124 228

Om *Sacred syllable* 335

Paḍiār = Tirukkaliṛṛuppaḍiār
Paisanti-vac *sound from chest or lungs* 231
Pañcakañcuka *five-fold garment* (*tt* 7-11) 228
Pañcākshara *five-syllable* (*a prayer*) 164 333.
Parā-Śakti *Śakti not yet gone forth from Śiva* 61 257
Para-Śiva *Śiva transcendent* 61
Para-mukta *one fully released* 357.
Para-paksha *their-side* (*Siddhiār, first part*) 23
Para-śarīra *spiritual body* 170 232
Para-tantra *depending on another* 56
Para-vaśa *dependent on another's will* 56
Pāśa *shackle, fetter* 19 37 93 141 168 184
Pāśa-jñāna *knowledge of matter* 78 141. 183 286 345+
Paśu *cow, individual soul* 19 37 43 141

Satasat *being-and-not, partly both* 178
Satguru *real true guru* 262
Sattva *good,* gentle (guṇa 1) 53 125 153
Sādākshya *quick* (*tt* 3)*; power to arise* 66 122 135 230
Sādhana *means, needful, requirement* 32 248 304 336
Sādhanaviyal *way* 23
Sālokya *his-place* (*Śiva's heaven*) 249
Sāmīpya *being-near-Śiva* (*after Kriyā-stage*) 244
Sārūpya *appearing like* (*Śiva*)*, after Yoga-stage* 244
Siddha *seer, finisher* 21
Siddhānta *ultimate aim, final statement, result* 1+
Smārta *based on tradition, ancient* 14
Smṛiti *tradition held authoritative* (*not Śruti*) 18 286
Soma *juice, as offering* 15
Sparśa-Dīkshā *instruct by touch* 284
Sthūla-śarīra *gross, weighty body* 127 208+ 227+
Sushupti *deep sleep* 217
Sūkshma-śarīra *subtle-body* 127 139 166 175 206+
Sūkshma-vāc *fine* (*soft*) *sound* 232
Sūtra *brief doctrinal statement* 22
Sva-paksha *our-side,* (*Siddhiār, last part*) 23
Sva-tantra *independence* 56
Svapna *sleep, dream* 218
Śabda-Adhvan *mental object* 122
Śabda-Prapañca *thought-world* 123
Śaiva *connected with Śiva* 1
Śakti *Śiva's power* 11 56. 202. 255 341+
Śaktini-pāta *descent of Śakti* 19 247 255 339
Śaṃkara *well-doing, beneficent* (*Śiva*) 55 76
Śāstra *instruction, textbook* 9 31
Śāstra-Dīkshā *philosophical instruction* 284
Śiva *kind, friendly* (*as name of God*)
Śiva-bhoga *enjoying Śiva, in complete union* 260
Śiva-darśana *knowledge of Śiva* 259
Śiva-jñāna *knowledge of Śiva via his Śakti* 20 78
Śiva-loka *Śiva's heaven* 244
Śiva-rūpa *known in his immanent form* 259
Śiva-yoga *being sub-merged in him* 259 331.
Śuddha-Māyā *pure Māyā* 66 121+
Śuddhāśuddha *pure & impure* 121 129 139 214

Vindu or Bindu *drop, point* (*tt* 2) 66 122 135 230
Viśesha-Dīkshā *rite introducing to mysteries* 284
Vyāpaka *what pervades* 58 183
Vyāpti *extending everywhere* 183 192
Vyāpya *what gets pervaded* 58 183

Yoga *absorption* 32 64 215 339
Yoga-Dīkshā *instruction in Yoga* 284
Yoga-kāṇḍa *yoga-part of Āgana* 13
Yoga-stages *three stages in Siddhānta* 244
Yogi *one who practices yoga* 63. 88 213 330

Index

Śaivite sects (ending -śaiva) and other schools (-vāda) are listed on p. 3; Śaivite scriptures (-āgama) on p. 14.

and on the next page or two
+ and on many other pages